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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a philosophical exposition of violence informed by two theoretical positions which confront 
complexity as a phenomenon. These positions are complexity theory and deconstruction. Both develop systems-
based understandings of complex phenomena in which relations of difference are constitutive of the meaning of 
those phenomena. There has been no focused investigation of the implications of complexity for the 
conceptualisation of violence thus far. In response to this theoretical gap, this thesis begins by distinguishing 
complexity theory as a general, trans-disciplinary field of study from critical complexity theory. The latter is 
used to develop a critique and criticism of epistemological foundationalism, emphasising the limits to knowledge 
and the normative and ethical dimension of knowledge and understanding. The epistemological break implied by 
this critique reiterates the epistemological shift permeating the work of, among others, Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Jacques Derrida. In this context, critical complexity theory begins to articulate the idea of violence on two levels: 
first, as an empirical, ethical problem in the system; and, secondly, as asymmetry and antagonism. Violence in 
this second sense is implicated in the dynamic relations of difference through which structure and meaning are 
generated in complex organisation. The sensitivity to difference and violence shared by critical complexity 
theory and deconstruction allows for the parallel reading of these philosophical perspectives; and for the 
supplementation and opening of critical complexity theory by deconstruction within the architecture of this 
thesis. This supplementation seeks to preserve the singularity of each perspective, while exploring the potential 
of their points of affinity and tension in the production of a coherent philosophical analysis of violence. 
Deconstruction offers a more developed understanding of violence and a wealth of related motifs: différance, 
framing, law, singularity, aesthetics and others. These motifs necessitate the inclusion of other philosophical 
voices, notably, that of Nietzsche, Arendt, Kant, Levinas, and Benjamin. In conversation with these authors, this 
thesis links violence to meaning, to its possibility, to its production and to the process by which meaning comes 
to change. Given these links, violence is conceptualised in relation to the notion of difference on three distinct 
levels. The first is the difference between elements in a complex system of meaning; the second is the notion of 
difference between systems or texts around which boundaries or frames can be drawn; and the third is the notion 
of difference between meaning and the absence of meaning. This discussion examines the relationship between 
this violence implicated in the constitution of meaning and the more colloquial understanding of violence as 
atrocity, as rape, murder and other socially, politically and ethically problematic expressions thereof. It is to 
empirical violence, following Derrida and Levinas, that we are called to respond and to intervene in the suffering 
of the other. The ethical and political necessity of response anchors this discussion of violence. And, it is 
towards the possibility of an adequate response – the possibility of an ethics sensitive to its own violence and a 
politics that is directed at the eradication of empirical violence – which this discussion navigates. 
 
iii 
 
OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis is ’n filosofiese uiteensetting van geweld wat deur twee denkwyses ingelig word wat kompleksiteit 
as fenomeen konfronteer. Hierdie denkwyses is kompleksiteitsteorie en dekonstruksie. Altwee ontwikkel 
sisteemgebaseerde verduidelikings van komplekse fenomene waar verhoudings van verskille die betekenis van 
hierdie fenomene beslaan. Daar is tot dusver nog geen gefokusde ondersoek na die implikasies van kompleksiteit 
vir die konsepsualisering van geweld nie. As antwoord op hierdie teoretiese leemte, begin hierdie tesis deur 
kompleksiteitsteorie as ’n algemene, trans-dissiplinêre studierigting van kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie te 
onderskei. Laasgenoemde word gebruik om kritiese denke van epistemologiese grondslae te ontwikkel, en 
beklemtoon die perke op kennis en die normatiewe en etiese aspek van kennis en verstaan. Die epistemologiese 
verwydering wat deur hierdie kritiek geïmpliseer word, herhaal die epistemologiese verskuiwing wat die werk 
van onder andere Friedrich Nietzsche en Jacques Derrida, deurdring. In hierdie konteks begin kritiese 
kompleksiteitsteorie om die konsep van geweld op twee vlakke te verwoord: eerstens as ’n empiriese, etiese 
probleem in die stelsel en tweedens as asimmetrie en antagonisme. Geweld in die tweede opsig word in die 
dinamiese verhoudings van verskil geïmpliseer, waar struktuur en betekenis in komplekse organisasie 
gegenereer word. Die sensitiwiteit vir verskil en geweld wat deur kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie en dekonstruksie 
gedeel word neem parallelle lesings van hierdie filosofiese perspektiewe in ag; sowel as die aanvulling en 
oopmaak van kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie deur dekonstruksie binne die struktuur van hierdie tesis. Hierdie 
aanvulling wil die enkelvoudigheid van elke perspektief bewaar, terwyl dit die potensiaal van hul punte van 
verwantskap en spanning in die produksie van ’n koherente filosofiese analise van geweld verken. Dekonstruksie 
bied ’n meer ontwikkelde verstaan van geweld en ’n rykdom van verwante motiewe: différance, beraming, wet, 
enkelvoudigheid, estetika en ander. Hierdie motiewe noodsaak die insluiting van ander filosofiese stemme, soos 
Nietzsche, Arendt, Kant, Levinas en Benjamin. Hierdie tesis tree in gesprek met hierdie skrywers en skakel 
geweld aan betekenis, aan die moontlikheid, aan die produksie en aan die proses waardeur betekenis na 
verandering lei. Gegewe hierdie skakels, word geweld in verhouding tot die begrip van verskil op drie spesifieke 
vlakke gekonsepsualiseer. Die eerste is die verskil tussen elemente in ’n komplekse stelstel van betekenis; die 
tweede is die begrip van verskil tussen stelsels of tekste waar grense of rame om getrek kan word; en die derde is 
die begrip van verskil tussen betekenis en die afwesigheid van betekenis. Hierdie bespreking stel ondersoek in na 
die verhouding tussen hierdie geweld wat in die  samestelling van betekenis geïmpliseer word en die meer 
alledaagse verstaan van geweld as wreedardigheid, as verkragting, moord en ander maatskaplike, politiese en 
etiese problematiese uitdrukkings daarvan. Ons word geroep om op empiriese geweld, in navolging van Derrida 
en Levinas, te reageer en in te gryp om die lyding van ander te keer. Die etiese en politiese noodsaaklikheid van 
reaksie dien as grondslag vir hierdie bespreking van geweld. Uiteindelik beweeg hierdie bespreking nader aan 
die moontlikheid van ’n voldoende reaksie – die moontlikheid van ’n etiek wat sensitief vir sy eie geweld is en 
’n politiek wat op die uitwis van empiriese geweld gerig is.  
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INTRODUCTION: CRITICAL COMPLEXITY THEORY, DECONSTRUCTION AND VIOLENCE 
I. VIOLENCE AND THE COMPLEX SYSTEM  
Where to begin a philosophical discussion of violence seems an impossible decision in light of the sheer 
vastness, pervasiveness and diversity of atrocity in the history of humanity. Violence is not confined to 
deliberate acts of overt cruelty – rape, murder, torture, genocide – but can be present even in the most intimate 
and caring engagements: in the reproachful eye of a mother; in the smothering expectation of a family; in the 
structuring of a well-ordered society; and in the promulgation of categories that make sense of our world – of 
race, class, gender and others. To begin a litany of violence is an impossible task. One would need to offer 
explanations of each of the unthinkable list of human atrocity between persons, between groups and in human 
engagement with animals and the natural world, while simultaneously engaging every possible theoretical tool in 
the pursuit of the perfect lens through which to view this terrible terrain. The impossibility of this task must be 
acknowledged before this project can begin. Given the overwhelming territory through which an exposition of 
violence must navigate, Beatrice Hanssen (2000: 9) argues that an attempt to begin to articulate the meaning of 
violence must confine itself to a certain perspective for which the context and application must be made explicit, 
its limitations must be made transparent. It should not present itself as a final and consummate explanation. In 
terms of this particular project, violence is examined as a general philosophical, ethical and political problem, for 
human beings in a social system, where individuals, socials systems and the environments in which they 
organise themselves are considered as complex, dynamic and interrelated systems of meaning. In this 
investigation, the relationship between meaning and violence is a significant theme to which permeates the entire 
discussion. 
The model of complex systems used in this thesis draws on the respective works of Edgar Morin (1983a; 1983b; 
1992; 2005; 2007) and Paul Cilliers (1998a; 2000a; 2000c; 2001; 2002; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2006)1This model 
is a means of understanding the world and of interrogating the act of understanding itself. This project follows 
the theoretical trail via Morin (1992: 99) and Cilliers (1998a: 37-44), through to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1983) 
systems-based understanding of meaning, to Jacques Derrida’s (1997) poststructuralist engagement with 
Saussure’s difference-oriented thinking. Two texts frame the engagement between complexity theory and 
deconstruction. The first is Derrida’s (2001: 351-370) Signature, Event, Context in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences in which systems-based structure, particularly dynamic and ‘complex’ structure, is addressed. The 
                                                      
1 The texts listed in this reference represent Paul Cilliers’ complexity-centred texts that inform the general characterisation 
of critical complexity theory in chapter 1. Other of Cilliers’ – own and co-authored – texts are used; however, this initial 
selection covers central concepts and ideas. See the reference list for full details. 
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second text, Of Grammatology (Derrida 1997), is Derrida’s most explicit engagement with systems thinking, the 
general structures of meaning, and with Saussure. These two texts reach out in the direction of Saussure and 
structuralist thinking, on one reading, and also relate to the wider corpus of deconstruction as a body of texts. 
They function, therefore, as a philosophical bridge between two distinct theoretical topographies. 
Deconstruction is used to enrich the understanding of the complex system, particularly with reference to human 
social systems. Derrida’s (1998: 9) and Elizabeth Grosz’s (1998)2 assertions of the pervasive concern with and 
for violence throughout Derrida’s texts, provide a further motivation for including deconstruction in this 
discussion. It is argued in chapter 1 that critical complexity theory begins a conversation on violence without 
developing it into a full and explicit engagement. However, because of the relationship between critical 
complexity theory and deconstruction, the latter can be used to incite this development. If critical complexity 
theory is to be applied to social systems, then this development is imperative.  
This work is a philosophical exploration of violence and complexity. The central line of argumentation in this 
project can be formulated in two ways. The first is this: empirical violence – violence that causes harm or 
suffering – is a problem in the world that requires a response; it is a problem for which theoretical insights from 
critical complexity theory and other complexity-informed philosophies offer an interesting and ethically and 
politically significant frame through which to understand it. This formulation captures the central thrust of this 
philosophical exposition. However, at the same time as being focused on the phenomenon of violence, this 
project is equally directed at exploring complexity theory and framing complexity itself as a problem to be 
confronted. That is, to interrogate the notion of complexity as a problem in the context of 
philosophical/theoretical projects – such as this one – that aim to clarify concepts such as violence with an eye to 
putting them into operation, of applying them in order to understand social reality. A second formulation of the 
central concern of this philosophical project would thus be: the acknowledgement of complexity, as it is 
confronted in critical complexity theory and deconstruction, has consequences for the way we understand the 
world; its acknowledgement thus also affects the way we understand violence in the world, which must be 
rethought in this new light.  
The possibility that the central thesis has two distinct formulations can be explained with reference to complexity 
itself. In order to deal with violence and/of/in the complex system, as a ‘part’ of the system, one must approach 
the relationship between violence and the complex system as one would the relationship between the internal 
organisation of the system and the emergent system as a whole. This latter relationship is one of mutual 
                                                      
2 Grosz (1998) develops this argument throughout her article, The Time of Violence; Deconstruction and Value, and, as 
such, the merit of her assertion is investigated and affirmed with reference to several of Derrida’s texts in chapters 3, 4 and 
5.  
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constitution (Morin 1992: 103, 110-111; 2005: 10). Relations at a ‘lower’ level of organisation generate general 
‘higher’ level emergent structures; and the emergent whole acts back onto the internal relations through which it 
is constituted. The exposition of violence and the complex system thus requires that the general understanding of 
the system developed here is used to inform the discussion of violence in the system and vice versa. Our 
understanding of violence also informs our understanding of the system.  
In order to set the stage for this process, this introduction offers an initial clarification of complexity and 
complex systems. It positions critical complexity theory in a relationship with deconstruction and introduces the 
philosophical perspectives that are used to supplement and complement these forms of complexity thinking. An 
initial sketch of the understanding of violence developed in this project is given in anticipation of the 
forthcoming five chapters. And, finally, the overall structure of this project is addressed and an indication of the 
conclusions toward which the argument develops is given, in order to orient the discussion that follows.  
II. COMPLEXITY AND THE COMPLEX SYSTEM  
A starting point in terms of the definition3 of complexity is that it is a property of phenomena that cannot be 
simplified in order to produce a perfect description of those phenomena (Cilliers 2005b: 608). Complexity is 
“woven together” (Morin 2005: 6). It emerges where the relationships between components in an organisation, 
between these components and the organisation as a whole, and between a phenomenon and its environment 
cannot be understood simply by analysing either the parts or the whole in isolation. Complexity is not stored in 
one part of an organisation of elements. It emerges in the process of self-organisation of these elements and 
involves the productive interplay of order and disorder (Morin 1992: 150). Complex phenomena or complex 
systems cannot be given consummate descriptions and resist all modes of understanding that simplify by means 
of analysis (reduction of the meaning of the system to its parts) and generalisation (reduction of internal 
differences to allow for the appearance of identity between unlike objects) (9-10).  
Having announced the impossibility of reducing complexity in order to understand complex phenomena, a fold 
must be inserted. Complex phenomena cannot be known in their complexity. However, simplification is 
necessary for understanding to take place. However, given the resistance of complex phenomena to 
simplification, a paradox arises. Complex phenomena cannot be reduced if they are to be understood in their 
complexity; complex phenomena cannot be known in their complexity and must be simplified in order to enable 
understanding (Cilliers 2005b: 137-138). Models that enable the understanding of complex phenomena reduce 
the complexity of the phenomena being observed. Therefore, although models of complex systems can be useful 
and produce important insights, they are inherently limited in their ability to deliver perfect knowledge. 
                                                      
3 The term ‘definition’ is used strategically here. It is intended to refer to the meaning of complexity; however, the rigidity 
and finality of a definition is problematic within critical complexity theory for reasons that are discussed in chapter 1. 
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Models of complex systems must be distinguished from complex things in the world. Models are attempts to 
understand complex phenomena in a way that is sensitive to the paradoxical character of this understanding. The 
shift from an atomistic mode of analysis towards a systems-based understanding is fundamental to complexity-
informed thinking. This shift grasps complexity as complexus, as interrelation between components within the 
whole (Morin 2005: 6). Both Cilliers (1998a: 38-44) and Morin (1992: 99), in developing their particular models 
of complex systems, look to Saussure’s (1983: 67) system of meaning as a starting point. What is significant 
about Saussure’s (65-67) model of language in this context is that it makes a crucial shift from attributing the 
meaning of signs to a self-enclosed, natural essence in the sign itself, to thinking of meaning as the result of an 
arbitrary system of relationships of difference between signs. Using Saussure’s (1983) system, complexity 
theory emphasises and values difference and diversity in complex organisation. 
The model of the complex system that is employed here is informed, primarily, by Cilliers’ (1998a: 3-5) general 
characterisation of the system that draws on Saussure, other forms of systems thinking, and Derrida’s 
poststructuralist reading of Saussure. This characterisation, explored in chapter 1 and chapter 3, frames this 
entire project. It is developed and supplemented throughout the discussion and exposition of violence in the 
system. However, the discussion is constructed on this frame.  
Morin (1992: 150), after a detailed exposition of and investment in the idea of the system as the most appropriate 
means of understanding complex phenomena, inserts an important qualification with respect to the status of the 
system. He (150) argues that the system has the same epistemological status as any other model. That is to say 
that it cannot be metaphysically grounded. As a result, the complex system is always still provisional and subject 
to change and development, and, if necessary and when appropriate, it should be dropped. The appropriateness 
of the complex system as a model depends on the particular phenomenon under investigation, the context in 
which it is understood, and the motivation for this understanding (Cilliers 2000c: 32). For example, in certain 
situations a novel could teach us more about a country than a high-level model of the systemic relations between 
citizens and inhabitants. It is the position of this philosophical investigation that Nietzsche (1909; 2000; 2006) 
and other ‘grammatologists’,4 Levinas (1979; 1986; 1989), Kafka (1948) and Zizek (2007; 2008) and many 
others, treat complex phenomena with sensitivity to their complexity without making explicit use of systems-
based models. The complex system is merely one aid in the meaningful confrontation with complex phenomena. 
The insights it manages to deliver – such as the fundamental nature of difference in the system or the deep 
significance of relations between elements in an organisation – remain useful and important. The system is a 
useful epistemological tool in the context of this project and, as such, will be employed and developed 
throughout chapters 1 to 5. 
                                                      
4 Chapter 2 clarifies the meaning of grammatological thinking. It is the philosophical attempt to think about structure as a 
dynamic organisation of elements without a centre from which that organisation is ordered (see Derrida 2001: 351-370 and 
Spivak 1997: ix–lxxxvii). 
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There is tension between a general theory of complexity that seeks to be relevant and applicable across many 
fields of intellectual endeavour, and the sensitivity to singular complex systems. This tension cannot be resolved. 
The development of a general model of complex systems will always be challenged by the recognition of 
complexity as challenge to generalisation as a form of reduction. Descriptions on a general level cannot provide 
a full and rich understanding of a particular system without developing that description in a specific application. 
And, conversely, descriptions on a local level may have a limited capacity to be generalised at a global level. 
Using only a general, high level model of the complex systems and applying it directly to in order to understand 
specific complex phenomena such as a particular linguistic or political or economic system, cannot tell us 
everything about that particular system. Every application of the complex system requires its reinvention in this 
sense. The characterisation of the system is, therefore, developed with the specific aim of providing an 
understanding of violence.  
III. CRITICAL COMPLEXITY THEORY: THINKING STRUCTURE WITHOUT AN ORIGIN 
Complexity theory is developed in many ways in different disciplines toward different ends. This thesis 
identifies a specific kind of complexity theory with which other philosophical perspectives can engage 
productively. Critical complexity theory is a variant of complexity theory that encompasses the respective work 
of both Cilliers and Morin. It is distinguished from other reductive forms of complexity theory, complexity 
science and chaos theory. The distinction between critical complexity theory and other engagements with 
complexity is informed by a distinction between general complexity and restricted complexity, respectively, 
made by Morin (2005). Theories that work with restricted complexity maintain that high level complexity can be 
explained by simple, general, underlying principles (9, 10). General complexity, in contrast, is an understanding 
of complexity as an emergent property of organisation that cannot be reduced to simple principles. This 
understanding of complexity confronts the paradox of reduction opened by complexity. In this confrontation, the 
epistemological foundations of thinking are questioned and rethought.  
As an initial characterisation, one could say that critical complexity theory is a variant of complexity thinking 
that tries to account for the epistemological consequences of the acknowledgement of complexity in the process 
of modelling complex phenomena. It introduces an element of radical – fundamental in the sense that it speaks to 
the foundations of knowledge – uncertainty into every act of understanding. If knowledge cannot be ultimately 
grounded, and, therefore, cannot be known with absolute certainty, then there must necessarily always be an 
element of normativity involved in choosing to affirm particular forms of knowledge over others. Only perfect 
knowledge is given. Contingent, contextual knowledge must selected or chosen. The element of choice, of 
normativity in knowledge, leads critical complexity theory to embrace the ethics of knowledge. Critical 
complexity theory espouses an inescapable responsibility for how one knows the world. 
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The understanding of critical complexity theory is further developed by contextualising its epistemological 
gesture within a general philosophical movement away from the grounding of knowledge in metaphysical 
origins/foundations/principles. Critical complexity theory must be drawn into an engagement with its precursors 
who began to think of the organisation of thought and of the world – the object of thought – as a dynamic self-
organising system without a first mover, maker, proper origin or intelligent centre (Derrida 2001: 351; Morin 
2005). Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences (Derrida 2001: 351) emphasises two 
major theoretical shifts that, together, bring about an epistemological cleavage. The first is the shift from the 
analysis of objects to the understanding of systems. The second shift abandons the endeavour to stabilise and fix 
the relationships in system. This double shift opens a space in which the encounter between critical complexity 
theory and deconstruction can unfold. 
IV. READING DECONSTRUCTION AS COMPLEXITY THINKING 
The structure of the exposition of deconstruction as a form of complexity thinking carried out in chapter 2 
repeats the structure of the discussion of critical complexity thinking in chapter 1. Although the language, 
references and nuances are different, this structure is used to draw attention to four significant points of affinity 
between these distinct theoretical endeavours. The first is that both critical complexity thinking and 
deconstruction stand in contradistinction with theories or ways of thinking – whether systems-based or not – that 
are anchored within a modernist thought paradigm, or what Derrida recognises as the metaphysics of presence 
(Spivak 1997: lviii). The second point of congruence is that both deconstruction and critical complexity theory 
attempt to provide a framework in which complex phenomena can be understood without destroying or ignoring 
the implications of complexity as discussed above.  
The affinity between deconstruction and complexity theory is proposed by Cilliers in Complexity and 
Postmodernism (1998a: 80-86). His (1998a: 3-5) model of complex systems in terms of ten general 
characteristics is developed in conversation with Derrida’s différance – difference that unfolds in time and space. 
In attempting to develop their respective understandings of complex phenomena, both critical complexity theory 
and deconstruction sketch general conditions of the emergence of meaning. For the former, this explication is 
crystallised in Morin’s characterisation of complexity5 and Cilliers’ (1998a: 3-5) ten characteristics of complex 
systems. For Derrida, these general conditions of understanding are characterised by a chain of supplemental 
concepts to which Rudolph Gasché (1994: 4-7) refers as the “infrastructures” of sense. The chain of 
infrastructures is always open to further supplementation. Included in it are: différance, trace, space, supplement, 
parergon and graft (Derrida 1981b: 40; Spivak 1997: lxx). Each of the aforementioned concepts is discussed in 
chapter 2 and used to enrich and complement the model of the complex system in chapter 3, in anticipation of a 
                                                      
5 See Dobuzinskis’ article, Where is Morin’s Road to Complexity Going?(2004: 436-438), for a concise description of 
Morin’s characterisation of complexity. It is discussed and expanded in chapter 1. 
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focused exposition of violence in this system. These general structural features of meaning in the complex 
system are offered in the absence of an origin and not as a replacement for the origin. Their status, like that of 
the system in critical complexity theory, is not that of a metaphysical certainty (Derrida 1992a: 70, 71). 
The third affinity between deconstruction and critical complexity theory is the centrality of the notion of 
difference in the system and the significance of relations between elements in the emergence of the system as a 
whole. To say that difference is fundamental appears to contradict the assertion that complexity thinking – 
critical complexity theory and deconstruction – moves beyond origins and foundations. However, it should be 
borne in mind that the foundation offered by complexity thinking is one of dynamic difference. Because it is 
dynamic, it cannot really ground anything (Morin 1992: 143). If the base is complex, it cannot authorise or 
justify any simplification (147). That being said, the complexity of the base frustrates the attempts to provide a 
final and consummate description of a complex phenomenon while enabling the emergence of rigorous, 
provisional and contextual understanding. The structure that can be read in the complex system and in the 
description of meaning in Of Grammatology (Derrida 1997) has an inside – internal difference – and a boundary 
– differences that distinguish one system from another – and an outside – difference that is not incorporated 
within the system. The repetition of this structure is the fourth significant affinity between these two iterations of 
complexity thinking, and informs the architecture of their meeting in this project. 
Beyond the worth of Derrida’s (1997) infrastructural tools in the development of the structure of complex 
organisation, deconstruction is strategically valuable because it navigates far beyond this structural modelling 
and initiates discussions of philosophical texts and motifs and political problems that are not explored in critical 
complexity theory. Deconstruction’s sensitivity to complexity does not always involve the adherence to a 
poststructural/infrastructural systems-based model. Every engagement with a complex phenomenon necessitates 
a concomitant sensitivity to its singularity and to its unique context and to the appropriateness of a particular 
style, level of description and content. Deconstruction is used to supplement the discussion of complexity with 
the intention that the affinities demonstrated between it and critical complexity theory will allow the latter to be 
opened by the encounter. While the model of complex systems developed in chapter 1 forms the general 
structure of the this project, deconstruction completes this structure by adding the vocabulary and content 
necessary for the development of model of complexity that is appropriate to the discussion of violence. 
V. VIOLENCE RECOGNISED AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM  
There is an awareness of violence as a problem within critical complexity theory. This problem is examined with 
particular attention given to its relation to the processes by which the world comes to be meaningful to us. Morin 
(1992: 3; 2007: 4) laments the “mutilation” of understanding and of concepts that carve away at the phenomena 
that they are intended to elucidate in the process of this elucidation. The light of knowledge, it appears, blinds us 
to its cruelty. He (1992: 3) goes on to argue that understanding the world in a way that mutilates and 
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misrepresents it without acknowledging the inherent error of this understanding leads to more overtly mutilating 
actions that are grounded in these misunderstandings. Cilliers (1998a: 107) suggests something similar when he 
argues that modest thinking or theories – ones inherently sensitive to their own limitations and to their violence – 
are trampled by boldly self-assured theories. Violence is conceptualised as a problem because it leads to 
misunderstanding and empirical harm and suffering in the world. 
There is another distinct understanding of violence that emerges in complexity thinking. Morin (1992: 116-120) 
describes it as an antagonistic dynamic organisation that structures relations in the complex system. This 
conceptualisation of violence as antagonism is not a conception of violence that is bad, evil or wrong in the sense 
that violence is understood colloquially. It is, rather, a violence to be juxtaposed to the peaceful, natural, static 
order that is ordained by nature, god, absolute truth or some manner of fixed foundation. Complex organisation 
emerges out of polemical differentiation in the system (Derrida 1982: 8). Cilliers (1998a: 95, 120, 124) develops 
an analogous concept named ‘asymmetry’. These corresponding understandings of violence require 
philosophical exposition and an explication of their ethical and political implications. Derrida’s (1998: 9) 
pervasive concern with violence in his texts is more overtly developed but requires clarity and cohesion. Both 
critical complexity theory and deconstruction have breadth for expansion in this direction. It is in response to 
these theoretical lacunae, this potential for development, that violence is addressed here as a principal concern in 
the complex system in need of its own conceptual investigation.6 
VI. THREE LEVELS OF VIOLENCE IN THE COMPLEX SYSTEM  
The structure of complex violence that is elaborated in the course of this analysis is a three-tiered organisation 
that corresponds to each of the regions of complex organisation in the general structure of the system: the inside, 
the boundary, and the outside of the system. This discussion engages with each site of violence as a ‘level’. It is 
a useful word, but the definitive separation between regions of organisation implied by ‘level’ is problematic 
because of its disagreement with the importance of interrelation in complex organisation. There is no more 
appropriate term than ‘level’ and so it is used under erasure, as it were. More considered attention is directed at 
this quandary when it is presented. The three levels of violence develop from Derrida’s (1997: 112) 
deconstruction of the opposition between speech and violence and its corollary, the association between writing 
and violence, to construct a frame on which to build the analysis of violence. The first two levels of violence are 
associated with the possibility of meaning and the understanding thereof. These forms of violence, like Morin’s 
                                                      
6 In On Violence, Hannah Arendt (1970: 8) expresses a concern that analyses of violence often address it as a marginal 
phenomenon in relation to politics or war, and in so doing, fail to develop a clear understanding thereof. She (8) insists that 
it is a problem worthy of its own treatment. This project attempts, given Arendt’s important precedent, to focus on violence 
rather than politics, war, the law or any other concern, though these topics must inevitably be addressed. 
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(1992: 3; 2007: 4) mutilation, are implicated in the way we know and interact with people and objects in the 
world.  
The first of these ‘levels’ or modes of violence is the violence of nomination, which permeates the internal 
relations of the complex system. The first level of violence destroys the unity and purity of an object by drawing 
it into a general system of meaning (Derrida 1997: 112). It compromises the uniqueness or singularity of an 
object or subject. It engenders dynamic and ‘différantial’ play, antagonism and asymmetrical relations between 
elements in this system (Cilliers 1998a: 95; 120; 124; Derrida 1982: 8; Morin 1992: 119). In generating this 
violent destruction of unity and self-identity, a second reparatory violence is required to restore the unity of an 
identity, to stabilise and to fix relations and to make them understandable (Derrida 1997: 112). This second 
violence is the violence of the boundary or the frame. Its most overt manifestation is in the law that orders 
society. It imposes a certain order onto the field of play. This order is both productive and enabling and it is 
constraining (Cilliers 2005b: 611). It can also be harmful where the order imposed in a system is oppressive or 
exploitative.  
When this harm emerges, we are no longer dealing with the violence only of meaning, but with violence as an 
empirical occurrence that produces suffering in the world. The third level of violence, empirical violence, is the 
most important of the three levels of violence. It includes the harm that is produced in the production of meaning 
and also other atrocities such as war, rape and murder (Derrida 1997: 112). The meaning of empirical violence 
must be robust enough to hold as diverse a range of cruelty as sexist slurs and genocide, to be generally 
understandable and able to articulate the singularity of an event. The conceptualisation of empirical violence, 
indeed, of all three levels of violence and the relation of each of these modes of violence to the other two, is a 
considerable task, but it is one that demands doing.  
VII. THE STRUCTURE 
a.  THE INSIDE, THE BOUNDARY AND THE OUTSIDE  
The structure of this thesis is shaped by the structure of the complex system and of complex violence in the 
system. It begins, in chapters 1 and 2, with a general discussion of the complex system, from critical complexity 
theory and deconstruction, respectively. A model of the complex system, in which internal relations, the 
boundary and the outside of the complex system are discussed, emerges in this general contextualisation and 
characterisation of complexity. This structure is carried through on a larger scale in the subsequent three 
chapters. The inside, the boundary and the outside are used to focus the discussion of violence at that particular 
level.  
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Chapter 3 begins the exposition of violence in the conceptual clearing opened by the two forgoing chapters. 
Although this project does focus on the exposition of violence in the complex system, the closure of this analysis 
is interrupted and interrogated by Hannah Arendt’s On Violence (1970). Arendt is chosen as Derrida’s 
interlocutor in the discussion of complex violence because, unlike Derrida (1997: 112), she carries out an 
analysis of violence which is clear and direct. She (1963: 9) also, unlike Derrida (1997: 112), opposes violence 
to language and in so doing allows language to function as a tool with which to intervene where empirical 
violence is proliferated. This chapter is a discussion of violence as a feature of différance, of the arche-violence, 
and of the supplementary notions of asymmetry and antagonism that emerge from Cilliers’ (1998a: 95, 120, 124) 
and Morin’s (1992: 99) respective characterisations of the complex system. These notions are related to 
Nietzsche’s (1909: 213) will to power and are argued to be the necessary theoretical outcome of a break away 
from philosophical theories that aim to stabilise and to fix the system with reference to a stable and natural origin 
for emergent order.  
Chapter 4 moves on to the violence associated with the boundary and all bounding activities in the complex 
system. It is associated with all forms of structure and of structured meaning that require that nonlinear, dynamic 
relations of différance be stopped in their tracks. While the discussion in chapter 3 explores internal relations of 
difference in the system – internal to the components of the system and internal to the system itself, depending 
on the scale of observation – chapter 4 deals with difference on a ‘higher’ level. The boundary is explored in its 
manifestations as the difference between systems, as the frame and as the hymen (Derrida 1979b; 1981a: 212; 
1992a; 213, 216). It is also explored in a more concrete manifestation, as the law (Derrida 1985a; 1992a: 181-
252). An important argument that is established in chapter 4 concerns the relationship between violence, order 
and nonviolence. While law and order are often associated with peace, justice and nonviolence; it is argued that 
the violence inherent in the establishment of any order – and, accordingly, also any peace – undermines the 
justness of that order. A pure state of nonviolence, in other words, cannot be brought about by means of the law.  
Chapter 5 navigates beyond the boundary of the complex system, to its outside. Nonviolence, because it cannot 
be addressed at the level of constant, open, dynamic organisation of arche-violence or at the level of closure of 
the boundary, leads the discussion here. The first two levels of violence, because they are implicated in the 
constitution of meaning, are absent only where there is no meaning or not yet meaning. The third level of 
violence is not wholly without meaning; but its meaning, the meaning of singular empirical events, is not 
immediate. It must be mediated by the first and second levels of violence in order to enter into the system of 
meaning. In this sense, empirical violence is both inside and outside the system. Its position inside/outside is 
analogous to all forms of singularity for which meaning is never given a priori. Singularities become meaningful 
in the system, but they are never consumed by the system. An excess of difference always remains outside. The 
connected themes of exteriority and singularity are given extensive attention, turning often, as Derrida (2001: 
97-192) does, to the philosophical contribution of Emmanuel Levinas (1979). This argument has considerable 
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ethical implications. These are worked out with reference to a discussion of aesthetic engagement as a possible 
way of harnessing and eluding the first two levels of violence. The full discussion of ethics and politics without 
which this project would certainly be incomplete is reserved for the final conclusion.  
b. SUPPLEMENTS: DERRIDA; NIETZSCHE; ARENDT; KANT; LEVINAS  
Supplementation is the completion of one thing by another (Derrida 1997: 144, 145). This completion implies 
the primacy of the original object, the thing being completed, and its inadequacy, its deferral to the supplement. 
Supplementation is not only completion but also is also the supplanting of one thing by another. Critical 
complexity theory is supplemented in all these senses throughout the exposition of violence. Reference is made 
to theoretical perspectives beyond the primary authors – Derrida, Cilliers and Morin – throughout this project. 
Neither deconstruction nor critical complexity theory exist in a vacuum; nor does either body of theory present a 
clean break with philosophical ideas that precede it. The reference to other perspectives and authors is the 
unavoidable acknowledgement of the repetition of, and affinity with, ideas and themes in the broader field of 
philosophy. If complexity thinking is to be relevant to the general and trans-disciplinary discussion of human 
social phenomena then it must be developed on this general philosophical plane with reference to the canon of 
philosophical texts. The relationship between deconstruction and critical complexity theory has already been 
sketched as a one that is mutually enriching and in which deconstruction offers a vocabulary through which 
violence can be addressed as a philosophical problem in the complex system. However, this is not where the 
strategic employment of deconstruction is exhausted. 
Because deconstruction carries traces of so many philosophical voices in its fabric, it opens the way for an 
engagement with Nietzsche (1909; 2000, 2006), especially in order to contextualise and develop the first level of 
violence. The discussion of the first level of violence makes room for a strong oppositional voice provided by 
Arendt (1970). The exploration of Arendt’s, Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s writing allows for the inclusion of Kant’s 
(1898; 1939) writing on ethics and the law as a source of critique and reflection on the second level of violence. 
In the final chapter, the exposition of empirical violence is largely informed by Levinas’ (1979) writing on 
exteriority. Saussure (1983), Claude Levi-Strauss (1961: 292-293) and Walter Benjamin (1978:277-300) each 
require recurrent consideration. These references are certainly not intended as perfunctory nods in the general 
direction of the canon. Rather, each one focuses on a limited aspect of work attributed to its respective author in 
order to establish a genuine relationship with or challenge to critical complexity theory or complexity thinking, 
more broadly. 
VIII. THE EXPOSITION OF VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF RESPONSE  
The end to which this project progresses is the exploration of the ethical and political consequences of theorising 
and applying the three modes of violence distributed across their respective three levels of complex organisation 
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in order to understand our socio-political world. A discussion of violence is certainly the discussion of more than 
merely an interesting philosophical dilemma; and it requires more than just conceptual clarification or creative 
interpretation. Empirical violence is, as it is argued in chapter 5, a problem, and as a serious problem in the 
world it demands a serious and real response. The ethical and political need to respond to empirical violence 
informs this entire project. We are responsible for our response to this problem, or, for that matter, for our failure 
to do so (Derrida 1993b: 377-380). The response to violence is an ethical response of the self to the other who 
suffers and whose singularity I or we seek to address. It is ethical, also, because it involves a choice. I choose 
how to respond and in so doing impose an interpretive violence – of the first and second levels of complex 
organisation –onto the other for which I must answer. However, the inevitability of interpretive violence is no 
excuse for inaction. 
A further point deserves mention, which serves here only as an initial alert to a theme that is slowly developed in 
the exploration of the first, second and third levels of violence in order to be explicitly explored in the final 
conclusion. The response – or non-response – to violence in the complex system is a political performance. It is 
political because all forms of empirical violence only become meaningful in a general complex system of 
meaning, and because empirical violence generates meaning that participates in and adds to that general system. 
There is no act in the complex system that is meaningful and at the same time closed off from that system. There 
is no perfectly singular, self-contained, perfectly personal act of violence. It is always informed by and informs 
the social. It always involves relations of asymmetry structured in an ultimately arbitrary, wider social system. 
The general argument about violence is used, in the conclusion, to propose that critical complexity opened by 
deconstructions, can be used to underpin a radical, lean political strategic framework that is sensitive to its own 
violence and to violence in the world. Before this can happen, the space for a meeting between critical 
complexity and deconstruction needs to be cleared and violence itself must be addressed. It is to this undertaking 
that the discussion is directed at this juncture. 
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CHAPTER 1 
READING CRITICAL COMPLEXITY THINKING AS PHILOSOPHY 
It would be easy enough to show that the concept of structure and even the word ‘structure’ itself are as old 
as the episteme – that is to say, as old as western science and western philosophy – and that their roots 
thrust deep into the soil of ordinary language, into whose deepest recesses the episteme plunges to gather 
them together once more, making them part of itself in a metaphysical displacement. Nevertheless, up until 
the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure – or rather the structurality of structure – although 
it has always been involved, has always been neutralised or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a 
centre or referring it to a point, fixed origin. The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance, and 
organise the structure – one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganised structure – but above all to make 
sure that the organising principle of the structure would limit what we might call the freeplay7 of the 
structure (Derrida 2001: 351). 
One cannot conclude that because Derrida identifies the difficulties or aporias in structuralist projects – 
Saussure’s, Lévi-Strauss’s, Austin’s, Foucault’s – his own writings escape systematic and theoretical 
pursuits (Culler 1983: 221). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To frame a chapter on complexity thus, with Derrida’s (2001) text and without first introducing or demonstrating 
an observable connection between these two distinct theoretical projects, is not designed to collapse this 
distinction. It may beg the question to commence an argument for critical complexity thinking – the overt and 
primary purpose of this chapter – with a pronouncement from Derrida. He was not writing about a theory of 
complex systems in Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences (2001). But, in another 
context, on a different page, with these same words, he could have been. The text announces a significant 
reflexive gesture already executed tentatively within structuralism and complexity science and more zealously in 
poststructuralism and critical complexity thinking.8 It proclaims the event of the disintegration of the “law of 
central presence” (353). To wit, the idea that structure within a system – social system; linguistic system; 
biological system – could be produced, guaranteed and fixed by a transcendental principle has come under 
                                                      
7 This term, ‘freeplay’, will be used throughout this project as it is used in this quote in order to characterise the complex 
organisation of a structure without a proper origin. 
8 Derrida (2001: 351-370) announces, in Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, the tremendous 
rupture and interruption to thinking that is the event of the decentring of the centre. Traditionally, structure could not be 
thought of without a transcendental centre structuring the elements in a system. This centre explained the structure without 
itself being explicable in terms of the resources of the system itself, either the elements or their relations. It could be a 
creative god; an absolute law; an essence; absolute truth; a transcendental subject. As transcendental absolutes, these centres 
function as metaphysical foundations that fix the structure and make it present to us. The presence of the centre guarantees 
the integrity of the structure. But this guarantee reveals the centre as a paradox: it is part of the system because the system 
cannot organise without it; and it is also eccentric because it escapes its own structuring logic (352). 
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pressure. In certain spaces, thinkers are thinking systems without this centre (353). A particular type of 
complexity theory that can be understood as critical participates in this once unthinkable thought. The approach 
taken is critical because it criticises the assumptions that guarantee or ground knowledge and the conditions 
under which these assumptions are tenable. And, more profoundly, it is critical complexity because it directs this 
critical reflexion at its own epistemological strategies.9 It is therefore implicated in the epistemological event, 
this rupture in western thinking that Derrida explores (351-370).  
Having made an epistemological clearing in which complexity and deconstruction might meet, it must be said 
that neither the internal nor external homogenisation of either discourse is suggested or desired. The distributed 
origins of complexity will not be plaited into a single unified root. Literature bringing poststructuralism and 
complexity together is conspicuous in its absence. There has not been any tremendous cross-fertilisation of 
intellectual referencing (Dobuzinskis 2004: 440). However, from different points we have the emergence of 
“[an] alternative concept of knowledge beginning and ending with difference” (Luhmann 2003: 767). 
Deconstruction and complexity have at least this in common, and a great deal more to be explored in further 
engagements between the two fields of theoretical enterprise.  
Before Derrida is swept to the periphery, his position at the head of this argument warrants further explication. 
One reading of the frame might suggest that as serious, canonised philosophy, Derrida’s (2001) text is offered by 
way of an apologia for complexity thinking. The quote from Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences is made to say, ‘this is also a philosophical enterprise (even if it emerges from scientific 
discourse)!’ Culler’s (1983: 221) interpretation of Derrida as involved in writing systematically strengthens the 
claim. The suggestion of a deep resonance between complexity and deconstruction legitimates the place of 
complexity and systems thinking in a text with pretension to calling itself philosophical. A challenge analogous 
to that of postcolonial or feminist philosophical enquiries is met but perhaps not ill met. The ‘and’ in 
‘Philosophy and Complexity’, or in ‘Philosophy and Postcolonialism’ or indeed in ‘Philosophy and Feminism’ 
threatens to undermine the purity of philosophical contemplation. It flings philosophy from its ivory tower and 
places it in a relation of unresolved tension with insights from other intellectual spheres. Philosophy in its 
capacity to be generalised and homogenised is not identical with complexity thinking insofar as it can endure a 
like internal sameness. But I argue that there is a philosophical complexity or critical complexity that is quite 
different to non-philosophical complexity. Also, that this seemingly trivial grammatical opposition is paramount. 
And, further, that philosophy can be opened and enriched by an encounter with particular insights from 
complexity thinking and complexity thinkers.  
                                                      
9 The distinction between critical complexity theory and what is characterised as restrictive complexity by Morin (2005: 9) 
is absolutely paramount in this analysis. The thinking that Morin (2005: 10) describes as general complexity is in step with 
the complexity thinking espoused by Cilliers (1998a) and Cilliers and Richardson (2006: 8), in stark contradistinction with 
restrictive complexity. What is common to these two positions is an inherent critical awareness. The adjective, ‘critical’, 
certainly warrants further explication. This is given in section III.  
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The deconstructive frame can be explained from a second direction. In the encounter between critical complexity 
thinking, drawn mainly from the writings of Paul Cilliers and Edgar Morin, and deconstruction, it is better to 
give the reader as much time and space as possible to mull over areas of congruence. Perhaps this reinvigorates 
the indictment that the frame collapses the clear and obvious distinction between complexity and deconstruction 
too quickly. Those who have theorised the link between deconstruction and complexity as the theoretical 
concern with difference, towards which Luhmann (1993) gestures, have been chastised for belabouring this point 
in order to divert attention from glaring divergences. Dillon (2000) proposes, rather without pause, that complex 
difference and deconstructive or poststructuralist difference are irreconcilably and absolutely different.10 While, 
once again, the tension between deconstruction and complexity is not intentionally resolved, it is pertinent to 
guard against the overstatement of sameness for the sake of cohesion. That said, points of divergence are not 
logically prior to, or more interesting than, points of convergence. 
Beyond these two justifications, or beside them, this chapter suggests that a persistent theme common to these 
distinctive theories is this: both run up against the limits of thought and knowledge set free from the centre. That 
is, both consider thoroughly structural structure. For now, however, deconstruction is confined to the margin. Its 
intrusion in the body of this complex discussion arises out of an already explicit theoretical hybridity in the 
development of Cilliers’ (1998a) general theory. However, the chief concern is with critical complexity, which 
must first be isolated from a broad and diverse body of literature that approaches the complex.  
To give meaning to the concept of complexity or a complex system is already to position oneself within the 
study of complexity, in which its poly-contextual proliferation produces several incommensurable meanings. 
Cilliers (1998a: iix) begins by distinguishing it from merely complicated systems.11 The latter can be given a full 
description in terms of all its discreet elements, which will produce a full and complete understanding of the 
system in question. A complex system, on the other hand, cannot be given a complete description. Complex 
                                                      
10 Dillon (2000: 4, 5) makes the argument that the radical relationality of complex systems, read as the relationality that is 
constitutive of a system, is confined to relations within the system. This is juxtaposed with poststructural and deconstructive 
radical relationality, which is always in a relationship with non-relationality. It is not clear what non-relationality is or why 
it is non-relational if it is non-relational in relation to the system. It is poetically stipulated as the “utterly intractable” or that 
which fundamentally cannot be assimilated into the system. Dillon’s argument seems to ossify or even deify this non-
difference to the extent that it becomes a metaphysical or transcendental exteriority. The possibility of relation with non-
relationality thus seems dubious. He positions complexity in opposition to poststructuralist “[alterity], différance, 
undecidability, responsibility [and justice]”, (22). It is characterised as instrumental in its obsession with order. In other 
words, the complex system consumes all. It is a totalising system. This argument is summarily rejected. The relation 
between complex systems and the outside is given a more nuanced treatment further on in this chapter and in chapter 5.  
 
11 The distinction between complicated and complex cannot be made in absolute terms because it cannot be separated from 
the act of observation. In other words, it is the result of an observation which always implicates an observing subject. The 
distinction is therefore not objective. It could be the observer’s position and limited knowledge that causes the observer to 
believe that something is complex (Cilliers 2000b: 42). Analogously, something that appears only complicated can emerge 
in time as a complex phenomenon. Morin (1992: 386) also uses this distinction, but adds the following. While the reduction 
to simple rules is useful, Morin maintains that reality is never identical to simple descriptions. The distinction 
complicated/complex is a useful distinction that results from the epistemological framework employed.  
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systems are systems that are constituted through the relations between their elements. These relations are non-
linear and thus not reducible to any algorithm or simple description (3). Organisation in complex systems is not 
ordained from any centre, but emerges as a result of the non-linear interactions within the system itself. As such, 
the system, in its organising, is not ordered. Both order and disorder are implicated in complex organisation 
(Morin 2005: 6). Because of the character of complex systems, they are not reversible. They cannot move 
backwards and forwards in time in a straight line, by linearly extrapolating from present organisation. At a most 
basic level, complexity deriving from the Latin complexus means ‘woven together’ (6).  
It is acknowledged that the foregoing characterisation of complexity is not at all definitive and lacks depth and 
formal structure. However, this first sketch is embellished and enriched in each successive section of this 
chapter. Theories of complexity are of differentiated origins that are distributed across disciplines and across the 
social and physical or natural sciences. The study of complexity is itself a complex, heterogeneous discourse, 
with different emphases, objects, methods and assumptions. Following Levy (1991), Morin (2005) and Cilliers 
and Richardson (2001), this heterogeneous discourse can be untangled into two distinct types of complexity 
thinking, with distinct theoretical emphases and consequences.  
Levy (1991: 87-99) distinguishes between systems science and systems rationality. The distinction is not an 
opposition between science as such on the one hand, and systems thinking on the other. Critical systems thinking 
is not anti-scientific (90). Unlike a science of systems that seeks to put the notion of a system to work without 
revisiting underlying epistemology, ontology and ethics, systems rationality is a critical encounter with the 
notion of a system. Levy (87-99) situates Morin’s broad philosophical project within a wider paradigmatic shift, 
which encompasses a turn towards complexity and the elucidation of the system as a critical tool. Within this 
shift the system becomes a vehicle for the critique of the history of western metaphysics in its various 
permutations: positivism; transcendentalism; and the methodology of disjunctive analysis. The critical character 
of systems thinking also connotes self-criticism. Critical systems rationality is reflexive. Because of its 
reflexivity, it is perpetually concerned with its own limitations and the limitations of scientific and philosophical 
concepts, which it opens to philosophical scrutiny and revaluation. Among these are the opposition between 
subject and object, and the opposition between order and disorder.  
Levy (98) adds another element to the tag, ‘critical’; to epistemological reflexivity, he adds a striving for 
“sociological emancipation”. Although Levy does not elaborate on this point, perhaps one can posit that critical 
complexity has an inherently ethical concern with the social. Or more generally, critical complexity theory seeks 
to retain, construct, or reconstruct a position from which to make normative judgements about the way human 
beings know and act. This mode of thinking the system in terms of complex organisation, breaks dramatically 
with a more instrumentalist application of the concept ‘system’ to phenomena in the natural and social world. In 
sum, the systems thinking of Edgar Morin can be classified as critical complexity insofar as it seeks to expound a 
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critical epistemological framework for the study of complex phenomena (87). It is an epistemology that is self-
reflexive, self-critical and invigorates the notion of system with a critical sensibility that is conscious of its 
normative dimension and ethical content.12 
Morin (2005) himself makes a distinction between restricted complexity and general complexity theory. The 
vein of complexity referred to as ‘restricted’ remains within the modernist scientific paradigm that is treated 
below (9, 10). In terms of a restricted understanding of complexity, the system, which is constituted in a large 
number of non-linear interactions with feedback loops, produces disorder that must be factored into any 
calculation. The acknowledgement of disorder renders the system fully or almost fully understandable using 
standard analytic, reductionist, generalising strategies. Fundamentally, complex organisation is still thought to 
operate according to general laws (10). Within this understanding, complexity is aligned with disorder and chaos 
and as a result, it is opposed to order and knowledge. Complexity is a threat to order and thus to understanding; 
but it is a threat that is still thought to be containable. This type of complexity thinking and its analytic 
methodology are expressly distanced from the position developed by Cilliers (1998a: ix). General complexity 
does not theorise complexity with the hope or desire to solve it. It also does not espouse a notion of complexity 
in which complexity is contained within specific disordered pockets within a generally well ordered 
organisation. It is sensitive to the indissoluble paradox of complex organisation in which order and disorder are 
mutually implicated (Morin 2005: 11). 
Restrictive or reductive complexity, in which category Cilliers (2001: 136) places chaos theory, is reductive 
because it posits that emergent complexity rests on a stable bed of simple underlying principles that can be 
found. It reduces complexity to simplicity. Complexity is a hindrance. This type of complexity that abstracts 
complex systems into numerical formal systems only acknowledges complexity in order to rid the system of it 
(Cilliers & Richardson 2006: 6). In contrast with this school of thinking, a metaphorical understanding of 
complexity emerges from the human sciences, such as organisation science. It is a well-argued point that social 
phenomena are not best understood using the methodology of natural sciences. This amounts to scientism and 
violence, as recognised by Morin (1992: 3).13 However, the language, concepts and implications of a theory of 
complexity can be used as a frame for knowledge of these human or social phenomena without reducing these 
                                                      
12 This type of critical engagement with complexity on a philosophical level occupies a marginal space in complexity 
thinking (Levy 1991: 88). Morin (2005: 27) makes a similar observation employing, once more, the distinction between 
general or generalised complexity and restricted complexity. “Unfortunately, restricted complexity rejects generalised 
complexity, which seems to the former as pure chattering, pure philosophy” (27). 
 
13 Morin (1992: 3) argues that knowledge is constituted in the interrelation between science, ideology and politics. The 
normative content and force of ideology and politics is hidden by bringing this content under the ambit of objective science 
in a way that masks normativity. By way of illustration, social convention such as that which privileges heterosexual 
relationships over homosexual relationships can be ‘justified’ with recourse to a scientific discourse that disregards power 
relations by calling itself objective.  
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disciplines to pseudo-sciences (Cilliers & Richardson 2006: 7). This application of metaphors does risk a loss of 
rigor. The loss of rigor is not a necessary outcome of a softer or qualitative approach.  
At a distance from these two schools, a third area of complexity theory is focused on the philosophical 
consequences of constructing and applying a general theory of complexity. This type of complexity, like Morin’s 
(2005: 10) general complexity, develops an epistemological framework sensitive to its own limits. This 
understanding of complexity theory can only produce contextualised, contingent, provisional knowledge that 
strives to understand complex phenomena in their complexity (Cilliers & Richardson 2006: 8). Hopes of 
prediction and control, entertained by the new devotees of complexity in the human sciences, find no foundation 
here. The non-linear relations between components of complex systems resist reduction in ways that frustrate all 
models, and thus all attempts at understanding. However, without being reductionist, there is space to strive to be 
rigorous and clear (11). The space for theorising, judging and acting is not closed by a critical attitude. No model 
is privileged over another a priori; but some models may prove more appropriate to some complex systems than 
others, as is argued below. Complexity thinking, in re-evaluating the status of all models, forces us to rethink the 
status of scientific models (12). The epistemological shift, encompassing the acknowledgement of context, 
contingency and the provisional nature of understanding, forces complexity thinking into an ontologically 
uncertain position. What could it mean to be ontologically uncertain? It is surely not to suggest that we live in a 
world purely of our imagination. Instead, it is to suggest that our access to the ontic, to beings, is always 
mediated by knowledge itself.  
This chapter proceeds by contrasting complexity thinking with the non-reflexive modern epistemology it 
disputes. The terms ‘general complexity’ and ‘critical complexity’ are used interchangeably. A general theory of 
complexity is delineated through an encounter with the works of Edgar Morin and Paul Cilliers. In order to 
follow the logic of complex thinking, it is necessary to develop as clear an understanding as possible of what is 
being discussed when the term is used. For this characterisation, which is neither definitive nor complete for 
significant theoretical reasons, Cilliers’ sketch of complex systems in terms of ten general characteristics is 
pivotal. Each of these attributes finds an echo in earlier and later writings of Morin’s.14Neither philosophy nor 
complexity thinking is a closed theoretical system and each is treated in accordance with this insight.  
The epistemological and ethical consequences of complexity are given extensive attention by considering 
complex organisation first in terms of general structural characteristics and then with more detailed reflection on 
                                                      
14 This project engages with the first volume of La Méthode, The Nature of Nature (1991). Five of the six volumes have not 
been translated into English, therefore extensive reference is made to On Complexity (2007) published three years after the 
sixth and final, L’Éthique Complexe (2004). Conference proceedings and articles in which Morin explores ideas introduced 
in La Méthode supplement this exploration. The poverty of English translations is perhaps indicative of the marginality 
Levy (1991) emphasises.  
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internal and external organisation. The intricate relations between knowledge, complex structure and the 
inescapable normative dimension implied by complexity thinking will begin to gesture towards the notion of 
violence in the system. It should also be stated that the works of Paul Cilliers and Edgar Morin are not intended 
to be presented as one and the same philosophical project. I understand insights from both thinkers to occupy a 
particular critical space. Specific differences and nuances are not denied. However, for the purposes of this text, 
the focus often shifts from Cilliers to Morin in order to lift out important tenants of critical complexity thinking. 
In order to situate this parallel reading, attention is turned to what critical complexity thinking is not. 
II. PARADIGMATIC SHIFTS: THE MUTILATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
Complexity has different meanings for different theorists in different contexts with different agendas (Cilliers, 
Richardson & Lissack 2001: 11). As such, a preliminary clarification of the meaning of complexity in this 
context is necessary. Tensions inherent to the notion of complexity resist definition if definition is understood as 
a complete description in terms of a finite set of characteristics that remain the same over time and can be known 
absolutely (Cilliers1998a: 2). This tension is a result of the understanding of complexity, which permeates this 
project and underpins the meaning as it is used here. Complexity is the condition in which a system is constituted 
through relations on three different levels. It is constituted through the relations between its composite elements; 
between the system as a whole and the composite elements; and between the system and its environment (3, 4).15 
The relations that constitute the system are dynamic. The complex system organises through these dynamic 
interactions (Morin 2005: 11). Not the whole, nor the parts, nor the environment wholly determine this 
organisation. The interactions that constitute the system do not unfold linearly. Several interactions play out 
simultaneously and feed back into the system in unpredictable ways. The number, richness and non-linearity of 
interactions cannot be added up to produce a set of simple production rules or laws. Another way of saying this 
is to assert that the complex system is incompressible (Cilliers1998a: 4, 10). This insight has significant 
consequences: if the system cannot be perfectly expressed in terms simpler than itself, then it follows that no 
simple definition can ever adequately describe the system (Cilliers 2000a: 9).  
The complex system as an open system is open to its environment and open in the sense that it is developing in 
time. The openness of the system is fundamental. Morin’s (2005: 6) definition of complexity as complexus must 
be recalled. Incompressibility certainly poses a challenge to knowledge strategies, but so does the interrelation of 
the system with and within other systems: “In a complex system, everything is connected with everything else” 
                                                      
15 The working definition offered here is elaborated under the discussion of a general theory of complexity and draws on the 
ten characteristics of complex systems developed by Cilliers (1998a: 3, 4). It may seem that these assertions are 
unsubstantiated. However, the purpose of these initial remarks is to provide a provisional clarity as to the meaning of 
complexity in anticipation of the exploitation of the concept prior to a more substantial exposition in section iii. 
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(Cilliers, Richardson & Lissack 2001: 6).16 Any description imposes closure because it cannot take all future 
possibilities of the system into account, and it cannot fully determine the environment in its complexity and 
separate it in a clear and final fashion from the system itself (Cilliers 2000a: 9). The dynamic structure of 
complex systems presents itself, in the first place, as a challenge to our modes of knowing:  
Complexity asserts itself first of all as the impossibility to simplify; it arises where complex unity 
produces its emergences, where distinctions and clarities in identities and causalities are lost, where 
disorder and uncertainty disturb phenomena, where the subject/observer surprises his own face in the 
object of his observation, where antimonies make the course of the reasoning go astray... (Morin 1992: 
386) 
The description of complex systems is always in conversation with this uncertainty, incompressibility, and with 
the normativity implied by the act of definition or description. This normativity is a direct consequence of the 
exclusion necessitated by the act of description. The evident tension between the concept of complexity and the 
attempt to elaborate on this concept and to understand it is at the core of the paradigmatic shift explicated below. 
Perhaps the place to start, since it is proposed that there has been and continues to be an epistemological cleft 
carved out in the history of thinking, is the somewhat trite distinction: modern/postmodern. Since it has played 
such an important and perhaps inflated role in contemporary philosophical debate, with complexity having been 
aligned with both sides in various contexts, it demands attention. The distinction is employed here with a 
nuanced consideration of very specific philosophical attitudes, premises and methodologies. The claim is not that 
modern thought has been temporally superseded by the kind of thinking now called postmodern. Rather, these 
two terms announce two different thinking paradigms. Cilliers (1998a: 113) refers explicitly to the distinction; 
and while the words themselves are absent from Morin’s texts, he certainly disavows a certain epistemological 
paradigm. This paradigm requires explication, because complexity thinking remains in conversation with it. 
Within this more careful attempt at definition, it must yet be acknowledged that those who position themselves 
or are positioned by others in opposition to the modern epistemological paradigm are often not in conversation 
or conflict with the same beast. Rather, as far as the works of Cilliers and Morin are considered, the paradigm 
that complexity thinking ruptures is perpetuated through the proliferation of a certain constellation of ideas that 
hang together. In order to follow a responsible strategy, both characterisations of what is called modern thought 
                                                      
16 In order to model a complex system as accurately as possible, one would need to include “life, the universe and 
everything” in the model (Cilliers, Richardson & Lissack 2001: 8). This is because, when we speak of complex systems, the 
boundary of the system can always be extended to take more relations into account. In other words, the largest model of any 
complex system would always extend to include everything that is. This is not always the best or even the most appropriate 
way of bounding a system. As the number of relations taken into account increases, the specificity of the description is 
traded off. However, this potential of the boundary to shift draws attention to the boundary as a function of description. This 
is elaborated once attention turns to the structure of complex systems. 
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are given here alongside one another. This is, therefore, less an endeavour to classify and define postmodernism 
as such, than an attempt to sketch modernism in order to open the space for critical complexity to show up. 
Cilliers (1998a) takes Lyotard’s turn away from the grand metanarratives of modernist theory seriously. The 
attempt to secure legitimacy for a certain position or science by appealing to a seemingly guaranteed external 
reference such as “the dialectics of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational 
working subject, or the creation of wealth” (Lyotard quoted in Cilliers 1998a: 113) is recanted. These 
metanarratives are unifying narratives that seek to reduce all forms of knowledge to a single whole, erasing 
differences even as they – the use of the plural here is not unintentional – masquerade as neutral objectivity. This 
masquerade has socio-political credence and consequence (Cilliers 2005a: 256). Legitimating discourses 
grounding knowledge function as if they are closed to one another, while analogous knowledge strategies are 
employed to produce similarly absolute, closed and ultimately relativistic truths. An example of this relativism is 
the rejection of scientific knowledge within religion. From another side, one can also argue that a rich 
description of the human contemplation of the concept of god cannot be given on the level of physics. The point 
is a cautious one. Complexity theory does not deny science in favour of more colourful narratives; but no science 
or other privileged discourse escapes its rigorous epistemological critique.17 
The notion of différance as a dynamic temporal and spatial differentiation is inescapable in the fabric of the 
complexity argument in which Cilliers attempts to undo central presence in the system. The drive of modernist 
endeavours was the desire to predict and control the system. Thus a struggle against disorder and chaos with 
serious consequences ensues. A widely employed tactic is the instrumentalisation of time, which is considered as 
consisting of discreet and uniform units unfolding linearly (Cilliers 2006: 107). Although this view is very useful 
in some aspects, it marginalises experiences of time that are out of line. It neutralises the force of time. By this it 
is meant that the present is exonerated so as to contain the meaning of the past and so that the present may be 
legitimately extrapolated in order to predict and control the future. A linear, uninterrupted time is one in which 
the future is present and in which it never changes so much that the identity of the system is disturbed (Cilliers 
2006: 108; Popolo 2003: 90, 91). Obviously, this understanding of identity is premised on the maintenance of 
sameness. Lyotard’s and Derrida’s insights, followed and developed in Complexity and Postmodernism (Cilliers 
1998a) and other articles authored by Cilliers thus allow for the conception of modern or structural18 thinking 
                                                      
17 Lyotard (1984: xxiii) writes that: 
Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the yardstick of science, the majority of them prove to 
be fables. But to the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is 
obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game.  
It is thus the search for absolute indisputable truth that Lyotard describes as quintessentially modern.  
18 Cilliers (1998a) frames the structural project of, among others, Ferdinand de Saussure as a modernist enterprise because it 
ultimately relies on a systems model that is spatially and temporally closed.  
22 
 
before the ‘post-’. This type of thinking is unifying; totalising; anchored in an externally guaranteed truth; and 
either oblivious to or actively opposed to complexity insofar as it undermines the search for absolute knowledge. 
Approaching modernism from another angle, Rasch (2000: 73) suggests that it is that epistemological project in 
which humanity or western thought is preoccupied with self-description and a deepening suspicion of panoramic 
totalising descriptions, secured as “God, Reason, or Truth”. Modernism as positivism signals a radical turn away 
from transcendentalism toward pure immanence or objectivism with its own methodology and fear of the outside 
and the unknowable. The outside, or what may be called transcendental, need not be God. In this context, it is 
taken to mean that which cannot be known by positivist methodology. In other words, if it cannot be known 
absolutely, it becomes mere conjecture. Perspectives that call themselves or are called postmodern express the 
opposite fear. This is not fear of the inside as such; but of an inside without an outside. It is a suspicion of 
knowledge of the world that professes to be purged of all speculation. The problem of the inside/outside 
distinction is central to the critical complexity problematic and it is specifically addressed in the conception of 
complex boundaries (Juarrero 2002; Cilliers 2001; 2005b; Morin 1992: 95-99). Rasch’s contribution, because it 
alerts us to this problematic in which modernism rejects what it cannot know absolutely, forms part of the 
constellation of modernist ideas sketched here.19 The question of the place of the outside in relation to the system 
and what it can and cannot do is of great importance.  
Edgar Morin suggests in Of Complexity (2007: 2) that the way we organise knowledge, the rules that are in place 
determining what we may know and how we may know it, is an organisation that is fixed and unable to reflect 
on its own limitations, or to grasp the “complexity of reality”. There are two implications to be noted from this 
idea, which frames the project undertaken in the aforementioned text. First, he postulates that reality as a whole 
is inherently complex; and, secondly, that this organisational framework or epistemology imposes certain 
                                                      
19 At this point it is fitting to acknowledge the widely recognised systems thinking of Niklas Luhmann and to marginalise 
his work. The relationship between Luhmann and postmodern thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault and Lacan has been 
explored at length; see Rasch & Wolfe (2000). Luhmann (1993) himself has investigated the relationship between 
deconstruction and systems theory as he conceives it in “Deconstruction as Second-order Observing”. However, the 
decision to marginalise Luhmann is not merely a matter of expedience. Pickel (2007: 395) emphasises the need for fresh 
perspectives within complexity theory, particularly in the humanities, and an engagement with philosophy, returning to 
questions of ontology and epistemology in order to move past what he argues is Luhmann’s hegemony. Although Luhmann 
is not associated here with reductive complexity in the tradition of the Santa Fe Institute, his theory of social systems is 
characterised by an emphasis on operational closure as absolute necessity for the autopoiesis of the system (Luhmann 1993; 
Cornel 1992; Teubner 2000; Rasch 2000). Stated differently, Luhmann’s autopoietic social systems have fixed boundaries. 
Furthermore, the constructed conversation between Luhmann and Derrida is one in which a polemical confrontation forces 
both theorists into their respective corners. Derrida is caricatured as having an excessive concern with the interruptive 
outside; and Luhmann as having an equal and opposite concern with a self-ordering inside. Such stark opposition between 
deconstruction and complexity is not one of the ambitions of this discussion. While Luhmann’s entire oeuvre cannot be 
confined to this opposition; it is clear that this mode of complexity thinking is at odds with the open critical complexity 
theorised by both Cilliers (1998a) and Morin (1992; 2007). The interruption of the boundary of the system brings it into a 
relationship with the unmarked space that cannot be coded as part of the system, and whose observation threatens the 
system’s self-contained autopoietic processes (Derrida 1992; Bjerge 2006: 64). The relevance of this insight will become 
clear in chapter 2.  
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strategies upon complex reality that “[mutilate]” it by carving into atomistic objects (3).20Morin (2-7) draws 
attention to the often implicit agreements at a supra-logical level that enable the successful construction and 
deployment of logic.  
Beyond the violent strategies that are employed in the process of drawing distinctions that reduce complexity, 
there is another layer of violence 21  at play in this framework. This framework is blind to the error in 
epistemological organisation, its reduction of complexity, and this blindness arises due to a lack of a reflexive 
critical dimension in this type of knowing. As a consequence, ideas are built, layer upon layer of unquestioned 
assumptions about the ontology and epistemology and indeed the ethics at work in knowledge. It is this 
problematic that leads Morin (2007: 2) to write: “The most serious threat that humanity faces [is] the blind and 
uncontrollable advances of knowledge (thermonuclear weapons, manipulations of all sorts, ecological 
imbalances etc.)”. What Cilliers (1998a: 112-115) cautiously refers to as modernist thinking finds a transposition 
in Morin’s work as a paradigm of simplification. Again, what is absent from this paradigm, and forceful in its 
absence, is modesty about the status of knowledge and all models of reality (Cilliers 2005a: 256). 
Morin (1992: 3) is quite adamant about the importance of auto-criticism because mutilating thought is not 
confined to theory. It has effects in the world and leads to mutilating action. Morin (quoted in Levy 1991: 89) 
pronounces:  
We feel a profound dissatisfaction when we face observations that are not in movement and which do not 
observe themselves, thinking that does not confront its own contradictions and masks the contradictions of 
reality, philosophy that reduces everything to key words (master concepts) which does not put itself into 
question, and particular speech (acts) which isolate the virtual world.22 
It is clear then that the space for self-criticism or the space that an epistemological framework or organisation 
has in which to interrogate its own methodology and assumptions is an indispensible part of the project to 
develop a general theory and methodology for approaching and understanding complex phenomena.  
                                                      
20 In The Nature of Nature, Morin (1992: 3) makes the bold statement that, “the concepts which we use to conceive of our 
society – all society – are mutilated and mutilating”. 
21 Morin (1992: 3; 2007: 4) uses the term ‘mutilation’ to describe the imposition of force without any ultimate justification. I 
have used this term interchangeably with the term ‘violence’. This is, admittedly, rather an impoverished definition. 
However, the instances of violence and mutilation offered in this chapter will tentatively begin to give flesh to this concept, 
which is central to this philosophical project as a whole. Although the primary task here is to give an exposition of critical 
complexity theory, the unavoidable reference to violence in the discussion of epistemology points to the necessity of 
conceptual clarification in this regard. It also points to the need for an exposition of the ethical implications of the 
interrelation of violence and epistemology.  
22 This passage is quoted and translated from Science avec Conscience (Morin: 1982: 89), which has not been translated into 
English in its entirety. 
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The paradigm of simplification that produces mutilating knowledge is one that Morin (2005: 5) associates with a 
certain constellation of theoretical gestures that he characterises as having a triangular structure or strategy. Each 
of these strategies has been touched on and continues to inform the epistemological position taken by complexity 
thinking. The first movement is that of determinism. It is assumed that it is, at least in principle, possible to 
uncover natural universal laws in reality that allow us to know reality in itself, past and present, and also to 
predict what will happen in the future. The second movement is that of reduction. This is the idea that complex 
phenomena can be explained in terms of their simple composite elements; and, conversely, simple and 
fundamental composite elements can be deduced by observing a complex whole. Reductions happen between 
several levels of understanding, each collapsing into the other in a strictly given hierarchy. These reductions 
explain reality as if it were ossified. The third movement is that of disjunction. This is the compartmentalisation 
of knowledge into what we have come to know as ‘disciplines’. The problem does not lie in the fact that there 
exist several specialised ways of examining complex phenomena. Rather, it is that these various explanations 
have become closed off from one another, with only internal modes of critique and no interdisciplinary 
interaction.  
Like Cilliers, Morin (1983a; 1983b) does not want to put an end to scientific endeavour and also acknowledges 
the wonderful contributions of science to society and knowledge. However, critique is directed at the status of 
this knowledge and its assumptions. Morin (2005: 6) suggests that the underlying ontology is one with a 
dualistic conception of reality: one layer of complex appearances and another of simple underlying laws and 
composite elements. He extends the argument to say that historically, the reality of simplicity has been afforded 
more value. The paradigm of simplification, through its uncritical assumption of determinism, reduction and 
disjunction, has pervaded most of human knowledge. It has led to an atomistic understanding of beings as 
objects and a similarly atomistic methodology for the acquisition and development of knowledge in analysis. In 
order for this perspective to neutralise itself, it has become objective. Beings as objects are isolated from the 
environment and from the knowing subject. Both are eliminated from objective reality with standards of control 
and concordance. The object, in order to be laid bare to knowing, had to become inert, fixed in time and 
unorganised (Morin 1992: 374). Or, more precisely, things are organised by universal laws and principles that 
are at once implicated in the very constitution of the object and separate from its contingent imperfection.  
The principle of disjunction works by exclusion and isolation. An oft cited example of this reduction is the 
atomistic understanding of the human subject in which all other disciplinary discourses and descriptions except 
one are excluded in the constitution of a valid body of knowledge. Such exclusion and isolation is evident in the 
conception of individuals and individuality, which begins by isolating individuals from social structures and 
society as a whole. This process of isolation and exclusion is not the only manifestation of reductionism. On the 
contrary, the social is understood by zooming out to a level at which the individual is but a type, a functional cog 
(Levy 1991: 91). There are contrary theoretical positions within modern thought. Here enters the notion of the 
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system. Within the paradigm of simplification, there has been a reaction to the principle of disjunction and a turn 
towards conjunction. Conjunctive theories find simplicity and unity at the level of the macro explanation, at the 
level of the total whole. The term ‘system’ has been cast as a substitute for more obviously reductive terms 
within an epistemological framework left unchanged. Morin recognises value in this diametric shift. Among 
important systems thinkers, he acknowledges Hegel, Marx and Weber (93). 
The newly recognised whole usurped the place of constitutive parts as the keeper of describable truth. Holism in 
opposition to atomism stays within the same binary opposition of whole/parts in which one or the other term is 
scorned. Holism or totalisation23 succumbs to the same reductionism as the analytic method. Both gestures erase 
difference and relationality and privilege a single description of reality. Morin’s thinking is anti-totalitarian 
insofar as it rejects the idea of the perfect whole. The whole is a ruse because it presents itself as the ultimate 
truth and as the entire story when in fact the relationality between whole and parts is itself complex and fraught 
with paradoxes and logical contradiction. 
The system is only totalising when it subsumes all meaning in a single coherent description as the actual truth 
more real than other interactions that happen on a lower localised level. This system understood as the whole – 
without granting theoretical significance to parts – is a simplified one-dimensional appearance. It is a 
construction. It is possible to argue this because the specification of the whole imposes a denial of its internal 
organisation and difference; its external organisation or relation with the environment; and the organisation 
between the observer and the system, now objectified and reified. It is a construction insofar as the reality of the 
whole is not simply given. It is always possible to offer a different description of the system as a macro-, micro- 
and meso-system and these descriptions cannot erase each other (Levy 1991: 93). In Morin’s terms, even the 
whole is always partial. This circularity in which the whole and parts implicate each other is the frustration of the 
analytic method and the substance of Morin’s “unitas-mutiplex” or complex unity (93-94). It is also this circular 
movement of mutual implication and constitution that informs Morin’s method. In all respects, it strives to 
navigate beyond either/or dichotomies such as inside/outside, open/closed difference/unity (Morin 2007: 8). 
Neither diversity nor unity is logically prior. As it might have been anticipated, complexity thinking thinks 
                                                      
23 Derrida (1991) expresses a similar attitude towards the romantic whole. He provides two accounts for the impossibility of 
totality. The first is perfectly in line with reductionism, simplification and of classical thought. The second concerns a 
system thought without a centre: 
Totalisation can be judged impossible in the classical style: one then refers to the empirical endeavour of either a 
subject or a finite richness which it can never master. There is too much, more than one can say. But non-totalisation 
can also be determined in another way: no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the 
empirical, but from the standpoint of the concept of play (365). 
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complex identity. The elements of a complex system do not lose their identity in the whole; nor do they retain an 
autonomous essential identity.24 Reduction is not possible in either direction (Levy 1991: 93-94). 
Having launched this attack on the idea of the whole, the concept is plainly not to be discarded. It is reframed 
within complexity as organisation and remains vital in developing any understanding of complex phenomena. 
This particular organisation is not observable at the level of composite parts alone. It is also not determination of 
the parts. The system is not identical with the whole or the parts but includes both. It therefore takes leave of the 
object of modern enquiry. The object as a complex system is a counterforce to the tripartite strategy of 
simplification. Further, this object as a system is always in relation to a subject that is always also a complex 
system. Morin’s (1983b: 3) point is that there can be no objectivity without a subject; and, equally, no subject 
without an object. The subject is implicated in the constitution of knowledge, and therefore undermines 
objectivity as it has been propagated. 
The implication of the subject or observer in the constitution of knowledge also links with the concept of self-
critique. This critique is not merely introspection, but rather critique of the concept of the self-subject as part of 
the critique of epistemology (Morin 1983b). The problem with theory is not that it produces descriptions of the 
world, but that it is dogmatic. The problem with reason is not that it has developed logics and methodologies, but 
that it focuses attention on the rationalisation of these logics and methods to the detriment of critical checks. 
According to Morin (2007: 6), reality is contained and controlled within a system of ever more tightly stacked 
ideas. These ideas are hierarchically ordered by master concepts such as positivism, materialism and 
structuralism. These concepts – or perhaps we can insert ‘metanarratives’ here – give authority to descriptions. 
As an alternative, complexity offers a methodology that is cyclical, recursive, reflexive and dynamic (Levy 
1991: 92). It flies against reductionism, claims to neutrality and linear causality.  
It serves the argument at this point to return to the original and apparently simple definition of complexity 
offered thus far: that complexity is relationality. What appears simple is in fact not. Complexity thinking is the 
attempt to think what simplifying epistemology cannot. This is the paradoxical interrelation of unity and 
diversity. The singular and autonomous whole and its internal and external modes of organisation, resists the 
simplification that can only think of unity in terms of sameness and isolation (Morin 2007: 4). 
Critical complexity makes a decisive break from the modernist epistemology and modern systems thinking so far 
reviewed. Despite the rejection of structuralism25 as a modern foundation within complexity thinking, it is 
                                                      
24 Consequently, Morin (1992: 146) argues against the simplicity that follows from essentialism: 
It is, henceforth, impossible to lock up the richness of system in simple and closed notions. The new type of 
intelligibility must be able to associate antagonistic notions and integrate ambiguity to understand the real complexity 
of objects and their relation with the thought which conceives them.  
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interesting to note that Morin (1992: 99) refers to Ferdinand de Saussure’s definition of the linguistic system as a 
model for complex systems in general. A system, Morin quotes, is “an organized totality composed of [solitary] 
elements which can be defined only by their relation to each other in function of their place in the totality” 
(Saussure quoted in Morin 1992: 99). According to this structuralist system of language, the units of language, 
linguistic signs, derive meaning only within a network of relations which form that system as such (Saussure 
1983: 65).26 There is nothing essential about this meaning; it is contingent and arbitrary. It is the result of the 
dynamic interplay of differences between signs (67, 68). Furthermore, it is dynamic and operates in time. Morin 
thus models complex systems with priority given to the notion of difference and relationality and importantly 
also time and change. Cilliers (1998a: 37-41) also refers to Saussure as a point of departure in the attempt to 
model complex systems, the linguistic system being an excellent example of complexity. However, the 
discussion is not limited to Saussure for long. Rather, with Derrida as guide, Saussure is read far beyond himself 
by following his logic to its radical implications. This is further explicated once attention is turned to the 
development of a general theory of critical complexity. 
The epistemological framework of complexity thinking brings another important opposition into question. This 
is the dichotomy of order and disorder which meet in the realm of complex organisation. Maintaining the 
modern metaphysical opposition between order and disorder has been intimately linked with prediction and 
control in the system (Morin 1983a: 24). This has had serious consequences for the manner in which 
determinism and freedom could be understood. That is, in a similarly adversarial polemic. This opposition, in its 
relation to choice and agency, has had yet further influence in the conceptualisation of subjectivity and ethics. At 
this stage is serves to make some preliminary remarks about the relationship between ontology, epistemology 
and ethics in a complex world. First, there is no way of finally disentangling these three areas of philosophy and 
life that would once and for all organise them into neat branches. Each feeds into the other, at once constraining 
and enabling development. Secondly, whereas critical complexity theory makes its voyage from the harbour of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
25 Gayatri C. Spivak (1997: lv) defines structuralism thus:  
[It is] an attempt to isolate the general structures of human activity. Thus the structuralism I speak of is 
largely the study of literature, linguistics, history, socio-economics, psychology. A structure is a unit 
composed of a few elements that are invariably found in the same relationship within “activity” being 
described. The unit cannot be broken down into its single elements, for the unity of the structure is defined 
not so much by the substantive nature of the elements as by their relationship. 
26 Language can be analysed as a set of words referring to or naming ideas or concepts. This is an essentialist view, which 
presupposes extra-linguistic, autonomous, universal concepts that exist prior to the words used to name these concepts. The 
meaning of a word is found and anchored in these concepts. However, within structuralism concepts are linguistic and not 
pre-given: they only arise in language (Culler 1976: 22). According to Saussure (1983: 65), attempting to think of language 
as nomenclature exposes the linguistic character of concepts, as well as the true underlying structure of language, which is 
comprised out of a set of units referred to as signs. This sign is a double entity emerging from the interplay of complex 
relations within the system (Saussure 1983: 66). 
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epistemology, attempting to rethink this organisation, its implications are certainly not contained there (Morin 
2005: 9). The place of this type of complexity thinking within social sciences stands in stark contradistinction 
with the most popular uptake of hard complexity theory in social science, that seeks validation and credibility at 
the altar of natural science (Cilliers, Heylighen & Gershenson 2007: 2). 
It is often argued that the world is becoming ever more complex. This is as the network of interactions spreads 
across the globe as a heterogeneously and densely connected “system of systems” (1). Santa Fe style complexity, 
chaos theory or complexity science recognises complexity without confronting the epistemological-ontological-
ethical quagmire opened by this recognition (Morin 2005: 10). This restricted complexity focuses on a 
synchronic view of the system. This is view that that aims to take all non-linear interrelations at an isolated 
moment in time into account in order to allow relations to be finally specified and resolved (Saussure 1983: 89). 
Systems are always open, with both a history and a future, but models impose temporal and spatial closure. An 
important aspect of this closure comes from the fact that models do not unfold in time in the same way that 
systems do.27 
The task now at hand, in light of the epistemological-ontological-ethical critique necessitated by the 
acknowledgement of complex systems, is to try to think through a model of complex systems. It must be 
attempted to arrange these insights into some manner of coherent strategy. This is in the first place so that a 
critical conversation is at all possible. There can be no reflexive critical engagement with a position so vague 
that it does not allow for any understanding at all, let alone criticism. Secondly, complexity thinking is not 
closed to the world and its problems. It is a response to perceived problems, and very particularly also the 
violence implied in epistemological strategies. It thus endeavours to sketch a general model of complex systems 
that, while remaining cautious and self-critical, can be used to critique its own and other philosophical strategies. 
Although it helps to understand that complex systems are complex, this does not help us to say much about 
particular complex systems (Cilliers, van Uden & Richardson 2001: 56, 57). A red flag is herewith raised: the 
reduction so far opposed to complexity is fraught with dangers; but it is also unavoidable. This point was 
integrated in the initial exposition of the concept of complexity, with reference to the system’s incompressibility. 
The attempt to understand and model any particular complex system imposes closure on that system that – 
unlike its model – remains open. This is because models always make exclusions that can be motivated but not 
justified in an absolute sense. It is also because the dynamic non-linear interactions cannot be fixed in time. Even 
a lean and general description of the system imposes an artificial closure on complex organisation. Complexity 
                                                      
27 For an account of the decisive role of time as signifying an epistemic revolution and the complex epistemological 
departure from modernism, see Damian Popolo’s (2003) ‘French Philosophy, Complexity and Scientific epistemology: 
Moving beyond the modern episteme’. 
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theory leads us back to a postmodern truism: there is no meaning without exclusion; no priority without a margin 
(65). Given that, from a complexity perspective, the world in itself is not immediately accessible to us, we 
cannot always derive theory from praxis. With complexity, we need achieve a measure of theoretical 
clarification first so that we might embark on a profitable, mutually constitutive engagement with the world.  
III. TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF CRITICAL COMPLEXITY 
This discussion has offered several aspects and consequences of a general theory of complexity, in opposition to 
modernist epistemological strategies and restricted complexity, which make it a critical theory. It would be 
difficult to find a philosophical perspective that called itself uncritical. Therefore, before the general theory of 
complexity is more extensively developed, its status as critical should be elucidated by drawing all these 
distributed offerings together. Perhaps most evidently, critical complexity is ‘critical of’ modernist 
epistemological strategies (Cilliers 1998a: 107; 2000c: 27-28; 2002: 80-81; Morin 1983a: 23; 2005: 1, 10, 12; 
2008: 1-24). This criticism extends to the error of unreflective reductions and simplifications, and the absolute 
status of knowledge that arises within this paradigm. Critical complexity also interrogates and repositions certain 
foundations/centres/grounds that justify knowledge within this paradigm. Here, oppositions that have grounded 
claims to certain truth are included. Dichotomies such as epistemology/ontology and subject/object come under 
pressure. Critical complexity opens the space for the interruption of the status of knowledge (Cilliers 2002: 80-
83; Morin 1992: 386). Auto-criticism is also inherent to critical complexity because its critical strategies are 
reflexive (Morin 1992: 3). This auto-criticism is directed at theory and the observer constructing, developing and 
applying the theory. The observing self-subject is no more an absolute foundation for knowledge than the 
observed object of positivism.  
The positive or substantive content of a critical theory of complexity or a theory of critical complexity always 
defers to Morin’s (1992: 386) insight that complexity manifests in the first place as the impossibility of 
simplification that arises from the dynamic structure of complex systems. More radically, perhaps, it can be said 
that it arises from the dynamic structure of the largest complex system – everything that is (Cilliers, Richardson 
& Lissack 2001: 8).28 The notion of a system as a model that can be used to elucidate local and global structures 
calls attention to the embedded nature of all systems. This flows from the conceptualisation of an open system 
followed by Cilliers (1998a: 37-41) and Morin (1992: 99) that considers relations rather than isolated units. The 
system itself can be a critical tool, a means of arriving at value judgements. It is thus positioned as a tool for 
understanding and criticising, for example, social relations.  
                                                      
28 I refer to the argument made earlier, that ultimately all complex systems are embedded in an undefined universal system. 
See footnote 16. 
30 
 
The emphasis on the direct or indirect relation of everything to everything always implies a critique of the 
system’s boundary (Cilliers 2002: 81). As it has been emphasised, rather than a naturally or transcendentally 
given site; the boundary is a frame constituted in the choice of observation. The dynamic and open structure of 
complex systems undermines the boundary as a clear determinate border line. However, all attempts at 
knowledge necessitate a boundary or frame. The frame cannot be found; it is chosen. This element of choice is 
the normative content at work in every attempt to understand. Complexity theory exposes this normativity – the 
critical moment – in order to open knowledge and actions to the possibility of being corrected. This possibility is 
never exhausted. Critical complexity theory is critical because it calls for the perpetual opening and reopening of 
the possibility that knowledge may be otherwise. It insists upon the acknowledgement of the normative moment 
implicated in all knowledge. Here another aspect of ‘criticalness’ can be marked. Critical complexity theory, 
because it opens what less modest theories, perspectives and politics closes up, is concerned with change. A 
system poised at a critical point in its history is one which is open to novelty, good or bad. When we speak of a 
person or an economy or a country at a critical moment, there is always something of an acknowledgement that 
we do not know what will happen next. This sense of criticality is retained in critical complexity. 
The analysis of complexity has an inescapable circularity. In approaching complex phenomena, we already 
assume that we know, albeit partially, what it is we are approaching. This assumption is open to revision, but the 
understanding of complexity that informs an analysis nevertheless frames the theory that is developed. However, 
the engagement between complexity thinking and the complex is dialogical. The to and fro motion does not 
come to rest. The point of departure, it is clear, is that we are not dealing with objects as they are understood in 
the modernist account. Rather, we are dealing with dynamic systems (Morin 1992: 143). Morin’s texts suggest 
that the confrontation with recurring themes in the attempt to acquire certain knowledge of the world is what 
leads us to a multifaceted understanding of complexity (Dobuzinskis 2004: 438). These themes can be 
understood as leading towards a general characterisation of complexity: 
a. Disorder and randomness cannot be reduced to order or made completely predictable. 
b. Certain phenomena such as living systems and social systems are highly complicated and plainly exceed 
descriptions that attempt to simplify behaviour in order to understand it. 
c. Order and disorder are both important aspects of organisation and this often falls beyond logical 
explanation. 
d. The appearance of singular phenomena in scientific endeavours demonstrates the limits of universal 
abstraction that denies singularity in order to construct categories. 
e. The nature of self-organisation in systems in which the relations between parts are not ordained from 
outside or above is an increasingly useful and interesting field of enquiry across several academic 
disciplines. 
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f. The observation of certain phenomena undermines the clear distinction between object and observer or 
object and environment. 
g. The unavoidable appearance of the observer or subject as a mediator in the observation of the object 
undermines the purity of observation as an absolute foundation of knowledge. 
h. Conventional methods of understanding fail to explain or characterise many phenomena. 
These eight themes serve as points of access into complexity thinking in which each aforementioned theme is 
not an obstacle to knowledge, but can be understood as integral to knowledge (436-438). 
Navigating beyond this initial confrontation with complexity as a common feature of objects of knowledge, 
Cilliers (1998a: 3, 4) provides a model of complex systems in terms of ten general characteristics. This is not 
exactly a definition because it maintains a level of generality that must be supplemented in the description of a 
specific complex system, but it does go a long way to clarifying the notion of complexity:29 
1. Complex systems are made up of a large number of elements, but are not reducible to these elements. 
The system is a result of the relations between these elements.  
2. Interaction between these elements is dynamic and changes with time. 
3. This interaction is rich. In other words, elements are not connected in pairs or pockets.  
4. Interactions are non-linear, which means that elements are exposed to change along different and 
dispersed paths of influence and causality. 
5. Elements are generally influenced by other elements that are closer rather than further away. This does 
not mean that interactions cannot have wide-ranging impacts on the system.  
6. There are loops in the system, which means that interactions feed back into the system. 
7. Complex systems are open systems. 
8. Complex systems do not operate near equilibrium. In fact, equilibrium or stagnation for complex 
systems is equivalent to death. 
9. Memory is a precondition for the existence of a system. The system always has a history. 
10. No one element can control the whole system or fully determine the behaviour of any other element in 
the system. Every element is both active and passive: acting and constrained by action.  
These characteristics are critical to the further development of the complexity argument. As such, they are 
deserving of some further discussion. It is easy to argue that complexity is a result of finite human understanding 
simply not being able to calculate all the interactions that are multiple and recursive. If this were the case, then it 
would be possible to imagine that complexity remains solvable even if this is only a theoretical possibility. 
                                                      
29  “These characteristics are not offered as a definition of complexity, but rather as a general, low-level, qualitative 
description” (Cilliers 2000c: 24, author’s emphasis) 
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However, having a large number of interactions/relations/differences is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the emergence of complexity. These interactions do not unfold as frames in a cinematic reel. They are 
continuous and dynamic. To describe the system at a given moment in time is to abstract from this continuity 
and richness. Furthermore, while it may appear clear which elements are related to which in the system, any 
attempt to specify these relations ignores the extent to which all elements are embedded in the system as a whole 
and, as such, are connected to every other element in the system. This is why local interactions that appear to 
involve just a few relations can have wide ranging effects. 
To describe these interactions as non-linear is to say that they are not additive. A dense network of interaction 
cannot be replaced by a small set of simple interactions that can be determined by observing the system. Non-
linearity also results in the condition in which small effects can have large causes and vice versa. Non-linearity 
frustrates the process of determining cause and effect, the observation of which requires construction. Effects 
cannot be contained and feed back into the structure of the system, also reverberating through its node of origin. 
The system, so long as it is alive, so to speak, remains in motion. It does not reach equilibrium. Stagnation 
means the system is no longer organising (Cilliers 1998a: 4). This does not mean that there is no structural 
integrity in complex systems. Complexity is not chaos. There is structure and often high levels of stability. 
However, it is never quite the same from one moment to the next. 
The notion of stability raises a few questions. One may ask how the structure of complex systems is determined, 
how relations are formed or why they are maintained. Or formulated differently: where is the centre of a 
complex system? The system is not determined from inside, above or outside. There is not one node or isolated 
relation that can determine the course of development a system follows. Interactions are local and ignorant of the 
system in its entirety. What may be observed as the overall structure is an emergent property of the interactions 
in the system (5, 89). The term ‘self-organisation’ refers to the fact that the system is not externally structured. It 
does not imply a deterministic subjectivity that arises out of organization and then retroactively does all the work 
of organisation. The work of organisation is distributed across the system (91).30 The observation that there is no 
centre of control does not mean that anything can happen in a complex system. In a lean sense, absolute novelty 
is possible in the system; but these possibilities are constrained by organisation at the level of the whole and at 
the level of local interactions between parts. The system remains open to new manifest organisation because of 
the dispersed organisation of its relations. It thus always contains unrealised alternatives to itself. This potential 
opens a gulf that threatens to unpin the presence of identity and set it afloat upon a sea of contingency and 
uncertainty.  
Structural constraint should not merely be thought of negatively. It is also enabling. It enables the system to be 
what it is. To use complexity language: the system emerges as a system as a result of the interactions between 
                                                      
30 “Self-organisation is an emergent property of the system as a whole (or of large enough subsystems)” (Cilliers 1998a: 91). 
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nodes in the system constituted through differences. There is not more to the system than relations; and the way 
in which these relations unfold in time constitutes the system as system.31 The system is not constituted by an 
essence; it is constituted by what happens in the system. It is the result of its history, although the word ‘result’ is 
used reluctantly. It connotes a finality which is in contradiction with the perpetual dynamism of the system. A 
more sensitive formulation could be to say that it is the process of its history. Memory is constitutive of the 
system (4). History never ceases to matter. 
The idea that the system has a memory and that it unfolds in time is not one to which so-named restricted 
complexity theorists or systems theorists would be averse. Nonetheless, the theoretical force of this insight is 
neutralised by its marginalisation in the process of modelling systems. The synchronic view is privileged over 
the diachronic (Saussure 1983: 89). Better to freeze the system so that we may pick it apart. Katherine Hayles 
(20001: 37 -162) therefore opposes systems thinking as the heir of cybernetic ideas to narratives. The narrative 
shows what synchronic systems thinking can only add as a footnote to the analysis: the system may be 
otherwise. And if the system may be otherwise, then the closure of the system is also contingent. The inclusion 
of temporality as a fundamental characteristic of complex systems is thus an acknowledgement of contingency. 
On the level of human political and social systems, this becomes an important guard against the petrifaction of 
the system and its boundary.  
Humberto Maturana’s analysis of self-organising living systems put forward an intimate and mutually dependent 
relation between the system’s autopoiesis, its self-production, and its operational closure (Rasch 2000: 74). In 
other words, autopoietic systems are closed to their environments, which cannot affect their operations or 
organisation in any direct way. There can only be a relation of loose coupling with anything outside the system. 
The outside can influence the system in terms of perturbations or unspecific disturbances. There is no causal 
relation between system and environment (Rasch 2000: 75; Hayles 2000: 141). This idea of operational closure 
has been taken up in systems thinking and it stands juxtaposed with critical complexity.32 The life of the system 
is dependent on its ability to interact with its environment (Cilliers1998a: 91).  
Complex systems need to be open. Openness can be conceptualised in terms of flows through the system that 
allow the system to be sustained as a system (Morin 1992: 196). Resources like fuel and information are taken 
into the system and used to produce outputs. For Morin (208), the openness of open systems is not a pure or 
                                                      
31 Morin uses several contradictory and complementary statements to summarise the relationship between the system as a 
whole and its parts. The whole is always less than the sum of its parts; and it is simultaneously also more than the sum of its 
parts; and both the whole and the parts are only ever partial (Levi 1991: 91).  
32 This discussion necessitates another reference to Niklas Luhmann. The first reference excluded – in footnote 19 – 
Luhmann (1993) from the critical project explored here. The relation between operational closure and autopoiesis in 
Luhmann’s differentiated social systems is discussed and criticised by Rasch (2000) and Hayles (2000). The distance 
between types if systems thinking that emphasise closure and ones that emphasise openness should be more apparent in 
light of this discussion of the dynamics and structure of complex systems. 
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exclusive openness. Openness and closure, while not collapsible, are also not foreign to one another. The open 
system needs both openness and closure to function. The system has a boundary and is therefore enclosed; and 
that boundary is problematic and permeable, which means that closure is never complete (Cilliers 2001; 2002c; 
Juarrero 2002). Complex systems are robust because they are able to negotiate complex and dynamic 
environments. This can only be possible if information about the environment outside the system is represented 
in some way inside the system (Cilliers 1998a: 10). The open system allows for some form of communication 
between the system and its environment.  
Cilliers’ (3, 4) sketch of complex systems maintains a level of generality necessary for the development of the 
notion of complexity as such. These characteristics are not meant to stand in for a substantive description of any 
particular system (5). In this sense, a general theory of complexity is not a doctrinaire metanarrative. It is itself a 
dynamic description that is developed in the attempt to approach specific complex phenomena with sensitivity. 
Examples of these complex systems are the brain and language, both of which are systems of meaning (Cilliers 
1998a: 37-47; Cilliers & Gouws 2001). Each of these systems maintains its distinctness and differences within 
this general scheme. There is another important facet at work in the attempt to understand complex phenomena 
as complex systems – this is the orientation or position of the observer in relation to the system.  
The system is always selected from its environment. What is included and excluded is not always obvious or 
given (Cilliers 1998a: 7). The openness and closure of the system is always to some extent the result of the 
position and frame of the description thereof (Morin 1992: 197; Cilliers 1998a: 7). For example if I choose to 
describe the legal system, I must decide how to include people in the system and how to frame the enquiry. Do I 
expand it to the level of society? Do I exclude aspects and relations of the elements that place them in other 
systems such as the political system or the economic system? The elements of complex systems can be poly-
contextual and therefore have more than one meaning in more than one system. These meanings do not 
disappear when they are described within a specific frame. The possibility of contagion from other systems is 
thus intrinsic to at least some complex systems and certainly those involving human beings.33 
The list of ten characteristics is very useful in approaching complexity. However, Cilliers (1998a: 70, 81)argues, 
having made this theoretical clearing, our understanding of complex systems can be further enriched by 
interrogating existing models or modes of description. Rule-based or formal descriptions have been used to 
describe complex systems in the past. However, this process is undermined by the incompressibility of non-
linearity in the system; and also by the dynamic organisation that cannot be captured in terms of fixed non-
                                                      
33 This idea calls up Morin’s (2005: 5) expressed disavowal of disjunctive analysis, which denies precisely this openness to 
other descriptions. Morin (5) explain that “[the] principle of disjunction…consists in isolating and separating cognitive 
difficulties from one another, leading to the separation between disciplines, which have become hermetic from one 
another”. 
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dynamic rules (Cilliers 2000b). The system’s excesses and irregularities cannot be contained in a discreet list of 
rules. If a rule-based model were to be used to understand a complex system, the complexity of the system 
would need to be modelled before the model could be used to say anything more substantive about the system. In 
general terms, one could argue that a rule-based understanding is appropriate to simple or complicated things 
(Cilliers 2000b: 42; Morin 1992: 386). Cilliers (1998a: 28) argues that connectionist models have sensitivity to 
complexity by virtue of their structure, which incarnates the characteristics of complex systems. Moreover, as all 
complex systems must store information to cope with the environment, the way the system stores this 
information and organises in response is a crucial component of the modelling process. This is more obvious in 
systems usually associated with meaning, such as natural language systems, but it is not confined to these 
systems.  
This process differs markedly from rule-based descriptions in which there are one-to-one representations 
between atomistic rules and external referents; and connectionist models in which relations of difference allow 
the system to distribute meaning across these relations (19). Connectionism in general will not be discussed at 
any length here. However, a few brief remarks are necessary. Connectionist models are made up of a number of 
elements, which by themselves contain no meaning. They are defined by their relation to one another, which 
develops in time. Through a process of learning, or responding to inputs from the environment, the network 
becomes structured by organising itself. The system organises because it has a memory. It remembers some 
things and forgets others. Meaning arises as the various nodes become weighted in this process (37). In other 
words, they acquire relational meaning that is distributed over the entire system (45).34 At bottom, however, 
these meanings are nothing substantial, nothing positive and cannot be outside the system. Cilliers (37-41) reads 
Saussure’s linguistic system of meaning as a connectionist model. Without representation in the conventional 
sense, meaning is not stored somewhere is the system. It is also not stored somewhere outside the system in a 
world of forms or in a god that is final arbiter. Rather, in Saussure's (1983) system, meaning is the result of 
interactions. Meaning is not given from outside; nor is it disseminated from the centre (Cilliers & Gouws 2001: 
8).  
For Saussure (1983: 67), the meaning of the sign ‘woman’ derives its meaning from arbitrary relations of 
difference on three levels. The first relation is between the two inseparable but nonetheless distinguishable 
aspects of the linguistic sign, the signifier and the signified. The former is a sound image; the latter, its concept. 
Secondly, the signifier ‘sex’ is identifiable because it can be differentiated from other sound images like ‘man’, 
‘woman’, ‘womb’ and ‘dovecote’. Thirdly, the signified or concept is identifiable as that particular concept also 
                                                      
34 Freud’s model of the brain is an example of a connectionist model that anticipates contemporary development of neural 
networks. See Cilliers & Gouws 2001.  
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simply because that concept differs from other concepts. The meaning of ‘sex’ is formed in the opposition of 
various possible meanings. We come to the meaning of ‘sex’ because ‘sex’ does not mean ‘love’, ‘kiss’ or 
‘gender’. To say that the sign is arbitrary is not precisely to say that it is random. Its meaning is the result of a 
certain structure, but that structure could have been otherwise. Sex is a good example of a sign whose publically 
contested meaning has changed dramatically throughout history. In effect, the entire system shifts when 
individual meanings shift because all the signs are implicated in the system of differences.  
On one reading, Saussure (1983) appears to think of language as an open system. This arbitrary nature of the 
sign and the contingency of the self-organising system are, however, fixed on three accounts. First, he (99) 
privileges synchronic analysis over diachronic. Secondly, meaning is still somehow anchored in the dualistic 
character of the sign.35 And thirdly, he privileges speaking over writing because speaking disambiguates what 
writing confuses because of its distance from the speaker’s mind in which the signified is called up (Saussure 
1983: 31; Cilliers 1998a: 38; Derrida 1997: 35). Saussure’s (1983: 98) system is protected from the forces of 
time and change because for Saussure the system is a synchronic phenomenon that cannot be observed over 
time. Relations in the system can only be observed as fixed stable connections. The identity and integrity of the 
system is threatened by temporality. Derrida (2001: 355) reads this system with an eye to unhinging it from its 
metaphysical foundation: “If one erases the radical difference between signifier and signified, it is the word 
signifier itself which ought to be abandoned as a metaphysical concept”. To wit, the opposition between syntax 
and semantics must be deconstructed in order to produce an alternative conceptualisation of representation.  
Structuralism remains within a modernist paradigm in which structure can only be thought in terms of strong 
subject/object opposition. It is an opposition defined by a scrutinising subject laying bare the underlying 
foundational logic of a particular system (Spivak 1997: lvii). It other words, the system of structuralism is not 
complex. It must remain fixed so that its meaning can be established objectively. This is not a flat denial of 
meaning or systemic stability. Derrida's general model of language, as a radical reading of Saussure's system of 
                                                      
35 Saussure (1983: 67-68) plainly states that there are, at bottom, only differences in the linguistic system. At the level of the 
signified or the signifier, meaning arises out of the interaction of purely negative entities. The arbitrary nature of the sign 
and its mutability is a function of these negative values (116). The sign as a unity is the correlation of two forms in this 
differential system (118). The sign as a unity is relational; however, it is not purely negative. In this analysis, the correlation 
between an idea and a specific sound image is positive. Saussure (119) writes:  
The moment we compare one sign with another as positive combinations, the term difference should be dropped. It is 
no longer appropriate. It is a term which is suitable only for comparisons between sound patterns (e.g. pére vs. mére), 
or between ideas (e.g. ‘father’ vs. ‘mother’). Two signs, each compromising a signification and a signal, are not 
different from each other, but only distinct (author’s emphasis). 
It is the relation, the linguistic unit, which is the positive content of language. It must be emphasised that the positive 
content of signs is formal and not substantial (120). This unit remains meaningless outside of mutual relations of opposition 
within that particular system whence it emerges. 
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differences, is used by Cilliers (1998a: 37) to open the connectionist model of complex systems.36 Derrida’s 
reading of Saussure demonstrates sensitivity to the complexity of language as a system (55).37 
In order to grasp the spatial, temporal and open character of the system of meaning, Derrida develops the notions 
of différance and trace (Cilliers 1998a: 80). Meaning arises in the differential, delayed, deferring reference 
within the system of signs (Culler 1983: 97). Différance is the process of differentiation of signs in space 
expressed in the relation x is not y is not z is not q. To find the meaning of x, we need to trace its meaning 
through all these relations which do not unfold linearly. In other words, x defers to y, z and q (and all other signs 
in the system) for its meaning while it is actively differentiating itself and being differentiated. Similarly, y, z, 
and q all defer to x when their meaning is traced. In this processing of tracing meaning, complete present 
meaning is unendingly displaced and deferred in time and space. What are present in the system are only traces 
of differences that are perpetually in motion.  
The sign ‘mother’ is not composed of a sound-image and its concept present to itself. When one tries to get at the 
meaning, one is not met with a preformed concept, but rather with a meaning that requires its own clarification 
and framing. One is met with more words/signs, the meaning of which refers to yet more words/signs and so on. 
In this process of perpetual reference, meaning is never finished and present but it is abundant and even 
overabundant (Cilliers 1998a: 80). There is always more meaning yet. Our descriptions of the system may be 
fixed but the system itself is in transformation (44). Because we are immersed in language, our experiences are 
also structured by the logic of the trace (83). This is not an argument for language as a self-contained or 
totalising system, or as a system that acts in one direction on other systems. Meaning arises within a system of 
signs, but that system is not closed to the human, the social, the material, the physical, the biological, the 
cosmos...language speaks to the world and the world talks back. To reiterate an earlier point, it is now clearer 
that a system constituted in the logic of trace and différance is one for which rules are an inadequate description 
(22). If rules are made to do all the work in a theory, then one inevitably needs to pull some metaphysical sleight 
of hand by fixing semantics a priori. 
                                                      
36 Cilliers (1998a: 37) draws these resonant systems together:  
Since it is based on a system of relationships, the post-structural inquiry into the nature of language helps us to 
theorise about the dynamics of the interactions in complex systems. In other words, the dynamics that generates 
meaning in language can be used to describe the dynamics of complex systems in general. 
37 Derrida (1997: 3-93), in Writing Before the Letter, Part I of Of Grammatology, deconstructs Saussure’s system of signs. 
The form and consequences of this deconstruction will be treated more thoroughly in chapter 2.  
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IV. STRUCTURE, THE BOUNDARY AND THE OUTSIDE 
a.  COMPLEX ORGANISATION IS DYNAMIC AND HETEROGENEOUS 
The connectionist model opened by différance is the starting point for this discussion of complex organisation. 
This process of opening is multifaceted. Whenever complex structure is discussed, three distinct and interrelated 
constituents must be considered. These are the inside, the system’s border and system’s outside. The system’s 
outside can be viewed from two perspectives that deliver qualitatively different descriptions. From one 
perspective, if it is possible to zoom out beyond the boundary of the system, the outside can be seen as the 
environment of the system. The environment is itself also always a complex system (Cilliers 2005a: 258). In 
terms of the system itself, or a perspective inside the system, the outside can be described as that which is not or 
not yet represented within the system. The inside, boundary and outside are constituted in the play of differences 
in the system and outside it. Complex organisation emerges at these three sites. This organisation produces both 
order and disorder; stability and change; hierarchies and movement. The temptation exists to interpret the 
complex system of differences as a visual metaphor in which many small evenly spaced nodes are encircled by a 
perforated line demarcating what is in and what is out. Even though this is a useful first conception, the 
temptation to stay with this picture should be resisted. Although the separation of the inside, outside and 
boundary is very helpful, it is merely a matter of convenience. Their genesis is simultaneous and mutually 
constitutive.  
The internal structure of complex systems has already been described under the discussion of a general theory of 
complexity. There is a dynamic and rich interaction of elements which move and are moved in a decentred 
process of interaction that replicates Derrida’s differing and deferring logic of différance. Because the system is 
not fixed, the movement of différance always involves every element in the system. For this movement to come 
to an end has been identified with death. And as a corollary, for the system to live or to survive it must never 
cease to organise in response to external information and internal organisation. Meaning in the system is thus 
constantly shifting.  
The complex system is not. It is always becoming. This process in time requires that the system includes space. 
For elements in a complex system to be able to organise dynamically, they cannot be tightly stacked. There must 
be a degree of freedom. That is to say, relations need space to be able to change. Spacing is not an element in the 
system. It is precisely that which the system cannot bring under the control of its organisation or erase. If it 
could, the system would be able to bring itself into order or to equilibrium. However, even as the system 
organises itself; it simultaneously disorganises itself. Some spaces are closed and others open or widen. Space 
and time are not external parameters of the complex system. Both are intimately involved in organisation of the 
system and the emergence of structure.  
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Organisation in complex systems includes both the opening and closing of space. Perhaps Morin’s (1992: 72) 
insight might help to elaborate on this point. The complex system, while it is organising, cannot be dead. 
However, it is always perpetually dying and living. Certain elements may even disappear, except as traces stored 
in the system’s memory. They may or may not be replaced by others. The internal integrity of a complex system 
does not depend on the maintenance of the same or an extension of the present. It is generative, degenerative and 
regenerative. Its structure, while it may not produce dramatic novelty in the form of an entirely new 
configuration, always necessarily includes an element of novelty. In other words, there is not only difference at 
the level of the parts of a complex system. The system as a system also always already differs from itself.38 This 
difference can be almost unperceived or it can be a dramatic break at which the system’s organisation takes off 
on a radically different path of development.  
If one follows the visual metaphor in which a complex system has differences that play out on only one plane, it 
appears that the structure of a complex system is flat. It seems that an egalitarian argument is germinating in this 
decentred process. But alas, all elements are not equal. If one thinks of a complex system with an absolute 
centre, it is easy to imagine that a clear hierarchy would emerge from this centre, down. It might be conceded 
that these hierarchies contain pockets of organisation at different levels but also that these lower level hierarchies 
are confined by the limitations imposed by the overall top-down organisation of the whole. Complex systems are 
not comprised of homogenous elements and they do have hierarchy (Cilliers 1998a: 95). These hierarchies are 
contingent. They are not deterministic. They shift with the general structure of the system and are always 
vulnerable to radical re-organisation. Hierarchy emerges with structure. They are not confined to specific levels, 
nor do they fit into each other like a stack of traffic cones. They are heterogeneous, emergent “at every scale” 
and always emerge within a specific context. If the context changes hierarchies, are able to transform (Cilliers 
2001: 144). This type of contingent and heterogeneous constellation of hierarchies has been characterised as a 
“heterarchy” (Cilliers, Heylighen & Gershenson 2007:10). 
The fact that there are hierarchies in complex systems implies that there are relations of power and that deference 
between elements in the systems is not quite so free and reflexive as first proposed. However, to say that 
relations between elements and between clusters of elements are necessarily asymmetrical is not to say that 
                                                      
38 Saussure (1983: 71-78) already tries to theorise both the variability and invariability of the system in terms of its 
becoming in time. He argues that, “It is because the linguistic sign is arbitrary that it knows no other law than tradition and 
because it is founded upon tradition that it can be arbitrary” (74). For tradition, it is perhaps more in keeping with 
complexity language to insert, ‘convention’. He goes on to argue, “The passage of time, which ensures the continuity of a 
language, also has another effect, which appears to work in the opposite direction. It allows linguistic signs to be changed 
with some rapidity (74)”.  
Cilliers (1998a: 97) uses complexity language to make the same point. Under certain conditions: 
...movement from one stable state to another will require very strong perturbations. For this reason the system will 
respond sluggishly to changes in the environment. However, with the system poised at the point of criticality...will 
also be able to change its state with the least amount of effort (97). 
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relations of domination and marginalisation are good. Structure is necessary and necessarily produces 
asymmetry.39 This asymmetry can tend toward domination and it is as likely to tend towards reification in the 
auto-organisation of the system as it is towards disintegration. The theoretical point has three prongs: all forms 
of organisation contain asymmetry; all asymmetry is dangerous; the dynamics of the system can reinforce or 
undermine asymmetrical structures.  
It must be re-emphasised that the organisation that reinforces or undermines ordering in the system is not 
bottom-up. That is to say, it is not merely the revolt of the parts against the tyranny of the whole. The parts and 
the whole are mutually constitutive. They are also mutually implicated in the disordering of this constitution. 
The system or whole that emerges out of relations of difference acquires a form of agency that can be 
characterised as downward causation. Sometimes this agency is quite easily locatable as in the case of 
consciousness emerging out of the interactions of neurons in the human brain. In other complex systems, such as 
the economic system, this higher level, emergent whole is not as easy to see. This is to the extent that the system 
is reduced to its parts– human actors– in order to argue that the system as such has no effect on what actions may 
or may not be taken at lower levels. In other words, structural causation only flows upwards.  
The danger of overemphasising downward causality or attributing a form of agency to it is that it obscures 
organisation and agency at the level of the parts. The opposite danger is that erasure of agency at the level of the 
system results in the system itself losing its capacity to bear responsibility for the constraint of the freedom of 
the parts at all. It appears, then, only as an immutable monolith that hangs above autonomous, unconstrained and 
wholly undetermined elements. However, following the complex structure thus far explored, the emergent whole 
is not merely the sum of its parts. While it is nothing mystical, it remains non-identical with internal or lower-
level interactions. Agency, which must not be confused with a sort of anthropomorphic selfhood, persists at both 
levels which are distinct but inseparable. At the hand of a paradigmatic example, such as the legal system that 
constrains human beings through its infrastructure and texts created in the relations and interactions between 
human beings, downward causation is difficult to theorise away.  
b. THE BOUNDARY 
The description of a system, and especially a system open to its environment, implies that this system is 
somehow distinguishable from an environment and from other systems. Even an open system is closed and must 
be bounded in some way. Thus far, this discussion has assumed that complex systems can be identified or 
                                                      
39Cilliers (1998a: 95) explains:  
If the initial state of the system is fully homogenous, the evolving structure could be symmetrical too. This will inhibit 
the development of complex structure. Symmetry-breaking is usually achieved spontaneously by means of missing or 
incorrect connections (or other happenings of chance), as well as by the non-linearity of the system and the resulting 
sensitivity to small fluctuations. 
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recognised even if the process is never complete. This identification could involve thinking of the system as 
having a clear visual boundary; however, it has already been stated that complex systems cannot always be seen 
and their conception may exceed the constraints of ocular metaphors. Notions like operational closure, 
elaborating on insights from Maturana, reinforce this picture of a boundary as a clear line around the periphery 
of the system, perhaps perforated to allow for certain flows in and out of the system (Rasch 2000: 74). These 
flows do not problematise the boundary as such. However, a more sensitive approach to complexity sees the 
boundary not as a clear line between inside and outside, but rather as the distinction that enables the inside to be 
constituted as inside (Cilliers 2001: 141). The boundary may be in many places and at many levels at once. What 
is inside that system is thus always at the boundary because it is always being constituted and reconstituted in its 
difference from the outside. 
This insight, this way of thinking the boundary, leads to a concern with both marginality and the context. The 
boundary does more work and is made to do more work when things are not clear, when hybridity and impurity 
challenge the boundary to make its mark. Marginal cases cannot be pushed out of sight if we want to understand 
complex systems (141). Marginality is thus displaced in its relation to the centre. The points that have been made 
so far regarding the openness, contingency, recognisable structure and thus identity of complex systems rest on a 
particular conceptualisation of the boundary of such systems. The boundary as an inside/outside distinction can 
be elaborated further. 
In complex systems, it is imperative that the boundary is distinguished from a limit, which is rigid and fixed 
(Juarrero 2002: 100). Boundaries can be traversed, shifted and viewed from both sides. However, we only ever 
see one side of a limit (Cilliers 2002: 82). The limit is related to Morin’s (2007:2) epistemological blind spots. 
They are a function of the way we know a system. A distinct way of thinking of the boundary is that the 
boundary is the emergent property of the complex internal relations of components of the system (Juarrero 2002: 
101). The emergent boundaries do not eventually settle and neatly define the system (Cilliers 2001: 141). Indeed, 
to reiterate an earlier point, as complex systems shift and develop in time with ever enriched histories, their 
boundaries becomes even more dispersed and problematic over time (Morin 2005: 15). Just when a boundary 
had been identified, the system could reproduce itself with increasing incidences of deviation from present 
configurations of relations in the system. The boundary is plainly not a spatial designation. Juarrero (2002: 100) 
designates it rather aptly, as an “active site”.  Its activity is inside/outside differentiation. 
The structure and boundary are both emergent structures that cannot be considered outside organisation. This 
description has left the observing subject aside to focus on the object, the complex system being observed. 
However, as it has already been argued, the subject is implicated in the constitution of every object as an object 
of observation. The world is not naked and carved up for subjects to merely label. The subject, even in a rigorous 
and provisional observation, is always situated and always brings a certain perspective and frame that necessarily 
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shift the boundary and reverberate through the structure of a complex system. This is also so for the system’s 
outside.  
c. OUTSIDE THE COMPLEX SYSTEM 
The system’s outside can be understood as its context or environment. The environment becomes meaningful to 
the system through its internal differentiation between information and noise and the interpretation thereof. In 
terms of the system, its environment is constantly changing as its internal resources allow for new 
interpretations. However, the environment is also shifted once again in the organisational shifting of boundaries. 
It also follows from the implication of an observing subject in the constitution of the boundary and impact on 
internal structure, that this subject and the frame it imposes in its observation will be implicated in the ‘selection’ 
of the system’s environment. Both the subject and the system operate by selection, which is a result of structure, 
which is a result of memory (Cilliers 2006: 109). The system's ability to anticipate a range of possible futures is 
linked to how rich this memory is. Selection produces the system as the system that it is: its identity emerges as 
the collection of its histories. The notion of selection is also significant because it is a function of the limitation 
of the system. It is because it cannot process its entire environment entirely, the system must make choices.  
A final note on the outside of the system must be made. For purpose, it is useful to refer to an example. If a 
complex system – in this case a cultural community – observes itself or a member of this community observes it, 
the outside is not merely a meaningful environment. There is also something which, in a dynamic system, 
escapes the production of meaning in the system. There is always noise. This noise may lie beyond the boundary 
of the system, but it is equally also present inside the system. Complex interaction produces and is produced by 
ordered and disordered relations (Morin 1992: 35, 41, 48).40 From the perspective of the observer, all attempts to 
understand a system as meaningful always produce their own forms of non-understanding (Morin 2007: 2). What 
is excluded is constituted in the act of understanding and participates in the constitution of that understanding 
through which it was produced. For this argument the notion of spacing must be invoked again.  
In the movement of differentiation, the open spaces that arise out of the process of organisation are unmarked by 
the ordering of the system. Something always escapes. The unmarked space cannot be made meaningful. Or 
                                                      
40 Morin (1992: 41) argues that complex organization cannot be reduced to regions of order that appear to conform to our 
methods of understanding, nor can regions of disorder be disregarded as merely exceptional and excluded from our 
conceptual scheme on this basis. The mutual implication of order and disorder is the complexity that we must try to 
understand knowing that our understanding will never be perfect: 
Order, disorder, organising potentiality must be thought of together, both in their well-known antagonistic character 
and in their unknown complementary character. These terms shuttle from one to the other and form a sort of moving 
loop. 
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rather, if it is, another will open. The system consists of meaning and non-meaning. The dynamics of the system 
ensures this. This is the outside inside the system. What is unmarked does not stay the same. For this to be the 
case, the system itself would have to stay the same. The process of marking and unmarking also applies in the 
system’s selection and interpretation of the environment. It might prove a hazardous formulation, but what is 
unmarked beyond the boundary could be called the outside outside. And the marked environment could be an 
extension of the inside outside. However, as a final note to the note on the outside, it must be stressed that the 
inside itself has already been disrupted by the movement of complexity. The absolute purity of the interior is 
interrupted by the exterior and vice versa.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that complexity thinking exposes the violence of theory on two levels. The first is the 
violence of confining complex dynamic phenomena to petrified, reductionist, conceptual schemes. The second 
and related violence at play is the theoretical chauvinism associated with claims to truth within distinct 
discourses. Critical, reflexive positions are pushed to the margins of theory in favour of the ostensive certainty 
offered by essentialism and even structuralism and other reified perspectives or indeed master concepts. These 
violent discourses are ignorant of the error in their observation. As such, they remain alienated from the very 
possibility that the violence of observation might be corrected. In the endeavour to create knowledge, the 
openness, the cracks, the spaces are filled in, bringing the system slowly towards stagnation. It may appear from 
the juxtaposition of modernist and complexity paradigms emphasising the mutilation or violence of modern 
thought that the argument made here exonerates complexity thinking of all violence, epistemological and 
otherwise. This is certainly not the case. Critical complexity is sensitive to the violence that is implicated in the 
meaningful interpretation of the world from any philosophical perspective. It is sensitive to the limits that 
constitute knowledge as knowledge. The epistemological frame that a subject and collective subjects bring to 
phenomena, allowing them to appear to us, imposes certain limitations on how we can know and what we may 
know (Cilliers 2002: 78). 
Epistemology and ontology are not easily disentangled, let alone opposed to one another, if one departs from a 
complex understanding of self and world. This deliberate opposition is drawn only in order to disambiguate what 
we are doing when we are using the language of complexity (79). As a metaphysical distinction, it cannot be 
maintained. This is because as knowing subjects, constituted in our knowledge and linguistic networks, we are in 
the world and of the world while maintaining our position as distinct knowing subjects. We do not arbitrate over 
the world as free floating islands of intelligence over a sea of either dead or chaotic matter. The complexity of 
complex organisation cannot be captured once and for all in any description, least of all this one. However, the 
attempt to say something meaningful about the world is not disavowed just because it is fraught with difficulty. 
This means that everything that is said must be said with caution, in a way that allows for shifts in 
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understanding. Everything that is said is said by someone. The constitution of knowledge is no innocent matter 
and responsibility for it cannot be transferred onto the system, the world, or a transcendental principle.  
Drawing to the end of this initial consideration of complexity thinking, a pertinent question that has quietly 
pervaded this analysis can be brought to the surface. What could it be to think structure without thinking its 
“structurality” (Derrida 2001: 351)? And conversely, what is the claim made here, that complexity thinks the 
‘structurality’ of structure? To the former: a certain strategies that can be collectively considered as modernist, 
that are acknowledged here to have their own internal differences, employ a type of thinking one can term 
essentialist. This type of thinking is characterised by the ideas that objects are deterministic; reducible to parts or 
to the whole; and that those disjunctive methodologies that isolate and close objects from one another are 
appropriate knowledge uncovering strategies. This is essentialist because the real meaning and absolute true 
identity of objects is located in self-contained essences found either in the composite parts or on the level of the 
totalising whole. Patterns of thinking that begin to leave behind this essentialist and atomistic modes of 
understanding are perceptible in structuralist and complexity concerned endeavours. These strategies generally 
approach the object in terms of its internal relations and relationship with its environment. They are therefore 
inherently resistant to the epistemological paradigm that can be read into modernist projects. The desire to 
control the interplay of order and disorder in organisation was fuelled by an underpinning need for simplification 
as a foundation for knowledge. Thus a shift from essence to structure was executed by Saussure and his 
intellectual heirs and restricted complexity thinkers. 
However, this structure is neutralised. It is fixed; contained by the analysis. The structure remained reducible in 
its essence. The laws of complexity and the dual-sided signifier/signified allowed for the closure of structure. 
Self-organising systems implied some manner of a self that is doing the organising. But from these tentative 
forays into the world of complex organisation, a different approach took its leave. Cilliers (1998a: 107) cautions 
against the deification of the system: 
Although strains of thought that value the importance of relationships – and look for patterns rather than 
essences – can be found throughout the intellectual history of the West, they have usually been trampled 
over by more macho theories claiming to have found the Truth: Platonic idealism, rationalism, Marxism, 
positivism. In our analysis of complex systems (like the brain and language) we must avoid the trap of 
trying to find master keys. 
In other words, what is said here about complex structure reveals the paradox of complexity. The 
acknowledgement of complexity leads us to a position of modesty and caution because we know that in 
whatever we say about complex systems, we have always already said too much and too little. This is because 
whatever is said makes certain unavoidable omissions, known and unknown. Furthermore, what is said is 
undermined by the unfolding of the system in time. Thus a description is always incomplete and can be 
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expanded; and at the same time, it is too expansive because what is said cannot be guaranteed in any final way. 
Once the structure is set free from the centres we have used to fix it, its structurality exceeds our modes of 
knowing. Whatever we say is provisional and contextual. It is a selection that is mutually enabled and 
constrained by the subject, object and environment.  
The structurality of structure, to return to the latter question directing this answer, is the dynamic spatial and 
temporal organisation which emerges as a result of relations in the system. It emerges. Structure emerges. 
Perhaps, for some, this statement is not enough. Indeed, for complexity thinkers, including the critical 
complexity thinkers of whom I identify Paul Cilliers and Edgar Morin, it is not enough. Complexity does not 
issue an imperative to cease knowing or acting in the world. This chapter has devoted considerable attention to 
the exploration and development of Cilliers’ (1998a: 3, 4) lean description of complex systems in terms of ten 
general characteristics. In this process, provisionally, certain spaces have been closed. In other words, their 
meaning has been reinforced and developed. But others will certainly have been opened. To cut right to the 
chase, the dynamics of complex systems and the limitations and boundaries at play in the constitution of 
knowledge imply a certain ethics (Cilliers 2002: 83).  
This ethics is implied because the argument from complexity and for uncertainty leads back to the moment of the 
decision. Complexity always implies normativity in the act of knowing. Complex systems, because they cannot 
be known in their complexity, must be framed or bounded in a way that necessarily limits our understanding. 
These limits, beyond which we are blind, cannot be predicted. This frame is not deduced or found, but rather 
constructed and chosen (Cilliers 2004: 22). The place accorded to the decision is what distances understanding in 
terms of critical complexity from knowing within a paradigm of simplification. Ethics is understood here as 
turning on choice. Complex systems are ethical because they are not more than the choices that are made at 
every level of the system. These choices do not determine the system in a linear fashion but they are at work in 
the system’s structure (Cilliers 2000c: 29). 
The structurality or complex organisation of structure undermines certain foundational oppositions. These 
include subject/object, knowledge/reality, order/disorder, inside/outside, and normative/fact. These oppositions 
do help us to know things, but they thwart the desire to understand complex systems. Knowledge and 
understanding imply a certain closure. This is not an argument against knowing. If it were, its form would 
certainly be rather a challenge to explain away. No one escapes thinking. We mark, we close, and we fix systems 
in the process of living rich and meaningful lives. But here another movement, a certain play, flows in exactly 
the opposite direction. It distorts and smudges markings. It opens, allowing the inside to escape and the outside 
to intrude. It resists our fixing and dissolves the centres we erect and protect from the structure itself. Is this 
complexity thinking? It is emphatically not. Complexity thinking does not escape the impulse to theorise and to 
impose closure on systems. It is, perhaps better to say that complexity thinking acknowledges the contrapuntal 
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movement of both thrusts in thought. This acknowledgement carries complexity to the other side of the 
epistemological break. 
This chapter began by placing the complexity thinking of Cilliers and Morin alongside one another in a space 
opened by a radical epistemological paradigm shift and by modernism itself. It was also suggested that the 
present endeavour is not to collapse these two distinct voices into one for the sake of cohesion. However, a 
degree of confluence is unavoidable in the construction of the argument for critical complexity. From here, the 
main point of departure for the conceptualisation of violence in the system is Cilliers’ (1998a: 3-4) model of 
complexity in terms of connectionist thinking. This choice is made because of the centrality of meaning in this 
model. It is also made because it is expressly engaged with poststructuralism as another philosophical 
perspective that is concerned with complexity and complex phenomena.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE SYSTEM: READING DECONSTRUCTION AS AN ITERATION OF 
CRITICAL COMPLEX SYSTEMS THINKING  
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist thematic of broken 
immediacy is therefore the saddened, negative, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play 
whose other side would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the 
world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and 
without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter 
otherwise than as loss of the center. And it plays without security. For there is a sure play: that which is 
limited to the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation also 
surrenders itself to genetic in determination, to the seminal adventure of the trace. There are thus two 
interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of 
deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity 
of interpretation as an exile (Derrida 2001: 369). 
The old universe was reified (Morin 1992: 58).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, like the previous one, is prefaced with an excerpt from Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of 
the Human Sciences (Derrida 2001). Both critical complexity theory and deconstruction are framed by the 
resounding epistemological rupture that turns on and away from the centre.41 It has previously been suggested 
that Derrida’s writing provides a wealth of theoretical tools that can be used to think the structures of thinking, 
and of language and of phenomena as systems and as systems without centres. This is possible only if the system 
is thought as a collection of relations of differences (Saussure 1983: 67). An additional requirement is that the 
system is not itself an attempt to reinstate order and restore the centre, to capitalise itself and protect itself from 
the differential logic and epistemological uncertainty it espouses (Cilliers 1998a: 107).42 The recognition of 
deconstruction as operating within the acknowledgement of “parergonality” as the logic of the process of 
                                                      
41 Both Morin (2007: 4; 1992: 386) and Cilliers (1998a: 2-4, 107) argue that the acknowledgement of complexity is an 
acknowledgement of the error in modernist reductionist, epistemological strategies. All attempts to know complexity are 
frustrated by the structure and dynamics of complex systems, but some models are better at negotiating this structure than 
others.  
42 Morin (1992: 150) is aware of the limitations of the system as a model like all models, that enables understanding and 
also limits it: 
Therefore, we must clearly understand that my aim, though integrally systemic, is opposed to the majority of 
systemist positions which, believing they have overcome the paradigm of simplification by refusing to reduce the 
system to its components, succumb to the paradigm by reducing all things and all beings to the notion of system. 
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framing that enables understanding only by exclusion and marginalisation, and the irrepressible spacing between 
knowledge and the unmediated world in itself echoes this sensitivity (Derrida 1979b: 30; Cornell 1992: 1,2; 
Culler 1983: 196). If all attempts to understand the world are insufficient in this profound way, and the 
conceptual tools Derrida develops expose this insufficiency, they must also be subjected to their own logic in 
order not to surreptitiously fill in the void and produce a new denial of uncertainty (Gasché 1994: 4). Derrida’s 
systemic understanding of understanding, knowledge and sense explored here must also defer to this logic. 
Deconstruction has the paradoxical task of affirming uncertainty and nonetheless producing its own critiques, 
descriptions and arguments. 
Derrida’s engagement with language, writing, philosophy and metaphysics takes the form of a critique in a very 
specific sense. It is not mere criticism of texts and systems, although it does also include this element. It is an 
examination of the presuppositions and grounds evidenced by a position, text or system as the possibility that 
such a system might persist (Johnson in Derrida 1981a: xv). It is also an examination of the limits of these 
grounds and the conditions under which the system or text is impossible (Gasché 1994: 4, 7). As a critique, 
deconstruction: 
...reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal, in order to show that 
these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from 
them, and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself 
(Johnson in Derrida 1981a: xv). 
Derrida himself (1988a: 1-6) confronts the difficulties of specifying the meaning of ‘deconstruction’ in Letter to 
a Japanese Friend. Deconstruction is not a word of pure invention.43 It has a history (Spivak 1997: lxxxiii). The 
matter of defining its exact meaning is complicated by the repetition of the word within different academic, 
political and cultural contexts:  
[It] is already clear that even in French, things change from one context to another. More so in the 
German, English and especially American contexts, where the same word is already attached to very 
different connotations, inflections, and emotional or affective values (Derrida 1988a:1, author’s 
emphasis). 
                                                      
43 The fact that ‘deconstruction’ is not merely a name for a pre-existing concept is not without its own significance. Derrida 
is not naming a pre-formed essence that he has uncovered. The sign and its meaning have a synchronous systemic origin 
(Derrida 1997: 45). Thus he (Derrida 1988a: 1) uses a word for which there are always already meanings, and these 
meaning cannot be erased but are enriched by the sign’s use. 
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The word has more meanings, more historical contexts and more virtual, possible, and yet to become possible 
contexts than Derrida can contain in a definition.44 Its reserves and excesses must be pruned and shaped to his 
intention; but his intention cannot protect ‘deconstruction’ from change and novelty. The meaning of 
deconstruction must always be reconstructed.  
The task of definition within deconstruction is problematic. For reasons that become apparent in the exposition 
of Derrida’s system of writing, the notion of definition must be replaced with the notion of interpretation 
(Derrida 2001: 369). Definitions limit meanings and freeze them in time. This way of understanding stays within 
the closure of metaphysics against which deconstruction steers (Caputo 1997: 33). There are several 
‘deconstructions’, all of which are directed at opening, broadening what is included, in re-examining and 
revaluing what has been marginalised and what is remarkable only by its absence (Culler 1983: 85). 
Deconstruction is concerned with the “complexification” of the text, which unpacks the apparently simple in 
order to show its multiple, irreducible, internal and external relations within a general structure of signification 
(Caputo 1997: 35). Hence, a strategy of presenting deconstruction simply is in tension with the complexity of 
deconstruction; although equally, no grounds for gratuitous complication follow from this complexity.  
Derrida’s writings are close reading of texts that span across philosophical approaches and different 
philosophical problems that are diverse, singular and specific. Nonetheless, between these texts and within them 
something called deconstruction, which can be systematically explored and developed and can be worked into a 
system, does emerge (Culler 1983: 221). Derrida (1981b: 68; 1988a; 1987b: 183, 184; 1994: 27, 28, 59; 1997: 
83) refers to deconstruction, explains deconstructions, and reuses and develops a range of theoretical resources 
as if there is resonance and unity that pervades his singular and dispersed enterprises. The choice of text and the 
choice of author is always also the choice of a more general philosophical problem. It is always singular and 
particular on the one hand; and it is general and paradigmatic on the other.  
The name that underwrites a text is the name of a philosophical problem that is worked out, and that plays itself 
out in the text (Derrida 1997: 99, 162).45 This pattern of tension between specificity and generality is one which 
permeates the field of deconstruction. Elaborating on this tension with reference to the example, Derrida (1994: 
34) writes that “an example always carries beyond itself: it thereby opens up a testamentary dimension. The 
example is first of all for others, and beyond the self”. The example is always marked with a trace of generality 
                                                      
44 Of this polysemy Caputo (1997: 31) writes: 
The very meaning of deconstruction is to show that things – texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs and 
practices of whatever size and sort you need – do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they 
are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy. 
45 Of Derrida himself, Spivak (1997: ix) writes that his name, like his protagonists’ names, is, “a collections of texts” that 
we, in order to speak about deconstruction, must read. 
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that gestures at once outside the boundary of the example itself and back toward its own uniqueness. It is not 
partially general and partially specific. Neither generality nor specificity can tolerate partiality. This is typical of 
deconstruction: it is both at the same time. This logic is repeated in the treatment of the supplement (Derrida 
1997: 155); the border (Derrida 1993a: 15); and the frame (Derrida 1979b).  
Deconstruction is a critique of certainty, an attempt to negotiate complexity, and it is a style of reading and of 
writing texts and philosophical problems, developed by Derrida and carried on by many who would call their 
interpretations ‘deconstructive’ or busy themselves with the activity of ‘deconstructing’ (Culler 1983: 83, 85). 
Derrida reads and writes himself into several traditions and into tension with them. Part of the task here is to 
gather up these distributed roots, to marginalise some and privilege others, and to reduce the complexity of 
deconstruction in order to make a coherent argument for Derrida as a systems thinker. That said, the question of 
history and of inheritance is irrepressible within the logic of deconstruction, and so to use deconstruction without 
any reference to the canon is disingenuous (Derrida 1994: 16, 21). Deconstruction is heir to a tradition of the 
critique of metaphysics of which phenomenology is a part; it is the critical inheritor of the structuralist 
movement; and it follows after psychoanalysis (Spivak 1997: l, lviii; Culler 1983: 22; Cilliers 1998a: 42, 43). 
Deconstruction engages with members of the philosophical canon in a critical way. Deconstructive readings of 
Heidegger, Freud, Nietzsche, Levinas, Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Rousseau and Austin are marked with criticism 
and with appropriation.46 The way deconstruction is presented is always also the choice of a philosophical 
context and the choice of a history. 
Deconstruction is a critique of western metaphysics (Culler 1983: 92-95). What Derrida means by metaphysics is 
particular and more thoroughly explored below. Spivak (1997: l) names Freud, Heidegger and Nietzsche as the 
names of particular philosophical positions and strategies that ‘deconstruct’ the metaphysical strategy that 
Derrida describes as the metaphysics of presence, each respectively focusing on the subject, Being and ontology, 
and truth and morality. Of Grammatology and the system of writing it develops is part of a history of questioning 
the grounds that stabilise philosophical discourse.  
Deconstruction as a critique of metaphysics is not, as it is often suggested (e.g. Rorty 1992), the devastation of 
logic, reason and truth. It is the rigorous exposition of these concepts and others taken to the limits of their 
intelligibility, at which point the frustration of thinking and of philosophy show up its limitations (Cornell 1992: 
1; Norris 2007: 28; Derrida 1981b: 51). Cornell (1992) reframes deconstruction as the ‘philosophy of the limit’ 
in order to distance it from the postmodern strategies that fall into an epistemological and ethical relativism. The 
philosophy of the limit explores the limits to philosophical strategies and concepts and the certainty they 
                                                      
46 Derrida’s first work was a translation of Husserl’s Origin of Geometry into French, which included an introduction 
critiquing the text to which it was appended (Spivak 1997: ix). Deconstruction also engages repeatedly with the philosophy 
of Plato, Hegel, Kant, Marx, Mallarme, (Culler 1983: 88). These names mentioned above form an integral part of the frame 
constructed for deconstruction in this chapter, emphasising its counter-metaphysical and systemic character.  
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produce. However, because language and concepts of deconstruction function in this liminal space, these 
concepts are necessarily marked by both sides of the system: with the inside, which allows the possibility of 
sense, understanding and philosophical conceptuality; and also with the unmarked beyond, the outside of the 
system, alterity which cannot be conceptualised (Derrida 1982: 5, 6; The Original Discussion of Différance 
1988: 85). They function both as the conditions of the possibility of meaning in the system and the conditions of 
the impossibility of full meaning, of meaning as a stable plenitude (Gasché 1994: 4, 12). This is the difficult 
terrain that deconstruction navigates with the chain of substitutions that can always be supplemented: différance, 
trace, space, supplement, parergon, graft and writing (Derrida 1981b: 40; Spivak 1997: lxx). These terms, like 
the system, resist capitalisation and reification (Derrida 1997: 86).  
An initial clarification on the road to answering the question, ‘What is deconstruction?’ is necessary. The text of 
which it is written here is not a book. It is not merely the document (Derrida 1997: 149). What is meant by the 
book or the document is a closed system of signification which contains an essential truth which must be found. 
Juxtaposed with this line of thinking, deconstruction can be called anti-essentialist. It is not a philosophical 
position that finds truth in predetermined, fixed, given essences and in a universe built on these essences that 
does not change and that is closed to novelty, a universe whose meaning is petrified (Caputo 1997: 42; Morin, 
1992: 58).47 The text is a system of signification that is open to other texts and to the linguistic system which 
both constrains and enables its signification. A deconstructive reading reads the text and not the book. The 
movement of deconstruction is at work in the structures that constrain and enable meaning in the text (Derrida 
1988a: 1). Deconstruction moves counter to construction, against the structuring that takes place within a system 
of language or culture, but always from within the system itself. It is not foreign to structure (Gasché 1994: 5). 
On this note, it can be added that deconstruction is not merely an activity, way of reading, writing and a critique. 
It is also a dynamic, an organisation of the text, of the system itself (Derrida 1982: 3-27).  
The logic of deconstruction is not confined to texts as an expanded notion of things written down. The text refers 
to all that has meaning and is therefore a manifestation of inscription (Derrida 1997: 9).48 This idea of the text 
                                                      
47 Derrida (1981b: 59) positions deconstruction in contradistinction with any discourse that is premised on essentialist logic: 
What I call text is also that which ‘practically’ inscribes and overflows the limits of such discourse. There is such a 
general text everywhere that (that is everywhere) this discourse and its order (essence, sense, truth, meaning, 
consciousness, ideality etc.) are overflowed…(author’s emphasis) 
48 Derrida (1997: 9) clarifies the notion of the text thus: 
For some time now, as a matter of fact, here and there, by a gesture and for motives that are profoundly necessary, 
whose degradation is easier to denounce than it is to disclose their origin, one says, ‘language’ for action, movement, 
thought, reflection, consciousness, unconsciousness, experience, affectivity, etc. Now we tend to say ‘writing’ for all 
that and more: to designate not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription, but also 
the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the dignifying face, the signified face itself. And thus we say 
‘writing’ for all that and more: to designate not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic 
inscription, but also the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying face, the signified face 
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follows from Derrida’s understanding of writing explicated here. This understanding is what allows for 
deconstruction to be extended to politics or social critique. What further allows for the application of 
deconstruction to problems is twofold. The critique of metaphysics as a pattern of thinking that pervades the 
history of the west and the history of western philosophy deconstructs the oppositional logic that underpins the 
system in which certain concepts dominate, exclude and abase others. Deconstruction can be framed as a 
strategy for the reversal of these violent oppositions (Derrida 1987b: 183; 1981b: 41). Deconstruction is 
thoroughly strategic (Derrida 1987b: 185; 1997: 83, 93; The Original Discussion of Différance 1988: 94). The 
choice of tools cannot be guaranteed with reference to any stable presence.  
The descriptions of deconstruction as both postmodern and poststructuralist philosophy require clarification in 
relation with this project. Although the distinction between modern and postmodern thought was outlined in the 
previous chapter, it needs to be briefly reiterated here. Modernism encompasses philosophical strategies that 
produce absolute certainty without recourse to either an accessible immanent reality or object or to an accessible 
absolute and uncontainable subject, truth, god or reason (Cilliers 1998a: 102, 107). In other words, using 
deconstructive language, modernist strategies are those that rely on and propagate the metaphysics of presence 
where the accessibility of these foundations of certainty relies on their presence in some mode (Spivak 1997: 
xix).  
Modern philosophical strategies cannot think structures without recourse to a centre as origin whose function is 
to fix the structure and to give it an absolute description without itself being subjected to the logic of structuring 
that it produces. In this way, the centre escapes the structure or system it produces: it is transcendental whether it 
concerns the subject or the object as the origin of certainty (Derrida 2001: 278, 396). In relation to this 
modernism, the certainty it underwrites and its relation to violence, deconstruction is postmodern (Cornell 1992: 
11). However, in relation to a group of philosophical strategies that confronted with the uncertainty of the origin 
resort to epistemological and ethical relativism and who read uncertainty as a licence to equalise all things and 
claim that a lack of absolute knowledge obliterates knowledge as such, deconstruction is not postmodern 
(Cilliers 2005a: 257, 261; Norris 1994: 32). The insight that philosophical concepts have limitations does not 
mean that these concepts have no further use or no meaning. It does mean that their meaning must be negotiated 
and their limits acknowledged.  
Derrida’s system of writing is read here in light of its position within the more general attempt to think in terms 
of a system of relations rather than atomistic essential identities. Structuralism can be understood as the 
development of the relational paradigm – of which the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure is the 
paradigmatic case – as an historical moment, and as theory on which Derrida (1997; 2001: 137-154, 175-206) 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
itself. An thus we say ‘writing’ for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not and even if 
what it distributed in space is alien to the order of the voice….political writing in view of the techniques that govern 
those domains today. 
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wrote extensively. It cannot, therefore, be discounted as a context in which deconstruction can be read. It is 
within an inexorable relation with structuralism, with attention to Saussure’s and Levi-Strauss’ writing in 
particular, that Derrida’s (1997) system of writing becomes meaningful.49 Derrida appropriates structuralist 
linguistics in order to open up its deconstructive logic. This reading attempts to think of structures without an 
origin/presence/centre as the challenge to the metaphysics and modernism that is at work in structuralism 
(Spivak 1997: lix). The ‘post-’ in poststructuralism signals navigation beyond certain structuralist gestures that 
impose closure onto the system and a continuation of those structuralist impulses that critiqued this closure 
(Culler 1983: 22, 25, Derrida 1997: 105).50 
This chapter proceeds from here by way of an exposition of the abasement of writing within the history of 
western thought in order to show how Derrida’s system of writing reverses this logic and displaces it. The 
discussion unfolds with reference to the metaphysics of presence and previous philosophical endeavours – 
notably Freud’s, Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s – at undoing this presence as a foundation of philosophy. Because 
of the spatial constraints of this chapter, imposed by an argument about violence that begins to emerge in this 
general theoretical exposition and in the previous chapter but that must still be made, the discussion of these 
counter-metaphysical philosophies will serve the purpose of elucidating deconstruction. This exposition then 
moves forward with a discussion of the internal dynamics of the system; the boundary constituted by the system; 
and alterity within the system and beyond its limit.  
II. DERRIDA’S SYSTEM: WRITING AGAINST THE METAPHYSICS OF PRESENCE 
Structuralism as a movement, and the appeal to Saussure’s linguistic model, was premised on a shift in focus 
from the subject to the system or systems in which the subject was embedded (Culler 1983: 222). Derrida’s 
critique of writing and language, especially with reference to Saussure’s linguistic system as the paradigm for 
human sciences, is a deconstruction of the structuralist paradigm that opens the text to new interpretation 
(Derrida 1997: 28). It is also a deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence because the opposition of speech 
                                                      
49 Derrida (1988a: 2) affirms the relationship between deconstruction and structuralism:  
At that time structuralism was dominant. Deconstruction seemed to be going in the same direction since the word 
signified a certain attention to structures (which themselves were neither simply ideas, nor forms, nor syntheses, nor 
systems). To deconstruct was also a structuralist gesture that assumed a certain need for the structuralist problematic. 
But it was also an anti-structuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity. 
50 Derrida has been read as a systems thinker from another angle. His work resonates with second order cybernetics taken up 
in systems thinking (Luhmann, 1993). Celine Lafontein (2007: 33) posits a relationship of influence between strides made 
in cybernetics with its operational shift to language as code, and structuralist projects. She pays particular attention to Levi-
Strauss’ work. Poststructuralist thinkers were, in her reading, influenced by the challenge from cybernetics to rethink the 
ontology of man and language. Although Derrida does not acknowledge any direct influence from cybernetics, Lafontein 
(40) reads his earlier works as a radicalisation of second-order cybernetics. This chapter does not pursue this link but rather, 
following Morin (1992) and Cilliers (1998a), reads Saussure as a systems thinker in his own right rather than as a pseudo-
cyberneticist. Derrida’s system is understood from this direction. 
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and writing – understood as representation of speech – which Derrida (1981a; 1988b; 1997) criticises and re-
inscribes within a broader system, is grounded in the metaphysics of presence. The deconstruction of this 
opposition is significant. It demonstrates the differential logic and the subversion of oppositions that writing 
proliferates. Writing is the system which Derrida (1997: 9) develops as the complex origin of meaning without 
recourse to a transcendental origin. This repeats Saussure’s (1983: 65, 66) break with an essentialist tradition that 
saw language as a process attributing names to preformed essences. Saussure (14, 15) describes language – the 
proper object of linguistic analysis – as a system of meaning that is the underlying deep structure which produces 
speech and writing (Culler 1983: 223). This object is not obviously available to the senses like most objects of 
scientific enquiry. It is the task of the linguist to uncover it (Saussure 1983: 8).51 
Of this structure, two things must be noted. The first is that Saussure (15) attributes an objective reality to the 
structure. It can be specified because it actually exists. The second notable point is that the constitutive elements 
of the system – linguistic signs – are unities of sound-images (signifiers) and ideas (signifieds) that are 
psychological. The psychological character of signs is what allows the signifier to be thought without being said. 
This is why the signifier is not identical with the spoken word. 
The linguistic sign as Saussure writes it carries two contrasting forms of logic. The first is the logic of relations 
of difference. The sign, even though Saussure (120) posits it as a positive unity, is only positive in its form and 
not in its content. It is the positive correlation between a sound image and a concept (60). Furthermore, this 
relation is unmotivated or purely conventional. Stated differently, because it is not an essence that links each side 
of the sign to the other, it is a unity that is still marked by difference despite Saussure’s argument that it cannot 
be pried apart (61). This differential logic which operates at the level of the relation between particular signifiers 
and particular signifieds is what renders the sign arbitrary.52 The arbitrary nature of the sign refers to the idea 
that there is no logical foundation for the association. The second form of logic that the sign perpetuates is the 
linearity of time, which allows privilege of speech over writing because the sign unfolds from consciousness to 
speech to the world external to consciousness with an ever widening alienation from its psychological origin 
(Derrida 1997: 11; Saussure 1983: 70).  
                                                      
51 The assumption of the system as a given entity and an objective reality is one to which strucuturalism clung in order to 
guarantee the scientific status of linguistics (Spivak 1997: lv). Saussure (1983: 15) explains: “Linguistic structure is no less 
real than speech, and no less amenable to study. Linguistic signs, although essentially psychological, are not abstractions.” 
52 This differential logic was discussed in the previous chapter, but it is useful to insert an explanation in this context. 
Constitutive of the arbitrary sign, the signifiers and signifieds are intrinsically arbitrary (Culler 1976: 23). Both the signifier 
and the signified are constituted negatively, within relations of difference. The sound-image ‘dog’ is ‘dog’ because it is 
different from all other sound images; and the concept ‘dog’, rather than corresponding to the sound image, arises out of 
relations of difference from all other concepts. Signifiers and signifieds are conventional “delimitations of [continuums]” of 
sound spectrums and of thought (29). 
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Writing is the representation of speech (Saussure 1983: 25). It is removed from the immediacy of speech which 
is produced by the presence of the sign to consciousness (Derrida 1997: 8). Writing is something which is both 
exterior to language and inferior to it (82). In fact, Saussure characterises writing as a source of corruption of 
speech, which he associates not only with the presence of the signifier to the signified and the presence of the 
unity of the sign to consciousness, but with purity and ultimately truth in its closer proximity with the structure 
of language. This presence is what guarantees the linearity of the sign (Saussure 1983: 70; Derrida 1997: 7). 
Writing is always contaminated by its distance or spacing. Saussure (1983: 31) warns that “[its] influence on the 
linguistic community may be strong enough to affect and modify the language itself”. Written language causes 
“erroneous pronunciations” (31). This is a strange claim indeed for one also claiming that the pronunciation or 
sound-image is unmotivated and differential. It is a claim that seems to undermine the idea of a ‘correct’ or 
‘incorrect’ pronunciation that nevertheless functions within the system. Despite the debasement of writing as a 
corrupter of language, Saussure (67, 68) also inadvertently renders language vulnerable to the logic of writing as 
corruption (Derrida 1997: 35).53 
This phonocentrism, the opposition of speech and writing that renders writing exterior and inferior to speech, is 
linked to still more oppositions: inside/outside; same/different; pure/impure; good/ bad; origin(al)/ representation 
(Derrida 1981a: 4). Phonocentrism is justified by the proximity of speech to mind and the presence of the origin 
of meaning – in Saussure’s case it is the signified – there. In this way, Saussure covers over the sign’s primary 
characteristic, its arbitrariness, in order to stabilise the system of meaning with recourse to an origin: the 
transcendental signified (Derrida 1981b: 13, 65). It is transcendental because despite the complex web of 
relations of difference, it escapes this contingency. 
The pattern of phonocentric privilege permeates the history of philosophy. It relies on the signifier as interior, 
immediate, and present to consciousness. Presence as a philosophical foundation is reproduced from Plato to the 
structuralists and is strongly correlated with the devaluation and “abasement” of writing (Derrida 1997: 102; 
Derrida 1981b: 53; Culler 1983: 93-96).54 Presence as immediacy conditions its antithesis, which is empirical 
                                                      
53 Saussure (1983: 61) contrasts the unbreakable bond between signifier and signified with the arbitrary link between the 
sign and the written mark. Derrida (1997: 35) makes the following observation of this gesture: “This natural bond of 
signified (concept or sense) to the phonic signifier would contain the natural relationship subordinating writing (visible 
image) to speech”. 
54 Derrida’s (1998: 72) critique of metaphysics is always marked by the differentiation of the diversity and particularity of 
his critiques: 
Certainly everything that has, say, interested me for a long time – on account of writing, the trace, the deconstruction 
of phallogocentrism and ‘the’ Western metaphysics (which I have never identified, regardless of whatever has been 
repeated about it ad nauseum, as a single homogenous thing watched over by its definite article in the singular; I have 
so often and so explicitly said the opposite!) – all of that could not not proceed from the strange reference to an 
“elsewhere” of which the place and the language were unknown and prohibited even to myself, as if I were trying to 
translate it into the only language and the only French Western culture that I have at my disposal, a culture into which 
I was thrown at birth (author’s emphasis). 
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and therefore contingent. Presence is only guaranteed if it is absolutely stable and this is permitted by its 
transcendence (Derrida 1997: 8). The opposition of presence and non-presence is implicated in a system of 
fundamental metaphysical oppositions: world/self; ideal/non-ideal; universal/contingent; 
transcendental/empirical (Derrida 1982: 3; 1997: 8). This is best explained by retracing the straight line from 
truth – logos – to speech. What spares the signifier from contingency is the presence of the concept or truth to 
which it is naturally bonded in the mind (Derrida 1997: 35). Without the signified, the signifier would be 
radically unstable because, as Saussure (1983: 67, 68) argues, it is an arbitrary association of purely differential 
entities which are themselves arbitrarily constituted.  
Writing is derivative because it is merely the representative image that has no intrinsic relation to the meaning 
present to consciousness (Derrida 1997: 33). Writing thus signifies absence on two levels. It is the absence of the 
meaning, of the signified which is not naturally attached to it; and it is the absence of consciousness, of the 
speaking subject and her intentions and of the understanding subject (Derrida 1988b: 5; Derrida 1997: 41). 
Derrida (1981a: 64-7; 1988b: 8) relates this gesture to his deconstruction of Plato’s mimesis, the evil of writing 
in Phaedrus. Writing contaminates language by carrying out the “archetypical violence” of the outside and 
absence of presence bursting in upon the inside (Derrida 1997: 34). The immanent and fallen world of writing is 
in conflict with the logos, spirit and speech.55 
The philosophical privilege of the voice is positioned within a system of hierarchical oppositions that is animated 
by a more fundamental hierarchy within philosophy that organises knowledge according to a linear movement 
from “thought, truth, reason, logic” down to “the Word” (Culler 1983: 92). Linearity is what guarantees 
transitivity from one level in the hierarchy to the next. But at each successive level, the purity of thought 
becomes increasingly vulnerable to contamination and it is this possibility that preserves the directionality of the 
line thus. The movement of metaphysics is always movement in this straight line towards its foundation.56 This 
conceptual scheme divides representation and meaning into two mutually exclusive worlds (Derrida 1997: 85).  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
However, I refer again to the logic of the example to counter his claim here (Derrida 1994: 34). Perhaps it can be formulated 
thus: there is metaphysics and there are many metaphysics. Particular manifestations of a specific sort of thing produce the 
possibility of a general logic that allows that sort of thing to repeat itself as a general form.  
55“The problem of soul and body is no doubt derived from the problem of writing from which it seems – conversely – to 
borrow its metaphors” (Derrida 1997: 35). 
56 Heidegger argues that the Being of beings has been thought in this way, as a presence (Heidegger 1962: 21, 23, Derrida 
1982: 47; 1981a: 352). In other words, Being as a whole, the very possibility that any particular being might be or not be, 
has over time become a universal, self-evident ground that nonetheless defies definition. Heidegger, having questioned this 
self-evidence, restructures the meaning of Beingas an unanswerable question in Introductions I and II to Being and Time 
(1962). Being therefore ceases to function as foundation whose presence renders the world’s meaning evident (Derrida 
1997: 18). Rather, as a question without the content of an answer, it is placed it under erasure (illustrated by its being 
crossed out) because it has no proper, positive referent. Heidegger’s (1962: 44) Destruktion, which is the de-structuring 
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Logocentrism – the foundational presence of the logos, which is a self-evident and absolute truth – is the 
foundation of phonocentrism.57 Its most keen representation is idealism, in which the idea of a transcendent 
origin outside the system is posited; but its pattern of founding and fixing meaning overflows to other 
philosophical endeavours (Derrida 1981b: 51). If deconstruction opens the text, undoes the structuring; then 
logocentrism encloses the text, stabilises and closes the spaces. There are always both movements.58 Indeed, as 
much as deconstruction is posited as a movement against construction or a movement that undermines 
construction, its subversion of structure can also be undermined. What Derrida (1981b: 51) seems to suggest 
when he argues that “everything can be reassembled under the rubric of logocentrism” has three elements. First, 
deconstruction is not an imposition of the text that has nothing to do with its real structure. Secondly, all 
deconstruction or opening is vulnerable to closure and thus deconstruction as a strategic action or as an 
intervention is still necessary where logocentrism is dominant. And thirdly, the tools used in strategic 
deconstructions must be used carefully and strategically, with the awareness that they might always be re-
inscribed within the closure of metaphysics. 
Derrida links logocentrism to western philosophy and western culture.59 Logocentrism, it has been argued here, 
sustains hierarchical oppositions which reiterate the logic of presence. Self/other, western/non-western, and 
man/woman are all oppositions carefully analysed by Derrida. These oppositions supplement those identified 
earlier in this chapter. Logocentrism is the logic that underpins ethnocentrism and phallocentrism, the centrality 
and originality of the phallus and marginality and derivative nature of the vagina (Derrida 1997: 80, 114, 120; 
2001: 213; Culler 1983: 165-166). The deconstruction of these oppositions by the movement of writing is 
elaborated below. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
engagement with the structure of ontology and epistemology as the historical concealment of the question of Being, has a 
direct and explicit link to deconstruction (Spivak 1997: xlix; Derrida 1988a: 1). Spivak (1997: xv) argues that the difference 
between Heidegger and Derrida’s destructuring is that Heidegger still positions Being as a master concept or an origin even 
if it remains a question. It retains a directionality of reference based on a strong distinction between the ontic – beings – and 
the ontological – Being – which animates the ontic and is its origin (Derrida 1997: 18).  
57 “Between the overture and the philosophical accomplishment of phonologism (or logocentrism), the motif of presence 
was decisively articulated. It underwent an internal modification whose most conspicuous index was the moment of 
certitude in the Cartesian ego. Before that, the identity of presence offered to the mastery of repetition was constituted under 
the ‘objective’ form of the ideality of the eidos or the substantiality of ousia. Thereafter, this objectivity takes the form of 
representation, of the idea as the modification of a self-present substance, conscious and certain of itself at the moment of 
its relationship to itself. Within its most general form, the mastery of presence acquires a sort of infinite assurance”(Derrida 
1997: 97, author’s emphasis). 
58 “Saussure’s text, like any other, is not homogenous. Yes, I did analyze a ‘logocentrist’ and ‘phonocentrist’ layer of 
it…but I did so in order to show immediately that it was in contradiction to Saussure’s scientific project” (Derrida 1981b: 
52). 
59 “In an original and non-‘relativist’ sense, logocentrism is an ethnocentric metaphysics. It is related to the history of the 
West” (Derrida 1997: 79). 
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Logocentrism and phonocentrism cannot be sustained without the opposition of presence and absence (non-
presence). Writing, on the contrary, being external to the system of language, is marked by absence. There are 
two moments in the deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition. First, the hierarchy is reversed, showing 
how writing and also absence is in fact the more general and more accurate description of language. Then, in a 
second moment, the re-imagined and expanded notion of writing displaces the oppositions between writing and 
speech, and absence and presence.  
Retaining Saussure’s sign as a double entity for the moment, ‘writing’ is seen as a signifier that signifies 
signification itself. This reference is made possible, not by a natural relationship, but on Saussure’s own terms, 
by the “instituted trace” (Derrida 1997: 46). The identity of writing is derived by tracing its difference through 
the system. The signifier ‘writing’ is identifiable as writing only because it is arbitrarily differentiated from other 
signifiers like ‘whitening’ or ‘eat’. In this sense, writing seems like any other signifier. However, the 
signification to which ‘writing’ refers is signification without any natural relationship with the psychological 
sign. The written sign renders meaning present because it is arbitrary. This arbitrariness which severs the written 
signifier from presence, however, is the most original characteristic of the sign in general (Saussure 1983: 67). 
Thus writing, which is disparaged for its absence of given meaning, is the paradigmatic case for language in 
general; and speech, if it could be a sustained by presence, would only be the exception.  
The differential logic attributed to the arbitrary written sign does not only gesture towards the absence of the 
presence of meaning. It also illustrates the structural absence of the speaker and receiver of meaning (Derrida 
1997: 41). The written mark has an obvious permanence that outlives its author and is thus always already 
severed from him or her (Derrida 1988b: 8, 9).60 This is true even of the written name. As soon as I write my 
name it is inscribed with its already having outlived me (Derrida 1985: 7). The written text need never be read to 
still retain the possibility of signification. Derrida (1988b: 10) extends this structural absence to speech because 
the subject is no longer understood as self-presence. Even if the speaker and listener are in the same room, they 
and their intentions are not fully transparent to their selves or to the other. Speech cannot therefore be sustained 
by a plenitude emanating from subjectivity. 
Absence can be explained in the elaboration of writing as the production of a recognisable and repeatable mark. 
In order for writing to work as writing, to be readable, it must be repeatable in different contexts (Derrida 1979a: 
78; 1988b: 9, 63, 65). It must be inscribed in a code that allows the possibility of decoding and also recoding its 
meaning (Derrida 1988b: 9). In order to be part of this repeatable code, the written sign must be durable enough 
                                                      
60 “To be what it is, all writing must, therefore, be capable of functioning in the radical absence of every empirically 
determined receiver in general. And this absence is not a continuous modification of a presence, it is a rupture in presence, 
the ‘death’ or the possibility of the ‘death’ of the receiver inscribed in the structure of the mark…” (Derrida 1988b: 8). 
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to survive being wrenched from its proper context and determinate meaning. It must be able to be the same word 
preserving a distinctness and integrity of identity, and yet also be appropriate to its different contexts. This 
repeatability is not specific to writing. It is characteristic of all signifiers, including spoken signifiers (Derrida 
1988b: 10; 1997: 91). Contrary to the idea that speech depends on presence as its core characteristic enabling 
meaning; it is instead the code, the ever-present possibility of the physical absence of both the speaker and the 
addressee as present interpreters, consciousness as the holder of essential meaning, and internal consistency 
guaranteeing meaning that enables spoken signs to function as language in the first place. Again, writing is not 
just shown to be more important than speech, it is shown to characterise the logic of the system of arche-writing 
in which speech and writing are constituted as language (Derrida 1997: 56). However, the general system of 
writing cannot maintain the opposition between the written sign and spoken sign. It displaces this opposition 
within a broader economy of signification.  
The science of arche-writing is grammatology.61 This cannot be sustained as a positive science like all others 
nourished by a present presence. Presence is determined by a plenitude of both ‘here’ and ‘now’. In the absence 
of this plenitude within the system, the movement of signification must yet be explained. The arche-writing, the 
system of signification, is not structured by the linear opposition of differences in the system (86). Without 
positivity produced by presence, the linear differences give way to the non-linear movement of différance. This 
can be illustrated with an example. It might appear at first as if the meaning of the sign ‘woman’ is self-evident, 
perspicuous, and present in the reader’s mind. However, when this meaning is unpacked it is found that it is not 
easy to specify exactly what it is. A starting point in terms of arriving at understanding might be ‘not a man’ but 
in fact this opposition does not tell us much. More can be added: ‘not a girl’; ‘not a mother’; ‘not a cow’; ‘not a 
boy’; ‘not a vagina’ et cetera. Each different signifier can itself be expanded in a similar movement. The addition 
of further differentiations beyond simple dichotomies does begin to enrich the meaning; but these additions also 
get no closer to an essential meaning – in fact they often say more about the context in which the sign signifies 
than the sign itself.  
This explanation is a little hyperbolic. Of course, not all answers to the question of the meaning of a sign begin 
with a ‘not’. Meanings can be formulated in positive terms, but this is a function of an economic condensation of 
differences which is produced by différance (Derrida 1981b: 40). The example is merely used to demonstrate 
that the movement of différance as dynamic reference distributed over the whole system, set in motion by the 
differential and arbitrary logic of Saussurian linguistics, does not erase presence. It is the appearance of presence 
                                                      
61 If presence is what guarantees certainty and Derrida is trying to formulate a theory without the certainty assured by 
presence, it follows that the ‘concepts’ proposed to describe arche-writing and the arche-writing itself announce both the 
possibility of sense and meaning, and the impossibility of guaranteeing that meaning (Spivak 1997: xiv). Arche-writing is 
thus not a foundation but a condition of the possibility and impossibility of meaning (Gasché 1994: 4). Derrida (1997: 60) 
explains that “[like] all the notions [he is] using here it belongs to the history of metaphysics as we can only use it here 
under erasure”.  
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instituted by an originary absence (Derrida 1997: 37). Différance is this obliteration of the transcendental origin 
instituted by arche-writing that, on Derrida’s reading, is its arche-violence (37). 
In order to get at the meaning of a sign, its differences must be traced. Differences that give the sign meaning are 
the traces62 of other signs. Another example can be offered: an ‘apple’ is a ‘fruit’. ‘Apple’ cannot be explained 
unless it is placed within a chain of substitutions: ‘apple’; ‘fruit’; ‘nourishment’; ‘food’. And yet, even though its 
meaning is constituted by the traces of other signs; these traces are the marks of the absence of these other signs. 
‘An apple is fruit’ can as correctly be formulated as ‘an apple is not fruit’. The meaning of ‘apple’ is thus 
sustained not only by the proximity or presence of other signs. It is also sustained only because of the space 
between signs. The movement of différance can only operate where there is space. The structure of the sign is 
the trace of the other which is not there and not that (Derrida 1997: 46, 61, 63, 65, 89, 90). The movement of 
traces is différance: 
It is not the question of a constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of 
the pure movement which produces difference. The (pure) trace is différance. It does not depend on any 
sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic (62, author’s emphasis). 
Spivak (1997: xvii) formulates it thus: “Derrida gives the name trace to the radically other within the structure of 
difference that is the sign”. The same is always already marked with the trace of the others, or more precisely 
with traces of others. Writing as arche-writing, différance, as trace, and as space, undermines theories of writing 
as representation and the myth of the simple origin (Derrida 1997: 92; 2001: 284).  
Différance is not a concept in the conventional sense. Rather, it must be understood as an attempt to explain the 
logic of a system in which no centre and no origin exists. Gasché (1994: 4) refers to différance, trace and the 
other substitutes for arche-writing as “infrastructures”. Although Derrida (1992a: 70, 71) himself is cautious of 
this term because it connotes a permanence, “fundamental” role or ontological security to theses “general 
structures”, he does acknowledge its pragmatic and strategic value, this with the caveat that the infrastructures 
still resist reification. This strategic term is chosen to demonstrate their place within the structure – not 
transcendent to it – and the indissoluble link of this discourse to structuralism (5). The infrastructures do not 
name anything. What they signify is the possibility of signification and its impossibility. The movement of the 
system no longer protected by a linear time delivering presence cannot be defined once and for all. Having said 
this, Derrida’s (2001: 396) affirmative attitude does not prescribe silence in the face of uncertainty. Différance is 
both a spatial and temporal phenomenon (Derrida 1982: 7, 8). As a spatial phenomenon, it is the activity of a 
sign differentiating itself from others; the passive ‘being differentiated’ of a sign by others; and the structural 
‘deferring to’ and ‘being deferred to’ of signs constituted by the trace. This is différance as spacing. Différance is 
                                                      
62 ‘Trace’ is a notion that Derrida (1997: 70) explicitly relates to the work of Emmanuel Levinas. The philosophy of Levinas 
will also be relevant in the discussion of exteriority further on in this chapter and in chapter 5. 
61 
 
also temporal. In the movement of trace, meaning never comes to an end. It is always deferred in time by the 
movement of the trace. Further explication is carried out in section iii, under the discussion of the internal 
dynamics of the system. 
This pattern of displacement of writing by arche-writing is replicated in the logic of the supplement. Writing has 
been seen as an extension of or supplement to language, which is itself merely an instrument in the service of 
communicating more perfect ideas (Derrida 1997: 82). This logic of supplementation allows writing a place 
inside language while preserving its exteriority. The exteriorising of writing facilitates the exteriorising of its 
contingency and the necessity of interpretation from the communication of ideas. Derrida deconstructs this 
gesture by reading Rousseau’s disavowal of both writing and masturbation as supplements. Rousseau condemns 
writing as the disease that destroys presence in speech (142). The written sign is the substitution of an artificial 
representation in place of a natural intelligible sign. Writing is thus the threat of perversion and impurity (147). 
Speech on its own fails to secure presence in all situations and, despite its danger, writing must act as a 
supplement (144).  
Instead of proving the clear inferiority of the supplement, its logic moves in two directions. This stems from its 
double meaning. The first meaning is one whole added to another in which both entities are self-contained and 
complete. The second meaning is something that supplants itself in place of that which it supplements (144, 
145). It thus shows up a deficit and an inadequacy in the primary entity by virtue of its very necessity. As both 
an addition and a substitute, the supplement is other than what it supplements. If it were an extension of the 
same, its addition would make no difference. As it does change the field it supplements, it maintains a form of 
otherness. However, if it were totally other it would also cease to supplement because the idea of completion 
also implies coherence and agreement.  
In Rousseau’s text, Emile, masturbation is another name for the supplement. This is the dangerous logic of 
impurity at work (151). It, like writing, is dangerous because it breaks with nature. Derrida reverses the 
hierarchy of sexual intercourse and masturbation, which is seen as a supplement in the absence of natural sexual 
intercourse between the subject and the object of his desire. By demonstrating that both masturbation and sexual 
intercourse are thwarted attempts at possessing the object of desire despite the fact that intercourse is commonly 
mistaken for satisfying this desire, Derrida demonstrates the structural necessity of absence of the object as a 
general condition for all sex (Culler 1983: 104). The essential characteristic of masturbation that excluded it 
from sex is what in fact renders these two disparate things similar.  
The supplement affirms the distinction between what is natural and institutional; but at the same time, by 
supplanting the natural and showing a lack there, it also undermines the originality of nature (Derrida 1997: 
155). The play of supplementation replaces a determined lack with the play of absence and presence (157). The 
unoriginal usurps the place of the origin. This analysis demonstrates an important theme in deconstruction: 
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impurity, hybridity and contamination are the general case (Derrida 1981b: 40; 1998: 9). Furthermore, because 
the supplement always supplements a lack, it promises to deliver presence as a fullness and completion. 
However, the exteriority of the supplement and its supplanting rather than completing, defers this promise.  
The interplay between presence and absence; purity and contamination; and same and other, in which absence, 
contamination and otherness cannot be reduced to a mere addition to the same, cannot be thought within 
metaphysics. Derrida (1997: 167) opposes the simplification of a system of metaphysics with the 
grammatological system that produces it and moves against it: 
The concept of the origin or nature is nothing but the myth of addition, of supplementarity annulled by 
being purely additive. It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary differance 
that is neither absence nor presence, neither negative nor positive. Originary differance is supplementarity 
as structure. Here structure means the irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or shift the 
play of presence or absence: that within which metaphysics can be produced but which metaphysics 
cannot think (author’s emphasis). 
This quote, not alone, but carried by the arguments presented here and elaborated further on support an 
interpretation of Derrida as a thinker concerned with the production of meaning as the confrontation with 
complexity or with a complex system (Cilliers 1998a: 22).63 
Spivak (1997: l) identifies Heidegger,64 Freud, and Nietzsche as ‘proto-grammatologists’. In other words, each 
thinker employs a logic that interrupts the self-evidence of metaphysical grounds of certainty. Recalling the 
meaning of the text as the interrelation of all modes of signification, which extends to our entire life-world or 
everything that comes to be meaningful, it must be remembered that this theory of meaning is also a critique of 
theories of meaning. 65  Freud is not only aligned with deconstruction in the critique of the presence of 
consciousness to itself (xl). Reading Freud’s Project in Freud and the Scene of Writing, Derrida (2001: 25) 
explores the model of the brain as a system that has tremendous affinity with the arche-writing he develops in Of 
                                                      
63 Cilliers (1998a: 22) writes that, “poststructuralism is not merely a subversive form of discourse analysis, but a style of 
thinking that is sensitive to the complexity of the phenomena under consideration”. This interpretation of Derrida as a 
systems thinker has been contested because of the absence of a cohesive modernist system in his writing (Walby 2007: 
455). Derrida’s system may not be modern but as an expansion, opening and supplementation of the Saussurian model it 
focuses on relations rather than atoms and remains systemic. 
64 See footnote 56. 
65“The work of writing and the economy of différance will not be dominated by this classical conceptuality, this ontology, 
or this epistemology” (Derrida 1997: 143). 
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Grammatology (1997). This reading is enabled by an emphasis on the brain as a network of neurons that are part 
of a system because of the function of memory in the system (Cilliers & Gouws 2001).66 
The system develops in time, changed by information from the outside that is represented within the system. 
This representation is enabled because when information enters the system as a trace it passes through some 
neurons and imprints itself on others. Memory is thus not symmetrically distributed, but is structured by different 
levels of resistance between neurons (Derrida 2001: 252). Because traces irrevocably alter the brain as a system, 
memory as the distribution of traces is both structured by and structuring of relations of difference in the system 
(251). Trace is not something that is given from the outside: traces are traces of information that arise inside the 
system triggered from outside (Cilliers & Gouws 2001: 243-244).  
Nietzsche instigates a radical deconstruction of the category of truth by situating its construction within a web of 
metaphor as the concealed origin of language (Derrida 1997: 19; van Tongeren 2000: 71).67  Nietzsche’s 
argument can be understood to begin by recognising the impossibility of ultimately grounding truth. 
Consequently, what is called truth is understood to originate in contingent, historical and dynamic human 
relations and the linguistic conventions that structure these relations (Nietzsche 2000: 54; 2006: 313, 319).68 As a 
product of these relations, language and truth cannot be grounded in reality that lies beyond language and 
beyond contingency. The self-evidence of a natural reference between reality and language is polemically 
restated as mere illusion in On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense (Nietzsche 2000: 55). Nietzsche (55) 
proclaims this contingency with zeal:  
What arbitrary differentiations! What one-sided preferences first for this, then for that property of a thing! 
The various languages placed side by side show that with words it is never a question of truth…The thing 
in itself (which is precisely what the pure truth, aside from its consequences, would be) is likewise 
something quite incomprehensible to the character of language and something not in the least worth 
striving for. 
Against the epistemological conviction that categories are natural, and that they are derived from nature, which 
is presented by epistemological strategies, metaphoricity is extended to all utterances (Derrida 1982: 227). There 
                                                      
66 This reading of Freud as a grammatological thinker emphasises the opening logic of the system developed. Resonant with 
Saussure (1983: 68), Freud (in Derrida 2001: 26) writes that “[memory] is represented (dargestellt) by the differences in the 
facilitations of the ψ neurons”. This is not the only reading to be made (Cilliers & Gouws 2001: 244). Like Saussure’s 
(1983) system, Freud’s is both grammatological and metaphysical, or both deconstructive and structuring if such a 
distinction can be maintained.  
67 “Nietzsche, far from remaining simply (with Hegel as Heidegger wished) within metaphysics, contributed a great deal to 
the liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos and the related concept of truth or 
the primary signified, in whatever sense that is understood” (Derrida 1997: 19).  
68 The second text referenced is Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future in which Nietzsche (2006: 
311-361) examines the related themes of truth and morality in order to argue against a generalised rule based morality. 
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is only an aesthetic or metaphorical link between the language and reality (Nietzsche 2000: 56, 57). The 
metaphor, in joining two unlike things, does not totally close the space or difference between these things. For 
example, to say that life is dream does not create an identity between ‘life’ and ‘dream’. It is more like an 
approximation or a correlation of only part of each thing. An aesthetic expression remains insufficient because it 
is not a full and natural identity: it does not signify the presence of a natural essence to a concept or a word.  
Nietzsche’s critique of truth as a fixed unity is a critique of all dogmatic philosophical positions or metaphysics, 
traced back to Plato, to which he opposes the idea of plurality or difference (van Tongeren 2000: 134). 
Metaphysics posits truth as a stabilising origin which is an immediate certainty and which lies beyond 
explanation and is thus shielded from contingency (135). The stability of metaphysics is only an illusion 
produced by epistemology that is ultimately indemonstrable (Nietzsche, 2000: 56). When its epistemological 
shield is obliterated, fundamental categories such as being and truth are usurped by the forceful movement of 
wills (Derrida 2001: 354, 369; Nietzsche 1909: 213; 2003: 66-67; van Tongeren 2000: 135, 159). The world as 
will to power is the perpetual play of differences between forces that do not come to rest. This description of 
reality displaces its function as a fixed foundation for meaning. A ‘foundation’ that is a dynamic process of 
interaction is not foundation in the conventional sense of stabilising and securing something. Following the 
argument from deconstruction, one can propose that it is a foundation under erasure or an explanation that is also 
a non-explanation because it certifies nothing and founds nothing but uncertainty and openness (Derrida 1997: 
286-287).  
The argument here is not that Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger are proto-grammatologists in relation to Derrida’s 
pure grammatology as a science of pure absence. This would be a “metaphysics of absence” because absence 
would function as a transcendental origin in the system, shielded from the structuring of arche-writing (Gasché 
1994: 25). Arche-writing is complicit in the appearance of presence in the system, but it cannot produce the 
purity of either presence or absence (Derrida 1997: 92). That would be to avoid the problem of presence by 
declaring it solved.69 In this sense, all grammatology will always only be ‘proto’. It will never rid itself of 
presence.  
III. MEANING, ITERABILITY AND DIFFÉRANCE 
Thus far, this chapter has sketched the movement of deconstruction as a countermovement to the metaphysics of 
presence. Both forms of logic – opening and closure, respectively – operate within a broader system of 
signification – the arche-writing – that produces structure and de structuring. This system should not be 
                                                      
69 The problem of metaphysics is not one that can ever be solved. Derrida himself acknowledges the folly of trying to evade 
metaphysics by trying not to use its concepts. The process of calling metaphysics into question is one that is perpetual 
(Wood 1998: 68, 69). The vocabulary, trace, différance and space all themselves tend towards metaphysical sedimentation. 
Thus Derrida’s critique of metaphysics is never yet complete. It depends on its iteration (68, 69). 
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understood as an ontological entity. On one level of description, the system is nothing more than the persistence 
of signification without a metaphysical origin. On another level, the system is produced in the description itself. 
Perhaps it can be formulated thus: the system is différance; and there is no différance without its description. 
Further attention is now turned to the internal dynamics of this system with attention to iterability and further 
exposition of the différance that initiates the chain of supplements: iteration, violence, play, trace, space, and 
temporisation. Heterogeneity and homogeneity in the system are also introduced with reference to the “paradox 
of structure and event” (Culler 1983: 95).  
Before the meanings of the system as différance are explored, the sign itself requires explication. Given that the 
sign is arbitrary and its meaning is no longer naturally linked to consciousness, its meaningfulness is acquired 
through circulation within the structure of language.70 As it has already been argued, from its inception, a sign is 
a mark that is marked by the possibility of its own remarkableness, and this possibility is its iterability (Derrida 
1988b: 8). A sign is never purely singular but is marked with its own idealisation, which is the possibility that it 
might become a type because it is a generally recognisable form (Derrida 1997: 91). This discussion returns to 
sign as a mark of absence introduced above. 
Derrida (1988b) in Signature Event Context reads John L. Austin’ s How to do Things with Words (1971) as 
deconstructing the link between meaning and consciousness. This is achieved by replacing the role of 
consciousness crystallised in Saussure’s argument with the speaker’s actions. The displacement of consciousness 
as the producer of meaning is enabled by the deconstruction of the opposition between constative and 
performative speech. And this in turn is enacted by demonstrating and undermining the hierarchical opposition 
of constative speech and its supplement, performative speech. Performative speech is distinguishable from 
constative speech on the basis that constative language carries its meaning within itself, and performative 
language, utterances such as ‘I love you’ or ‘you are guilty’, depend instead on their context to communicate 
effectively (14-15).  
However, all meaning according to Austin, referring to what is communicated by the text, is determined by the 
context in which it is uttered (14). This theory in which meaning is located in the context assumes a context that 
is saturated, definable, limited and transparent so that it can be correctly interpreted. The context is thus elevated 
to a transcendental level that escapes contingency and uncertainty. It further assumes that the sign itself is 
absolutely embedded in its present context. In order to make this case, Austin opposes serious speech acts to 
non-serious, trivial examples such as a play in which the words, ‘you are sentenced to death’, for example, 
obviously do not condemn an actor to die because – this is the crux – they are merely quoting (15-17). The mere 
                                                      
70 “A signifier is from the very beginning the possibility of its own repetition, of its own image or resemblance.” (Derrida 
1997: 91) 
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repetition of words, for Austin, out of context means nothing and is parasitical on normal serious language which 
it only imitates. 
Repetition, the function of the parasitic form of language, is what allows a written mark to function as language 
in the first place. If the word ‘fruit’ was not recognisable as a distinct differentiable from all others, it could not 
begin to signify anything. If it is recognisable then it must be repeatable, if only in principle. Iterability as 
recognisability is the a priori condition of the possibility of meaning.71 Whenever words are used meaningfully 
they are thus always repeated. Citation or quotation, rather than being the parasitic exception, is the more general 
logic (Derrida 1988b: 15-17; 1992a: 226). This iterability necessarily exceeds the context in which a word is 
repeated. Meaning is not exterior to the context but the context does not exhaust the meaning of the sign or 
enclose the sign totally (Derrida 1979a: 81; 1981a: 7; 1988b: 9). Derrida goes further arguing that the context, no 
longer determining meaning, is also not determinable itself (Derrida 1979a: 76; 1988b: 63).  
The context can always be expanded to include more information or shifted to include different information 
(Culler 1983: 123).72 Different information becomes relevant as frames of understanding shift. Two examples of 
such shifts are new discoveries in natural science or different understandings of human beings in political 
economy. Intention is also part of the context but so is the speaker’s non-intention. The subject does not enter 
                                                      
71 Searle (1977: 200) in his Reply to Derrida, an attempt to resuscitate language as the communication of intended meaning, 
accuses Signature, Event, Context of the fundamental error of conflating permanence – the fact that a written mark survives 
its author/intention/origin – with iterabilty – the fact that a sign can be used in different contexts. Derrida allegedly 
misunderstands repeatability, which belongs to all signs written and spoken, to be peculiarly “graphematic” in order to 
claim that writing is more general than speech and slay the subject as the producer of meaning: 
But again this possibility of separating the sign from the signified is a feature of any system of representation 
whatever; and there is nothing especially graphematic about it at all. It is furthermore quite independent of those 
special features of the “classical concept” of writing which are supposed to form the basis of the argument” (201). 
This argument is made with haste. Its tenets are familiar. First, Derrida does not argue for the special privilege of physical 
marks or ‘classical writing’. Rather, the features of this writing, the structural absence of both author and reader or its 
‘permanence’, as well as the absence of the signified or its ‘iterability’, are both pronounced manifestations of that larger 
system of signification which Derrida strategically calls a kind of writing (1988b: 48; 1997: 91, 108). The strategy 
undermines the metaphysical gesture discussed above. Derrida (1988b: 9, 50-51) argues for the structural necessity of 
permanence and iterability, which Searle restates as the alleged omission of the text:   
But the sign possesses the characteristic of being readable even if the moment of its production is irrevocably 
lost…As far as the internal semiotic context is concerned, the force of rupture is no less important: by virtue of its 
essential iterability…No context can entirely enclose it. Nor any code, the code here being both the possibility and 
impossibility of writing, of its essential iterability (1988b: 9). 
And further on the argument is extended to all language: “Are they [permanence, iterability and spacing] not to be found in 
all language, in spoken language for instance, and ultimately the totality of ‘experience’ insofar as it is inseparable from the 
field of the mark…” (10). 
72 This claim resonates with the claim that the boundary of a complex system, in this case the text, can always be expanded 
in space until it extends to the largest possible complex system as life and the universe (Cilliers, Richardson & Lissack, 
2001: 8). Even this system remains open because of its spatio-temporal distribution. See chapter 1 and Structure, Sign and 
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, especially page 365 (Derrida, 2001: 351-370). 
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here reconstituted as a self-presence (Derrida 1997: 69). Rather, Derrida includes the unconscious which exceeds 
both the speaker’s and listener’s intention and comprehension (Culler 1983: 24; Derrida 1997: 89). Additionally, 
the attempt to delimit the context or the frame of understanding, because it is itself not given, transparent and 
certified, is itself circumscribed within the context.73 
The sign, each time it signifies, is both singular and already differentiated within itself. Its iterability gestures 
toward its place within the structure and towards its own structure which allows it to be copied and, in that 
instant, obliterates its own originality. This is the paradox of structure and event that could also be the paradox of 
paradigm and example or sameness and difference. An excellent demonstration to which Derrida diverts much 
attention is the proper name. The proper name is always caught in a system or a chain of differences. If the name 
were naturally bonded to an essential identity, it could maintain its perfect singularity that one tends to attach, 
especially to one’s own name. However, in order for that name to signify that singularity, it must be 
recognisable. And if it can be recognised, it can at least in principle but also in practice, be repeated. This is the 
violence of writing described by Levi Strauss (1961: 292-293),74 a type of violence Derrida (1997: 109) extends 
also to arche-writing in which nothing can be named without also being classed. Language as writing cannot 
preserve singularity. The structure of writing as a structure of difference allows for the appearance of the origin 
and its violent destruction (10). This original violence is the logic that supports all classification and labelling. 
The structure of writing and iterability as violence is complex. The first moment is the inscription within a 
system. The mere act of naming, before the name is repeated, is violent: 
 To think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of arche-writing: arche-
violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, of self-presence which has never been given but only 
                                                      
73 “Attempts to describe the limits always make possible a displacement of those limits, so that Wittgenstein’s suggestion 
that one cannot say “bububu” and mean “if it does not rain I shall go out for a walk,” has, paradoxically, made it possible to 
do just that” (Culler, 1983: 124). 
74 Levi-Strauss sees the introduction of writing into society as contemporaneous with the introduction of violence (Derrida, 
1997: 110). It is not violence generally as the deliberate use of force or even cruelty that he bemoans. It is the 
differentiation, hierarchisation and stratification, which writing brings to civilisation that opposes it to nature. It is this 
arche-writing that he (Levi-Strauss, 1961: 292) thinks is missing from the Nambikwara, an ‘illiterate’ South American tribe:  
If we want to correlate the appearance of writing with certain other characteristics of civilization, we must look 
elsewhere. The one phenomenon which has invariably accompanied it is the formation of cities and empires: the 
integration into a political system, that is to say, of a considerable number of individuals, and the distribution of those 
individuals into a hierarchy of castes and classes. Such is, at any rate, the type of development which we find, from 
Egypt right across to China, at the moment when writing makes its debuts; it seems to favour rather the exploitation 
than the enlightenment of mankind.  
Pursuing a Marxist critique from another angle, writing is what allows for the creation of classes, categories and identities 
that structure life (Derrida, 1997: 119). There can be no differences, also no social differences, without the code that creates 
that difference. 
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dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to itself except in its own 
disappearance (112).  
This originary violence severs the proper name from what is properly its own. The name is always already 
internally split. This internal difference is spacing; it is a schism between the name and itself. The name is the 
identification of difference that, following Nietzsche (2000: 55-57), is properly metaphorical (Derrida 1997: 89). 
Space within the signifier is an internal differing and an active deferral of its fullness (1988b: 9; 1994: 17).  
The signature is subjected to the same logic in Signature Event Context and Limited Inc abc (Derrida 1988b). 
The signature is always singular, new and original; and also, in order to be verified as a signature, unoriginal. 
One cannot be made up every time someone signs something: 
Are there signatures? Yes, of course, every day. Effects of signatures are the most common thing in the 
world. But the condition of possibility of those effects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of their 
impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity. In order to function, that is , to be readable, a 
signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present 
and singular intention of its production (20). 
Presentation is the possibility of representation and its own internal division (Derrida 2001: 321, 361). Yet, the 
name and the signature and the word manage still to retain a singularity, a suggestion of uniqueness that is as 
irreducible as iterability. The signature, like the proper name, is both structural and an event. This is the 
paradoxical logic of repetition (Derrida 1994: 10). Each repetition is marked with both a trace of the event and of 
the non-event. Every time a sign is used, its meaning is something new, caught up in new contingencies. It 
novelty is an event. However, for an event to be a pure event, it also needs to destroy the possibility of its own 
return. The sign, whose meaning changes and reforms as it is used, is an event each time it is used; and it is also 
part of a general structure that makes this event possible (Derrida 1988b: 119).  
Translation can be read as a paradigmatic instance of iteration as structure and event (Derrida 1994: 22). Its very 
task is to maintain the same as something totally different. This difference is resisted by reinforcing the authority 
of the original.75 However, from deconstruction, an argument is made here for the necessity of that difference. At 
this point a note on interpretation is pertinent: a text with a meaning that is secured in an origin, a pure and 
undifferentiated meaning, even if this meaning was very complicated, could sustain a theory of interpretation 
that merely found this meaning and brought it to light (Derrida 1981a: 23). A text that is open to an open context 
is constituted in part by intentions that are never quite present, and that contains the logic of iterability at the 
level of the sign, also contains this logic of iterability at a global level. That is, each reading is marked with a 
                                                      
75 “…as internal division of the trait, impurity, corruption, contamination, decomposition, perversion, deformation, even 
cancerization, generous proliferation or degenerescence. All these disruptive ‘anomalies’ are engendered…by repetition” 
(Derrida 1992a: 211). 
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certain structure, with respect to the structure, and it is also an event because it is a reconstruction of context, a 
reiteration of signs and the privileging of different information. The act of reading transforms the text; it is itself 
also writing (Derrida 1981a: 63; 1981b: 63).76 This is a second interpretation of interpretation that is captured in 
the sense of translation. 
What is at work here is différance as the logic of the system of arche-writing. Différance is not an origin, it is not 
a being and it is not a source (Original Discussion of Différance 1988: 85). It is the system itself. What is meant 
by this elliptical statement is that différance does not transcend the system and it cannot be a transcendental 
centre of the system. Différance is the structure of the structure itself. It is the attempt to think a system without a 
centre77 and it must therefore avoid all centrality and any attempt to shield itself from structurality, contingency 
and absence (Derrida 1982: 7). That said, within the structure of relations of difference between signs, both the 
possibility of meaning and the impossibility of completeness of meaning must be explained. Différance is 
something like an origin, if this ‘origin’ can be thought of as complex and distributed (9). Difference can be said 
to produce effects (Wood 1988: 63, 64). Derrida (1997: 92) acknowledges the complicity of différance as arche-
writing in the presentation of the present/presence. However, the productivity of différance is not simply 
transitive. It cannot have the structure of causality of an autonomous agent moving an inert body. If différance is 
implicated in the generation of meaning, then this meaning is not separated from the signs themselves. 
Différance cannot be seen as an entity that attaches itself to the sign as the signifier and signified were attached 
to and completed each other (Original Discussion of Différance 1988: 88). The semantics of the system can no 
longer be seen as a realm that is separate to the syntax and which independently completes the syntax from 
outside.  
In order for différance to be an autonomous agent in the system, it would have to be a clearly defined principle 
that logically and observably causes the system to be what it is. But différance falls short. It is “neither a word 
nor a concept” (Derrida 1982: 3, 7).78 Of course, it is written, it is word and it is being conceptualised here and 
thus retains conceptuality. But, it is also very literally not a word, not an accepted word. It is a neologism: a 
corruption of language. Yet through its use and in its use it acquires meaning. Regarding its conceptuality, 
                                                      
76 Derrida (1992a: 211) refers to the problem of reading, critique, teaching a text and writing about it as instances of 
translation as interpretation. The ‘original’, even marked with its own difference, still imposes itself as the paradigm. Every 
interpretation, in other words, cannot be made to simply say what it wants because it is still responsible to the text even 
when the text is open. This difficulty of interpretation is captured in the functioning of the law, which must remain resolute, 
consistent and the same; and yet also answer to the specificity of the case before it, and be sensitive to each new context 
(212). 
77 Derrida (2001: 278), having located this attempt within an epistemological rupture, is thus implicated in this very event. 
78 Derrida (1981a: 6) argues that metaphysics belongs to a logic and not a concept. No concept contains the metaphysics 
itself. It is articulated by the functioning of specific concepts in a certain system of oppositions, within a specific chain. 
Against this, différance must instead be, “a process of textual labour and different sort of articulation” (6).  
70 
 
différance is not a concept if a concept is understood as a name with a proper and complete describable reference 
and an exhaustible content (6). The replacement of the ‘e’ in ‘difference’ with the ‘a’ of différance is strategic. It 
gestures both towards the importance of differences in constituting meaning, and to the writing/speech 
deconstruction, because it is a difference that makes no difference in speech because it cannot be heard (4, 5). It 
also gestures toward the double movement of différance, first as generative, and secondly, as its own 
countermovement, as a force that disrupts and displaces (Derrida 1981b: 45). Différance is not a word that hangs 
alone. It – structured by the structure it describes – is supplemented by a chain of other concepts that explain and 
supplant its logic (Derrida 1981b: 57; 1982: 12). 
As the structuring of the structure, différance is the play of traces that is both active and passive (Derrida 1982: 
9, 11). Play is the movement of trace that is not directed by an origin (Derrida 2001: 352; Gasché 1994: 49).79 As 
such, because it does not follow a straight path from signifier to presence, meaning is instead traced, tracked 
through one sign to another and another without coming to an end (Spivak 1997: xv). This is because the traces 
of other signs to which meaning defers are themselves also always never more than traces of still other signs. 
The trace left by the movement or the play of the trace is the generative movement of différance that is not 
presence but a “simulacrum of presence” (Derrida 1982: 24). Because it is a simulacrum and not presence itself, 
the trace, the imprint of the difference of the other and differences of all others in the system, also dissolves what 
it builds. The meaning generated in the play of the trace is not fixed. It is dynamic. The trace opens up 
appearance and sense in general (Derrida 1982: 19; 1997: 63).  
The trace, because it must be tracked through the network of differences in the system, is also a detour that plays 
itself out in space and time (Derrida 1982: 13). In fact, without space and time, the trace could not play. The 
system would be a tightly stacked hierarchy in which movement would not be possible. Without movement as 
the very possibility of change in the system, time would be reduced to a homogenous extension of the present. 
The system, because it is movement, is spacing itself, in which differences can differ. In order to distinguish 
between two signs, there must be room between them that allows difference to unfold. There must be space in 
which the movement of the trace enables the distinction between what is and what is not (10). Spacing allows the 
movement of différance as a spatio-temporal activity. As a spatial phenomenon, this movement is captured in the 
previously outlined description: it is the active differentiating and passive being differentiated of each sign in the 
system. Added to this seemingly disinterested differentiation is a more forceful moment of disagreement 
                                                      
79 Play is also possible within systems with stabilizing origins, but it is constrained: 
The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure – one cannot in fact conceive of 
an unorganized structure – but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what 
we might call the play of the structure…the center also closes off the play which it opens up and makes possible. As 
center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer possible (Derrida 2001: 
352). 
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between signs (8). Signs are in contest producing meaning as a result of the competition of different forces 
(Derrida 1997: 155). Meaning is not innocent. Its origin is forceful. The movement of the trace through the sign 
as a detour in space is also a detour in time. 
The meaning of a sign is never resolved. It never stops, because each sign it differs from and defers to for its 
meaning is itself sustained and moved by the movement of the trace (Derrida 1982: 8). Something is always held 
back, reserved and deferred until later (Derrida 1997: 66). The movement of différance opens up time-space that 
cannot be separated from the system as dynamic organisation (Derrida 1982: 13; 1997: 60, 68).80 This time-
space disrupts presence and all categories that are grounded in it: the transcendental signified; the self-present 
subject; Being and every other metaphysical foundation. Spacing allows a sign to change in time and with its 
context. It is what allows the sign its polysemy (Derrida 1981b: 43).  
Spacing also signifies something other than the unmarked spaces inside the system. Caputo (1997: 97) reads 
différance as the confrontation of unmarked, ‘unmarkable’ and un-mastered space that is outside the system.81 
Rather than something of a different type in relation to the space opened by difference and differing within the 
system, this seemingly more exterior exteriority is a reiteration of internal spacing. Or conversely, space between 
signs is the outside inside the system. If spacing inside the system becomes evident in the movement of 
différance between signs, then spacing outside the system becomes evident in the difference and differing 
between this signification and non-signification. This confrontation with space is what situates the operation of 
différance at the limit of meaning and sense as such (99). This liminality is what prevents différance from either 
escaping the structure, or from being drawn in as just another word. The openness of the system is what prevents 
its ossification. 
The past, present and future as unfolding moments in a straight, determined line are deconstructed by this 
understanding of time-space (Derrida 1997: 67). The movement of trace remains open to the future and the past 
(Derrida 1982: 13). Because the system is thoroughly temporal and unfolds in time, its history is paramount and 
constitutive (Derrida 1981b: 49). Just as the sign cannot be wrenched from its relations of difference in space 
and remain meaningful, so the sign cannot be frozen in time and understood only in terms of a here and now. 
The here are now of the sign already recede into the past and future, and begin to distribute across relations of 
                                                      
80 “In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of 
time or the becoming-time of space of time (temporization). And it is this constitution of the present, as an “originary” and 
irreducibly nonsimple...synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions...that I propose to call archi-writing 
[arche-writing], archi-trace or différance. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporalization” (Derrida 1982: 13, 
author’s emphasis). 
81 Caputo (1997: 97-99) calls this space the “void” or “khora” following Derrida’s readings of Plato’s conception of khora. 
The void is addressed in an essay titled Khora (Derrida 1995: 89-130). However, this outside can also be called space, the 
other, justice, the gift and the future (Derrida 1994: 25, 26, 37, 59; 1997: 68; 2001: 97-192; 2002a: 230-259) 
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difference. Each time the sign is written, it is written on its history of effaced and changing meanings (Spivak 
1997: lxxxiii). This change in turn feeds back into the system because of the movement of the trace. 
Derrida (1997: 89) argues that it is impossible to understand the system without understanding its history. The 
system is not synchronic and cannot be frozen because of the preceding elaboration of its structure as “generally 
complex” (89). Within the history of the metaphysics of presence, history has always been linear, whether the 
line was drawn from the present straight into the past and future as its continuous extensions, or whether it was a 
circular boundary without perforation that designated a completely homogenous field (Derrida 1981a: 7; 1981b: 
56; 1982: 16; 1994: 70). However, the movement of différance does not unfold linearly. Relations in the system 
are non-linear (Derrida 1981b: 50; 1997: 109). The deconstructed time-space does not sustain a homogenous 
field (Derrida 1994: 16; 1997: 86, 87; The Original Discussion of Différance 1988: 89). Derrida writes (1997: 
101), “In its syntax and in its lexicon, in its spacing, by its punctuation, its lacunae, its margins, the historical 
appurtenance of a text is never a straight line”. Relations within the system are constantly changing and shifting. 
The economic condensation or accumulation around a particular sign to which attention was directed earlier, as 
well as the active and passive deferring of signs in the system, produce relations of asymmetry (Derrida 1982: 
16). The field is heterogeneous. Understanding a non-linear system in terms of its history, which remains open, 
like its context, involves the choice of a frame that allows meaning to play against this closure (Derrida 1994: 
16, 21). The non-linearity of relations enabled by différance stands juxtaposed with linear metaphysical 
dichotomies. 
Metaphysical oppositions, although they, like all signs, are enabled by différance, are also undone by its 
movement. Différance exceeds the meanings it generates. Its movement always produces an excess and leaves a 
reserve that forces the marks of classification open to modification (Wood 1988: 67; Derrida 1992a: 228, 2001: 
365). Différance institutes the relations between signs and allows for contagion within the open web of 
interaction (Original Discussion of Différance 1988: 85). This heterogeneity of meaning cannot be thought 
within a system that locates meaning in essences and consequently understands oppositions – man/woman; 
good/bad; reason/emotion – as natural, given and reified hierarchies. The counter-oppositional movement of 
différance is intensified in the logic of strategic deconstruction.  
The violence of instituted and protected meanings manifested by metaphysical oppositions, for example, 
‘heterosexual/homosexual’ in which homosexuality is most often written into a relation of both exteriority and 
inferiority to heterosexuality,82 must be countered with its own violence (Derrida 1988b: 41; Spivak 1997: 
lxxvii). It must be actively un-structured by a deconstruction. Derrida describes the strategic intensification of 
différance thus:  
                                                      
82 This argument takes the same form as the deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition, mirrored in the logic of the 
supplement. See page 67-68. 
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I often use this rather easy pedagogical scheme, that in deconstruction there is a first phase in which you 
have to oppose, to reverse order, the hierarchy. And it is a negative move. In politics you have to violently 
oppose something before you can neutralize the opposition, or the previous logic, in order to open the way 
to another distribution, prepare another structure (Derrida 1987b: 184). 
Derrida (1981b: 36) cautions against the bypassing of this counter-violence and the rash movement toward the 
neutralisation of categories. If in a relation of inequality, such as is implied in metaphysical dichotomies, the 
dichotomy is declared undone before its effects have been reconstructed and while actual inequality still persists, 
then this neutralisation can do more harm than good by concealing violence in the system. However, 
neutralisation or re-inscription of the opposed terms by an elaboration on each sign’s contamination on the other 
and of the other, acknowledging the différance at play is equally necessary (Derrida 1981a: 6).  
Oppositional difference blurs the more intricate differences between things by suppressing différance (Derrida 
1987b: 183). Deconstruction does not seek to undo difference in the pursuit of sameness in deconstructing 
metaphysical oppositions. Instead, the erosion of the absolute status of bilateral differences allows other 
differences, dynamic differences, non-linear differences to flourish. This allows for a much richer understanding 
of difference and of the conceptual field delineated in the differences (183). Racism, sexism and other such 
ideologies are ideologies of difference that are static. Each seeks to contain the heterogeneity of the system of 
meaning by imposing categories that are premised on essential, exclusive identities that impose closure on the 
system. Deconstruction deconstructs this institutionalised difference in order to allow dynamic differences to 
emerge. These dynamic differences, operating with the logic of the trace, do not respect the integrity of 
boundaries, categories and classes. 
The marking of a distinction that divides the system into general classes, whether between genres of literature, 
gender, or genus, always implies the possibility of its own transgression (Derrida 1992a: 223).83 This argument 
can be made with reference to the iterability of the distinction and it can also be made with reference to play. The 
heterogeneity of the system always manifests on its ‘lowest’ level of differences and resists genre (Original 
Discussion of Différance 1988: 89). In the case of the system of signification, this is the difference of every 
single sign from every other sign. Différance is the limit of the attempt to reduce these differences by impressing 
generalisations upon them (1981b: 40). The irreducibility of the sign must not be mistaken for the conservation 
of some pure essence. What is essential to the sign is only difference (Derrida 1992a: 225). The movement of 
différance undermines the motif of internal consistency and purity propagated by essentialist philosophies and 
dogmas (Derrida 1981b: 64). This is not to say that no classification or genres are possible. On the contrary, 
classification within any system or code is unavoidable (Derrida 1988b: 9; 1997: 109). It is merely the status of 
                                                      
83 Genres or group identifications are subject to the logic of iterability: “…as internal division of the trait, impurity, 
corruption, contamination, decomposition, perversion, deformation, even cancerization, generous proliferation or 
degenerescence. All these disruptive ‘anomalies’ are engendered…by repetition” (Derrida 1992a: 211). 
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this classification that is shaken and the concealment of its violence that is exposed. A text participates in its 
classification but it cannot be contained by it (Derrida 1992a: 230). Derrida (1998: 9) points to overtly creolised 
spaces as privileged windows on the logic of violence, classification and excess. This motif will receive more 
considered treatment in forthcoming chapters.  
IV. THE BOUNDARY, THE LIMIT AND THE OUTSIDE 
The forgoing description of the dynamics of the system assumed that somewhere the system must have an inside. 
The logic of arche-writing; différance; trace; play; supplementation; spacing; temporisation; and the opening and 
closing of meaning each repeat the effort to characterise the possibility of meaning. The system opens the 
possibility of signification, given the absence of an a priori explanation, foundation or centre from which 
meaning could originate. The system’s internal organisation sustains a ‘here’ and ‘now’ that is opened by a 
heterogeneous and non-linear time-space (Derrida 1997: 86; The Original Discussion of Différance 1988: 89). 
The retention of the ‘here’ and ‘now’ always gestures towards a ‘not here’ and ‘not now’. The discussion of 
signification could not take place without a concurrent discussion of space or non-signification. Phrased 
differently, the inside of the system as the possibility of meaning has a limit beyond which there lies an outside. 
The system with both an inside and an outside is repeated at least twice within deconstruction: there are 
particular texts – first instance – and the general text – second instance (Derrida 1988b: 59). Derrida (1997: 60) 
writes of a ‘language’ generally, the text, différance; and of a text, the book or document open to the general 
economy of writing and textuality (149). It is argued below that this separation is not an absolute one and subject 
to a certain structural ambiguity or ‘undecidableness’. Without the objective reality attributed to the general text 
within the structuralist paradigm, the general text cannot exist without particular texts. Two systems, two 
‘insides’ demand the explication of two ‘outsides’ and the boundary. 
The outside or non-system in deconstruction – already encountered as space within the system – is not simply 
exterior and appears at moments to lose its exteriority in relation to the system altogether. The notion of text that 
Derrida (1997: 9; 1981a: 36) 84  espouses appears to be totalising on one reading. For example, in Of 
Grammatology he (Derrida 1997: 158) writes, “There is nothing outside the text”. And further on: “There has 
never been anything but writing” (159). The system of language prefaced with these statements and others like 
them appears as a totalising system in which everything is reduced to language. It also appears to be a closed 
system in which language has no relation to anything outside it. However, the general extension of writing and 
textuality can be restated following the logic of writing developed so far. For example, one could say that there 
is no sense or meaning that escapes the attempt to ontologise or render it present in space and time, nor is there 
any sense that escapes the absence of presence (Derrida 1981a: 4; Gasché 1994: 24). Or in other words, 
                                                      
84 See footnote 48. 
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everything that has sense and that is known falls short of guaranteeing presence and thus falls short of 
guaranteeing itself as absolute truth (Derrida 2001: 278).85 There is non-text or non-meaning within the text as 
far as it may extend. This understanding of the outside refers to the system in general, but also to particular 
meaningful systems that are constituted within the general system. 
Non-text or non-meaning does not destroy identity in the system of signification. Changing perspective to 
consider particular systems within the general system, it is clear that a lean notion of identity as distinctness 
rather than essence is retained (Derrida 1981a: 6; Gasché 1994: 16). Derrida’s (1988b: 20) treatment of 
repetition with regard to the signature relies on this recognisability. It implies that in order for recognition to take 
place, an edge or boundary that at the very least distinguishes it from what it is not. What is demonstrated by the 
signature is also necessary for any singular text (Derrida 1979a: 76). It is true of any meaningful system that can 
be identified, whether it is a novel, an artwork, a nation or the solar system. The notion of a boundary as such is 
not in question. It is only the nature of that boundary that is challenged.  
Iterability points to another understanding of the outside of the particular text. The argument was made earlier 
that the meaning of the sign and the text is not purely intrinsically determined and is enabled by the context 
(Derrida 1988b: 63, 185). The boundary between the text and its context must therefore be porous, allowing flow 
in two directions. The context ‘acts on’ and encloses the text; and the text resists this closure and exceeds it 
(Derrida 1981a: 7). The text and context operating within the logic of arche-writing defer to one another and 
differ from one another. Their respective closure is interrupted and displaced by the trace (Derrida 1979a: 84; 
1982: 8; 1988b: 60). The logic of the context’s own openness as a practical impossibility of deciding where the 
context ends because of the volume of information that could still be relevant and is not yet included will not be 
repeated but it does need supplementation. The context is itself textual (Critchley 1992: 38; Derrida 1981a: 63). 
What this means is that the non-linear opening of time-space in which the system plays itself out opens the 
context to perpetual movement.86 This is why the context cannot be the imposition of total closure on the code. It 
is both that which encloses the text and that which is included in the text itself, contributing more difference to 
the text’s play (Derrida 1988b: 8, 63, 79). Like the text, the context must have an edge to be read. And like the 
text, the edge of the context cannot be ultimately resolved (Critchley 1992: 33; Derrida 1979a: 81, 92, 107).  
                                                      
85 “If there is nothing outside the text, this implies, with the transformation of the concept of text in general, that the text is 
no longer the snug airtight inside of an interiority or an identity-to-itself (even if the motif of “outside or bust” may 
sometimes play a reassuring role: a certain kind of inside can be terrible), but rather a different placement of the effects of 
opening and closing” (Derrida 1981a: 36). 
86 “If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance 
or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field that is, language and a finite language excludes totalization. This 
field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because 
instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing 
from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions” (Derrida 2001: 365). 
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What is considered to be marginal within a clearly delimited area, just inside or just outside the boundary, is the 
site of continual drawing and redrawing of the inside/outside distinction. This point can be illustrated with 
reference to the example of the boundary between masculinity and femininity considered as texts. 87  The 
boundary between these texts is not most emphatic at their respective middle-points which conform to stable 
agreed meanings such as – very crudely – ‘men are strong and rational’ and ‘women are nurturing and 
emotional’. The boundary works and is at work in distinguishing men and women in accordance with this 
exaggerated ‘central’ meaning. However, the distinction and the meaning it produces in the system must do most 
of its work in creolised cases in which the it is not clear whether something should be included in ‘masculinity’ 
or lies outside it. In this case, recourse to the middle both strengthens its reach and weakens or distributes it by 
increasing the complexity of the boundary. This limited example also makes another point about the boundary: it 
is everywhere in the system, rewritten at every sign. It does not really enclose anything. 
Having rendered the boundary complex and thus undecidable, Derrida (1997: 59) inserts a ‘but’, a fold in the 
argument. The impulse to stop play in its tracks is not only irresistible, but also a necessary process of 
understanding (Derrida 1997: 59; Gasché 1994: 39). The boundary as the distinction between the inside and the 
outside is a frame or ‘parergon’ (Derrida 1979b: 3, 37). It is a judgement. The frame, of which the exemplary 
case is the frame of an artwork, is a construction that constitutes the inside as an inside and signifies the 
beginning of the outside (34). The necessity of this constitutive role of the frame already threatens the purity of 
the inside because it cannot simply delimit itself as an essential interiority (Derrida 1993a: 80). This is because 
the frame itself can be construed either as an extension of the inside, or as an intrusion of exteriority. It is either 
part of the artwork or part of the wall and also neither (Derrida 1979b: 24). In both cases, it remains an addition, 
a supplement that is grafted onto the work itself or onto the context (Derrida 1979b: 20; 1981a: 11; 1988b: 82). 
This process of grafting is not innocent. By imposing closure on the play of textuality, this play is altered. 
Reverberation against the frame distorts play (Derrida 1979b: 30).88 This is not to say that without a frame, a 
purer meaning exists. The frame remains necessary and constitutive but it and the distortion it imposes is 
ultimately arbitrary and violent (30). Derrida (1981a: 9) reiterates this argument with reference to the preface, 
which like the frame cannot be either totally interior or exterior with respect to the text it prefaces.  
                                                      
87 In considering masculinity and femininity as texts, it is the consideration of these domains or identities as meaningful and 
not the identification of lived identities with linguistic constructions (Derrida 1993a: 23). The border is felt as a physical 
crossing point, like between two territories or cultural spaces. It can also play out between different languages or discourses. 
And it reinforces the space between terms. Every boundary is an iteration of the logic of difference as differing and 
deferring, of contest and relation. 
88 From a critical political perspective, this is both an argument for the distortion of ideological frames on arguments and 
politics; and an argument that renders the clear separation of a text from its ideology as a clearly identifiable entity 
problematic (Derrida 1981a: 43).  
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The undecidability of the boundary is an effect of space inside the system. While space is implicated in the 
movement of différance, it remains other than textuality. To exceed the system in this sense is to escape marking 
and to lie beyond meaning. Space transcends signification. It lies outside sense. This strange formulation of 
space inside and outside is necessary to resist the reification of the outside as an eccentric origin of the system, 
and in order to resist the construction of a metaphysics out of deconstruction. Gasché (1994: 21) makes the claim 
that the text as it is discussed, always makes room for the other. This idea is repeated on two levels that are, 
again, implicated by one another but remain theoretically separable and significantly so.  
Alterity within the system is difference between texts and also between people as texts. Each text is opened by 
the play of the trace and the trace is set in motion by the deference of each sign to the other without consuming 
the other or identifying with the other in the sense of becoming the same thing, the same word, or the same sign 
(Derrida 1979a: 101). Derrida (1987b: 177) uses ash as a metaphor for the trace: it is the absolute mark of the 
trace of the other that is absent, that cannot be subsumed inside the same, self or I. Within arche-writing, both the 
sign and the text are constituted in relation with the other and with all others in the system. There can be no 
différance without alterity, singularity and non-identification (Derrida 1994: 31; 1997: 60). The movement of 
différance that has been described as violence is thus also the very possibility of ethics in the system because no 
element inside the system can be without being with others (Derrida 1997: 37, 139-140). No node in the system 
is meaningful alone. Derrida (1988b: 9; 1997: 68) argues that spacing or espacement is the genesis of alterity 
within the system. Spacing itself, in order to keep the system open, retains a “radical” otherness in relation with 
the system itself (Derrida 1981a: 5). While it resists presence, it retains forcefulness within the system (Derrida 
1981a: 5; 1997: 71).  
The motif of alterity is one that Derrida in Violence and Metaphysics (2001: 97-192) writes on in conversation 
with Emmanuel Levinas’ deconstruction of the encounter between the self and the other in which the other is 
fully disclosed within the self’s knowledge and perception of the other. This tendency has pervaded the history 
of western philosophy (Levinas, 1986: 346).89 Levinas (348) seeks to reintroduce asymmetry into the self-other 
or ethical relation by reframing it as a heteronomous experience in which the self defers to the other, rather than 
one of identification. The experience of the other by the same is not an extension of the self; rather, this self as 
an enclosed unity is interrupted and enriched by the face of the other, which is not the other itself but only its 
trace (351). The other comes from outside presence. It makes an infinite appeal to the self as absolute non-
                                                      
89 “Western philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a being loses its 
alterity. From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other that remains other – with an insurmountable 
allergy...philosophy handed down to us reduces to this return not only theoretical thought, but every spontaneous movement 
of consciousness” (Levinas 1986: 346).  
78 
 
presence to which the self is called to respond. This call to responsibility is infinite (353).90 The other is pure 
absence, while presence is something that belongs only to the self-subject who may be marked with an interior 
alterity that must not be conflated with the transcendence of the other (358).  
Levinas’ argument is sketched here as a foil to Derrida’s more ‘corrupted’ notion of alterity. Following Cornell 
(1992: 69), it can be argued that the other that is completely transcendent falls into a chain of binary opposition – 
self/other; same/different; inside/outside – that the system cannot maintain without impurity or without allowing 
a contagion across the boundary. Instead, the alterity that marks the other is already marked with an intrusion of 
the same. “[All] egos are others for others” (Derrida 2001: 157). The purity of the other is interrupted by a trace 
of the self as its other. Furthermore, the asymmetry instituted by deference to the other is maintained as a 
dynamic relation that always retains the possibility of reconstitution. The other also defers. Ethics does not 
escape textuality, which includes the other as another. The system cannot totally consume the other within the 
system (Derrida 1994: 14, 15). It must be repeated that the system is not an absolutely totalising system. It 
remains open. Singularity escapes the system. The system cannot signify the singular without contaminating it 
with a trace of the possibility of its own repetition or without marking it with generalities (14). A trace of the 
other is not full disclosure of the other any more than traces of the world fully disclose the world in itself . 
This discussion calls for an explanation of the relation between signification and the world in itself. Following 
the argument made so far, the boundary between text and the world is complex. Insofar as the world is 
meaningful to us, this meaning is structured by the trace, which means it is constituted differentially and it is 
open to change and development (Derrida 1982: 19; 1997: 63). The world is not fully disclosed in signs because 
the complex distributed reference provoked by différance does not have the essential object in the world as its 
pure origin. Explanation within a dynamic system, enabled by a frame, is partial and distorting (Cornell 1992: 4-
6; Derrida 1979b: 30). Any classification that claims to be absolutely true, presupposes inert, dead and 
unsurprising matter that fits into fixed concepts (Derrida 1981a: 23; Morin 1992: 58). The text is not dead and it 
does not assume a reified universe in a linear time-space. Acknowledging the spacing both within and without 
the system is an acknowledgement of internal limits which have hitherto been referred to as boundaries, and the 
limits to all sense, knowledge and meaning in general. The limit is a boundary of which only one side – the 
inside – is visible. However, like the boundary, différance producing change in the system allows these limits to 
be reconstituted (Culler 1983: 123; Derrida 1993a: 47, 67). 
The acknowledgement of the openness of the system is an acknowledgement of the impossibility of making a 
decision once and for all within the system because a decision as a frame imposes spatial and temporal closure 
                                                      
90 “The I before the other is infinitely responsible. The other who provokes this ethical movement in consciousness, and 
who disorders the good conscience of the coinciding of the same with itself involves a surplus for which intentionality is 
inadequate” (Levinas 1986: 353). 
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that reverberates back into the system. The confrontation with the limits of sense, knowledge and certainty is 
what Derrida calls “aporia” (Derrida 1993a: 21). Aporia is the impossibility of calculating or applying a rule in 
order to work out what to do or which way to go; and aporia is the necessity, in the face of this undecidability, of 
nonetheless making a decision (Derrida 1994: 27; 1993a: 12). What is worked out here is not different to the 
discussion of the border. When reading a text, the reader can find herself both inside and outside the text 
simultaneously. The undecidability, which is not indecision but the impossibility of clearing up all ambiguity in 
the system, does not do away with the decision itself. In fact, it is the impossibility of deciding by knowing 
which way to go that opens up the possibility of the decision as a decision, as a choice for which responsibility 
cannot be deferred. Derrida (1994: xix-xx, 21-31; 2002a: 230-259) also frames aporia and undecidability in 
terms of the law as a system of which justice is its other or its outside. 
Derrida (2002a: 230-259) writes about aporia as the experience of responding to the call of justice. Justice is 
outside the operation of the law. Within the logic of arche-trace that allows us to speak meaningfully about law, 
lawfulness, morality and ethics, nothing can guarantee that our laws, or the intellectual and social frames that 
frame laws, are just. In order to know once and for all what justice is, one would have to freeze the system and 
trace all its relations until the true meaning of the system could be found and the system could be adjusted to fit 
that perfect meaning. In the face of the structural impossibility of such a task, Derrida nevertheless retains justice 
as a possibility that sustains the logic of perpetual change and transformation. Justice as an aporia is another 
name for that forceful outside implicated in the transformation of the system. It is différance as the possibility of 
the other for which space opens. It is quasi-transcendental and not fully transcendental. This follows because 
justice is not inside signification and thus has no content. Its force in the system is not determinate. I cannot 
appear in the system as an untainted idea of the good or of god. It cannot become an origin any more than space 
but, like space, its invocation in deconstruction must actively resist reification. Because it cannot ever be 
instituted or programmed into the text due to the structure of the text, it is impossible within the text. The 
question of justice always proceeds from the future as the outside. It is never a question of presence. It exceeds 
the metaphysics of presence (Derrida, 1994: xix).91 
Aporia has three moments (Caputo 1997: 136-138; Cornell 1992: 133-135). First, aporia is the suspension of the 
law as a rule which governs decisions. It is the “epokhe” of the law because within the logic of différance, we 
know that no rule as a general distinction can itself be justice (Derrida 2002a: 251). The decision must respect 
the singularity of the event, while the rule can only ever be general. Secondly, it is the confrontation with 
undecidability even if, or especially if, all possible efforts to know what to do with recourse to knowledge and 
arguments are exhausted (252). And thirdly, in this moment of undecidability which cannot be extended 
                                                      
91 The confrontation with justice as aporia is only introduced here. It is relevant to the broader project with which this thesis 
is engaged and will be treated with specific attention to Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundations of Authority” (Derrida 
2002a: 230-298).  
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infinitely, justice as the future possible impossible cannot wait (255). Justice makes its demand now, but it 
makes this demand as a possibility and for the possibility of a just future. This future is discontinuous with the 
present and cannot be disclosed in the present (Derrida 1994: 59). Justice is not the fulfilment of the system; it is 
the possibility of transformation that opens up in the cracks and disjunctions in the system (26).  
 Justice is the possibility of deconstruction (28, 30). The structure of the system, the opening and closing of the 
system as signification, is dependent on alterity as non-signification. This is the other, reiterated as space, non-
signification, alterity and justice. Space is the possibility of the future of the system as different and 
discontinuous with the present-presence of the system. The system organises itself by structuring and by 
deconstruction; by closing and by opening what has been closed. For both these movements to be sustained as 
movement there must be space. Because justice like space is not within signification, it has no structure, and is 
itself undeconstructable (31). There is no deconstruction, change, transformation without the undeconstructable.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reconstructed the system of arche-writing that permeates several deconstructive texts through 
the lens of critical complexity theory. Although this system is not always easily identifiable because it is not 
written as a cohesive and totalising modern system and also cannot be identified as an ontological unity, its logic 
is reiterated in the repetition of a constellation of terms such as différance, trace, space, iterability, 
supplementarity, and so on. One of the tasks of these movements and logics is the dual gesture of both 
explaining the possibility of signification in a system that has no proper origin and no pure centre; and to show 
the limits of this possibility as each is marked with the impossibility that it might ever escape its own 
deconstructive tendency. In other words, if these infrastructures function as origins in the system, they are 
origins for whom the system might conversely be an origin. They do not transcend the structuring of the system. 
This lack of absolute foundations deems deconstruction vulnerable to charges of relativism both from its 
supporters and critics. 
Richard Rorty (1992: 235) argues that taking the systemic language of deconstruction seriously and positioning 
Derrida as a rigorous philosopher is disingenuous. He makes a two-pronged argument. In a first gesture, he (242) 
reduces all philosophical or literary uses of language to a practical effort to make language work for us, to solve 
a problem, or to serve an interest. In other words, language and truth claims are only pragmatic and have nothing 
to do with the possibility or impossibility of truth in any rigorous way. The second gesture circumscribes 
deconstruction within this relativist logic of expediency. In other words, deconstruction is seen as arguing 
eventually only for the folly of all attempts to make rigorous arguments by way of rather a theatrical 
demonstration in its texts (240). If Derrida’s arguments, especially in the earlier texts considered here in which a 
systematic and systemic motif emerges rather pronouncedly, are taken seriously, then Derrida must be 
considered a transcendental philosopher, another metaphysician of the type he critiques.  
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To this argument, at least three points of rebuttal must be raised. First, the text is not the reduction of the world 
and everything in it to language. The epistemological uncertainty that emerges within deconstruction is not a 
denial of the world or on any penetration between sense and reality in itself; it is only a denial of pure and 
immediate access to a world that can be disclosed without reserve. Furthermore, Derrida never abandons truth or 
logic, but demonstrates the limits of truth and logic and in fact uses truth and logic in a rigorous manner that is 
evidenced by close readings of philosophical problems worked out in his texts. And finally, deconstruction is not 
relativism. The retention of the notion of justice as the name in which deconstruction happens, as the possibility 
of the other in the system, does not suggest that judgements are arbitrary and expedient. Rather, the task of 
deciding within the system is an impossible task that generates an infinite responsibility. It is not pragmatics but 
ethics that perpetuates the logic of deconstruction. Knowledge that supports decisions is not impossible within 
the logic of différance. However, absolute knowledge that would shift responsibility from the individual or the 
system to a calculation with respect to the decision is dissolved by its movement.  
This is why deconstruction can be considered to be strategic. The movement against a system of metaphysical 
oppositions grounded in presence makes a break with all epistemological positions that rely on the dogmatic 
adherence to foundations (Derrida 1997: 83). This epistemological uncertainty produced by différance, which 
carries with it an acknowledgement of the necessary error and urgency of all knowledge and decisions in the 
system, is not grounded in knowledge itself. Knowledge is grounded in ethics. Aporia opens this possibility 
because it opens the possibility of a decision for which the decider bears a radical responsibility within the 
system and therefore to the others in the system. Any strategy formulated within the logic of deconstruction is 
made in light of the epistemological uncertainty it casts on the system. Deconstruction as a strategy can never 
become a substantive programme. Like all meaning, its substance is always contextual, partial and ultimately 
unjustified. Like complexity theory, deconstruction cannot separate epistemology from ethics. 
The work of deconstruction is never finished. The non-linear time-space which opens the system to play and to a 
future that is discontinuous with the present, ensures a perpetual motion that requires unceasing intervention, in 
the name of this future. Each deconstruction implies the possibility of a reconstruction, for which deconstruction 
cannot provide a priori content (Derrida 1987b: 84; 1988b: 41). This discussion has introduced violence. It has 
considered the notion of violence in the system implicated in both the organisation of the system itself, and in 
deconstructive interventions. 
This chapter has repeated the structure of the previous one with two aims. The first is to show how a reading of 
Derrida’s texts allows for the construction of a system that breaks with certain philosophical positions that have 
repeated the metaphysics of presence. This metaphysics resonates with the reductive modernist strategies which 
characterise modernism, whether premised on a transcendental subject or object. Deconstruction and complexity 
theory respond to different specific philosophical problems, but these approaches can be collected within a 
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movement of inhibiting play and complexity with recourse to an unstructured metaphysical foundation. Derrida 
(2001: 352) characterises it as follows: 
The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a play based on a fundamental ground, a play 
constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the 
reach of play. And on the basis of this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is invariably the 
result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were 
at stake in the game from the outset. 
Both deconstruction and critical complexity theory attempt to face up to the anxiety for which the centre has 
served as an anecdote.  
The second aim of the iteration of the structure of complex systems was to allow for a resonance between this 
structure and the seemingly foreign terminology and history of deconstruction. To this end, detailed explanations 
of différance and other core concepts within deconstruction were necessary. The internal dynamics of the system 
of signification is not a totalising system. Even the internal dynamics of the system, which can be given a 
description with due consideration of the parergonality of this description, are not fully disclosed in the system. 
The deconstruction of the line which had previously structured both space and time within the system prevents 
the system’s ossification. It allows both the opening of internal structure and the opening of the boundary of the 
system. The system is opened to internal difference, the possibility of new differences not yet included in the 
system, space, justice and the future.  
The discussion of the outside of arche-writing, particularly as the other and as justice as a quasi-transcendental, 
could give the impression that Derrida ‘capitalises’ this outside as pure transcendence or renders it absolute. This 
is a strategy that he himself aligns with the metaphysics of presence as the metaphysics of dichotomies (Derrida 
1997: 86). However, for reasons that were argued earlier regarding the implication of the outside inside the 
system, arising inside the system as a confrontation with the limit of interiority, this outside can be reframed as 
precisely that which prevents capitalisation. Derrida must posit a forceful outside as part of the dynamics of the 
system in order to resist capitalisation as such. What has been suggested in this chapter is that creolisation, 
hybridity and impurity are a necessary outcome of the heterogeneity of the system. These themes are also of 
significance in the discussion of the violence. This line of argument is most thoroughly developed in chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SYSTEM IS VIOLENCE: THE COMPLEX SYSTEM AND THE FIRST LEVEL OF VIOLENCE  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Violence is a concept that is often deployed as if its meaning is unproblematic. However, its meaning, extending 
to both what counts as violence and how it is valued – for example, legitimate and illegitimate or necessary and 
gratuitous – is not simple or self-evident. This complexity is brought to the fore in a systems based 
understanding of meaning in which the logic of différance structures relations of difference in the system with 
consequences for the grounding of all definitions and theories. What is considered violent depends on how these 
relations of difference are structured and on the context in which they are constituted. The significance of the 
context is evidenced by commonly held divergent perceptions of capital punishment. To some, the 
institutionalised killing of a convicted criminal is not so much violence as the restitution thereof or perhaps 
justice itself; while to others, killing enacted by indifferent state machinery is the most grotesque form of 
violence imaginable. From a third perspective, state killings might be acknowledged as violent, but defended as 
a necessary violence. From this viewpoint, having the monopoly on this violence is what constitutes the state as 
a state and produces order and legitimate structure in the social system. A systemic understanding implied in 
each of these explanations is not the only legitimate frame for an analysis of violence. As a counterpoint to this 
systemic understanding in which complex violence will be explored in this chapter, the more confident and 
precise exposition of violence carried out by Hannah Arendt (1970) in On Violence is introduced here as both a 
foil and a challenge to complexity thinking, warning against certain gestures and demanding clarity and 
relevance to social reality. Because it is motivated by the ethical ideal of a nonviolent society, the precision of 
this analysis as well as its uncompromising stand against violence must be taken seriously. 
Derrida’s (1997: 112) analysis of violence in the system, through which this analysis of violence in the system is 
structured, appears to be an attempt to get beyond the self-evidence of what constitutes violence. This analysis of 
violence in the system can be read in the same pattern in which Derrida (91) positions his analysis of the system 
as a text or as arche-writing. That is, rather than seeking out from the beginning of Of Grammatology (1997) 
what writing is by locating and explicating its stable essence, arche-writing is an answer to the question of what 
writing must be in the absence of full presence or in a system without a centre. This chapter repeats the form of 
Derrida’s argument. Rather than pursuing the meaning of violence by the aggregation of close readings of its 
changing meanings in several authoritative texts, complexity thinking as a form of systems thinking that is 
embodied in critical complexity theory and deconstruction is developed as the point of departure. Against this 
systemic understanding, the question is posed: what must violence be within a system structured by différance? 
In this regard, this project is not so much a treatment of violence in itself, but a treatment of violence in the 
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system without a centre. To this end, it is the system that must be properly explored and understood in order to 
get at violence, rather than violence that must be understood to get at the system. However, following the 
argument from complexity, there is no doubt that such an approach produces its own blind spot (Morin 1992: 
150; 2007: 2). It is for this reason that Arendt’s (1970) various concerns are used to interject at points.  
A first answer to the question of what violence must be comes from critical complexity in resistance to the 
modernist epistemological paradigm, and from deconstruction with regard to the metaphysics of presence. 
Violence is implicated in what might be called the ‘old’ paradigm, although this paradigm of presence has 
neither been replaced by the complex system, nor worn by its insights. By returning to the example of writing, 
and with reference to Nietzsche as a proto-grammatologist, violence is generalised on one level to coincide with 
the play of the system set free from old anchoring origins. The consequences and dangers of such a 
generalisation are explored below.  
Having cleared some conceptual ground with regard to deconstructive or complex systems, it is already evident 
that absolute meanings and clear categorical distinctions such as those proposed by Arendt are not tenable within 
a critical complex frame of understanding (1970: 44-47). Violence, like all other signifiers, can always be placed 
in several chains of supplementation. A first, relevant to this chapter, might be: power; force; signification; 
différance; creativity; violence. And a second that has emerged as significant within both deconstructive and 
critical complexity writing is: oppression; exclusion; violation; suppression; violence. This violence as an 
exclusion and violation is paramount in the development of the ethics of a deconstruction and critical complexity 
approach (Cornell 1992: 155-169). In an abstract but fundamental sense, the isolation of violence from the 
system as a whole is artificial. Its meaning cannot be defined in absolute and fixed terms. However, this does not 
mean that a limited provisional account of violence in the system must not be given.  
Within the discussion thus far conducted, the complex system has been described as a system that has an inside, 
a boundary and an outside that is implicated in both the inside and the boundary. These three sites of 
organisation remain relevant in the discussion of violence. Derrida (1997: 112) identifies three levels of violence 
in the production of the system of meaning. The first is at the level of the organisation of the system itself; it is 
the original violence of the system as the complex origin of meaning. It is on this level that writing as a system 
of relational meaning can itself be considered violence. The second level of violence concerns the imposition of 
closure in the system. It is the violence of the frame or boundary. The third level of violence is empirical 
violence, which includes acts such as rape, murder and war. It is violence that injures its object. This chapter is 
directed at the task of clarifying violence in relation to the first level of violence, the fundamental organisation of 
the system, and particularly its relation to différance.  
85 
 
II. HANNAH ARENDT’S EXPOSITION OF VIOLENCE 
Arendt (1970) writes in a world irrevocably changed by the scale and reach of violence as a political instrument 
of the Holocaust and World War II, and in the context of the Cold War, in which the ever escalating threat of 
violence from either side appeared, from a certain perspective, to be making the world more peaceful by 
containing empirical violence (3, 5). Within this context, violence as a phenomenon in its own right was 
marginalised, a mere secondary issue in the treatment of the primary interest, often war or international relations 
(8). This concern is echoed by Sylvia Walby (2009: 191-192) in a recent complexity-related publication that 
attempts to introduce a systems understanding to society as a whole, and within society to frame violence as a 
complex system unto itself.92 Within the historical situation in which Arendt’s writing was produced, what was 
given attention was the justification of violence, either by its ultimate inescapability or with reference to its 
purpose. This justificatory rhetoric was widely incorporated in the analyses of political revolutions in the Third 
World and European and American student uprisings (Arendt 1970: 12-15, 19, 21). The discourses developed 
around violence tied it to the task of setting right the unjust and exploitative social hierarchies in the world. 
Within this logic, violence took its place in opposition to power, as an instrument of the weak.  
Arendt’s treatment of violence (1970) is a firm stand against violence and against the rhetoric of its absolute and 
inescapable necessity that she reads in her philosophical contemporaries and in the canon. She (Arendt, 1970: 
12, 14, 20) pays particular attention to Georges Sorel and Frantz Fanon – particularly the first chapter of The 
Wretched of the Earth (2001) – as authors who provide apologies for violence. Her choice of interlocutors was 
motivated by their influence in the political arena. Sorel (1999: 78) argues for the inevitability of violent struggle 
in society and for its determinate link with socio-political vitality: 
Not only can proletarian violence ensure the future revolution but it also seems the only means by which 
the European nations, stupefied by humanitarianism, can recover their former energy. This violence 
compels capitalism to restrict its attentions solely to its material role and tends to restore to it the warlike 
qualities it formerly possessed. 
Arendt (1970: 71) does not quite identify Fanon’s writing, a call for colonised people to stand up and seek 
enfranchisement by deliberate and uncompromising means, with the mechanical theorisation of society and 
                                                      
92 Walby (2009: 193) presents violence as “an institutional domain, a social system in its own right and not reducible to any 
other”. Her analysis is drawn into the conversation because it, briefly, brings theories of violence which maintain an 
opposition between violence and power, and consequently and hastily cast violence as the occupation of weak and 
disenfranchised, into a complex systems understanding, which undermines it. Like Morin (1992: 3; 2007: 4), Walby (2009: 
199) links violence with modernity. However, for her, the modern state – which, following Weber, she sees as the 
centralisation and monopolisation of violence – is a goal toward which society should strive. Its centralisation of violence, 
Walby (196-199) argues, will protect weak parties who are the victims of the strong in societies. As this chapter progresses, 
it will become evident that critical complexity theory cannot support this legitimisation of violence by virtue of its 
centralisation.  
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violence attributed to Sorel. However, its insistence on revolutionary violence as a response to colonial violence 
alerts us to a dangerous propensity, which in excess leads to the idea that violence cannot only be justified, it can 
itself be just. 
Arendt (20) also engages with Jean-Paul Sartre (2001: 7-26), who in his preface to The Wretched of the Earth 
makes an evaluation of Fanon’s text that links violence both to the subject and the wider social system. The 
system is understood to be constituted by a racist logic disseminated by Europe and the West. In this system, the 
order that was established through the violent subordination of colonised subjects is not recognised as violent 
(8). On Sartre’s account, violence is used in the first place to exclude certain peoples from the category of 
humanity on the basis of race, and thus assert by way of this violence the subjectivity of the white race. This 
gesture is then reversed. The colonial subject asserts his subjectivity by means of counter-violence (18-20). 
Given the first systemic violence, this second one is irrepressible. Violence has already called up its counter-
violence with dialectical necessity. Sartre (25) believes that this dialectic can move to a peaceful synthesis: “Will 
we recover? Yes. For violence, like Achilles’ lance, can heal the wounds that it has inflicted”. Violence is 
necessary and inevitable for the system to restore itself to a more just order. Sartre (26) attributes arbitrariness to 
violence: “you may be sure we will not avoid it…they’ll go for us and hit out blindly...” Violence is therefore 
justified on a systemic level, without regard for individual subjects’ suffering or accountability.  
Fanon himself (2001: 27) sets out the programme of decolonisation as one of systemic transformation. In a 
system instantiated by violence, violence appears to those who are violently subjugated as the only possible 
means of escaping it. There is certainly evidence of what Arendt (1970: 20) calls Fanon’s “rhetorical excesses”. 
In particular, the alignment of violence with the reclamation of power and dignity is a point of concern. Fanon 
(2001: 57) does not consistently advocate violence for all colonised people or all people who have suffered 
violence. Rather, it is described as the last resort of those for whom the system does not allow other forms of 
agency. Violence, according to Fanon’s (27-84) argument, is a means to power. Violence of the powerful and 
counter-violence of the weak answer each other with escalating intensity (69). Fanon’s essay raises the question 
of the possibility of violence coming to an end, when its movement has already begun. The arguments presented 
in The Wretched of the Earth suggest that an end is at least very unlikely. This position, one that advocates 
liberation through violence, conflates power, subjectivity and violence; however, Arendt objects. 
Arendt (1970: 4, 44-47) makes several emphatic and clear conceptual distinctions between terms often conflated 
in social scientific research and writing: power, strength, force, authority and violence. Power can be understood 
as a capability, either to act or to control. Further, for Arendt (44), power is of the group, not the individual. It is 
the effect of a group of subjects acting in concert. When power is mistakenly associated with an individual, what 
is actually meant by ‘power’ is strength (45). Arendt (45) also warns against the use of the term ‘force’ in a 
discourse on violence, because it is a term misappropriated from the natural sciences, which tend to naturalise 
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the discourse of violence as if, like a mechanical expenditure of energy in a natural system, violence cannot be 
judged. One further term that is conflated with violence is ‘authority’. For Arendt (45), authority is a legitimised 
hierarchy. It does not involve coercion. It involves consent.  
These concepts are kept apart from one another in order to speak specifically about violence. The bleed of one 
into another confuses the meaning of violence. It compromises the ability to identify it and to alleviate its effects 
and restore peace. What all the concepts discussed above have in common is that they all structure society by 
different means (43). Within this scheme, violence is an instrument, a means to achieve power (48, 51). 
However, there is an inverse relation between violence and power. Those who have power have no need for 
violence; and the converse is also true. Power increases with greater consensus and cohesion of the group, while 
violence does not depend on numbers (42). Significantly, violence, unlike power, authority and strength, does 
not depend on a structure like the group, a specific configuration of the system, a consensus or a hierarchy that 
enables it. Violence comes as an interruption of that configuration. Violence is therefore implicated in a certain 
kind of transformation. Arendt (30) makes an important qualification on this point. She argues that it is only if 
history is thought as a linear progression towards a final telos that violence can interrupt the system. In other 
words, if history were inherently closed to change then it would be the case that change necessitates violence. 
However, if history is an open-ended accumulation of transformations, then the system without violence remains 
open to change.  
Violence is arbitrary because is merely instrumental, and because it interrupts the foundations of society and has 
no foundation of its own. It does not respect the singular or the individual.93 The arbitrariness of violence is not, 
however, to be confused with irrationality (64). Irrational acts are acts without reason. Violence is a rational 
instrument for the achievement of a goal. The opposition of violence and reason seeks to ‘animalise’ violence. 
However, violence is not an extension of some natural order. It is the instrumentalisation of reason itself (82-83). 
It is only when violence is separated from its end, in a seemingly endless series of attacks and reprisals, that 
violence seems irrational. This distinction between nature and violence, which is then a distinctly human social 
phenomenon, is important. It is echoed in a slightly different tone within deconstruction (Derrida 1997: 37).94 
Walby (2009: 195), in her systems analysis, undermines the separation between power and violence. She also 
reverses the inverse relation between violence and power that Arendt (1970: 42) theorises. She writes: “The 
predominant theorisation of inter-personal violence as a consequence of a disadvantaged class position is 
                                                      
93 Violence has no natural purpose. Its force is not discriminating. “[Violence] harbours within itself an additional element 
of arbitrariness; nowhere does Fortuna, good or ill luck, play a more powerful role than on the battle field” (Arendt 1970: 
4).  
94 The opposition between violence and non-violence in the system repeats the opposition between artifice and nature within 
the history of philosophy (Derrida 1997: 37). Both are oppositions that are deconstructed. In these deconstructions, violence 
associated with artifice returns from its exile beyond the system. 
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challenged by its use by dominant groups to maintain gender and ethnic/racial/national/sexual hierarchies” 
(Walby 2009: 195). An understanding of violence which opposes it to power excludes the maintenance of 
essentialist oppositions by the powerful, and already ignores a deeper operation of violence in the system. 
Arendt’s (1970) frame of enquiry is blind to this systemic violence. 
The framing of violence as an empirical, arbitrary use of force, usually by a single agent or groups of agents 
must be shifted in order to render other forms of violence visible. Indeed, Slavoj Zizek (2008: 1; 8-33) points to 
the erasing effect that this subject-centred frame has on other forms of violence, the execution of which emanates 
neither from a definite single nor collective agent.95 These other forms of violence are instead structural features 
of the system in which empirical or subjective violence manifests. Structural or objective violence takes two 
forms. The first form is the violence of language or symbolic violence, the “imposition of a certain universe of 
meaning” (1). This also involves the suppression of any contrary meanings. The second form is what Zizek (2, 
10) characterises as ‘systemic violence’. This is the maintenance of an established hierarchy in society through 
economic, social and political institutions and mechanisms. This tripartite interrelated structure of violence – 
subjective, symbolic and systemic – complicates the use and theorisation of the concept ‘violence’. 
In this analysis, instances of empirical violence that seem to disrupt an apparently peaceful status quo can be 
interpreted as more than the irrational outbursts of individual agents. The meaning and hierarchy disrupted by 
this violence are also opened to new interpretations. When reframed in an analysis which contextualises 
subjective violence, for example a violent strike at a gold mine or a violent revolt in the ranks of low level 
military personnel, within a system of relations, violence is no longer simply the actions of bad individuals, or 
simply unjust or simply unmotivated (9). Understanding violence as an interruption to the perpetuation of the 
system due to its causing a systemic adjustment is related to Walter Benjamin’s ‘divine violence’ (10, 137).  
Benjamin’s Critique of Violence (1978: 277-300), which begins by framing assessments of violence in terms of 
the law and making a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence, suggests that there are certain 
instances of violence that are produced by the excessive production of the system’s own logic. This violence 
undermines the system, which is also violent, and it therefore undermines the injustice of the system because it 
brings about a different order of things from outside the system’s violent relations (277, 300). This account of 
violence is sympathetic to the anti-liberal stance of Sorel and Sartre (Hanssen 2000: 3). Divine violence, which 
must be distinguished from both law-making and law-sustaining – violence that instantiates and conserves the 
system – violence that Benjamin (1978: 297) calls mythical, comes as pure structural interruption. Because it 
                                                      
95 “Opposing all forms of violence, from direct physical violence (mass murder, terror) to ideological violence (racism, 
incitement, sexual discrimination), seems to be the main preoccupation of the tolerant liberal attitude that predominates 
today…Is there not something suspicious, indeed symptomatic, about this focus on subjective violence…?...Doesn’t it 
desperately try to distract our attention from the true locus of trouble, by obliterating from view other forms of violence and 
thus actively participating in them?” (Zizek 2008: 9). 
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comes as an interruption to the system, it is not always recognisable within the system: “If mythical violence is 
law-making, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys 
them…” (297). Mythic violence can never be just because it arises within the system itself (Cornell 1992: 156). 
However, divine violence, because of its exteriority, still possesses this potential. Rather than violence 
interrupting a peaceful order, justice, the divine, interrupts a violent order violently. 
The question of the whether or not what is called violence can ever be thought just is one which Arendt (1970: 
21, 63) answers in the negative; although she does concede that under extreme conditions of oppression, the 
absence of power produces no alternative to the violent pronouncement of one’s grievances. However, this 
violence cannot restore peaceful relations. She (80) argues that all actions in the world always change the world, 
but that violent acts only change the world into a more violent one. It is precisely for this reason that she draws 
attention to the respective problematic positions of Fanon, Sartre and Sorel’s respective appraisals of 
revolutionary violence. The question of whether violence can ever be considered just or even appropriate is one 
that complexity theory and deconstruction also have to answer.  
Derrida’s (2002a: 230-259) response in Force of Law96 is that violence itself is never just. However, referring 
back to the previous chapter in which the logic of deconstruction was explicitly linked to deliberately violent 
destruction of hierarchies, this ‘no’ must be qualified (Derrida 1988b: 41; Spivak 1997: lxxvii). Derrida (1981b: 
36) preserves a space for what might be termed ‘necessary’ violence, but stops short of identifying this violence 
with justice itself. This simultaneous employment and disavowal of violence will become clearer once further 
exposition of the system is carried out. In line with Zizek (2008: 159), the complex systemic position preserves a 
space in which systemic violence remains visible and counter-systemic violence cannot be reduced to the 
irrational actions of individuals. Rather, context always matters in determining the meaning of violence. But 
before anything further can be said about violence in the system, attention is turned to what is meant by ‘system’ 
when this term is informed by both complexity theory and deconstruction. Within this description, some initial 
remarks can be made regarding the violence associated with the metaphysics of presence or modernist 
epistemological strategies. 
                                                      
96 This essay will not be specifically addressed here as it is central to the discussion in chapter 5. Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence will also be relevant there. However, in substantiation of the claim that deconstruction does not advocate violence:  
I have often called for vigilance, I have recalled myself to it…the risk of giving authorisation to violent, unjust, 
arbitrary force…In the texts I just evoked it is always a matter of differential force, of difference as difference of 
force, of force as différance (différance is a force différée-différant); it is always a matter of the relation between force 
and form, between force and signification, of ‘performative’ force…(Derrida 2002a: 235) 
Justice is, however, as argued in the previous chapter, outside this economy (242). 
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III. BETWEEN THE SYSTEM AND THE SYSTEM  
a. SUPPLEMENTING CRITICAL COMPLEXITY THINKING 
Complex systems thinking is a leap away from atomistic modes of thinking, those that see subject and object and 
self-enclosed units, toward the relations and spaces between elements and the larger phenomena of which they 
are a part (Derrida 2001: 351-370). I have positioned this idea of a system in proximity with an epistemological 
break that separates two theoretical paradigms that have been called modern and postmodern respectively. This 
break refers to a shift away from the conceptualisation of the structure of thought as secured by a transcendental 
origin – modern thinking – toward the conceptualisation of this structure without a transcendental origin (Cilliers 
2005: 262; Derrida 2001: 278, 369). The system as it is developed in both critical complexity theory and in 
deconstruction begins with Saussure’s (1983: 67) assertion of the anteriority of difference in the system and also 
the idea that elements within the system related and are constituted through these relations. Despite this common 
frame, it was stressed in chapter 1 that it is not endeavoured here to collapse the distinction between these two 
theoretical positions, although, critical complexity theory, especially as it is developed by Cilliers (1998a), is 
already constituted in part by its inclusion of deconstructive tools. This constitution is significant, especially 
because deconstruction was read in chapter 2 as an attempt to develop a model of a complex system of meaning, 
extended to all attempts to make sense. The centrality of meaning in deconstruction can be used to reinforce a 
similar centrality of meaning in the complex system.  
The simultaneous sameness and difference between the system of complexity theory and the system of 
deconstruction finds an explanation in Derrida’s (1988b: 8; 1997: 91) notion of iterability. To recapitulate, the 
appearance of a sign depends on its ability to be recognised and is contemporaneous with the possibility that it 
might be repeated. The sign’s meaning, because it does it is not determined by an essence, is co-constituted by 
what is external, its context. It is therefore always divided within itself: both the same and different with each 
repetition. What is iterated in critical complexity theory and deconstruction is the notion of a system that 
structures itself through its interactions. It is the self-organising complex system (Morin 2005: 11). 97  Or 
elsewhere, it is the post-metaphysical system, one that attempts to dislodge itself from the self-evident logos 
(Derrida 1981b: 52). Or the system without a centre (Cilliers 1998a: 5, 89; Derrida 2001: 278). Or the system 
without a proper origin (Derrida 1997: 37; 2001: 369; Morin 1992: 38-41). 
                                                      
97 “Organised complexity means to our eyes that systems are themselves complex because their organization supposes, 
comprises, or produces complexity…[A system] is a relation between parts that can be very different from one another and 
that constitute a whole at the same time organised, organising and organiser” (Morin 2005: 11). 
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While each respective theory has overtly shaped and altered the presentation of the other, this resonance and 
alteration are of the movement of supplementation 98  within this project and not simple identification. 
Supplementation is not able to consume or erase the other’s difference. The strategy followed from this point 
will use the complex system beginning with and constituted by difference and already opened by différance as a 
point of departure. Where the word ‘system’ is used, it refers in the first place to an attempt to confront and 
understand complexity. Deconstruction read as a manner of systems thinking – with due acknowledgement of 
the partiality of this reading and the space for other valid readings – is used to supplement this system. 
Deconstruction is particularly important in speaking about violence in the complex system, for which critical 
complexity theory does not have so extensive a vocabulary. 
The need for further attention to the parallel reading of the system from complexity theory and the system from 
deconstruction beyond chapters 1 and 2 is motivated by the need for caution against the reductive simplification 
of the relation between these theories. It is for this reason that considerable attention was directed at the 
clarification of the respective intricacies of the complex and deconstructive systems individually. To rush too 
quickly into a merging of these two theoretical fields, stressing their difference without thorough attention to the 
way concepts within each respectively deconstructs the notion of a determined system, fixed by its origin, 
assumes too much in an area of philosophy that is by no means saturated with commentary. There is a marked 
deficit in literature that compares or contrasts complexity theory and deconstruction.99 Mark Taylor (2001) – 
echoing Michael Dillon’s (2000) misgivings that were noted in the margins of chapter 1 – warns against 
precisely the gesture executed here that relates complexity theory and deconstruction. Dillon (2000: 4, 5) 
acknowledged the affinity between these two theoretical approaches. This affinity is the anteriority of 
relationality in both complex and poststructural systems. However, to restate the problem, it is the nature of this 
difference that allows Dillon to maintain the strong opposition between complexity theory and poststructuralism.  
Taylor’s apprehension is motivated by other concerns. Taylor (2001: 14) relates the need for complex 
understanding to this historical moment, which he understands as falling between perceived states of global 
equilibrium. In other words, we are living in a volatile transformational era in which uncertainty abounds. He 
                                                      
98 The logic of the supplement preserves the exteriority of the supplement to that which it supplements, and also transgresses 
this boundary: 
The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of 
presence...But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if 
it fills, it is as if one fills a void (Derrida 1997: 144-145, author’s emphasis).  
99 In my research I have found that the most extensive project that brings critical complexity theory and deconstruction 
together is Complexity and Postmodernism (Cilliers 1998a). There are more undertakings that draw complexity theory into 
conversation with the poststructuralism of Gilles Deleuze than that of Derrida. Deleuze uses the language of complexity 
science in his philosophy that encourages the comparison between this philosophy and projects within natural science. For 
thorough illustrations, see the work of Keith Ansell-Pearson (1999) and Manuel De Landa (2002).  
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(Taylor 2001: 14), in line with Cilliers (1998a: 3) and Morin (2005), distinguishes complexity theory, from 
which he draws insights, from chaos or catastrophe theory. His (Taylor, 2001: 72) reading of complexity as a 
theory with the potential to ground critical intervention then moves through poststructuralism, urged on by an 
ethical imperative to act for the possibility of a better future. It is the openness generated in our complex world 
that produces this possibility.  
Taylor (2001: 55) engages with three core poststructuralist perspectives: Derrida's deconstruction, Foucault's 
social constructivism and Baudrillard's simulation. While he is generally positive about the contributions of these 
thinkers to social critique, he points to a deficiency in all three perspectives. They all lead to paralysing 
uncertainty.100 Derrida, like the complexity theorists, is understood as being interested in systems far from 
equilibrium.101 That is, systems that are what they are in virtue of their instability and thus movement. However, 
it is argued that the emphasis on instability is taken too far in poststructuralism and that this undermines the 
possibility of theorising stable structures and renders rigorous scientific understanding that presupposes structure 
in the system moot. The allegation that poststructuralism rejects the stable structured system is informed by the 
assumption that the poststructuralism perspective is oriented by an opposition between a rigid hierarchical 
system, which excludes difference, and freedom, which is difference itself. Poststructuralism can therefore only 
be a sentinel to the coming complexity because all it can muster is the opening of rigid systems with no workable 
alternative (Taylor 2001: 15). Complexity theory, on the contrary, is heralded as a way to move beyond the 
characterisation of the system as repressive and so navigate the impasse between scientific reductionism and 
poststructuralist pure interruption, promising rigorous knowledge, room for revision and a platform for action 
(60).  
As a reply to Taylor, one could raise two points. The first is that deconstruction, by way of différance, the trace 
and spacing, opens structure to movement, development in time, uncertainty and provisionality (Derrida 1993a: 
21; 1997: 62, 83, 89, 90; 2001: 284). This does not undo structure. It does, however, acknowledge what Derrida 
(2001: 278) calls “the structurality of structure” or, in other words, dynamic self-organisation. The second point 
is that deconstruction does not undo knowledge, but changes its status. From critical complexity theory, it can be 
argued that the impasse or the need for decision rather than calculation that follows from deconstruction is 
                                                      
100 Poststructuralism is often called to account on the charge of being anti-foundationalist to the point of an irrational and 
immoral unwillingness to make judgements about whether something is good or bad or good or evil, a legacy tied to its 
Nietzschean heritage, and hence also unwillingness to advocate action or indeed to act in the name of something that is good 
(Hanssen 2000: 3, 7).  
101 See Cilliers (1998a: 4). Being far from equilibrium is one of the most general characteristics of complex systems and the 
condition for the system’s ‘life’. The movement of différance is implicated in the push from equilibrium or stasis. As 
opposed to static oppositions, in this case difference with an ‘e’, “[there is] différance...as soon as there is a living trace, a 
relation of life/death or presence/absence” (Derrida & Roudinesco 2004: 21).  
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iterated in the complex system (Cilliers 2000c: 27, 29). The claim that the deconstructive system undermines 
science or rigorous knowledge as a motivation for action depends on a theory of representation between 
knowledge and reality that assumes that the only way to enable knowledge is the establishment of a fixed one-to-
one reference between objects in the world and objects within sense (Norris 1998: 69). Without this natural link 
between reality and representation, the ‘artificial’ systemic one destroys the possibility of knowledge. However, 
to believe in this destruction requires that one first accept that foundations are necessary for knowledge to exist.  
The distributed reference of an epistemology without metaphysical foundations discards this foundationalism. It 
has been argued from the perspective of both critical complexity theory and deconstruction that knowledge, 
sense and language are not closed systems (Cilliers 1998a: 83; Norris 1998: 69).102 It is through knowledge and 
language that the world as a complex system is open, not closed.103 The complex system is both the attempt to 
explain the possibility of meaning and knowledge and its limits through the development of ten general 
characteristics (Cilliers 1998a: 3, 4). These characteristics are restated here, enriched by deconstructive 
language, with a particular eye on locating violence in this system.  
b. CHARACTERISING THE COMPLEX SYSTEM AGAIN: THE TEN CHARACTERISTICS 
OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS SUPPLEMENTED BY DECONSTRUCTION 
The first characteristic of complex systems as discussed by Cilliers (1998a: 3) is that they are constituted by a 
large number of elements. None of these elements has an atomistic identity and none functions as an origin 
within the system. It is the relation between the elements that matters. These relations are not merely significant 
in understanding the system. They constitute the system. Without relations there would be no system; elements 
themselves become meaningful in the system. The sign within deconstruction is inscribed from the first instance 
within a system as its possibility of being meaningful (Derrida 1988b: 9). The system of deconstruction is 
relations of dynamic difference. It is relations of différance. It is the plural and dynamic movement of trace 
(Derrida 1997: 63). The elements constituted by différance are always marked by internal difference, the 
                                                      
102 What deconstruction does is to move away from self-evident simplicity of linguistic reference towards the complexity it 
conceals (Johnson in Derrida 1981a: xv; Norris, 1998: 71). This does not mean that reference, or the fact that when we 
speak, think and act there is an ‘about’ which orients that language, knowledge and action, falls away completely (Norris, 
1998: 85). Rather, reference or the ‘about’ of these spheres of meaning is complexified and retained. Norris (85) writes, 
“Sometimes this referential moment escapes notice since the terms in question may plausibly be viewed as capable of 
rigorous definition at the intra-systemic level”. And thus the argument that is pursued in Of Grammatology (1997) and 
beyond it, unhinging the signifier from its signified appears to do away with reference as such.  
103 Laurent Dobuzinskis (2004: 440-441) identifies the rejection of foundationalism premised on the revaluation of the 
relationship between language, culture and knowledge as the initial point of intersection between Morin’s work and 
poststructuralism or postmodernism. He (440) extends the affiliation of complexity thinking with poststructuralism to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, which echoes arguments made in chapter 2 and further on in this chapter.  
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element/sign differing from itself in time, and by external difference, the sign differing from other signs, from 
the system as a whole and from the system’s environment. 
Derrida (1982: 8) describes the differing and deferring of signs as a paradoxically active and passive process and 
also frames this oscillation between passivity and activity in a way that implies contest and domination of one by 
another. Relations are characterised by dissimilarity which is passive and by “allergic or polemical otherness” 
(Derrida 1982: 8). These relations of différance are what allow the system to organise. As this process involves 
both order and disorder,104 it requires that elements are acted upon, moved, structured and obedient, and also free 
to escape this structure. At every level, what might be seen as a passivity or acquiescence of a part to a part, or of 
a part to the whole, can be understood as complementarity between elements (Morin 1992: 118). This is the 
ability of the part, or indeed the whole, to be organised and to remain organised. Without it, the system would 
disintegrate because the system’s self-organisation always requires some level of conservation or maintenance.  
Complementarity is not balanced by a countermovement, but it is challenged by one. This countermovement is 
the second aspect of différance that characterises the internal dynamics of the complex system and the text 
(Derrida 1982: 8). This can be described in complexity language and it is at play at every level of organisation 
from the lowest to the highest (Morin 1992: 119). On this point, it is important to note that when speaking of 
various levels in complex system, what is spoken of is in fact various relations that are distributed in time and 
space and not particular layers within a fixed pyramidal hierarchy. Morin (1992: 116-120) calls the 
countermovement “antagonism”. It is necessary in a dynamic – rather than static or dead – system in which 
movement in time requires not only that structures are made; but that structures are made, unmade and replaced. 
Antagonism between elements replaces the ordering force of an origin. Asymmetry is the corresponding concept 
theorised by Cilliers (1998a: 95, 120, 124) that captures competitive, forceful interactions in the system. 
Relations between elements in a complex system are never static and equal. Structure presupposes that, although 
open to further change in time, all relations are characterised as less or more asymmetrical. 105  Complex 
                                                      
104 The disorder which Morin (1992: 118; 2005: 11) implicates in organisation is quite specific. He (Morin, 1983a: 25-26) 
elaborates in Beyond Determinism:  
Disorder is not a notion symmetric to order. It is a macroconcept which, while still containing the idea of randomness, 
can include sometimes the ideas of disturbance and dispersion, sometimes the ideas of perturbation or accident 
(relative to a functioning operation, an organisation), and, when it is a matter of an informational/ communicational 
machine (such as the living machine), the ideas of noise and error. 
This idea of disorder resonates with what Derrida (2002: 235) identifies as a differential force that undermines oppositions, 
order and law. 
105 “Closely related to the principle of non-linearity is the principle of asymmetry. Linear, symmetrical relationships give 
rise to simple systems with transparent structures. In complex systems, mechanisms have to be found to break symmetry 
and to exploit the magnifying power of non-linearity. This is ensured by a rich level of interaction and by the competition 
for resources” (Cilliers 1998a: 120).  
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organisation always involves dominance and suppression. However, dominance is always dynamic, it is always 
mutable. 
Morin (1992: 119) writes that, “the idea of the system is not only harmony, functionality, higher synthesis; it 
includes, necessarily, dissonance, opposition, antagonism”. Complexity theory, particularly the critical 
complexity theory of Morin (1992: 119), draws on a lineage in which the relations between parts are competitive 
and characterised by struggle. While the idea of harmony in the system is retained, the difference between 
conflict and harmony as a binary opposition is not maintained. Rather, this relation of difference is one of the 
dichotomies that complexity theory undermines (Morin 2007: 8). If this is taken into account, then Morin’s 
(1992: 119) announcement of harmony and conflict in the system should not be taken to mean that somewhere in 
the system there is pure harmony and somewhere else there is conflict. Perhaps a better way of stating it invokes 
undecidability as it is worked out in relation to the motifs of the hymen, invagination and the fold (Derrida 
1981a: 212-213; 1992a: 216). Organisation is both harmony or synthesis and conflict or dissonance, the way the 
vagina can be thought as both inside and outside. It is both at the same time. Deciding whether to describe it one 
way or the other is always an ethical judgement. 
This system that is structured by relations of differences, it should be made explicit, is the system in general. It is 
the most general model of a complex system that departs from connectionism or structuralism as its base. It is 
not yet a human social system, or a legal system. Antagonism or polemical difference is not yet one person 
exploiting or dominating another. Neutralising the language of violence by invoking it in a general description of 
the system can be criticised on the same grounds that Arendt (1970: 45) disparages the use of ‘force’. It gives the 
appearance – one that is challenged by the normativity asserted in wider critical complexity theory – that, even 
when it is applied to human social phenomena, it involves only an unbiased mechanical account of events. 
The second characteristic of the complex system, already evident in the description of antagonism and 
asymmetry, is the dynamic nature of interactions in the system. The complex system unfolds in time and this 
situation in time as well as its differential structure produces change in the structure of the system (Cilliers 
1998a: 3). The temporal aspect of différance gives time a new significance in the complex system. It is the 
temporisation of différance, its distribution in time-space that opens the system to the possibility that it might not 
be a perpetuation of the present (Derrida 1982: 13). To retrace this argument, if a system is static then time is not 
a relevant force in the system and functions only as an impotent parameter. The system can move backwards and 
forwards in time with little consequence. However, the complex system is dynamic and its internal dynamic 
structures are of the nature that changes that occur are distributed throughout its entire non-linear network and 
cannot be measured or corrected without again irrevocably altering the system. The delay and deferral produced 
by différance are constitutive of relations within the system. The system’s differences are produced as “the 
effects of transformations” that cannot be captured in a description that examines a synchronic snapshot of the 
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system (Derrida 1981b: 27). If a system is dynamic, then time which involves both an active past and an open 
future holds the possibility of novelty and transformation.  
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth characteristics are all related because they each refer to an aspect of the 
interactions themselves. The third characteristic of complex systems is that the interactions between elements are 
rich. This means that no oppositional logic can contain the full meaning of an element (Derrida 1987: 83). Each 
element is connected to several other elements in the system (Cilliers 1998a: 4). In one sense, each element is 
also related to every other element because it is implicated in the system. This richness of connection is what 
allows for a richness of meaning.  
The richly connected elements are not connected in a linear arrangement (4). This is the fourth characteristic. 
This idea has been discussed both within the complex system and within the system of arche-writing. Non-
linearity, which affects both space and time, means that the development of the system cannot be expressed in 
simple terms without compromising these relations. As a consequence of non-linearity, the effect that elements 
have on one another is not always proportional to the force exerted by one or either element: “small causes can 
have large results” (4). The non-linearity of the system thus allows the system to shift in unpredictable ways. It 
appears to suggest that the system jumps from one state to another with a break or discontinuity between the two 
states. However, time in the system is continuous and the idea of a ‘state’ is an abstraction from this continuity. 
The notion of the trace in the system captures this continuity. Even if the system were to transform, it would still 
be constituted by nothing more than traces of past traces moving in time. As a limited example, the word 
‘deconstruction’, although it acquired radically new and different meaning within texts written by Derrida and 
beyond, was used because its past use and non-use allowed this transformation and remain relevant (Derrida, 
1988a: 1).  
The resistance to simplification is the incompressibility of the system (Cilliers 1998a: 10); the non-linearity of 
the dynamics of the system in tension with an attempt to compress, simplify or reduce the heterogeneity of the 
system to a straight line (106). Linearity or simplicity in our models does not signify an absence of complexity or 
heterogeneity within the complex system (Derrida 1997: 86). It rather involves a repression of heterogeneity. 
This repression can also be the imposition of an order, a boundary, a hierarchy or successive levels. The arche-
writing (and complex systems) breaks with linear writing (and simple models) that assumes that phenomena can 
be simplified without any problems. What happens between the lines disrupts the lines, making space for 
different ways of thinking (Derrida 1987: 183).106 
Even though the system implicates each element within it in the constitution of every other element, this 
implication should not be understood in a strong sense (Cilliers 1998a: 4). Phrased differently, the fifth 
                                                      
106“The line represents only a particular model, whatever might be its privilege” (Derrida 1997: 86). 
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characteristic of complex systems is that most interactions occur locally and have a relatively small range of 
impact. This does not, however, preclude small interactions localised at one point in the system from having a 
wide-ranging impact. Non-linearity and richness of connection in the system sustain this possibility. If one 
thinks of the economic system as a complex system, then it makes sense to say that local farmers in Lesotho 
trading in mohair interact with a relatively small group of buyers and exporters; however, the introduction of this 
mohair into the international market, if it were, for example, introduced at a much lower cost than mohair from 
Europe, could affect the price of mohair in the world market. This in turn would affect the demand for mohair 
and feed back into the operations of local farmers in Lesotho. There is recurrency in the system (4). This is the 
sixth characteristic. Actions in the system produce reactions but these reactions do not cancel each other out. 
Rather, each calls up further reaction, steering the system away from rest. 
The seventh characteristic of complex systems is that the complex system is an open system. It is open in three 
senses. It is open to what one might call its environment or its context. The boundary of the system must allow 
flows of resources and information in and out of the system (Clark 2005: 171). It is open within itself because of 
the movement of différance and the play of the trace – deferred and deferring and differing and distributing – 
that prevents internal closure (Derrida 2001: 365). It is also open in the fundamental sense that the system allows 
for non-system: an exterior that is not identical with difference within the system. It is not totalising. To illustrate 
within the social system, man and woman are different but both identities are marked within the system. Neither 
is so radically different so as not to allow the trace to traverse the distinction between these meanings. Each is 
the other’s other in this sense, but not other than the system. There is something more different than interior 
difference. This is the unmarked and meaningless space or spacing in which the system operates. There is always 
something not systemised. Morin (1992: 14) emphasises this point when he writes that “every system which 
aims at enclosing the world in its logic is an insane rationalization”.  
A constitutive outside that allows for novelty thwarts all our attempts at totalisation and control. The outside or 
spacing is what produces the system far from equilibrium – the complex system’s eighth characteristic – 
constantly moving with the force of différance.107 Dillon’s (2000) charge of different definitions of radical 
difference in the complex and poststructuralist systems respectively, can be answered both with reference to 
critical complexity, which does indeed leave theoretical space for a difference more different than distinctions in 
the system’s code, and from deconstruction, which is to say that what might be called the radically different, 
while it may be given various names – justice, the other, the future-to-come – is nothing more mystical than this 
                                                      
107 As it has previously been suggested, there can be no différance without an outside. Derrida (2004: 40) argues that 
différance is both:  
…the same (the living being, but deferred, relayed, replaced by a substitutive supplement, by a prosthesis, by a supplementation 
in which technology emerges) and the other (absolutely heterogeneous, radically different, irreducible and untranslatable, the 
aneconomic, the wholly other or death). 
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unmarked space or non-meaning. Both systems are in relation with this non-relationality, non-meaning or 
spacing insofar as relations, meaning and the elements require space to interact, differ and defer. The system is 
always open to what is not included in its description (Morin 1992: 195-197). However, this relation cannot be 
symmetrical. The system cannot see space as anything other than a hypothetical beyond-the-limit. From inside 
the system, the movement of relations between elements closes open spaces, allowing meaning to arise. 
However, the outside as such can never be marked. It can never be made to mean something the way an element 
in the system has meaning.  
The ninth characteristic of complex systems is that they have a history (Cilliers 1998a: 4). The system is not 
more than its history, but this history is nonlinear and does not fully determine the future in the sense that the 
future can be extrapolated from it (Derrida 1981b: 49). This history is not stored in any one point in the system, 
but is distributed across the entire web of interaction. Furthermore, given the non-linearity of relations within the 
system, the history of interactions does not have impacts whose magnitude and significance can be calculated for 
all time. History, itself the movement of trace and différance, must be selected because it is not fixed in time or 
space. This selection, like all action in the system, feeds back into it in unpredictable ways (Derrida 1994: 14, 
21). The openness of the system in space and time is also openness to the idea of a future that is not yet possible 
within the configuration of the system, but that might yet become possible (37). Within a complex system, the 
future understood in its strongest sense is not what is possible within the system, a latent potential about to be 
realised. It is exactly what is not possible in the system, and thus coincides with the radical exteriority beyond 
the system’s limit. It is the impossible whose content cannot be determined because it cannot be imagined within 
the system itself.108 
The tenth characteristic of complex systems is that the elements within the system are ignorant of the operations 
of the system as a whole (Cilliers 1998a: 4). If we were to use this model of a complex system to model a social 
system in which the elements in the system would be people, institutions such as courts and banks and various 
other agents, then this seems counter-intuitive. As subjects making decision in the legal system, for example, we 
can find out what is legal and illegal. There are known procedures as to how the law should operate and what can 
be done if the law is to change, and we can ascertain the consequences of various behaviours and make informed 
                                                      
108 It is the possibility of the impossible or the outside of the system that allows us to think of something like change or to 
hope for anything like progress. However, this progress would only ever be to come and never yet achieved: “wherever 
deconstruction is at stake, it would be a matter of linking an affirmation (in particular a political one), if there is any, to the 
experience of the impossible, which can only be a radical experience of the perhaps” (Derrida 1994: 35, author’s emphasis). 
The future is the system’s exterior in its most radical sense. Thus far, the argument for an open or unmarked future has only 
been made from the perspective of its operation within the organisation of the system. Derrida (1994: 37) makes the point in 
another way: he argues that to deny the future or the possibility of alterity to the system is to make an ungrounded 
assumption that turns the open system into a monstrous unity that consumes absolutely everything. This would be a 
totalising system. 
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decisions as to how to act appropriately within a specific situation. However, this is not what is meant by 
ignorance in the system.  
No element in the system can ‘know’ – used very loosely here, for certain elements within complex systems are 
not afforded the subjectivity necessary to know – what is happening everywhere in the system, understand it in 
its entirety and control it. Cilliers (4-5) explains:  
Each element in the system is ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole, it responds only to 
information that is available to it locally. This point is vitally important. If each element ‘knew’ what was 
happening to the system as a whole, all of the complexity would have to be present in that element 
(author’s emphasis).  
The element would function as a transcendental signified shielded from the complexity it generates (Derrida 
1981b: 13, 65). An example of this gesture in a systemic paradigm that has already been mentioned is Saussure’s 
(1983: 31) dual-faced sign. Without a centre, the system can be regulated only by conventions established within 
the system itself. It organises itself but it, the emergent system is not an autonomous subject with unidirectional 
agency over its components. Organisation is distributed across all components, the emergent system as a whole 
and the interactions between these quasi-levels. Order flows from the bottom up and the top down. 
The structure of the complex system is repeated here, changed by its encounter with deconstruction. Each of the 
characteristics of the system contributes to the system’s openness, to its continual development and to the ethical 
understanding of knowledge of complex phenomena. The complex system structured by différance, the trace, 
spacing, the boundary, the frame, undecidableness, the mutual implication and co-constitution of subject and 
object, heterogeneity and heterarchy within its structure and non-linear relations between its elements, 
incorporates the limits of what Derrida (1982: xix-xx, 9) refers to as “mastery”.109 In straightforward terms this 
means that our understanding of the system, enabled by the system, is not ever identical to the truth of the 
system, what the system actually is in itself, and cannot capture all the system is, has been, will be and could be 
                                                      
109 There are two forms of mastery at work in the philosophical project insofar as one can impose unity onto this project. 
Each reflects a mode of violence identified within the complex system. The first form of mastery is hierarchy of which 
Derrida (1982: xix) writes that “the particular sciences and regional ontologies are subordinated to general ontology, and 
then to fundamental ontology”. In other words, philosophy is afforded the task of uncovering the right order of things. The 
asymmetry of relations of different forms of knowledge enables a comprehensive understanding of everything in its place. 
The second form of mastery is envelopment:  
Homogenous, concentric, and circulating indefinitely, the movement of the whole is remarked in the partial 
determinations of the system or encyclopaedia, without the status of that remark, and the partitioning of the part, 
giving rise to any general deformation of the space (Derrida 1982: xx). 
Hierarchy and totalisation are repetitions of the violence of metaphysics to which attention and reaction is directed within 
deconstruction and critical complexity theory, and subsequently also here and in the previous two chapters. These forms of 
mastery coincide with phallocentrism and logocentrism discussed in chapter 2 (xxi). 
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from every possible angle. The consequences of this inherent limitation for the description of the general system 
or particular systems are outlined below. 
c. COMPLEXITY AND THE RECOGNITION OF VIOLENCE 
The previous two chapters argued that critical complexity theory and deconstruction, respectively, espouse 
theoretical positions which open an intractable gap between knowledge, which is mediated, and unmediated 
reality. The gap between the unmediated world in itself and knowledge of the world enabled by the models of 
the world, of which the critical complex system is one, produces two significant consequences. The first is an 
unavoidable normativity in every attempt to know the system (Cilliers 2005a: 257). And the second, derivative 
of this normativity, is an ethical understanding of understanding that requires an acknowledgement of 
normativity and for this acknowledgement to affect the way that we try to know the system, the way we act and 
the decisions we make (Cilliers 2000c: 27, 29). Différance, whether it is understood as a spatial or temporal 
phenomenon, or elaborated further, is foremost an insistence on mediation of all sense, experience, knowledge 
and language (Derrida 1992a: 8; McKenna 1992: 80). It does not stand between the subject and the world like a 
lens between a photographer and her model; but rather allows for the subject to be constituted as a subject in 
relation with a meaningful world. 
If language and meaning open the world to us, then the structures of language and knowledge we have will 
determine what kind of world is ultimately opened to us.110 Morin (1992: 58) points out that a dynamic and 
critical, complex epistemology allows us to understand the world that is similarly dynamic and complex; while a 
rigid epistemology with fixed, essentialist categories produces a world that is dead. A world that is indeed unlike 
the changing and surprising one in which we live. It is not only an epistemological error. It is judged as an 
ethical error because the complex system sees violence in rigid atomistic categories that suppress complexity 
(Derrida 1998: 9; Morin 2007: 4).  
This ethical content that is produced within the epistemology of the open de-centred system requires careful 
expounding in order to understand the charge of violence that the complex system lays against proponents of the 
metaphysics of presence. The openness of the system, again, refers to the system’s continuous unfolding in time, 
which is the absence of naturally given boundaries that allow for the system to be understood in terms of pre-
framed moments in time by means of a synchronic analysis (Cilliers 2005b; Derrida 1981b: 27-28; McKenna 
1992: 73). The system is open because of its spatial distribution, that is, the internal play of the system, the 
                                                      
110 John Protevi (2001: 45) describes the relation between the system and the world as one of the trace. The world is other 
than language. Or, phrased differently, language has no natural relation with the world. However, the world enters language 
in traces that are not the world itself but information ‘about’ the world. This is akin to Cilliers’ and Gouws’ (2001: 243-244) 
analysis of the trace within the brain modelled as a complex system. Traces are like translations of the outside that arise 
inside the system triggered from outside. 
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distribution of meaning across spaces between the same and the other, the confusion of the boundaries and the 
heterogeneity and dynamism of structure that characterises the complex system and its elements.  
As a consequence of openness, no rule or calculation is adequate and can be maintained in an absolute form 
within the system (Cilliers 2000b). Without an absolute rule or foundation of all identifications and guarantee of 
our descriptions, the content of our descriptions cannot but retain an element of normativity and the 
responsibility for that normative moment cannot be transferred to the system itself. The subject/observer is 
always ultimately responsible for its decisions. This responsibility is further complicated by the impact of the 
boundary or frame. The open structure of the system results from complexity of the system. In order to under to 
understand the system, its complexity must be reduced. The observer cannot, either in terms of its own limited 
perspective and knowledge in or terms of the system, take all past, present and future relations of the system into 
account in any one description. Drawing a boundary or reducing complexity always destroys these relations and 
reverberates back into the system, which, unfolding in time, is irrevocably changed in this process (Cilliers, 
Roodt & de Villiers 2002: 9). All models must reduce this complexity to be intelligible. Acknowledgement of 
the significance of characteristics that are lost or obscured in this process is paramount in the critical engagement 
with complex phenomena.  
The moment of normativity enters every model not only in overtly ethical issues like whether a model is harmful 
to the world, but already in the act of selection of the frame in which the model becomes meaningful and in the 
specification of a boundary that excludes the environment from the system (Derrida 1979b: 34). What Derrida 
proposes to expound in his use of ‘violence’ to characterise the process of framing is not a theory of violence as 
a general project; but rather to position the particular violence of theory, philosophy, knowledge, decisions and 
actions on a continuum and, in so doing, challenge existing theories of violence that seek to define narrowly 
(McKenna 1992: 24). In other words, the distinction between what is considered violent and nonviolent is 
challenged by doing exactly what Arendt (1970: 43-45) sought to guard against. That is, to blur the boundary 
that contains violence itself and to generalise it to the extent that it applies to several new spheres of meaning. 
Indeed, the meaning of violence is expanded well beyond the use of implements to physically harm another. 
Hanssen (2000: 9) suggests that violence after the interventions of Critical Theory and poststructuralism includes 
diverse, conceptually difficult areas such as “psychological, symbolic, structural, epistemic, hermeneutical and 
aesthetic violence”.  
Deconstruction and critical complexity theory make a distinction between theories that are less and more violent 
than others. More violent theories are those that neither recognise nor acknowledge the violence at work in 
thinking (Cilliers 1998a: 107; Morin 1992: 3; 2007:4). Without this recognition, the very possibility that this 
violence might be eradicated from the system disappears. Cilliers (2000a; 2000c; 2005b) and Morin (1983a: 25) 
argue that if one follows the argument from complexity, taking the structures and incompressibility of complex 
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phenomena discussed above into account, then all rules, laws and estimations of complex systems must 
continually be reviewed. Complex models therefore have provisionality at their core. It is motivated by a deep 
concern with epistemological violence.  
Derrida (1987: 183; 1981b: 41) reads the violence of the metaphysics of presence as the violence of distorting 
and suppressing plural and dynamic differences that constitute a complex system of meaning. Thus the violence 
of the system of metaphysics is intimately linked to the theme of metaphysical dichotomies, in which one 
meaning is structurally exterior and inferior to the other. Alan Bass, in his preface to Writing and Difference 
(Derrida 2001: xviii) sees another related violent gesture in the totalising movement of this type of system. 
Because it must explain everything in terms of boundaries, rigid oppositions and hierarchies, everything must 
first be subsumed within the system, allowing for no superfluous differences to remain outside the system. This 
violent gesture of totalisation is repeated within structuralism in which the system as an objective reality leaves 
no room for escape and no possibility of spaces where the system is in fact not all that is the case.  
In sum, the violence of metaphysics of presence is the repression of différance. In his analysis of the supplement, 
Derrida (1997: 141-164) harnesses the play of the superfluous differences to undo the opposition between 
writing and speech that binds signs to the system of metaphysics. By his own pen (1981b: 36), this and other 
deconstructions are acts of necessary counter-violence that disrupt and transform the system. It may be sensibly 
interjected that the necessary – textual – violence perpetrated by deconstruction is a far cry from the necessary 
violence against which Arendt (1970) makes a decisive stand or even from the revolutionary action that Sartre 
(2001: 7-26) or Sorel (1999) advocates. Derrida’s (2002a: 255) own defence of his call for violence or force is a 
step back that calls the violence he advocates the use of differential force, something quite separate from a call to 
arms. This raises two questions. What is violence as differential force? And how does it relate to the acts of 
violence such as rape and murder? The questions are posed once more at the end of this chapter. 
The description of violence from deconstruction and complexity theory – and all theories that bring in areas of 
meaning that seem to deviate from the pure violence of the battlefield – is neither gratuitous nor necessarily 
pinned against the nonviolent ideal expressed in Arendt’s (1970) text. The pervasiveness of philosophy and 
epistemology in all forms of knowledge, and the decisions and actions that follow from this knowledge, requires 
an understanding of violence that accounts for this interrelation (Derrida 1981b: 19; McKenna 1992: 72). In 
other words, this particular description of violence is not confined to the analysis of philosophy simply because it 
begins there. However, by focusing only on the war, it may be argued that one covers over the violence that is at 
work in the philosophical, legal and economic justifications for that war that enabled it.  
Both critical complexity theory (Morin 2007: 4) and deconstruction (Derrida 1998: 9) preserve the link between 
the agency of subjects and violence in order to, like Arendt (1970), preserve a space of accountability. However, 
the widening of the lens through which violence is seen repeats Zizek’s (2001: 9) disquiet about the motivation 
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and outcome of focusing exclusively on individual agents of violence and individual victims. The complex 
understanding of violence within the system comes as what Robert Zacharias (2007: 104) calls the “and yet” of 
deconstruction. It is the simultaneous recognition that a certain position is both valid and requires 
supplementation. The ‘and yet’ is what prevents the confusion of deconstruction and destruction. The 
deconstructive or complex systemic understanding of violence does not destroy the idea of violence as subjective 
or as instrumental physical harm, but subverts the dominance of this definition and supplements it with the 
layered analysis, of which the exposition follows. 
IV. THE ORIGINAL VIOLENCE OF MEANING: ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
VIOLENCE AND WRITING  
A vocabulary with which to talk about violence is not yet developed within the critical complex system. 
Although Morin (2007: 3-6) does take steps in that direction with the notion of mutilation, particularly the 
mutilation of knowledge, this notion is not explained in Blind Intelligence (2007). Similarly, Cilliers’ (1998a: 95, 
120, 124) exposition of asymmetry in the complex system, understood as a necessary condition for the 
emergence of structure and meaning, read in conjunction with the ethics of critical complexity theory advocated 
in the position outlined above, also begins to gesture towards the need to develop the description of the system in 
this direction. Derrida (1988b: 41; 1997: 101-140), on the other hand, in Of Grammatology (Derrida 1997), in 
which the system of arche-writing is worked out most extensively, and also in other texts, pays considerable 
attention to the concept of violence, both as it appears within texts that operate within the closure of the 
metaphysics of presence and within the revised system of writing.  
An argument put forward by Elizabeth Grosz (1999) suggests that all Derrida’s texts concern what he reads as 
violence. Grosz (1999: 9) gathers several terms together under the theme of violence in deconstruction: violence; 
trace; force; discord. Derrida (1997: 112), within the system of arche-writing, proposes a three-tiered structure of 
violence. These levels are: the violence of the origin or systemic organisation; the violence of meaning, the 
frame and the boundary; and empirical violence, violent acts such as rape and murder (112). The close reading of 
Derrida’s three levels of violence detailed below supports Grosz’s (1999) assessment. The structure of this 
violence is explored here by briefly considering the historical association of the narrow conception of writing 
with violence, and then turning to the complex structure of violence with particular attention to the original level 
– the violence concerned with the origin – in this structure. 
The violence of metaphysics lies in the fixing of meaning by suppressing complexity and ossifying boundaries. 
Epistemological strategies that employ this violence reinforce it with a second violence that deconstruction 
works, in the first place, to expose. This second violence is the erasure of the first. Phonocentrism, logocentrism 
and all the other dogmatic ‘isms’ that turn on their respective centres, because they found themselves on an 
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unquestioned hierarchy and because they are totalising positions that do not allow for revision and 
transformation, cannot see or even deliberately un-see their own violence (Derrida 1982: xix-xx; Morin 2007: 2). 
The possibility of acknowledgement and redress disappears with this blindness. What deconstruction works to 
actively demonstrate, is the mediation of all meaning in the broadest possible sense wherever metaphysics posits 
its ‘violent’ construction of immediacy or presence (McKenna 1992: 80). Deconstruction is concerned with 
demonstrating the violence of the origin.  
These epistemologies, called ‘violent’ from within the perspective opened by the complex system, lodge their 
own allegations of violence against writing. In order to postulate the purity of presence and the nonviolence of 
true knowledge, thought and speech, violence needed to be externalised and subordinated to presence. It had to 
be legislated that “writing does not inhabit speech, but the outside of speech” (Derrida 1997: 127). Writing – the 
arbitrary system of marks wrenched from a proper origin whose character is that of the paradigmatic supplement 
to natural language – is closely associated with violence within the history of philosophy (34-37, 121).111 The 
necessity of externalising the violence of meaning repeats the need within the metaphysics of presence to 
exclude the arbitrariness of writing from the natural order of reference that was explored in the previous chapter 
with reference to Derrida’s (155) analysis of the supplement. This is because arbitrariness is what begets 
violence. What was dangerous about the supplement, its contamination of the pure and natural, is also the source 
of its violence (104-105). From the perspective of those philosophies that are determined by presence, violence 
is its destruction. 
The identification of writing with violence is not denied by deconstruction (106).112 Instead, Derrida (101-140), 
reading Claude Levi-Strauss (1961: 286-297), whose attention to writing is carried out only for the purpose of 
dismissing it as the instrument of oppression within societies that have moved toward ever greater ‘civilisation’ 
and the destruction of a more pure and innocent natural and original order, takes this identification very 
seriously. The question that informs this chapter is thus taken from Violence and the Letter: “What must violence 
be for something in it to be equivalent to the operation of the trace?” (Derrida 1997: 101). In other words, in 
                                                      
111  Saussure’s (see 1983: 67) phonocentric exclusion of writing by virtue of its distance from consciousness and its 
unnatural relationship with speech is central to this argument. His (67) exclusion of writing instigates the development of 
the arche-writing in Of Grammatology (1997). Derrida (1997: 34) identifies a particular fear, repeated since Plato’s 
Phaedrus, in this Saussure’s exclusionary gesture: 
[The] Phaedrus denounced writing as the intrusion of an artful technique, a forced entry of a totally original sort, an 
archetypical violence: eruption of the outside within the inside, breaching into the interiority of the soul, the living 
self-presence of the soul...(author’s emphasis). 
112 Derrida (1997: 106) writes:  
…that digression about the violence that does not supervene from without upon an innocent language in order to 
surprise it, a language that suffers the aggression of writing as the accident or disease…but is the originary violence of 
a language which is always already a writing. Rousseau and Levi-Strauss are not for a moment to be challenged when 
they relate the power of writing to the exercise of violence (author’s emphasis). 
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order to locate violence in the system of writing that is deemed the absence of presence, attention must be 
directed to the other of presence, the instituted trace that allows writing to be externalised in the first 
place. 113 Acknowledging that writing is violent, Derrida (1997: 37) argues that arche-writing, in its form 
elaborated in chapter 2, is also violent. 
As a first step, in order to cast violence as the trace and to cast the trace outside of sense, the metaphysics of 
presence must reassert that pure space in which nonviolence can be identified with meaning that comes about 
without the trace. The trace, it has been argued, is the necessary outcome of a system that is constituted out of 
differences without a transcendental origin (Derrida 1997: 46). That is to say, the trace operates in a system in 
which the play of reference never comes to rest at some natural point, whether this is an absolute truth, a pure 
idea, or the thing in itself, pure positive reality (Derrida 2001: 352). The absence of the origin produces a 
deferral of reference that distributes itself across the entire system in which meaning arises out of the intrusion of 
the other in the same (Derrida 1982: 9, 11; Spivak 1997: xv). Identity is constituted by reference beyond the self, 
to the other. The trace, within this frame, is opposed to natural order – stipulated as order emanating from an 
origin – and its associates, presence, simplicity, originality and peace.  
To illustrate this point on a very simple level we can use the example of the sign ‘body’. The meaning of ‘body’ 
is always already understood only by calling up or tracing its common opposition to the soul, and, in line with 
earlier arguments made, its relations with every other sign in the system (Derrida 1997: 46, 61, 63, 65, 89, 90). 
However, because the trace of ‘soul’ in ‘body’ is not merely a relation of dissimilarity, but rather a mutually 
constitutive relation, the trace of ‘soul’ in ‘body’ is not a mark that is momentary or can be effaced by a 
discourse that tries to remove all traces of ‘soul’ from the meaning of ‘body’. Its mark is changing but it is 
permanent. The intrusion of the other sign, ‘soul’, on the interior meaning of the sign ‘body’ has always already 
begun. This intrusion iterates the original intrusion of the arche-violence of writing as the supplement to speech 
discussed in chapter 2 (Derrida 1997: 34). 
The trace is moved onward by the absence of the origin (Derrida 2001: 278). It is not only opposed to natural 
order, but institutes itself in place of it. Where no natural link between, for example, knowledge and the world 
can be established, the trace as a buoyant system of conventions usurps the place of nature. The trace and its 
movement of intrusion and contamination in a play of differentiation is a function of the system of writing as an 
                                                      
113 Derrida (1997: 101) asks the question of writing, not only to specify it, but to move away from the self-evidence of 
violence. Perhaps, it can be argued, as much to open and unsettle the meaning as to stipulate it. Grosz (1999: 9) adds:  
If violence is no longer so simply identifiable and denounceable, if it is not readily delimited in its spheres of 
operation, if it becomes ambiguous where the divide between violence and its others can be drawn, then violence is a 
form, possibly the only form, that writing can take. 
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arbitrary system.114 The arche-writing as trace is the arche-writing as violence because its presence/absence 
destroys absolute presence (Derrida 1997: 148). This destructive and arbitrary violence, Derrida (1997: 37) 
argues, is the entire system of signification: “violence of writing does not befall an innocent language. There is 
an originary violence of writing because language is first, in a sense...writing.” This crux of Derrida’s exposition 
of violence in the system can now be summarised. 
Writing is a dynamic system of distributed traces moved by différance because it is merely conventional and has 
no natural origin. Because it operates by the trace that destroys natural order and replaces it with an arbitrary 
one, it is considered violent. However, as all sense is structured by the logic of the trace, all sense must in some 
fundamental way be produced in violence. Writing, which was previously discussed as the supplement of 
absence to a presence that cannot sustain itself, is thus also a supplement of violence to an ostensibly nonviolent 
order that cannot sustain itself.115 The arche-writing, the arbitrary and differential system that allows for the 
appearance of writing as well as speech, is the unnatural institution of the trace that carries the violent disease of 
writing beyond itself (Derrida 1997: 142). What makes the force of signification within writing violent is not 
force itself, but the character of this force which is unmotivated by an absolute foundation. It has neither a 
natural subject nor a natural object and no source of legitimacy.116 
The destruction of the origin is at the same time a violent destruction of the original and singular (Harvey 1986: 
136-137).117 This idea was sketched in the introduction to the tripartite structure of violence in chapter 2 in the 
discussion of iterability. Levi-Strauss, the interlocutor in Derrida’s (1997: 101-140) exposition of violence, 
attributes several powers to writing. The first, often understood as its primary task, is the preservation of 
knowledge that spans beyond the limitation of individual or collective memories, allowing for greater advances 
in knowledge and the movement toward enlightenment (Levi-Strauss 1961: 290-291). Writing, here, is still 
                                                      
114“...as we know, these two motifs – arbitrary and differential – are inseparable in his [Saussure’s] view. There can be 
arbitrariness only because the system of signs is constituted solely by the differences in terms, and not by their plenitude... 
‘Arbitrary and differential,’ says Saussure, ‘are two correlative characteristics’” (Derrida 1982: 10).  
115 With reference to Rousseau, whose name can perhaps be read as the first name of the dual philosophical problems of 
supplementation and purity, writing is cast out of language and then reincorporated as something necessarily inside the 
system that nonetheless insists on its exteriority:  
Rousseau condemns writing as destruction of presence and as a disease of speech. He rehabilitates it to the extent that 
it promises the reappropriation of that which speech had allowed itself to be dispossessed (Derrida 1997: 142). 
116 This point is not identical with Arendt’s (1970: 4) analysis of violence as arbitrary in her description of the randomness 
of violence, especially on the battlefield. However, it has a noteworthy resonance. Violence, unlike force, a word which 
Arendt (1970: 45) discards for its organic connotation of neutral inevitability rather than rational human choice, finds no 
natural or just object but harms without discrimination.  
117 “What language [as writing] kills is thus the purity of the idiom…In the movement from impurity to purity we can 
perceive perhaps the very movement of différance itself” (Harvey 1986: 137). 
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something that comes from outside thought. The second but more primary function of writing on Levi-Strauss’ 
(1961: 292) account is the creation of structures of difference in society that produce an unnatural order in which 
individuals are moved into a “hierarchy of castes and classes”. He (Levi-Strauss 1961: 292) argues: 
If my hypothesis is correct, the primary function of writing, as a means of communication, is to facilitate 
the enslavement of other human beings. The use of writing for disinterested ends, and with a view to 
satisfactions of the mind in the fields either of science or the arts, is a secondary result of its invention... 
Furthermore, the violent artificial order instituted by writing that produces relations of violence between human 
beings is entrenched by its permanence (293). Hierarchy and classes do not merely destroy the natural state. 
Writing as the institution of these violent orderings inserts space that disintegrates the presence of subject to 
fellow subject and subject to object. The space necessitated by the trace destroys the possibility of more 
authentic social interaction facilitated by presence, thus writing renders society “inauthentic” by its arbitrariness 
(Derrida 1997: 136). 
The exceptions in this regard, societies in which hierarchy, classing and exploitation persisted without graphic 
writing, are not understood to threaten the hypothesis because structures of dominance are comparatively 
fleeting. What writing allows is thus a permanent state of hierarchy and classing, the reach of which cannot be 
escaped. A society without writing, even where force is used, such as the Nambikwara studied by Levi-Strauss 
(1961: 296), are without violence because they preserve the intractable singularity of all people and objects, 
going so far as to refuse to attribute standard values to objects in the process of bartering.  
This view is problematic in that it assumes that a society without a standardised alphabet is one without arche-
writing (Derrida 1997: 125).118 It is also problematic in its assumption of an original and innocent language. It is 
an ethnocentrism that is blind to its own violence of negating the violence it witnesses in a neutralising 
description (Derrida 1997: 113-114, 116, 120, 123). In light of this, Derrida (1997: 101-140) is set the task of 
rewriting violence so that it accommodates the physical or empirical violence that Levi-Strauss denies by 
opposing unwritten cruelty of a natural order to the more base violence of ‘civilised’ society, while maintaining 
his original hypothesis that the trace is indeed equivalent to violence in the system. In order to include hierarchy, 
categorisation and empirical violence such as murder, rape or war, violence must have at least three 
countenances. 
The manifestation of the three levels of violence begins with the origin. This is the origin of the metaphysics of 
presence that renders itself nonviolent by reducing its own violence to that of a supplement, both exterior and 
                                                      
118“We are dealing here not only with a strongly hierarchized society, but with a society where relationships are marked 
with spectacular violence” (Derrida 1997: 135). 
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inferior to the original.119 The first level of violence, the inception of the system or the code, is unearthed by 
returning attention to the convention of naming within the Nambikwara, who are deemed without writing and 
without violence. Against this, Derrida (1997: 110) recognises the “obliteration of the proper” or the destruction 
of the original that is the possibility of writing in the Nambikwara. These people, who resisted the generalisation 
or classification of singular things, were assigned proper names that were kept secret, as if the utterance of the 
name were violence against the person to whom it referred or who owned the name (Derrida 1997: 111; Levi-
Strauss 1961: 296). The secrecy of the name is an acknowledgement of its iterability. Even the most singular of 
signs, whether written or spoken, contains the possibility that it be recognised, repeated, and thus carried beyond 
the context which guaranteed its singularity (Derrida 1988b: 20). To attribute names to something, even a proper 
singular name, even one that is never again uttered, is to inscribe what is singular within a system that cannot 
tolerate its singularity (Derrida 1997: 112).  
The name is never only a name but always already an identity that assigns a class by means of a covert or overt 
generalisation (Derrida 1997: 109; Harvey 1986: 136-137). Thus Derrida (1997: 112) writes: 
There was in fact a first violence to be named. To name, to give names…such is the originary violence of 
language which consists in inscribing within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative 
absolute. 
To use a name is a violation because, as it has already been said of writing in general, its iterability120 severs the 
original – the proper name – from its origin, at once destroying its originality. Without an origin, the possibility 
that the name might yet be meaningful is the system itself. It is the code that enforces its identity (Derrida 1988b: 
9). The space between the name and its origin creates space within the name itself.121 The name, deferring to the 
system for its meaning, is incapable of being a plenitude in itself (1988b: 9; 1994: 17). With this violent 
destruction of the origin(al) at its inception, the singular is marked by the arche-violence as the intrusion of the 
other on the same (Derrida 1997: 37, 113). Because the name is not a plenitude, it is continuously and violently 
supplement by traces of others. This first level of violence is the system itself as an origin-less entity, one 
oriented “towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin” (Derrida 2001: 369). The first level of 
violence is thus the possibility of meaning without an origin: writing.  
                                                      
119 McKenna (1992: 90) writes that, “[the] structure of violence is itself complex because it is violence itself that expels 
another violence”. In other words, in the constitution of meaning, there seems not to be a moment that is somehow before 
the commencement of violence. In the beginning, if there ever was a first word, that word would appear to be violence. The 
‘arche’, the most original, is not an origin at all if the origin is read, as it is in Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of 
the Human Sciences (Derrida 2001: 351-370351-370), as a source of stability in the organisation that tends towards an 
equilibrium state. Violence as the origin of the system of meaning must instead push the system away from equilibrium.  
120 The iterability of the name is both its permanence in time that outlives the singular and its repeatability that classes the 
singular. See chapter 3 and Signature Event Context (Derrida 1988b: 1-23). 
121This the “violent spacing” of language (Derrida 1997: 108). 
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The second level of violence to which we have already gestured without regarding it in this particular structure is 
“reparatory, protective, instituting the ‘moral’, prescribing the concealment of writing” (Derrida 1997: 112). This 
second level of violence is perhaps where those epistemologies, against which critical complexity theory and 
deconstruction are oriented, are placed. That is, within the system of différance, to speak with certainty enabled 
by a prosthetic origin, whether one speaks of the laws of science or the penal laws that govern social interactions 
or the moral laws that govern sexuality in society, is to enact this second violence. This is perhaps the violence 
of the frame or of boundary judgements that suppresses the trace (Derrida 1979b: 30). It is the violence of 
deciding the boundary both in the sense of delimiting it, producing a description of the system, and deciding the 
boundary so that it might be penetrated. This the violence associated with the hymen, both in designating the 
boundary between inside and outside and the violent penetration of the inside enabled by the hymen’s 
description (Derrida 1992a: 213, 216). 
These two levels of violence are constitutive of meaning: they enable the dynamic construction and 
deconstruction of order and disorder in the system. They are systemic in the sense that they describe the 
fundamental movement of the system as trace and différance. The second level of violence is analogous to the 
symbolic and systemic violence to which Zizek (2008: 1, 2) draws attention. The first is the forceful movement 
that enables and undermines order, the differential force that Derrida (2002a: 235) considers irrepressible.122 
Although the remainder of this chapter will return to the first level of violence, it needs saying that Derrida 
(1997: 112) subordinates these forms of violence, necessary and unavoidable though they may be, to a third form 
of violence. This is the empirical violence that is most often recognised as violence. The mostly physical 
manifestations of violence, such as rape, murder, war and genocide, are gathered in their diversity in this level. 
Operations at lower levels allow for the constitution of specific acts as violence in particular contexts (Derrida, 
1997: 112). The frame, its constitution, its exclusions and distortions, make violence on this third level appear 
and disappear. The third level does not escape textuality. It participates in the constitutive violence of the lower 
levels (Grosz 1999: 11). This level of violence is the most complex because it is always in fact all three levels of 
violence at once (Derrida 1997: 112).123 The challenge is that in spite of this, the effects of violence, harm and 
suffering, demand that these three levels are separated and valuated.  
                                                      
122 This understanding of violence as the decentred system recurs in other poststructuralist projects, notably Foucault’s. 
Hanssen (2000: 14) writes:  
Indeed one ‘figure’ of violence, whose persistence and recurrent circulation in contemporary poststructuralist thought 
the book [Critique of Violence (2000)] pursues is that of a counterforce or counterviolence (Gegenwalt) that takes the 
form of what Foucault and Derrida have called ‘antidogmatic’ or ‘antimetaphysical’ violence. Thus the use of a 
symbolic, figurative, discursive force, wielded as a counterprinciple, is meant to undo metaphysical, institutional 
sedimentations of force, especially the violence exercised by instrumental reason, with its logic and practices of 
exclusion. 
123 This point can be illustrated with reference to any attempt to specify and value within the system. For example: 
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V. THE FIRST LEVEL: THE POSSIBILITY OF A SYSTEM IS THE POSSIBILITY OF 
VIOLENCE  
The complex system as a meaningful system structured by the movement of trace, space and différance is a 
system moved by force, by clash and by competition. Rather than to reinvent violence from a systems 
perspective, following the deconstructive logic discussed above, violence understood as the forceful interruption 
of a generally nonviolent condition is displaced and generalised in a movement that mirrors the displacement and 
generalisation of writing (see Culler 1983: 89-110). It is this generalisation that enables deconstruction of the 
opposition between violence and nonviolence and results in arche-violence being inserted into the chain of 
substitutions that characterise the system as such (Derrida 1981b: 40). Violence supplements différance, trace, 
space, supplement, parergon, graft and writing, which means that each of these terms, while it exceeds the arche-
violence, is also intractably marked and moved and even made possible by it. As Harvey (1986: 129) argues, in 
the system without an origin, to imagine a language that is itself not force is unthinkable. Violence is not located 
somewhere in the system. In a sense, the complex system is violence. The recognition of the violence of the 
metaphysics of presence and epistemological strategies that repeat its violence (referred to as modernist 
strategies in chapter 1) is not the recognition of violence that is foreign to the complex system. Rather, the 
critical complex system is an attempt to make all violence explicit by demonstrating the inescapability of 
different modulations of violence at all levels of the system. This description of violence does not follow from its 
essential meaning; it is the result of a model. This theory of violence is made possible by the system itself.  
Violence as arche-violence falls into that category of deconstructive tools that Gasché (1994: 4, 7) calls 
“infrastructures”. On the one hand, this violence, like différance or trace, is the possibility of the system. It is not 
an origin in the sense that it is a source of the system, but rather, within the system thought without an origin, it 
remains a condition of possibility that the system might yet persist (Derrida 1982: 9; Original Discussion of 
Différance 1988: 85). From another angle, in line with Gasché’s (1994: 4-7) caution against reading the 
infrastructures as objective realities, violence is also a limit to the possibility of the system. The arche-violence 
cannot be characterised once and for all in an exhaustive description that would shield it from the very dynamic 
transformative system it institutes. This limitation would fix violence as an absolute origin, an eccentric centre. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
The difficulty is always to distinguish between...a sexual violence that is ‘tolerable’, in a way, because it is 
‘structural’, the violence that inhabits relations of passion and love – which always include, indeed, a form of violent 
asymmetry...and on the other hand, types of aggression for which the distinction is difficult to delineate. That’s why 
there are laws against rape, or at least what everyone agrees to call ‘rape’, even if the most widely shared passion 
never excludes some kind of asymmetry from which the scene of rape is never completely erased (Derrida 2004: 31). 
And further on, Derrida (2004: 32) continues how to draw the boundary “between a violence that is legitimate, in some way 
irreducible...and the violence that is called abnormal or abusive”? 
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However, the first level of violence is not located at the centre or any specific point in the system, but like 
representation that is distributed over all relations in the system,124 so violence must be, to be implicated in this 
organisation, distributed over all relations in the system (Cilliers 1998a: 33-34, 69, 81). The differential character 
of elements in the system closes the possibility that force associated with particular elements or clusters might be 
singular and unidirectional. That would require that this force is generated from within a particular element. 
The polemical differences that produce conflict and contest between elements (Derrida 1982: 8), the antagonism 
that resists reification and closure (Morin 1992: 119), and the asymmetrical relations of dominance and 
subjugation within the system (Cilliers 1998a: 95) are all produced by the movement of arche-violence. 
Relations of conflict and hierarchy are not something that the complex system can avoid. In this sense, Levi-
Strauss (1961: 292) is correct in attributing a constitutive role to the violence of writing or arche-writing in 
relation with violent relations of dominance in society. The hierarchisation at the lowest level of organisation of 
the complex system is indeed constitutive of higher emergent hierarchies in the system. However, unlike Levi-
Strauss’s (1961: 293) estimation of the hierarchies enabled by writing as permanent hierarchies based on the 
relative permanence and immutability of the written mark, the system as arche-writing, while it tolerates and can 
reinforce certain stable structures, at bottom retains the possibility of transformation at every moment.  
Furthermore, the hierarchies instated within complex organisation, while they can of course become violent in 
line with Derrida’s (1997: 112) second and third level of violence often associated with unidirectional force and 
domination, are not characterised by this tendency in the first place. Rather, complex hierarchies are 
characterised by both upward and downward causations and are not neatly nested within one another but rather 
reflect the heterogeneous composition of relations between elements in the system (Cilliers, Heylighen & 
Gershenson 2007:10; Juarrero 2000: 33). Juarrero (2000: 33) explains: 
It is true that the word “hierarchy” implies a unidirectional flow of order or authority, always and only 
from higher to lower…To counteract this connotation, students of complex dynamical systems have 
coined the neologism “heterarchy” to allow inter-level causal relations to flow in both directions, part to 
whole (bottom up) and whole to part (top down). 
As writing as différance enables the construction and deconstruction of meaning, so writing as distributed 
violence in the system enables not only the construction of asymmetry, antagonism and hierarchy, but also the 
disintegration and reversal of hierarchy. At every moment of transformation within the system, there is no pocket 
of interaction that escapes the heteronomy of organisation in the complex system.  
                                                      
124 “Saussure (1983) presented us with a system of distributed semiotics by arguing that the meaning of a sign is a 
consequence of its relationships to all other signs in the system. Meaning is therefore not a specific characteristic of any 
discreet unit...the whole system is involved – the meaning is distributed” (Cilliers 1998a: 81, author’s emphasis). 
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The arche-violence as an infrastructure of the complex system undermines any theory of violence as merely 
repressive because it is clearly generative of all relations. It also disrupts the clear separation of concepts that 
Arendt (1970: 44-45) wanted to maintain. Arche-violence – the first level of violence – is not associated with 
any instrument and not directed at any specific end. It is neither rational nor irrational. On this low level of 
description, arche-violence is not yet a proper concept that can be given a value. Violence, power, authority and 
force cannot be disentangled here. Arendt’s (1970) strong opposition of violence and nonviolence depends on 
the clear separation of violence and nonviolence in the system, which is not tenable given the distributed nature 
of violence. On this account, it is nonviolence that constitutes and violence that destroys.125 Violence no longer 
lies outside language and politics as something that contaminates these areas (Hanssen 2000: 162-163). Seeking 
to rid the world of damaging relations of domination and the use of arbitrary physical force to achieve political 
means is important; however, in opposing violence to nonviolence, the possibility always exists that this very 
distinction makes certain violence invisible. Whatever description one may assign to nonviolence that would 
inform community consensus which supports it, this description would be subject to the logic of parergonality 
and thus implicated in the maintenance of an order produced on the second level of violence (Derrida 1997: 112) 
The deconstruction of the opposition between violence and nonviolence in the system, generalising violence to 
the extent that is fundamental to the system’s organisation, produces a description of violence that is so 
pervasive that the possibility of escaping it even momentarily seems theoretically impossible. This is precisely 
the fault of a systems-based approach that Katherine Hayles (2000: 137-162) identifies as the violence of the 
system. The system itself, she argues, is blind to this violence, instating itself everywhere. Once the system is 
described in any detail, it appears omnipresent. This follows from the shift from an atomistic to a large-scale 
holistic approach instated by the system: 
As I see it, the problem with systems theory is that once a system stands revealed in all its pervasiveness 
and complexity – whether it be the invisible workings of power in Foucault’s society of surveillance or 
Lacan’s psycholinguistics, or Maturana’s autopoiesis – the system, precisely because of its logic and 
power, is likely to seem inescapable (161). 
This is violence of totalisation of which structuralism as a systems perspective also stands accused (Bass in 
Derrida 2001: xviii). To offer a possible way out of this violence, she (Hayles 2000:160-161) offers the narrative 
                                                      
125 Hanssen (2000: 162) elaborates with reference to several of Arendt’s texts: 
 For Arendt, there could be no doubt that coercion-free deliberative speech was the organ in and through which power 
was actualised – not this time as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. Because violence constituted the limit of 
silence or mute aggression, as she argued in numerous of her articles and books, it simultaneously spelled the end of 
power, which is what it resolutely needed to be situated outside the arena of political speech. 
For Derrida – see especially Force and Signification (2001: 1-35) – on the other hand, it is necessary that the involvement 
of force in the production of meaning is rehabilitated so that it may be opened to critical interrogation and intervention. 
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as the force of time that opens the system to new configurations and open futures that emphasise the system’s 
contingency. Critical complexity theory has this forceful future or exterior already theorised into its dynamic 
structure. 
The emphasis on the boundary and the outside, the undecidability of which prevents the final closure of the 
system, has been argued in both preceding chapters to guard against totalisation. However, on the other hand, 
this project too has emphasised the generality of the system, the pervasiveness of mediation through the system 
in the constitution of all sense and the role of the largest possible system – everything that is or could still be 
meaningful – or the general text in the meaningful constitution of all that is particular. On its own, the threat of 
totalisation is one that requires careful attention in the unfurling of the notion of the system. The pervasiveness 
of violence ever extending its reach through the extension of the system renews the urgency for vigilance against 
the deification of this model.  
Derrida (Derrida 1981a: 36; 1997: 9, 158, 159) makes himself vulnerable to the accusation of totalisation in 
several places by asserting the pervasiveness of the general text. However, he (Derrida 2001: 278) has also 
argued against the system as totalising on the grounds that it is an open system – open in the sense that it cannot 
enclose reality and open in the sense that it is in constant transformation. Of the pervasiveness of the system of 
arche-writing as violence, he (Derrida 1997: 127) writes: 
If it is true, as in fact I believe, that writing cannot be thought outside of the horizon of intersubjective 
violence, is there anything, even science, that radically escapes it? Is there a knowledge, and above all, a 
language, scientific or not, that one can call alien at once to writing and to violence? 
The answer to these questions of escaping violence and the system itself are negative. If one considers the 
example of singularity as discussed in Spectres of Marx (Derrida 1994: 14-15), one is met with a paradoxical 
movement. At first it appears that the system’s intolerance of the singular as demonstrated by the sign’s 
iterability is purely one of violent exclusion and suppression of difference. However, one can also read this 
intolerance of the pure otherness of the other as a rather more benevolent slippage that in fact regards the 
otherness of the other as something almost sacred (14, 15). The system thus allows the singular to exceed it, to 
slip outside, because inside the system the other is marked by the movement of the system. The intolerance of 
the system need not be negative. The system is all violence all the time, not only then in the sense that its 
movement is violent, but also in the sense that subjects, constituted within the system or systems in which they 
participate, language and knowledge included, are implicated in the carrying out of the system’s violence against 
other subjects. This is the movement that is invoked when it is asserted from a deconstructive frame that there 
are no innocent meanings anywhere (McKenna 1992: 72). Neutrality is a myth begotten of the myth of the pure 
origin. 
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VI. NIETZSCHE’S (VIOLENT) WILL TO POWER AND COMPLEX ORGANISATION 
In terms of the analysis carried out to here, violence generates meaning in the complex system. It is implicated in 
the very life of the system. Without différance, to which the movement of the system in time – its temporisation 
– that allows for the dynamic organisation away from equilibrium is attributed, the system would stagnate 
(Derrida & Roudinesco 2004: 21). In terms of complexity thinking, such stagnation is synonymous with death. 
In other words, without arche-violence there is no différance; without différance there is no dynamic 
organisation; without dynamic organisation there is no complex system. It is only in a stagnant equilibrium state 
that a system could be without arche-violence. The arche-violence initiates conflict and relations of dominance 
and deference between elements characterised by Derrida (1982: 9), Cilliers (1998a: 95) and Morin (1992: 119). 
Dominance is never entirely unidirectional in flow and is not necessarily good or bad. However, the 
‘heterarchical’ system (Cilliers, Heylighen & Gershenson 2007:10; Juarrero, 2000: 33) is not to be identified 
with an egalitarian system. 
Forces exerted within the organisation of complex systems do not balance each other. In order to maintain a state 
far from equilibrium, there can be no balance. Furthermore, the non-oppositional motion of différance results in 
distributed forces that can never quite be quantified because they have quite fully expended themselves. Instead, 
they are carried on into the future, moved onward by the trace, and never exactly traceable in the open play of 
interaction.  
To say that forces are not traceable does not mean that they cannot begin to be traced, but rather that in tracing a 
force, one is always in fact tracing several forces, pulled in several directions in a dance analogous to the tracing 
of meanings (see Derrida 1997: 61-65; van Tongeren, 2000: 161-162). In Force and Signification, Derrida 
(2001: 20) explores the systematic separation of force, forcefulness and violence from meaning within 
philosophy. In the process of rehabilitating the violence within meaning, the question of where “violence and the 
force of movement, which is more than its quantity or direction” has already been theorised, is raised. 
The complex system is not the first to attempt to think the infinite play of forces; nor to link the life and 
creativity of the system within this dynamic violence. Arendt (1970: 74), having expressed concern over both the 
validity and the consequence of this association, traces this tradition back to Friedrich Nietzsche’s will to power 
and Henry Bergson’s126 vitalist philosophy. She (74) reads each of these philosophers as offering an apology for 
                                                      
126 Bergson, whose work is not treated within the limitations of this project, deserves mention here because of the significant 
attention his work has received within recent research into complexity theory in conversation with philosophy. This research 
includes works by Keith Ansell Pearson (1999), Stephen Linstead (2002) and Damian Popolo (1993). Ansell Pearson 
situates Bergson in the company of Freud and Darwin as forerunners to the poststructuralist biophilosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze. Popolo (1993: 96) too establishes coincidences in the dynamic systems thinking of complexity theorised by 
Progogine, and the philosophy of Deleuze and Bergson respectively. Linstead (2002), while he also pays specific attention 
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and incitement to violence. A relationship between Nietzsche and Derrida, in respect of each philosopher’s 
grammatological project, was established in chapter 2 with reference to Nietzsche’s ontology as a critique of 
metaphysics (Derrida 1997: 286-287; 2001: 354, 369; van Tongeren 2000: 135).127 A direct analogy between the 
system of critical complexity theory and Nietzsche’s philosophy has been drawn in order to elaborate on the 
subject as a complex system (Cilliers, Roodt & de Villiers 2002). What is of particular interest in Nietzsche’s 
(1909: 213) writing, with regard to conceptualising complex organisation as violence, is his description of the 
world as will to power.128 
This is the hypothesis that all the world is the dynamic interaction of forces, themselves moved by still other 
forces in an unending motion that involves both “action and resistance” (6).129 The perpetual interaction of 
unequivocal forces is not reducible to a simple and homogeneous unity but rather gives rise to a complex whole 
in constant motion (7). This tumultuous interaction is an open-ended play that produces a foundational pluralism, 
a constant interruption to any attempt wrap it up in words, even Nietzsche’s own words, which do not escape the 
play they instate (Derrida 2001: 253, 369).130 
The will to power is a qualitative description of the world or reality as a plurality of wills. The singularity of the 
‘will’ is only an attribute of the word and not the activity it describes (van Tongeren 2000: 159-160). Forces are 
not paired in oppositions, nor are they homogeneous in value or mode. As Derrida (2001: 369) emphasised, like 
all self-organising complex systems, the world as the will to power is not ordered from any centre.131 At the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
to the relationship between the complexity language used by Deleuze and Bergson, draws attention to the affinities between 
Bergson’s account of the vitality of organisation and poststructuralist thinkers in general, including Derrida and Foucault. 
127 “…if we wished to choose several ‘names’, as indications only, and to recall those authors in whose discourse this 
occurrence [to think the system without an origin] has kept most closely to its most radical formulation, we doubtless would 
have to cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of Being and truth, for which were 
substituted the concepts of play; critique of self-presence, that is, the critique of consciousness, of the… Heideggerean 
destruction of metaphysics, of ontotheology, of the determination of Being as presence” (Derrida 2001: 354). 
128 Nietzsche (1909: 213) proposes the will to power against other static ontologies: “But what is life? A new and more 
definite concept of what ‘Life’ is, becomes necessary here. My formula for this concept is: Life is Will to Power”. And 
elsewhere: “This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you too, are this will to power yourselves – and 
nothing besides!” (Nietzsche in Wick 2002: 74, author’s emphasis).  
129 The activity and resistance echoes the dynamic relations of Morin’s (1992: 119) antagonism and Cilliers’ (1998a: 95) 
asymmetry in the complex system. 
130 In §2 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche (2006: 313) writes: 
The metaphysicians’ fundamental belief is the belief in the opposition of values. It has never occurred even to the 
most cautious among them to raise doubts here at the threshold, where doubts would be most necessary...For may 
there not be doubt, first of all, whether opposites even exist...? (author’s emphasis). 
131 “Every centre of force adopts a perspective towards the entire remainder, i.e. its own particular valuation, mode of 
action, and mode of resistance. The ‘apparent world’, therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the world, 
emanating from a centre” (Nietzsche in Cilliers, Roodt & de Villiers 2002: 6). 
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lowest level of organisation, the world as will to power is pure heterogeneity. The diversity of wills reacts, each 
to all others and to the system as a whole, in various configurations (van Tongeren 2000: 161). The outcome of 
adopting the will to power as dynamic, forceful organisation is an understanding of reality that, like différance, is 
thoroughly temporised. Put differently, the world as will to power is not present, it is not a presence, it is a 
becoming, the past and future of which stretch outwards in a wide range of unrealised possibilities (63). 
Furthermore, the world as will to power is becoming as struggle, in which the dominant, the strong, the law, 
dogma, truth and indeed every appearance is not arrived at by a peaceful movement radiating from an origin. 
Rather, all appearance is borne of violence. 
Some have given into the temptation to read Nietzsche as a metaphysician providing an account of the essential 
substance of the world as the clash of wills (see for example, Wicks 2002: 71-75), which stands in 
contradistinction with Derrida’s (1997: 19) interpretation.132 Wicks (2002: 131) also echoes Arendt’s (1970) 
suspicion of descriptions of violence that lift it to the level of a catchall explanation that justifies its appearance 
and even propagates its proliferation. A first source of substantiation for this reading is found in the “neutrality” 
of Nietzsche’s description that appears to present itself as a non-normative amoral account of the way things are 
(Wicks 2002: 131). This accusation must be taken seriously, for it can equally be lodged against the complexity 
theorists whose scientific rather than political sounding description of the dynamics of complex organisation 
tends towards the same amorality or neutrality. Against the charge of foundationalism, van Tongeren (2000: 
157) elaborates at length on the cautiousness of Nietzsche’s counter-narratives, especially in Beyond Good and 
Evil: “Suppose [...] and [suppose] [...] is it [then] not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question 
whether...” The preface to Beyond Good and Evil (2006: 311) establishes the text as an extended and elaborate 
hypothesis: “Assuming that truth is a woman – what then?” Further evidence of Nietzsche’s strategic uncertainty 
is found in On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense (Nietzsche 2000: 53), which opens as if it were a story or a 
myth: “Once upon a time, in some way out corner of the universe...clever beasts invented knowing”.  
This being said, undisputable evidence of the warring temperament that Arendt (and Wicks) fear can be 
produced. For example, in The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche (2006: 488) asserts:  
I consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for power: where the 
will to power is lacking there is decline. My assertion is that this will is lacking in all the supreme values 
                                                      
132 Van Tongeren (2000: 159) sheds light on this clash of interpretations, referring especially to section 36 of Beyond Good 
and Evil in which the world as will to power is presented as a plural and dynamic phenomenon, an hypothetical alternative 
to monadic descriptions of the world. But he also notes other passages in which Nietzsche does seem to suggest that will to 
power is itself a mystic unity: 
In a certain sense the world as will to power is unmistakenly a metaphysical assertion, metaphysics being the branch 
of philosophy that attempts to conceptualise what reality is as such, and thus, what all reality is. This does not prevent, 
however, this proposition being significantly different from other metaphysical designs that have been presented in 
the history of philosophy, and even being to a certain extent antimetaphysical. 
117 
 
of mankind – the values of decline, nihilistic values hold sway under the holiest names (author’s 
emphasis).  
However, it can be argued that these brazen moments only contradict the dynamism and antimetaphysical 
flavour of the will to power, and do not negate it. Rather, these moments must be read as they stand in conflict 
with the will to power as disunity and transformation (van Tongeren 2000: 159).  
Passages such as the one above, taken from The AntiChrist (Nietzsche 2006: 488), suggest that will to power is 
associated with subjects as enclosed unities. On this reading, the will to power is a justification for the subject 
asserting his will by violence and thereby increasing vitality. However, the will to power goes all the way down, 
as it were. The self is itself the complex emergent whole resulting from lower level interactions, lower level 
clashes of wills to power (Cilliers, Roodt & de Villiers 2002: 2-7). At every moment, the will to power 
associated with a distinct and identifiable being or unitary force exerting itself against a weaker force is only the 
provisional outcome of an ongoing struggle. Singular forces are complexified by forces exerted within and from 
every direction without. Will to power resonates strongly with the deconstructive violence of the world as a 
complex system. It also provides an enriching supplementation to the lean vocabulary with which violence and 
force in the system, conflated at this level, can be described.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The structure of this chapter has followed a line of argumentation that moves from the intensive theoretical 
exposition of the previous two into discussion of violence with the inclusion of perspectives of, among others, 
Hannah Arendt’s On Violence (1970). This structure is motivated. First, both the discussion of critical 
complexity theory and the discussion of deconstruction, each framing the other, were oriented by a broader 
frame in which the distinction was made between those philosophical and epistemological strategies that derive 
meaning from some modulation of an originary presence, and those that do not. The closed, static system 
espoused by these theories of presence was not rejected with recourse to any alternative pure origin or absolute 
foundation. It is, within the writing of Cilliers (1998a: 136-140; 2002: 83; 2004; 2005a), Morin (1992: 58, 150, 
386; 2007: 2-7) and Derrida (1987: 183; 1988b: 40-41; 1998: 9), interrogated on both epistemological and 
ethical grounds. Ethics is necessary in a complex world in which matters cannot be simplified to calculable 
problems without drawing normative elements into the process of both identifying the problem and deciding 
which way to go from there. Theories that are too rigid to acknowledge and negotiate this ethics of 
undecidability are associated with violence. The need to develop this notion within the critical complex system 
stems from this allegation. 
A shift in thinking, towards the acknowledgement of complexity, has serious consequences for how we 
understand the world. Violence within the system is included in this world of meaning that needs to be 
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interrogated. It is not extensively worked out, but is captured in notions like mutilation and asymmetry.133 
Arendt’s (1970) analysis of violence was brought in as challenge to the system. This was done deliberately 
because she writes with a clear separation of violence and nonviolence in which the former is rejected outright as 
a viable and lasting solution to political problems; and also because she (44-48) makes clear conceptual 
distinctions between violence and the often associated and conflated terms: power, strength, force and authority. 
The advantage of Arendt’s conceptualisation of violence is that is makes the identification of violent and 
nonviolent means and ends simple, or at least simple to identify if not achieve. However, this view was itself 
shown to be problematic and in fact potentially implicated in the concealment of violence in the system. 
Rather than attempt to work any predefined notion of violence into the complex system, this project begins at the 
other side, iterating Derrida’s strategy in Of Grammatology (1997) in which the meanings of writing and 
violence are developed by looking at the system itself and by the ‘violence’ it produces in its complex 
interactions. Within the complex structure elaborated above, violence is manifested on three distinguishable 
levels. The first is a constitutive violence, the system itself as arbitrary organisation. The second level of 
violence is the violence of the boundary or the frame. The third level of violence is empirical violence. These 
three levels have serious consequences for the original clear meaning posited in the introduction. In the first 
place, the original violence, the first level to which the most attention was devoted in this chapter, undermined 
any notion of a strong opposition between violence and nonviolence. Indeed violence, here identified with a 
generative power, is an infrastructural movement within the complex system. It is implicated at all levels of 
organisation, in the antagonism, asymmetry and polemics and dominance between elements. 
The first level of violence, also at work wherever the second or third level of violence is at work, expands the 
notion of violence to include all arbitrary force in the system, that is, all force in the system that does not radiate 
from an origin. This would suggest that the idea of power or authority in society, or, indeed any relation in the 
complex system, being possible and not being marked with violence, is unthinkable. The danger of this 
generalisation is one that brings us back to the ethics of complexity as both an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of deciding as a condition of deciding and as an acknowledgement of the inevitability of fighting 
violence with more violence (Derrida 1988b: 41; Spivak 1997: lxxvii). This complicates the notion of violence 
further by positing a kind of violence that must be judged. Violence can be good or at least necessary for the 
survival of the system; or it can be bad. Bad violence, although it is often located at the third level of violence, 
empirical violence such as rape and war, need not be. It could be the violence of law that does not recognise 
                                                      
133 Cilliers (1998a: 120) demonstrates a concern with these matters by applying asymmetry to human relations: 
The social system is non-linear and asymmetrical as well. The same piece of information has different effects on 
different individuals, and small causes can have large effects. The competitive nature of social systems is often 
regulated by relations of power, ensuring an asymmetrical system of relationships. This, it must be emphasised 
strongly, is not an argument in favour of relations of domination or exploitation. The argument is merely one for the 
acknowledgement of complexity. 
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same-sex unions, or, equally, the violence of epistemological strategies that impose a certain order and value 
onto the word in an attempt to cover over the original violence, the arbitrary movement of systemic organisation.  
Derrida (2002a: 235) qualifies more emphatic calls in earlier work (e.g. 1988b: 41) for the mobilisation of 
violence of the system against itself by explaining this violence as a distributed force, a disruptive violence. 
However, this disruptive force, because it is not violence in the sense of the more overt second and third levels of 
violence, is illusive. Cilliers too (1998a: 120) emphasises that the necessity of asymmetry in organisation is not 
an argument that asymmetry in itself is good. The complex system offers no simple solution to this impossible 
problem. Violence, empirical or otherwise, like everything else in the system, is always constituted and 
recognised by means of a frame that must be selected or a boundary that must be decided (Cilliers 2004: 22; 
Derrida 1979b: 20; 1981a: 11; 1988b: 82). The frame itself will be violent because it is ultimately arbitrary, 
exclusionary and marginalising (Derrida 1979b: 30; 1997: 112). The idea that one might escape violence in the 
system, a problem to which Katherine Hayles (2000: 161) alerts systems thinkers, is a problem that is relevant to 
the rest of this project. It should be asked what becomes of nonviolence in this system and whether it does not 
participate in the construction of a more violent reality. 
The question of whether or not the generalisation of violence in the system is itself good or bad is not one that is 
easily resolved. However, as with Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power which was brought into relation with 
complex distributed violence, the question of value and of absolute authority even in the case of moral 
judgements is disrupted and complexified by the choice of a description of the system that is itself always the 
plural, diverse and open interplay of forces. The justification for this generalisation is that ‘violence’ cannot ever 
be permanently erased or unseen by such a system. In other words, in all its potential concrete manifestations, 
there is the theoretical space to construct a frame in which it could appear. For example, a patriarchal society 
may not consider the killing of women for the sake of the preservation of family honour violent. However, 
intensifying the play of arche-violence in order to deconstruct gender identities can disrupt not only this unseeing 
of violence, but the underlying symbolic and systemic forms of violence that produce the structure, hierarchies 
and categories by which, as Levi-Strauss (1961: 292) noted, this violence is legitimated. Even on a first reading, 
this theoretical posturing is not entirely convincing. Heeding Fanon (2001), it must be asked whether violent 
societies in which violent rule allow for potent agency that is not itself empirically violent. Does every society 
tolerate passive resistance or intellectual interventions, or do they only understand brutal uprising? 
The provisional answer to the problems both of recognising good violence from bad, and of the possibility of 
working towards a system that is in fact free of violence is this: 
 ...a general ethics of vigilance seems necessary with regard to all the signals that, here or there, in 
language, in advertising, in political life, teaching, the writing of texts, etc. might encourage, for example, 
phallocentric, ethnocentric, or racist violence (Derrida & Roudinesco 2004: 28).  
120 
 
It is certainly a rather lean answer. This chapter can be read as an exposition of the violence of the inside of the 
complex system. That is, the violence of complex dynamics, the first level of violence. The following two 
chapters are directed at the violence of the boundary and the implication of the outside in the conceptualisation 
of empirical violence and nonviolence. The second level of violence that is explored in chapter 4, is the level at 
which the violence at play in all our decisions is most evident. The normativity that gives complexity its ethical 
character is a result of the necessity of selecting a boundary or frame. The relation between bounding and 
violence requires careful attention. The ethics of complexity, which is sensitive to both levels of violence in the 
system, will also be introduced at the end of chapter 4 and discussed more fully in chapter 5. Both chapter 1 and 
chapter 2 emphasised the significance of the outside. This significance of the outside is that it is unmarked, it has 
no meaning, and it is both a necessary condition for meaning in the system and the condition that prevents the 
closure and finality of that meaning. To emphasise the argument already made, the outside, producing open 
meaning, opens meaning to ethics. The concept of ‘outside’, it will be argued, has an important relation with 
nonviolence in the complex system. While this analysis moves on from the original violence of the first level, 
this constitutive level remains significant in both forthcoming chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BOUNDARY IS VIOLENCE: THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE COMPLEX 
SYSTEM 
...as soon as a genre announces itself, one must respect a norm, one must not cross a line of demarcation, 
one must not risk impurity, anomaly or monstrosity (Derrida 1992a: 224-225).  
A reason must let itself be reasoned with (Derrida 2005b: 158). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 proposed that both critical complexity theory and deconstruction recognise a form of violence at work 
in the way human beings understand the world. This argument is expanded here by moving beyond only the 
possibility of meaning, to its proper constitution as understandable meaning in the complex organisation. The 
first two levels of violence are intimately related. The first level of violence is the violence of perpetually 
differing differences that produce the possibility of meaning. It does not allow for a stable, understandable 
meaning to appear. The overabundance it generates requires that it be limited in its excess in order to be 
understood. The second level of violence is the violence of fixing differences so that the excessive play of 
meaning is readable or understandable (Derrida 1979a: 117; 1997: 112). Because it functions as a quasi-origin 
like the trace, the first level of violence operates with the infrastructures behind sense. Its violence is exposed 
only in its description. The second level of violence, however, is more visible than the first. It is not 
infrastructural, but structural. If the first level of violence produces the complex system as an open system, then 
the second level can be conceptualised as that which simultaneously closes organisation (Derrida 1997: 112). 
The closure of open organisation is what marries the discussion of violence to the explication of boundary and to 
the process of bounding. This idea is central to the argument proposed here and demands a careful reading of the 
descriptions of closure found between critical complexity theory and deconstruction: the boundary itself; the 
frame; and the hymen.  
Four significant ideas must be introduced in order to contextualise the second level of violence and in order to 
understand how, in the face of empirical atrocity such as rape, murder, torture, philosophers should come to turn 
their attention to words when theorising violence. The first of these ideas is that all language is performative 
(Derrida 2005b: 73). The meaning of language is not without its own force. It is forceful because the articulation 
of meaning is not a benign description of an objective reality. It participates in the construction of reality. The 
discussion around linguistic force can be traced back to Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1971) lectures 
delivered in 1955, in which he asserted that speech can be considered an act (Hanssen 2000: 169). To say 
something, in other words, is also to do something. The word ‘force’ referred to success of the speech act in 
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doing what it was intended to do. This force was not extended to all types of speech. In fact, Austin (1971) 
maintained a strong opposition between language that was forceful and language that was not. The opposition 
between constative and performative language preserves this function for only the latter. This idea that language 
could be thought of as an action and a forceful action was extended beyond Austin’s technical linguistic analysis 
and taken up in different permutations in liberalism, critical theory and poststructuralism (Hanssen 2000: 169). A 
new tool for linguistic and also social analysis was introduced herewith, for if language can be framed as an 
action and not purely linguistic then its consequences can be extended to other extra-linguistic spheres. A 
linguistic analysis is thus relevant to all manners of social interaction.134 
Derrida’s (1988b: 13-21) deconstruction of this dichotomy extends the capacity to produce reality with that 
description/inscription to all language. Constative language is commonly thought to be falsifiable with reference 
to an objective state of affairs. If one reads the statement ‘the girl is homosexual’ as a constative utterance one 
need only check that the girl conforms to definitions of ‘girl’ and ‘homosexual’ that are independent of this 
particular situation in order to verify the legitimacy of the observation. Performative language, on the other hand, 
is understood to be fulfilled when it successfully brings reality in line with its assertion. For example, “You are 
guilty” constitutes an accused party as a criminal one. In this process, the person is transformed from an accused 
person into a criminal. What a criminal is understood to be – what he or she has been determined to be within a 
system of meaning – determines a certain fate, justifies a chain of events, limits his or her degrees of freedom to 
be something other than a criminal within the system. Similarly, it is not only the girl that fits into the definition 
of ‘girl’ and ‘homosexual’, but the definitions themselves that constitute the girl as a ‘girl’ and a ‘homosexual’.  
Because the deconstruction between constative and performative language was discussed in chapter 2, its 
mechanics will not be repeated. However, its significant effect, which is the generalisation of the power of the 
performative to constitute, shape and enforce reality, enabled by a context and the general text, must be 
considered when evaluating the argument that the level of activity explicated in this chapter should be 
understood as violence. The world is produced and ordered through meaning (Derrida 1992a: 252). Meaning 
structures relations between components in the system. Reality rendered meaningful within sense and knowledge 
also constrains the range of possibilities of how one interacts with the world (Morin 2007: 2-6; Sen 2006: 9).  
                                                      
134 Hanssen (2000: 170) argues that the forcefulness of language is taken up in liberal theory in order to argue for the power 
of language to intervene in social matters: 
...[Common] liberal conceptions of free speech rest on what appears to be an intuitive understanding of speech act 
theory, insofar as stress is placed on the performative enactment of political power in and through speech.  
This idea is illustrated in the discussion of Arendt’s (1963: 87) exclusion of violence from political speech in order to 
preserve its power to supervene in conflicts.  
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The latter is the second idea informing the description of this level of violence. Accepted meaning legitimates 
itself by legitimating certain relations, hierarchies and actions. The most overt incarnation of this ordering 
through meaning is the law, which Derrida (1997: 112) asserts is the quintessential embodiment of the second 
level of violence. Racist laws and social mores determine that actions motivated by racial difference are 
legitimate and acceptable. In its most extreme expression, this feature of meaning allows all racist, classist, 
gender-based and related acts of violence to find their justification in racist, classist, misogynist or homophobic 
ideas, whether codified or not. These particular manifestations of violence exemplified by the ‘corrective’ rape 
of homosexual individuals are made possible by their ideological frames.  
A third and related idea that frames this analysis is that the second level of violence always contains the 
possibility that a third and empirical level of violence will arise (Derrida 1997: 112). The second level of 
violence can produce concrete and material effects. There is no more vivid an articulation of the impersonal 
violence of the law than Franz Kafka’s (1948: 191) “remarkable piece of apparatus” in In the Penal Colony. In 
this narrative, an explorer visits an island on which a penal colony exists that has a developed a special piece of 
machinery. This machine is used to deliver punishment to the prisoners. The explorer is invited to witness this 
extraordinary machine at work and in this process bear witness to the efficacy of the punishment and indeed the 
material force of the law. A description of the mechanism is given so that the explorer may understand and 
appreciate how it functions. 
It has three components: the Bed; the Designer; and the Harrow (193). The condemned man is laid face down 
and naked on the Bed and then constrained and gagged (194, 195). The Designer hangs directly above the bed 
and shares its dimensions. From it hangs the Harrow with its gleaming metal teeth. The officer explains with 
pride: 
Our sentence does not sound severe. Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is written upon 
his body by the Harrow. This prisoner, for instance...will have written on his body: HONOUR THY 
SUPERIORS (197)! 
The force of the law is written onto the body of the prisoner who cannot move, cannot escape the process of 
inscription, and whose inability to escape results in his death. The reader is given other significant items of 
information. First, the officer in charge of the execution is speaking French and neither the assisting soldier nor 
the prisoner understands the description that is offered to the explorer (194). The functioning of the system of the 
law happens without warning. The prisoner also does not know his sentence. Instead, he is meant to “[learn] it on 
his body” (197). The misunderstanding or lack of understanding of the prisoner is resolved with violence.  
Unlike the liberal recognition of the victims of violence (Arendt 1963: 8; 1970: 44-45; Hanssen 2000: 162-163), 
In the Penal Colony situates this suffering within the sphere of meaning and language. It announces the violence 
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of language and the constitutive role this violence plays in every functioning society. The most obvious message 
enforced in the penal colony is that the law does not have merely linguistic effects. Law is not closed to the 
social or the physical. When law is enforced, it is enforced in the world. Its material violence is, however, also 
linguistic. Or rather, it is related to the production of meaning. Writing the law on the body produces violence. 
Furthermore, the guilt of the prisoner is never doubted. It is a technical matter that is resolved by the system – 
the soldiers, the officer and the machine – that constitutes him as a transgressor of law in the execution of his 
sentence. The observer is given a full description of this process; however, neither the victim nor the soldier – 
his executioner – understands this explanation. The prisoner is not required to understand but only to respect the 
law because he is made to feel its effects. The image of the Harrow carving into the body of the prisoner is a 
poignant reminder that any discussion of violence that necessarily abstracts from concrete experience must 
remain mindful of the suffering of individuals engendered by violence.  
The fourth idea underpinning this discussion is captured in the quotation at the head of this chapter. It also 
speaks of the law (Derrida 1992a: 224-225). In order to fix meaning or enforce the law, ambiguity must be 
cleared up, heterogeneity must be suppressed and the boundary must be sealed. Each sign must mean what it 
means and nothing besides. There can be no blackness inside whiteness. Or, if there is, then what is described is 
neither black nor white but must fall into its own category: grey. Ambiguity does not confuse classification if it 
can be explained away within a system of classification. In an essay on genre, Derrida (218-252) discusses this 
process of classification or subjecting the singular to an imposition of a general framework. Genders, genres and 
cultures are examples of this type of collective difference (Derrida 1993c: 90). The internal organisation or 
différance associated with the individual components of the system must be neutralised in order to establish and 
reinforce the boundary and in order to exclude what is really different from that particular system. Elizabeth 
Grosz’s (1999: 9) proposition that Derrida’s texts all concern forms of violence whether theoretical, interpretive, 
political or otherwise, are echoed by Derrida’s (1998: 9) own observation of his work. He (9) insists on the 
purification of the constant interplay between motifs of purity and impurity as the locus of violence. To close, to 
halt, to arrest the play of différance is irresistible and the violence of this gesture is equally unavoidable (Derrida 
1997: 59). Each of the three ideas discussed in this introduction – the performative force of meaning; the self-
legitimating force of legitimate meaning; and the suppression of internal difference – are necessary features of an 
argument that asserts the violence of closure. 
The language of the first level of violence – antagonism and asymmetry – suggests conflict. The boundary, 
stability, structure and the frame associated with the second level of organisation do not. The apparent neutrality 
of the language used to articulate violence at this level is not insignificant. The violence of the boundary is not 
bad. It is not merely constraining. It is also enabling. In order to be readable, a certain structure must be imposed 
on this chapter. Its meaning must be enabled by a frame. It must be constrained by the quotations at its head, by 
the architecture of its headings, by footnotes and the broader context of the project within which it is produced. 
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This chapter therefore proceeds by returning to the relationship between the three levels of violence in the 
complex system in order to guard against hasty simplification of this relationship into an unproblematic three-
tiered typology. The language of levels is problematic but it is expedient. The interaction between levels of 
violence is related to the interaction between the freeplay and closure in the system.  
The relationship described here enables a characterisation of the violence of the boundary in space and time. 
This in turn allows for an exposition of the implications of the second level of violence for language and the law. 
To remain within abstraction while purporting to address violence as it relates to concrete suffering in the world 
would be disingenuous. This chapter thus invokes two significant examples in the course of discussion. The first 
is the definition of rape in South African law which demonstrates the violence at work in the second level of 
organisation in the complex system. The second is Nelson Mandela’s appeal to lawfulness against the racist laws 
of apartheid. This is used to show how the second level of violence is also involved in the pursuit of the end of 
violence. It is only in the context of the argument developed before it that the relation of the second level of 
violence to peace can be addressed and the consequences for the negotiation of this level of organisation can be 
explored.  
II. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE SYSTEM 
a. THE NEED FOR PAUSE IN IDENTIFYING THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE 
Derrida’s (1997: 112) analysis of violence in the system distributed over three levels is extended in this chapter, 
beyond the organisation of the system as the play of difference on which the first level of violence functions. The 
lens is shifted from open, dynamic, complex organisation inside a system to the stable and robust structures that 
can be observed. In order to locate and characterise the second level of violence in Derrida’s analysis, it is useful 
to recapitulate what was said about both the first and third levels of violence. As it is argued in Of 
Grammatology (112), the clear separation of these three levels of violence is not absolute. Rather, each level of 
violence involves and feeds into each other level. This interrelation and feedback also follows from the 
description of the complex system given hitherto.135 What determines structure in complex systems is neither 
                                                      
135 It should be recalled that the central tenet of complexity thinking is the shift from focusing on individual elements in 
isolation, to thinking in terms of relations between elements, the system as whole and the environment (Cilliers 1998a: 37-
47; Morin 1992: 105-108; 2005). To focus on a single level of interaction is to fail to account for a set of relations within the 
system and to reduce the complexity of the system without full knowledge of the implications of that reduction for the 
understanding of that system. The tension between relations on different levels within the system and the reduction required 
by descriptions of that system can be illustrated by considering the relation between the whole and the parts of complex 
systems: 
In opposition to reduction, complexity requires that one tries to comprehend the relations between the whole and the 
parts. The knowledge of the parts is not enough, the knowledge of the whole asa whole is not enough, if one ignores 
its parts; one is thus brought to make a come and go in loop [sic] to gather the knowledge of the whole and its parts. 
126 
 
purely the interactions of the parts, nor purely the whole (Morin 1992: 113). The interactions between individual 
components are as deeply implicated in emergent systems and subsystems as these emergent wholes are 
implicated in structuring relations between elements in the system and there is both upward and downward 
causation in the complex system (114). The organisation of the system’s structure is therefore distributed across 
all relations in the system: between parts; between the whole and the parts; and between subsystems, the whole 
and the parts (Cilliers 1998a: 91). Furthermore, these relations, like relations between particular elements in the 
system, are non-linear. They cannot be compressed and resist reduction (Cilliers 1998a: 4, 10; Cilliers & 
Richardson 2006: 11). If violence is not something that is inserted into the system from the outside, but is instead 
a characteristic of the interactions within the system – violence is “equivalent to the operation of the trace” 
(Derrida 1997: 101) – it is subject to the same incompressibility and resistance to reduction to a single privileged 
level as the interactions themselves. 
This qualification of the ‘levels’ of violence does not really problematise the levels as such. To say that they are 
ambiguous or fuzzy is not to question that they exist. It is unclear what the ontological status of Derrida’s (1997: 
112) levels of violence is. One can infer, on a charitable reading, that these levels have a status similar to the 
general system of textuality. That is to say, the levels have no objective reality outside the description of these 
levels. The levels are not independent of their being understood. However, these levels of violence are still 
instantiated when we try to understand or to speak about the world. This is less problematic if the system being 
described is a book than if it is a family. In certain situations, it is obvious that one would want to claim that the 
violence really exists regardless of whether or not it is being described. This problem is symptomatic of the 
larger linguistic quagmire with which different iterations of complexity thinking are confronted. Once the gap 
between language and the world is opened, the relationship between language and the world is unhinged.  
This said it is still always possible to offer a description on a micro (the level of interactions between elements), 
meso (the level of interactions involving clusters of elements or subsystems) or macro (the level of the system of 
interest as a whole) level. This does, however, require the acknowledgement that the maintenance of levels is at 
least partly a function of the way we understand violence and decisively not an ontological certainty. The 
separation of levels of organisation is a necessary reduction of the complexity of violence in the system. It is 
necessary insofar as it enables a description and understanding of violence. However, this reduction, like all 
reduction, cannot be made in an absolute way that does not allow for revision and does not acknowledge the 
blind spots created in this process. This description is not complete. It can always be adjusted by taking into 
account the specific relations that it marginalises for the sake of expedience (Levy 1993: 93). Given these 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Thus, the principle of reduction is substituted by a principle that conceives the relation of whole-part mutual 
implication (Morin 2005: 10). 
Because this discussion of violence is still also a discussion of relations in the system, the same logic of interrelation, of 
being “woven together”, still applies when attempting a characterisation (18). 
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qualifications, it should be remembered that the second level of violence is both constituted by and constitutive 
of patterns of violence on the first level. The complex interaction between these levels of violence can be likened 
to the mutual constitution of the internal interactions of the system and its boundary elaborated in chapters 1 and 
2. This analogy is elaborated in the exposition that follows below. 
b. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE FIRST 
The first level of violence, it has been proposed, is the foundational violence of the system.136  It is the 
instatement of a system of meaning, that emerges from interactions that are produced within sense and 
understanding rather than found in nature as a pure ontological reality. In order to explain the need for the 
second level of violence, the fundamental characteristic of a meaningful element within the system should be 
recalled. All signs, in order to have meaning, must be recognisable, and in order to be recognisable, must be 
iterable (Derrida 1988b: 8, 20; 1997: 91). Iterability compromises the singularity of the sign. In order to be 
repeatable, the sign must have something generalisable about it. It must tend towards a universal form that can 
be reproduced with the same meaning. To inscribe the singular or unique within such a system, and indeed the 
very instatement of such a system whose movement destroys the singular, is the first violence. 
Arche-violence destroys the original identity of the individual element through internal division of the self, 
distributed in time through repetition and generalisation (Derrida 1992a: 211). The second aspect of this division 
is the perpetual reference to other elements in the system (Derrida 1982: 13). This aspect of arche-violence 
destroys the original identity of the self by distributing the identity of the individual element across its relations 
of difference with other elements in the system.137 The relation to the other is conflictual (Derrida in McKenna 
                                                      
136 Asymmetry in the system is a result of the fundamental movement of organisation, which we have characterised as 
différance. It is the polemical differing and deferring of each element of each element to each other that necessarily involves 
aspects of inequality in these interactions (Cilliers 1998a: 95, 120, 124). It is the activity of différance and a necessary 
activity for the emergence of dynamic complexity, as opposed to static structures (95). Complex interactions are symmetry 
breaking. Chapter 3 asserted an analogy between Cilliers’ (95) asymmetry and Morin’s (1992: 119) concept of antagonism 
between elements in a complex system.  
137 This point demonstrates the role of the arche-trace as arche-violence, and ties it to the language of complexity: 
The arche-trace [... is] defined as the inevitable mark of the Other born by a self-present or self-contained entity...the 
site of referral to an Other still to come, is an infrastructural principle of asymmetry...(Gasché 1992: 12).  
While this quote clearly illustrates the intrusive violence of the arche-trace, I do not agree with Gasché’s (12) capitalisation 
of the “Other”. In keeping with Derrida’s (1981a: 5; 1994: 14, 15; 2002: 230-259) own insistence on a more radical alterity 
of the system or text’s “outside”, it is more appropriate to reserve capitalisation for this otherness, if for any. The other or 
difference within the system, whose mark or marks are announced by the trace, stands in a relation of asymmetry with the 
self/same/sign that works both ways (Cornell 1992: 62). Each other in the same is always also a self/same to another other 
and all also marked by the sign it marks (Derrida 2001: 158). The ‘properness’ suggested by capitalisation is thus 
compromised by the movement of arche-trace and arche-violence. In his discussion of Levinas in Violence and 
Metaphysics, Derrida (2001: 158) disrupts the logic of absolute or self-enclosed difference explicitly by asking whether, “a 
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1992: 101). There is no system without conflict and competition. According to Derrida’s (1997: 111) description 
in Of Grammatology, complicity in the proliferation of violence is unavoidable. Violence engendered in the 
iteration of the sign is necessary and constitutive. Without it, the singular would not suffer the corruption of the 
other or the disintegration of its own self-identity by its distribution in time-space. However, it could also not 
maintain the possibility of being meaningful at all. The singular would be mute without its corruption (Gasché 
1992: 16).  
The first level of violence creates space within what would be enclosed unity. In so doing, it also creates the 
space necessary for the dynamic play of meaning to unfold. Referring back to the example of the sign, or indeed 
the signature, it is clear that unity only appears because it is already divided at the moment of its appearance. In 
the chapter 3, this spacing was located between the word and its referent, and also within the word itself, 
between the word and itself (Derrida 1988b: 9; 1994: 17).138 However, as the first level of violence in the 
system, this spacing also refers to the impassable difference between sense, meaning and knowledge on the one 
hand, and pure, unmediated reality on the other. The epistemological gap upon which both deconstruction and 
critical complexity theory insist is the original violence that allows each theory to engage with the other. 
Regarding social systems, it can be argued that nature as a pure origin is replaced by culture, which is impure 
and contingent (Harvey 1986: 136-137; McKenna 1992: 92). The purity of observation of all complex systems 
including the biological or physical system is tainted by this artifice at work in meaning (Morin 1983b: 5). 
Gasché’s (1992: 16) remark on the corruption at the root of sense is reinforced by Morin (1983b: 5), who argues: 
 Indeed, the problem of the cultural, social, historical conditions of knowledge cannot be eluded. It is to 
the extent that science believes itself to be a pure reflection of the objective universe that it was able to 
take on hardly scientific airs of eternity, extra-temporality and extra-sociality. On the other hand, as soon 
as one sees that science is not limited to pure accumulated fact, but composed of and by theoretical 
systems, necessitating languages, ideas, logic... 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
division between the same and the other, […] does not suppose, at very least, that the same is the other's other, and the other 
the same as oneself?” 
138 This space is opened by the play of the trace, moved on by the perpetual deferral of one sign to the next, causing a 
perpetual delay in space and time, between the sign and its complete and finite meaning. Caputo (1997: 100) summarises 
this violent spacing at the heart of deconstruction as a system of meaning structured by the trace: 
That meaning – and reference – is a function of the difference, of the distance or the “spacing” between the traces, 
what is called, in a perfectly serious way, the “play” of differences or traces, what is called, in a perfectly serious way, 
the “play” of differences or traces (author’s emphasis). 
The space within the sign allows for its insertion into different contexts in which the meaning will always maintain a degree 
of integrity or sameness, and at the same time allowing for contextual differences to supplement this sameness (Caputo 
1997: 31; Derrida 1979a: 78; 1988b: 9, 63, 65).  
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It is in this sense that the first level of violence can be said to be involved in the appearance of any unified 
system. This is so even when the system in question is commonly understood as a ‘natural’ phenomenon. 
The space opened between language and the world creates the need for the movement of trace so as to allow the 
simulacrum of presence. However, the arche-violence marks this presence with absence. Something else is 
required to erase this mark. This contamination requires a second violence whose purpose is precisely to conceal 
the first violence and to reinstate the origin (Derrida 1997: 112; Harvey 1986: 136).139 The first violence, 
associated with the trace, différance, producing antagonism and asymmetry or antagonism in the system, is 
located at the possibility of meaning, but it is not sufficient for meaning to arise in the system. Meaning requires 
dynamic organisation, dissonance and contest; and it requires stability, structure and a boundary. It is with this 
latter group of requirements that the second level of violence becomes visible.  
The second level of violence arrests the movement of the first in order to limit the play of the arche-trace and fix 
relations of asymmetry so that meaning can be interpreted. This arrest is achieved with a law: 
Out of this arche-violence, forbidden and therefore confirmed by a second violence that is reparatory, 
protective, instituting the "moral," prescribing the concealment of writing and the effacement and 
obliteration of the so-called proper name which was already dividing the proper... (Derrida 1997: 112) 
This passage refers to the event described by Levi-Strauss (1961: 270-271) in which the Nambikwara hid their 
proper names as a matter of rule and of morality in recognition of the violence of naming. Their social norm at 
once acknowledged and denied the violence of the name. Moral law repaired the violence of the name by 
denying the name as such. Derrida (1997: 112) extends this gesture of reparation to all attempts to arrest the play 
of trace in the system.  
The first two levels of violence can be thought as openness and closure in the system. The first level of violence 
is the distributed force of différance that disrupts the identity or closure of the sign with movement of the trace in 
time and space. The sign is thus left open to an infinite play of intrusion, of the disruption of its boundary 
(Derrida 2001: 365). When the meaning of a sign and its relation to other signs is specified, this intrusion must 
be prevented. One must confine the sign to itself and stop the trace in its tracks. In this way, the restitution of 
closure, of a boundary denies the lack of origin and the movement that this lack begins. Against this unending 
play of trace, the second level of violence functions as the origin, fixing meaning and preventing the original 
violence (Derrida 1997: 112).  
                                                      
139 The second violence counters the first and moves against it: 
[The first level of violence] requires a second, ‘reparatory’ or compensatory violence, the violence whose function it 
is to erase the traces of this primordial violence, a kind of counter-violence whose violence consists in the denial of 
violence (Grosz 1999: 10). 
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This violence is associated with all those mechanisms that legislate, that assume the authority of correctness, and 
that resist change and transformation. Derrida (101-112, 120) specifies certain examples in his discussion of 
Violence and the Letter: morality; the law; and philosophy. Each example espouses fixed hierarchical 
dichotomies that categorise and stratify the world. This list can be supplemented: reason; standards of truth and 
right; culture; religion; social identities and norms; academic discourses; and national borders (Grosz 1999: 10). 
In opposition to the violence it conceals, the return of the system to a stable state, “names itself as the space of 
non-violence” (10). The second level of violence is the denial of the arbitrary character of meaning in the system 
(McKenna 1992: 90). In order to do so, it must erase the mark of absence of the origin and supplant itself in 
place thereof. It must proclaim itself “the reassuring seal of self-identity” (Derrida 1997: 112).  
Openness – associated with the first level of violence – and closure – associated with the second – are necessary 
conditions of complex organisation (Cilliers 2001; Derrida, 1997: 59, 125; Gasché 1994: 39; Juarrero 2002). 
When it is argued that the second level of violence repairs the first, what is meant is that it halts its movement. It 
does not redress asymmetry between elements in the system. It simply legitimates a specific configuration of that 
asymmetry. Levi-Strauss’ (1961: 292) alignment of writing and violence, 140  which Derrida (1997: 106) 
proclaims undoubted and even indubitable, is precisely this rigid hierarchisation. Dynamic asymmetry is not 
sufficient for the establishment of hierarchy in any complex system. Stability is also required.  
Given that both the first and second levels of violence in the system appear at this stage to have a source of 
legitimacy insofar as each is constitutive of the system as a system of meaning, the question can already be 
posed as to how and why one should seek to recognise, value, evaluate or redress violence at either level. And 
further, if in fact these two levels of violence are neutral and do not require recognition or redress, then it seems 
problematic to still refer to the arche-trace and the boundary as sites of violence rather than merely force and 
closure. In other words, it might be more appropriate, as Arendt (1970: 45) suggests, to reserve the word for 
empirical violence. The first answer that Derrida (112) offers to this concern is that empirical violence may or 
may not arise out of the first and the second. In other words, these two facets of complex organisation produce 
empirical violence. It is this that demands the recognition of and perhaps also intervention in the first two. The 
recognition of empirical violence interrupts the authority of the second level of violence and, in so doing, calls 
attention to the movement of arche-trace and arche-violence.141 The operation of the second level of violence and 
                                                      
140 This development of hierarchy is: 
...the integration into a political system, that is to say, of a considerable number of individuals, and the distribution of 
those individuals into a hierarchy of castes and classes. Such is, at any rate, the type of development which we find, 
from Egypt right across to China, at the moment when writing makes its debuts; it seems to favour rather the 
exploitation than the enlightenment of mankind (Levi-Strauss 1961: 292). 
141 “It is on this tertiary level, that of the empirical consciousness, that the common concept of violence...whose possibility 
remains yet unthought, should no doubt be situated” (Derrida 1997: 112). 
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the clarification of the complex interrelation between arche-violence and the law that has been suggested hitherto 
requires that attention is turned to the problem of closure in the open, complex system.  
III. CLOSURE: THE BOUNDARY, THE FRAME AND THE HYMEN 
a. FREEPLAY AND CLOSURE IN THE SYSTEM  
In order to articulate the second level of violence in the complex system as the violence associated with the 
imposition of closure, it is first necessary to recall the implications of the arche-trace as arche-violence for the 
conceptualisation of the function or possibility of closure in the system. Such a discussion must return to the 
concept of ‘play’, which was used to draw attention to both complexity theory and deconstruction as theories 
that argue for the anteriority of dynamic difference in the system. The relations of dynamic difference in the 
system are not oppositional in character (Derrida 1987: 183). This non-oppositional character of the element 
within the complex system has been argued with reference to Cilliers’ (1998a: 3, 4) sketch of complex systems, 
and also with attention to the constitution of the sign within writing. The latter is a useful illustration of the 
notion of distributed reference or freeplay.  
The sign or the component of a complex system in more general terms, can never refer only to itself or to its 
opposite (Culler 1983: 99). Within the system, if one were to trace the meaning of any one sign, one would be 
pulled in the direction of several localised points of reference, and still outward toward other signs and new 
differences that are all in constant flux. Several examples have already been offered as illustrations of this central 
point: the iterability of signs always invokes other signs, the past and the future in the constitution of meaning of 
‘this’ particular thing ‘here’ and ‘now’(Derrida 2001: 353). Relations of différance illustrated by this example 
produce an irreducible delay in the completion of the meaning of the sign. Meaning is always distributed in 
space and time. It exceeds the ‘here’ and ‘now’ of a particular description and is therefore irreducibly open 
(Derrida 1982: 7, 8). McKenna (1994: 80) develops this point by adding that the delimitation of a description is 
not only insufficient as a complete meaning; this insufficiency manifests as an error. To exclude undetermined 
meaning could be to leave out vitally important meaning. This error is characteristic of all attempts to determine 
meaning.  
Freeplay produces the system as an open system, but it does not produce complex organisation as random 
organisation (Morin 1992: 102-105). Derrida (1988b: 116) summarises the consequences of freeplay for the 
process of description or delimitation in three points:  
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1. The freeplay of the system resists the confinement of binary oppositions, or indeed the confinement of 
meaning to any contained form, whether three or four or even four hundred oppositions are invoked.142 
2. The freeplay of the system, although it resists containment, is also what allows meaning to be contained 
in the first place. It allows for the specification of meaning, while at the same time alerting one to the 
limits of any attempt to specify, to calculate, to formalise, or to decide its movement. 143 
3. Freeplay produces the system as a heterogeneous system in which differences on the lowest level of 
description survive any attempt to create a homogenous field and to secure full presence in the system.  
The specification of meaning in the system involves a decision to stop freeplay at a certain point and suppress 
heterogeneity. This is a decision to contain it within a certain space, to gather its past organisation into a neat 
linear history and to stop present organisation from distributing itself into the future. To stop freeplay is thus to 
resist internal difference and change. In each sense, the specification of meaning in a calculation, a formalisation, 
a narrative, or any general description, is the imposition of closure.  
Freeplay resists closure. It undermines the authority of any specification of meaning in the system (Derrida 
1979a: 107; Gasché 1994: 21). A novel, for example, which must be read in time, must have a beginning and an 
outer edge (Derrida 1979a: 76, 83). It cannot be read at the same time as every other novel and is thus enclosed 
on itself. However, a novel requires that it participates in a linguistic system that overruns its boundary. One’s 
understanding of a novel is also enabled and enriched by reading more, by having experienced more, by 
following the trace into other texts, reference works, criticism, historical contemporaries and more (107). The 
novel demonstrates both the inevitability of closure and the impossibility of self-containment. The meaning is 
constituted within these extra-textual elements or context that is itself governed by the logic of freeplay or 
complex organisation (Culler 1983: 123; Derrida 1979a: 81, 83). The example of the novel demonstrates two 
sides of the problematic instated by the text: the novel refers beyond itself while maintaining a level of unity or 
integrity; the outside or context, which is impossible to determine, disrupts the enclosure of the novel because it 
is implicated in the constitution of meaning inside the novel (Derrida 1979a: 82). The context is thus never 
purely exterior. The text and the trace gesture beyond what is simply present and invite an expansion of what is 
considered to be part of the original unity (Critchley 1992: 75). 
                                                      
142 As it was pointed out in chapter 2, Derrida (1987: 183) contrasts the containment of binarity or oppositional difference 
with freeplay or différance. 
143This aspect of freeplay can be explained by returning to the trace with which it is associated: 
What I call the erasure of concepts ought to mark the places of that future meditation. For example, the value of the 
transcendental arche [archie] must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased. The concept of arche-trace 
must comply with both that necessity and that erasure. It is in fact contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of 
identity (Derrida 1997: 61). 
Without the trace, meaning could not be thought to be present in the system. The trace allows meaning to present itself as 
much as it renders the fullness of presence impossible. 
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This idea of the problematisation of the inside/outside dichotomy repeats the idea of complexity as complexus. It 
is not possible to determine what lies outside the system in any absolute sense (Morin 2005: 6; Cilliers, 
Richardson & Lissack, 2001: 6, 8). It is always possible to include more, to expand the boundary of what one 
considers to be part of the system under analysis. The notion of incompressibility discussed in chapter 1, the idea 
that something cannot be fully explained in terms simpler than itself, can be expanded on this point. The system 
is not incompressible in space. It is also incompressible in time. A perfect description, accepting this theoretical 
possibility for a moment, would need to evolve with the system (Cilliers 1998a: 4, 10; 2000c: 24). Not only the 
system, but also what is considered its context or environment and the relation between these two systems resists 
simplification in space and time (Cilliers 2001: 140). 
That particular texts or complex systems can be recognised at all assumes that there must be a play of difference 
analogous to the differences between elements within the system on global level. In order to have some minimal 
identity, a particular phenomenon must be differentiable from everything outside it. This ‘everything outside’ 
refers to other particular texts or systems and the general system of textuality in which particular texts are 
produced (Derrida 1988b: 7, 148). Although the argument is made here that complexity thinking is an argument 
for irreducible openness, it is not an argument against all closure. It is an argument against reified absolute 
closure. Wherever lines are drawn that enable recognition or understanding, there is still always an overflow or 
excess, a disruption, and an extension of the line (Derrida 2001: 365). There is always more distributed in space, 
and more still to come distributed in time. 
Derrida argues that the organisation of the textual system renders totalisation “useless” and “impossible” 
(Derrida 2001: 365).144 That is, to enclose a system within a ‘here’ and ‘now’, at the same time arresting the 
system’s development in space and time, is thwarted by complex organisation as complexus. However, this 
argument against totalisation understood as subsuming the system in an absolute description that provides a 
discrete account of all components, their history, and a determined future, does not mean that the system is 
random and chaotic. The freeplay of the system is the possibility of meaning. But in order for that play of 
meaning to become meaningful, freeplay is not enough. This can be explained with reference to the centre or 
origin which the complex system has been argued to be without: 
The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure – one cannot in fact 
conceive of an unorganized structure but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the 
structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. By orienting and organizing the 
coherence of the system, the centre of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form 
(Derrida 2001: 352). 
                                                      
144 “If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite 
glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field – that is, language and a finite language – excludes 
totalization” (Derrida 2001: 365). 
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The centre, in other words, allows structural organisation to organise itself into a structure in the more 
conventional sense. That is, a recognisable form with stable relations, hierarchies. If one were to specify the 
boundary of a properly centred system, it would follow that the only problem one would encounter would be to 
find the boundary, which in principle would be there to be found.145 
The assertion that deconstruction and also complexity theory do not destroy structure in the process of 
acknowledging the dynamic and transformational character of that structure has been repeated at various stages 
within this project. It is relevant again here. Although the lowest level of interactions in the system is indeed 
given to a movement that divides itself in time and in space, this movement is counteracted by acquiescence, an 
inclination towards subjugation and a propensity to be organised. Structure within complex systems is always in 
tension and, at least in principle, decomposable. The first level of violence is implicated in this decomposition 
(Derrida 2002: 235). This is not an equilibrium argument, for that too has been rejected in the process of 
description of the complex system. However, it is an argument for a degree of closure, a stability towards which 
elements within complex systems tend. In other words, play is not entirely free even without an origin. There are 
constraints on play from within the system itself that allows structures to emerge.  
b. THE BOUNDARY OF THE COMPLEX SYSTEM  
Extensive attention to the conceptualisation of the boundary of the complex system was necessary within the 
discussion of critical complexity theory and deconstruction. However, its intimate implication in the genesis of 
violence in the system warrants more considered attention. There is no meaningful system that is without a 
boundary. It need not be an edge or a membrane. It can also be a centre, origin, an explanation, identity or 
definition. In one sense, the boundary is the distinction between the system and everything outside it. The 
boundary, in this description, is nothing more than difference whose significance is amplified by the perspective 
of the observer. The différance between an element in the system and the space and elements around it is a 
dynamic and distributed boundary. It is clear that in order that a sign such as ‘school’ maintain a level of 
intelligibility, that différance must be constrained in some way (Gasché 1994: 16). There must be closure in the 
system: the open sign itself must be closed. Another requirement of the boundary can be demonstrated by 
                                                      
145 Understanding the system as a system of freeplay means that while the system itself organises by constant and dynamic 
differentiation, the specification of categories of different things is never a matter of finding these significant differences. 
There is always a measure of ultimately unjustifiable creation at work. Nietzsche (2000: 55), to whom Derrida (2001: 354, 
369, 370) attributes the most rigorous recognition of this creativity, explains: 
Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique 
and entirely individual experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it 
simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases – which means, purely and simply, cases which are 
never equal and thus altogether unequal. 
The original violence of the system is that all words already have this property of destroying singularity (Derrida 1997: 
112). All words are always already concepts in this sense. 
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shifting the observation to view a school as a complex system. A school has many levels of interconnection with 
other systems. It is part of a society, a culture, a system of education and other larger systems. It also shares its 
elements, people, books, and others, with different systems such as families, libraries and the legal system. And 
yet, it seems obvious that the school is distinguishable from these systems of which it is a part and with which it 
shares components and resources. In other words, there is something outside it. The school must be bounded for 
there to be an inside and an outside. This boundary is not simply a function of description but also of the internal 
organisation of the system itself. Closure is necessary so that the differences do not simply reverberate into the 
system’s environment because there is no difference between system and non-system (Cilliers 2005b: 608). One 
could say that in order that the play of differences enable the constitution and stability of certain structures 
within that system, the reverberation of play needs to be constrained in some way. 
The descriptions of the complex system made within critical complexity thinking and within deconstruction 
suggest that the boundary as a concept must be extricated from its common close association with the line. In his 
important discussion of closure in Derrida’s texts, an important and recurrent theme in deconstruction, Simon 
Critchley (1992: 61) begins by identifying different forms of closure and various systems that are all closed in 
some sense. Logic, language, poems, novels, artworks, homes, persons, debates and eco-systems are all closed 
systems. Each is distinct and recognisable. The boundary of a complex system can coincide with a visual 
boundary but it need not. The boundary of the legal system can be understood as the point at which the legal 
code is superseded by a different one, such as a moral code or an economic one. In simple terms, the boundary of 
the legal system emerges where its components are constituted within a different network of differences. Even 
an element at the centre of the system is vulnerable to the ambiguity of its meaning and belonging. Thus a 
boundary must not be thought of as a circle enclosing a stable centre that devolves into fuzzy edges. Because it is 
the difference that constitutes both the inside and outside of the system, the boundary is distributed throughout 
the system. In this sense, when we invoke the identity of the system as a unity, we are never far from its margin. 
Conversely, when we are at the margin, we are also close to the centre (Derrida 1979b; 1981a: 5; 1982: 35, 
1997: 44).146 Outside and inside are produced by the boundary as a site of activity, a process rather than a thing 
(Juarrero 2002: 100).  
In all cases, closure produces finitude within an infinitely open field (Derrida 2001: 355, 365). As a spatial 
designation, it distinguishes a finite territory (Critchley 1992: 61). It also denotes a temporal delimitation 
bringing something to its conclusion or its end. Critchley (61) does not read closure as the end itself, but as the 
pursuit of an end. In other words, closure is dynamic. The foundation, future or origin it organises around is 
                                                      
146 This idea is repeated in the discussion of the frame (Derrida 1979b), the role of the preface in a text (Derrida 1981a: 5), 
the significance of a single footnote in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Derrida, 1982: 35), and the discussion of 
supplementation (Derrida 1997: 44, 141-157). What is at relegated to the boundary or even beyond it to the outside, can be 
demonstrated to be vital to the constitution of the system as it is at its centre.  
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static. The attempt to describe the system is an attempt to circumscribe it and to impose certain limits on it, 
whether spatial or temporal or both (63). The complex organisation of the system, as discussed above, allows 
these limits to be breached. The absolute closure of totality is breached by the movement of text (64). The 
boundary of the complex system is shifting and permeable and a function of the interaction of the complex 
organisation of the system with the act of observation (Cilliers 2000c: 24; Juarrero 2002). Closure always 
involves a double movement: non-belonging and belonging, or transgression and restoration (Critchley 1992: 
87). The concept of the whole understood as a recognisable unity which must maintain a level of stability in 
order to allow for recognition is not destroyed by thinking complexity (Morin 1992: 103). Closure itself may be 
dynamic but its specification is not. To specify the boundary of a system is to specify a particular difference and 
to privilege it over all others (Critchley 1992: 64; Derrida 1987b: 183). For a system to be specified, the function 
of its boundary must be to exclude things that are not part of the system here and now. 
In a sense, the emphasis on openness in complexity thinking – critical complexity theory and deconstruction – 
must always assume a boundary, border or level of stability that is susceptible to being opened. It is not pure 
openness. Transgression assumes something to be transgressed. In order to engage with a system, a language, a 
signature or a society, in order to name it and to try to understand it, there must be what Gasché (1994: 16) calls 
“minimal universal intelligibility”. Anything that can be recognised must be contained. Différance generates a 
system that is open and closed at the same time. Openness produces the possibility of meaning; closure renders 
that meaning understandable. Derrida (1979a: 117) argues that neither movement can erase the other: 
If we say that the unreadable [complex organisation] gives, presents, permits, yields something to be 
read...this is not a compromise formula. Unreadability is no less radical and irreducible... 
The boundary is generated by différance and yet resists différance. Stable structures emerge out of complex 
organisation. It is on this point that complexity and randomness can be distinguished. The boundary in the 
complex system cannot be disentangled from stability. The system generates itself by distinguishing itself from 
its environment. In other words, it entrenches the difference between itself and its environment. The effect of this 
entrenchment, which becomes the distinction between the inside and the outside of the system, is that internal 
differences feed back into the system in a positive way (Cilliers 2001: 141). This idea is useful and can be 
incarnated in practical examples. The English language is established as English by reinforcing the difference 
between it, and sounds and marks that are not English. In stabilising the boundary between English and other 
languages, the internal structures such as syntax or definitions are reinforced. In other words, the identification 
of differences on a ‘higher’ level or at the level of the whole requires that internal differences do not disrupt the 
difference between differences on a global level, between the whole system and its environment. 
Operational closure is the distinction between the system and its environment enabled only by self-reference 
(Luhmann 1989: 138). This theory of closure has been presented in chapter 1 and dismissed as an appropriate 
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model for the boundary of the complex system. This notion emphasises the role of the boundary as keeping the 
environment outside the system, with the exception of allowing only perturbations from outside that are 
necessarily transformed from noise into meaning and thus made understandable and valid in terms of the 
operations of the system itself (Cilliers 2001: 140). There is an absolute enclosure around the system that 
prevents any interpenetration between complex systems. If this model of the complex system is extended to 
human beings then operational closure would guard against any form of inter-subjectivity. If they are social 
subsystems such as the legal and economic systems as Luhmann (1989) intended, then operational closure would 
prevent any penetration between these systems. In other words, operations, conclusions or truths generated 
within each system or subsystem would be established only with reference to the enclosed system itself (138). 
The system cannot refer beyond itself.147 This line of thought appears to lead toward a path of relativism in 
which meaningful engagement of ‘truths’ appears impossible and irrelevant. 
This position, however, is clearly not maintained within the conceptualisation of the complex system as an open 
system within either critical complexity theory or deconstruction. Luhmann’s (1989: 136-150) operational 
closure does not assume that boundaries are natural. They are the result of social interactions and observation, 
the system observing itself. The suggestion appears to be that the boundary is what the system says it is. The 
only reason that it would change would be if the operation of the system required change in order to maintain 
itself. However, because of freeplay, the boundary is always problematic.  
The implication of observation in the constitution of the boundary does not clear up the ambiguity and 
heterogeneity instated by différance.148 The boundary thought of as that which constitutes the system as “a global 
unity” is an emergent property (Morin 1992: 103). It emerges out of the interactions within the system, between 
                                                      
147 Luhmann (1989: 139) explains how a complex system, in this case the legal system, can participate in its environment 
and maintain absolute autopoietic autonomy by virtue of its operational closure: 
Thus, like every autopoietic system, [the law] is and remains to a high degree dependent on its environment, and the 
artificiality of the functional differentiation of the social system as a whole only increases this dependency. And yet, 
as a closed system, the law is completely autonomous at the level of its own operations. Only the law can say what is 
lawful and what is unlawful, and in deciding this question it must always refer to the results of its own operations and 
to the consequences for the system's future operations. 
148 In trying to work out how the system works internally, it is useful to recall the treatment of the boundary as if it is in fact 
closed, keeping the inside in and outside out: 
When dealing with complex systems in an ‘operational’ way, there is nothing wrong with this approach. One should 
be careful, however, not to overemphasise the closure of the boundary. The boundary of a complex system is not 
clearly defined once it has ‘emerged’. Boundaries are simultaneously a function of the activity of the system itself, 
and a product of the strategy of description involved. In other words, we frame the system by describing it in a certain 
way (for a certain reason), but we are constrained in where the frame can be drawn. The boundary of the system is 
therefore neither purely a function of our description, nor is it a purely natural thing (Cilliers 2000c: 24). 
The convenience of this simplification neither justifies nor removes the error of reifying the emergent boundary. 
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the system and its environment and with the observer. Cilliers (2000c: 24) situates emergence within complex 
organisation: 
Since the interactions are rich, dynamic, fed back, and, above all, nonlinear, the behaviour of the system 
as a whole cannot be predicted from an inspection of its components. The notion of ‘emergence’ is used to 
describe this aspect. The presence of emergent properties does not provide an argument against causality, 
only against deterministic forms of prediction. 
Emergent properties of complex organisations present as something new or different in relation to the local 
relations between components in the system (Morin 1992: 105). The boundary as an emergent property is an 
event that must be reinstated as the system organises itself (105). Added to the properties of exclusion of what is 
non-system, inclusion of what is properly part of the system, and stabilising and constituting structure within the 
system, the boundary must also be irreducible to the system and vice versa (106). This last point means that the 
boundary neither determines the system, nor is it fully determined by the system. The emergent boundary does 
not circumvent the problem of how to articulate the function of closure with the announcement of systemically 
sanctioned ambiguity. The description of any emergent property cannot treat it as an emergent property. In order 
to do this, the activity of the system would need to be captured in its total complexity. The recognition of the 
emergence of the boundary out of the interaction of order and disorder, however, is a guard against the 
imposition of rigid closure onto organisation that remains open.  
We cannot accurately determine the boundaries of the system because it is open (28). In order to say anything 
about the locus and character of the boundary, one has to make a selection. This selection is informed by the 
internal organisation of the system as much as it is by the context, which is also a selection (Cilliers 2001; 
Derrida 1979a: 81; Juarrero 2002). This limited selection is what enables understanding. The selection of a 
boundary – understood as the inside/outside distinction with respect to specific systems – is itself enabled by 
another understanding of the boundary as a frame. 
c. THE BOUNDARY AS A FRAME: BOUNDING AS UNDERSTANDING 
The idea of the boundary as a frame was introduced in chapter 2 as an instantiation of the critique of boundary 
judgements. Think of the boundary as a frame adds a new aspect to the boundary. The frame makes a certain 
space intelligible. The frame can be thought of as the collection of assumptions and structures that allow 
boundaries to emerge as such. The frame limits what can be seen in a constituted space. This limited and limiting 
character of the frame is itself the absolute limit to mastery of the system as a unit to which epistemology strives 
and sometimes imagines itself having achieved (Derrida 1982: ix-xi). The description of the boundary is always 
the imposition of closure within a system that cannot be closed. The observation of a boundary is a judgement 
rather than a discovery. Three aspects of the frame or parergon are pertinent to the argument here. Whereas it is 
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clear from considering the boundary in general that it has an undecidable character, the frame emphasises the 
need of still deciding where the boundary is in order to enable understanding. A frame enables understanding 
separating the inside from the outside and, in so doing, it allows the inside to become meaningful (Derrida 
1979b: 3, 20). Without repeating what has been said about the frame, the process of framing can be explicated by 
turning to an analogous structure: the preface. 
Derrida (1981a: 1-60) argues, in his preface to Dissemination, that the preface in outlining the general theory of 
a text, pre-empts what can be read or understood in a text. It legitimates certain meanings and already 
marginalises others by creating a telos whose function is to promise what the text is obliged to fulfil. It decides 
the meaning and imposes closure onto the possibilities of freeplay once that play has already begun. It thus 
orientates the play or dissemination of meaning in the system towards the fulfilment of a telos or intention 
(Derrida 1981a: 9, 10). The outside determines what is inside (Derrida 1988b: 152). This is only possible 
because of its purported exteriority. It announces its authority of the text from the outside in order to participate 
inside the text (Johnson in Derrida 1981a: xxxii). By remaining exterior, its certainty is shielded from questions 
and ambiguities in the text itself. However, the preface of the text, like the frame, is undecidable. Its effect on the 
text from the outside, while it professes an exteriority or marginality in relation to the actual text, pervades the 
interior space of the text by supplementing and moulding its meaning. It adds to the text and fulfils a lack within 
the text itself. By this gesture it supplants the centrality of the text itself, exposing its own interiority or 
textuality. The logic of the preface and parergonality applies to all explanatory frameworks (Derrida 1979b: 37). 
Like the frame, the book, and any structure that creates unity such as a state or an ideology, the function of the 
preface is to create closure. In order to do this, it must negate its own complex character.  
A frame is necessitated in every possible description of the system. The meaning it makes legible or describable 
is not natural. Like the trace, the frame is an artificial institution (Derrida 1979b: 39; 1997: 42, 44, 46). A pure 
and natural frame is a “fiction” (Derrida 1979b: 39). Derrida’s (34) analysis of parergonality makes this clear: 
A frame is in essence constructed and therefore fragile, this is the essence or the truth of the frame. If such 
a thing exists. But this ‘truth’ can no longer be a ‘truth’, it defines neither the transcendent nor the 
contingent character of the frame, only its character as parergon. 
The frame remains necessary and constitutive and it implies a necessary but ultimately unjustifiable “violence” 
because in its institution because it is arbitrary (30). The frame cannot be derived from a natural foundation. The 
violence of the frame – and of all knowledge and understanding – is the ultimately ungrounded or arbitrary 
exclusion of certain elements, the suppression of complexity in terms of the distribution of the system in time 
and space, the privileging of some relations and structures and the marginalisation of others, and its distortion 
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that feeds back into the system.149 No meaning is possible without exclusion of information in time and space; 
and no meaning arises that is without structure that differentiates the margins from the centre (Cilliers, van Uden 
& Richardson 2001: 65). 
Error is built into the frame and into the meaning it enables and constrains. Nietzsche (2006: 225), in The Gay 
Science, boldly states that truth is merely a multitude of errors that have not yet been refuted. Meanings enabled 
by a frame that seems to be beyond question are, in a sense, already wrong and already anticipate the succession 
of one frame by another. The frame is therefore provisional because what is included always constituted by 
information it excludes. This exclusion is always already erroneous. The frame is constructed, provisionally, 
with the possibility of deconstruction included within its structure.  
The epistemological violence of the frame, as Morin (1992: 397; 2007: 2-6) points out when discussing the 
mutilating effect of violence on the world, has serious consequences.150 It is not only critical complexity thinking 
that theorises this connection between meanings and actions. Amartya Sen (2006: 9), in a work on identity, 
develops the theme of rigid socio-political or cultural identities leading to empirical violence and social 
inequality and exploitation that is premised on and justified by these ossified categories: 
Traditional inequalities, such as unequal treatment of women in sexist societies (and even violence against 
them), or discrimination against members of other racial groups, survive by unquestioning acceptance of 
received beliefs.151 
In this instance, it is clear that an instituted difference – or reified boundary – around collective identity prevents 
the arche-violence from distributing itself because this institution is believed to be natural. “The application of a 
fiction always runs the risk of believing in it, or in creating belief in it” (Derrida 1979b: 39-40). This instituted 
order as an instance of framing is itself violence and it produces violence. It legitimates violence and in so doing 
                                                      
149 Of the frame within aesthetics, reading Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Derrida (1979b: 30) writes: 
The violence of framing proliferates. It confines the theory of aesthetics within a theory of the beautiful, the theory of 
the beautiful within a theory of taste, and the theory of taste within a theory of judgment. These decisions might be 
called external: the delimitation has far-reaching consequences, but even at this cost a certain internal coherence may 
be retained. Another act of framing which, by the introduction of the border, violated the interior of the system and 
distorted its proper articulations, would not have the same effect. 
150 Morin’s Blind Intelligence (2007: 5) sounds the demand from complexity for new ways of knowing because of the 
violence at work in those theories that are not sensitive to the complexity of the system. He (1992: 6) writes that “mutilating 
thought necessarily leads to mutilating actions”. Furthermore, this mutilation will not cease so long as reason as 
rationalisation “encloses reality in a system of ideas that are coherent but partial and unilateral and do not know that a part 
of reality is unrationalizable” (Morin 1992: 6). 
151 Sen (2006: 174), in remarkable resonance with Morin’s general anti-reductionism, formulates the relationship between 
empirical violence and identities as one that depends on the reduction of multidimensional and developing – one could say 
complex – meanings to monadic, inert classifications. Such an essentialist approach to identification both produces and 
shapes violent confrontation between opposed groups. It also serves as a justification after the fact, legitimating violence by 
framing it as the rational outcome of differences of identity. 
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makes that violence invisible to those for whom its naturalness renders it beyond question (Grosz 1999: 12). This 
example also draws attention again to the necessity of the process of bounding and framing as something which 
exceeds the visual metaphor. A law frames society in that it structures society and in so doing makes it 
understandable. A theory of economics frames the system of exchange. Language as an instituted system of 
meaning frames all experience. Ideology frames political engagement. A relationship between two people could 
frame their sexual experience of one another. In each case, the logic of parergon is reincarnated. 
d. THE BOUNDARY AS A HYMEN: BOUNDING AND PENETRATION 
The preface, read above as a frame that enables understanding, can also be thought of as a point of entry. Having 
mastered a preface, one has traversed a line, moved inside a text toward its central meaning. One could think 
oneself as having penetrated the boundary. Derrida (1979a: 76) connects understanding with penetration when 
he proposes that the reading of any text begins with the location of its edge or border. However, another 
metaphor that can be used to elucidate the undecidability of the boundary of the text is that of invagination, 
which involves both the hymen and the fold. The hymen is commonly thought as a fixed barrier between a pure 
inside and a pure outside that must be broken to allow penetration (Derrida 1981a: 212). It protects the inside 
from the violence of intrusion of the other; however, within this operation, its only purpose is still to be broken 
(Derrida 1992a: 213, 216). The hymen is idolised for its preservation of purity; and yet it is equally urgent that 
this function be subverted. The hymen is only a hymen insofar as it executes both of these seemingly 
contradictory operations at once (Derrida 1981a: 213; 1992a: 216). Its meaning cannot be reduced to either. Its 
meaning remains undecidable (Derrida 1988b: 75). Yet, it is precisely the idea of a boundary as something 
meant to be crossed – with some violence – and that allows the outside inside that must be thought to separate 
the text and the context, two parallel texts and oppositions inside a text.  
The breaking of the hymen is not to be conflated with penetration to the centre of a text. The fold is the second 
element of invagination. In order to think the fold, one needs to imagine approaching a text by tracing its edge, 
the title, or the first line, the first point of contact. Then one reads further and further, consuming more of the 
text, thinking oneself penetrating to its core or its innermost meaning or its centre. However, says Derrida 
(1979a: 97; 1979b: 31; 1992a: 236-237), when you think you have penetrated to the inside, you are still only 
tracing the edge and will have gotten no deeper than the surface of play. The fold creates a pocket that gives an 
impression of being inside or having reached the centre (Derrida 1979b: 31).152 The play of meaning in fact has 
no centre. Once you have decided the centre, it can be challenged by shifting the context or shifting your own 
situation in the context (Derrida 1979a: 78). The logic of the trace confuses the penetration of a text by resisting 
                                                      
152 “Invagination is the inward refolding of la gaine [sheath, girdle], the inverted reapplication of the outer edge to the inside 
of a form where the outside then opens a pocket. Such an invagination is possible from the first trace on. This is why there 
is no ‘first’ trace” (Derrida 1979a: 97). 
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any halt required by the constitution of a final meaning. Even when the boundary has been specified, we do not 
have unmediated access to the interior space (Derrida 1992a: 189). The boundary resists penetration (200). We 
are always outside, before the boundary. The inside remains: “inaccessible to contact, impregnable and 
ultimately ungraspable, incomprehensible – but also that wish we have not the right to touch” (211, author’s 
emphasis).  
The same logic also applies if one approaches the edge from the inside: the boundary, the edge, or the border of 
a text and the context has two sides. The fold does not confuse the inside and the outside by blurring or mixing 
these two areas. It confuses the inside and the outside by allowing one to be simultaneously inside and outside 
the text, and by displacing both the ‘here’ and the ‘there’ (81). If you delimit the inside of the text, the trace may 
force the inclusion of more information on the inside in the perpetuation of its continued journey of distributed 
reference (84). What was outside is drawn into the inside by the structure of the text and textuality. Thinking of a 
boundary as a hymen emphasises the aspect of knowledge that is fictional. The myth of penetration requires that 
the structural ambiguity of the hymen be erased. It is this dynamic structure as a process in a non-linear time-
space that makes the boundary undecidable (Derrida 1979a: 92).153 It does not dissolve the boundary or avoid the 
problem of bounding by identifying the boundary with the limit of all understanding. The boundary is 
ambiguous, undecidable, porous and complex, but it cannot be employed in this way. When we use the boundary 
it must be decided. Its fictional character must be denied. The violence of the boundary is the violence of all 
language and also meaning in general (Derrida 2001: 117).  
IV. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE: THE VIOLENCE OF THE BOUNDARY 
a. VIOLENCE AS THE SUPPRESSION OF HETEROGENEITY  
It is clear from the analysis of the frame and the hymen that the construction of closure is violent because, like 
arche-violence, it is arbitrary. However, the form this violence takes requires further exposition. If the second 
level of violence must counter the first, and the first level of violence is associated with différance, then the 
second level of violence must erase the effects of différance. It must erase the mark of the other in space and in 
time. It must erase the imprint of absence in structure and reinstitute presence (Derrida 1997: 59, 86). Derrida’s 
concern with violence and meaning is a concern with this process and its effects in the world. This is the ethical 
                                                      
153 The interruption of the border does not produce an undifferentiated sludge:  
Thus the text overruns all the limits assigned to it so far (nor submerging or drowning them in an undifferentiated 
homogeneity, but rather making them more complex, dividing and multiplying Strokes and lines) all the limits, 
everything that was to be set up in opposition to writing (speech, life, the world, the real, history, and what nor, every 
field of reference - to body or mind, conscious or unconscious, politics, economics, and so forth) (Derrida 1979a: 84). 
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impulse that runs along with Derrida’s (1987: 183) insistence on the difference between opposition and 
différance. The second level of violence operates in the service of purification: 
For the phenomena that interest me are precisely those that blur these boundaries, cross them, and make 
their historical artifice appear, also their violence, meaning the relations of force that are concentrated 
there and actually capitalize themselves there interminably. Those who are sensitive to all the stakes of 
“creolization”, for example, assess this better than others (Derrida 1998: 9). 
The second level of violence, called counter-violence, counters the anti-metaphysical or counter-foundational 
violence of the lowest level of complex organisation (Hanssen 2000: 14). The second level of violence is the 
violence of the metaphysics of presence or what has been called modernist thinking. To naturalise the frame, 
rendering it present and thereby rendering the interior field it constitutes present too “is metaphysics, onto-
theology itself” (Derrida 1979b: 39). The frame transforms the field frames. It instates its artifice by “force” 
(Derrida 1998: 9). 
Différance generates difference in space (Derrida 1997: 66). The system is heterogeneous (Cilliers 2001: 143). 
Even the components of the system, because they are defined in terms of other components, are never enclosed 
in perfect self-identity. The associated activities of bounding, framing and penetrating are the reduction of 
difference and plurality to the same (Critchley 1992: 29). The violence of the boundary is the violence of erasing 
difference within the same. This difference is both the difference of the other within the system and it is the 
difference of the other-than-system.154 That is pure exteriority or openness itself. It was postulated that the first 
level of violence destroys singularity. This is not denied, if the basis of singularity is a unique, clearly defined, 
neatly bounded entity. However, it can also be argued that the system produces a new form of singularity. 
Singularity is reformulated in terms of incalculability (Derrida 1992a: 228, 230; 2005b: 150). It is not an 
impervious line that separates one thing from another and creates irreducible difference. It is arche-violence 
instating a play of infinite difference through relation to others within the system that produces irreducible 
difference (Derrida 1992a: 230, 1997: 60; Gasché 1994: 45). By distributing the name in space and time, the first 
level of violence allows its repetition; however, it also allows each repetition of a name to remain differentiated. 
In order to purge the system of this violence, the boundary must prevent this differentiation and intervene 
wherever there is impurity, hybridity and contamination, which on this account of organisation, is the general 
case (Derrida 1981b: 40, 64). Singular instances must be gathered under a collective identity with no room for 
difference. The boundary must be enforced so that it is not overrun by the text, a risk that is constantly present 
(Derrida 1979a: 83).  
                                                      
154 “What is also at the same time at stake – and marked by this same word in différance – is différance as reference or 
referral [renvoi] to the other, that is, as the undeniable, and I underscore undeniable, experience of the alterity of the other, 
of heterogeneity, of the singular, the not-same, the different, the dissymmetric. The heteronemous” (Derrida 2005b: 38, 
author’s emphasis). 
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This form of violence need not be explored in the abstract. Derrida (2005b: 73) discusses it as the political 
violence of the performativity of language. To impose a unified meaning, whether by consensus or a more 
authoritarian strategy, is violent in this sense, whether this meaning is proliferated in rhetoric or law (Grosz 
1999: 12). More obvious examples of this violence are totalitarianism, nationalism and egocentrism (Derrida 
1993b: 14). In each case, the internal differences and the mark of the other within the state, the nation and the 
self, respectively, are denied. The violence necessary to confirm the self-identity of a cultural identity clearly is 
another example that can be invoked in this context. If cultural identity is thought of as grounded in the idea of 
sameness, then a culture must always be internally consistent.155 There cannot be any deviance or impurity 
within its boundary. In this process, a complex dynamic system is reduced to a thing, an object (Morin 1992: 
92). 
Boundary is related to the notion of hierarchy (Cilliers 2001: 142). Like the boundary, hierarchy is an emergent 
property of complex interaction. Hierarchies that are no longer suited to the system can change, whether or not 
they become exploitative, when a certain overt violence is demonstrated, but that change is enabled by the frame 
which has replaced another. Asymmetrical structure – which is dynamic because it is relationally constituted 
within complex organisation – must be bounded in order to become meaningful and visible (Derrida 1993b: 
143). In order to make a judgement on whether the asymmetrical relations between components in the system are 
good or bad, you need to already assume certain boundaries. We cannot understand the structure of complex 
interaction without a frame. However, this framing is also a freezing of relations.  
An ideology of the sovereignty of human rights must deny the violence of the origin in order to function (154). It 
is clear that the constitutive violence at work within this ideology cannot be dismissed as bad. Its interpretive 
violence renders certain acts visible as empirical violence that once could not be legitimately interpreted as such 
were a different frame employed. A hyperbolic example of this problem is the legal definition of genocide. By 
naming events in the system ‘genocide’, we violate the singularity of those events. We make them recognisable 
and, in at least a provisional way, they become understandable in this process because they are pulled into the 
system of signification (Praeg 2008: 194). Naming genocide calls up comparisons with other like and different 
                                                      
155 The case of a culture as a complex system provides an illustration of the clear tension between the differences or rather 
différance between individuals within that system, and the sameness that sustains identification between them. 
Derrida(1993c: 90) elaborates on this idea: 
This can be said, inversely or reciprocally, of all identity or all identification: there is no self-relation, no relation to 
oneself, no identification with oneself, without culture, but a culture of oneself as a culture of the other, a culture of 
the double genitive and of the difference to oneself. The grammar of the double genitive also signals that a culture 
never has a single origin. Monogenealogy would always be a mystification in the history of culture. Will the Europe 
of yesterday, of tomorrow, or of today have been merely an example of this law? One example among others? Or will 
it have been the exemplary possibility of this law? Is one more faithful to the heritage of a culture by cultivating the 
difference-to-oneself (with oneself) that constitutes identity or by confining oneself to an identity wherein this 
difference remains gathered?  
The second level of violence is the resolution of this tension by institutionalising sameness and erasing difference. 
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forms of violence locally and far away, it calls up contextual information, other information and ambiguities. 
However, to deal with genocide, these references must be gathered up. Some must be disallowed while others 
are prioritised. Certain interests are marginalised and others are made central. This is done so that genocide can 
be dealt with within the system. It is done so that the violence of genocide may be recognised as an intolerable 
violence and so that an appropriate remedy might become possible. The arche-violence of the moral and legal 
frameworks that allow this interpretation must be denied: 
The violence of human rights rhetoric must be understood in this light – as actively involved in concealing 
the violence of its origins in order that the international law regime may aspire to its necessary and, 
eventually, self-evident legitimacy (Praeg 2008: 204).156 
It is clear that stopping the operation of arche-violence in its tracks can be necessitated. The second level of 
violence can be employed to mediate empirical violence as in the case of genocide (Gasché 1994: 16). It can be 
demanded by the fact of suffering of fellow human beings, or non-human beings for that matter. While this is not 
denied, the violence that enables this process is still ultimately ungrounded. An argument against genocide that is 
grounded in human rights must assume a certain idea of what it is to be human ‘here’ and ‘now’, and some 
specific idea of a right ‘here’ and ‘now’. Such assumptions do not only reduce difference in space. The law as a 
complex system can anticipate the future by creating a model of the future based on information in the model 
now. This model can incorporate future changes. However, because it cannot be based on anything other than the 
system as it is, the model cannot allow for radical change in any way other than building a core of provisionality 
into itself. In the face of such hyperbolic empirical violence as genocide, it is plainly problematic to assume only 
a provisional stand. This is a problem facing any ethics that begins with the acknowledgement of complexity.  
b. VIOLENCE AS REDUCING PAST AND NEUTRALISING THE FUTURE 
Différance produces space and time that are inseparable (Derrida 1997: 68). Arche-trace and consequently also 
arche-violence is the opening of all temporisation (Gasché 1994: 46). The violence of the boundary is enforced 
in space and time. The reduction of difference in the system reduces the range of possibilities of the system’s 
interpretation of the past and the meaning that the future has for the system. The complex system is constituted 
                                                      
156 Praeg (2008: 204) continues:  
All juridical orders – including the regime of International Law of concern here – are founded on violence, on the 
violent manipulation of the right to violence. Of course it will become just in retrospect, that is, in terms of the 
juridical order premised on that founding act of violence. This is why regimes are most violent at, or shortly after their 
inception; why dictators can plausibly claim to act as midwives to democracy. Shortly after its founding the violence 
of the founding is still there for everyone to see, the question of legitimacy wide open and hence the violence of its 
enforcement all the more necessary. Any new regime needs time to establish and ‘naturalise’ the rule to be enforced 
through the violence of law, through law-enforcing violence. 
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by its history. Memory, which is the retention and interpretation of this history, is constitutive of organisation of 
the present insofar as a present can be abstracted from the perpetual organisation of the system.  
The trace is related to memory (Derrida 1997: 71). The non-linear movement of trace carries past organisations 
of the system into the present. The system’s mediation of its inheritance is significant in how it can interpret the 
present and future (Derrida 1994: 23). However, it also works in the opposite direction. The way the future is 
anticipated works back on how the present and history of the system can be interpreted. Totalisation or the 
violence of closure is the violence of reducing the heterogeneity of the past in order to justify the present and 
extend the present into the future, reducing the heterogeneity of possibility that lies beyond the horizon of 
presence (xx). The imposition of temporal closure need not be the denial of past or future, but a linearisation of 
both which denies both any force.  
In Spectres of Marx, Derrida (14-16) reflects on the possibility that, as Fukuyama predicted, we have reached the 
end of history. That is, that the socio-political-economic differences that sustained a dialectical antagonism in the 
history of the world had been resolved with the dawn of an ideological higher synthesis. In this narrative, history 
proceeds by an oppositional logic. A thesis calls up its antithesis and this tension is resolved in a synthesis. The 
end of history is its telos (14). The present is directed towards it. Derrida (15) proposes that we have not reached 
history’s end, but that this dialectical and eschatological version of history which is shaped by its anticipation of 
a closed vision of the future is what has come to an end. Instead, we must re-imagine history, memory and 
inheritance in terms of heterogeneity (16).157 The present is always already contaminated with traces of the 
future and the past (21). The process of interpreting both past and future involves a process of selection and 
reduction within a network of differences. This reduction feeds back into the system and limits the range of 
possibilities within what we frame as the present. The responsibility of inheritance is not merely to repeat, but 
also to engage with the histories of the system and to find something new in this engagement. However, 
whenever a history is invoked, whether as an explanation or merely a description, the structure of history as the 
structure of the trace must be whittled down. Disparate memories of the past must be set against one another in a 
contest that only allows one victor. A heterogeneous history undermines the attempt to plot a course of 
progression towards a telos.  
Hayles (2000: 137-162) proposes the narrative as an antidote to the totalising violence of the system in its 
construction of a pervasive presence. However, if the violence of closure is taken seriously, then the narrative 
                                                      
157 Derrida (1994: 16) argues that the process of understanding inheritance is necessarily one of exclusion and distortion: 
An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist 
only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing. ‘One must’ means one must filter, sift, criticise, one must sort out 
several different possible that inhabit the same injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashion around a secret. If 
the readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the same time defy 
interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it. We would be affected by it as by a cause – natural or 
genetic (author’s emphasis). 
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certainly does not escape the violence of closure. In the construction of a narrative, one constructs a line, follows 
only one or a few stories and one can only take so many perspectives and tangents into account before the 
narrative loses its force, which is precisely its unfolding in time and into the future. In other words, at any point 
in the narrative, in order to justify the ‘present’, only one past is allowed, and only one future is anticipated. 
Reducing a heterogeneous history – one not entirely extricable from the present – to a determinate origin, in 
order to posit a past that is outside the system, and thus challenges its closure, always undermines itself. The 
history implicated in narrative structure it is stripped of its opposition to teleological thinking (Derrida 2001: 
367).158 In can only oppose one telos with another. The construction of narrative is usually a delimitation of a 
unity, even if that unity unfolds in time in a sense, if it becomes rather than is (367-368).  
This is not an argument against narrative. Its risks must be accounted alongside the risks of describing so 
heterogeneous a history that its effects are utterly distributed and unaccountable. The effective result of such a 
position would be an ahistorical or synchronic analysis. It is clear, however, that narratives contain no simple 
tonic to the problem of totalisation or systemic violence. However, developing this line of thinking, the idea of 
history as containing several antagonistic histories, can be proposed (Derrida 2005b: 120). Each intellectual 
paradigm or indeed human experience has its own historicity, which is a challenge to every other. Any attempt to 
resolve this antagonism by the establishment of a frame which claims universality will reduce the complexity of 
the past.159 Derrida offers examples of this teleological violence: Kuhn’s paradigms; Foucault’s epistemes; and 
scientific discovery. A goal projected back onto the past makes the past intelligible and reduces that ability of the 
past to be interpreted anew. The history of a complex system is not dormant. The system’s interpretation and 
reinterpretation is marked with a trace of the event – something new – and of the non-event (Derrida 1994: 10). 
This is why one perhaps could say that the movement of any archaeology, like that of any eschatology, is an 
accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure on the 
basis of a full presence which is beyond play (Derrida 2001: 353). To reduce the past and posit this reduction as 
an origin is part of the operation of the second level of violence. 
                                                      
158 Hayles (2000: 137-162) is not the first to attribute an anti-totalitarian force to historical analysis. By tracing the history of 
a system, its contingency as a product of successive and distinct events which could have been otherwise is demonstrated. 
Derrida (2001: 367) argues that a reduced history is: 
...in complicity with a teleological and eschatological metaphysics, in other words, paradoxically, in complicity with 
that philosophy of presence to which it was believed history could be opposed. The thematic of history, although it 
seems to be a somewhat late arrival in philosophy, has always been required by the determination of Being as 
presence. 
Nietzsche’s genealogy harnesses this anti-metaphysical force of historicity (van Tongeren 2000: 193). However, its success 
follows from the rhetorical devices harnessed within the genealogy that undermine its own authority. 
159 “Whenever a telos or teleology comes to orient, order, and make possible a historicity, it annuls that historicity by the 
same token and neutralises the unforeseeable, the incalculable interruption, the singular and exceptional alterity of what [ce 
qui] comes, or indeed who [qui] comes, that without which, or the one without whom, nothing happens or arrives (Derrida 
2005b: 128). 
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Similarly, the projection of a telos posits the future as an origin (Derrida 1988b: 130). The future presents a 
similar but different problem within the movement of totalisation. Like the past, the future of a complex system 
is heterogeneous. Like the past, the future must be interpreted. The future of a complex system can and is 
anticipated by the system itself in order to be robust and resilient. Like the past, this anticipation is framed and 
thus suppresses most of the heterogeneity of the future and reduces the range of possibilities open to the system. 
There is, however, another understanding of the future as an event, which is not an extension or projection of the 
present or of the past. Rather, it is an interruption of structure by the appearance of the new. In order that the 
boundary preserves its integrity, it can incorporate the future in the first limited sense outlined. However, it 
cannot tolerate radical change. Thus the violence of the metaphysics of presence neutralises the future as an 
event. This violence extends to “dogmas, all conversions, all articles of faith or philosophy” (Derrida 2001: 119). 
Reason itself, science, progress and all other attempts to systematise and unify are teleological insofar as they 
cannot be sustained on the basis of a plurality (Derrida 2005b: 120). 
The theory of alterity within deconstruction has an ambiguous relationship with Emmanuel Levinas’ Other 
(Derrida 2001: 97-192). The other, marked within the system of signification, cannot maintain a position of pure 
exteriority. However, radical alterity thought of as unmarked space within the system does maintain this 
position. Thus, the association of radical alterity with a pure future developed by Levinas (1989: 42-44) in Time 
and the Other is still relevant to this discussion. In contrast with the attempt to purify the interior, which involves 
the emphatic differentiation of a field, a pure outside is unmarked. Therefore it is meaningless. However, the 
future can be rethought so that it is possible to make room for an encounter with what is totally unforeseeable 
within the present configuration of what has been rendered present by the entrenched fiction of the frame 
(Derrida 1994: 28; 2001: 118). 
Levinas (1989: 43) describes the arrival of the Other as coming from the future. The exteriority of the Other is 
not a result of mere spatial differentiation between the self and the Other. If the Other were simply differentiated 
in space, then the Other would, in principle, remain absolutely knowable even if this principle could not be 
achieved in practice. However, the relationship with the Other is not one of knowledge or mastery (42, 45). It is 
the confrontation with a mystery. The Other is incalculable. The other within deconstruction retains this 
association with the future because of the structure of the trace. This is not the future in terms of anticipated 
possibility within the system or self: 
The future is what is in no ways grasped. The exteriority of the future is totally different from spatial 
exteriority precisely through the fact that the future is absolutely surprising. Anticipation of the future, 
sanctioned as essential to time by all theories from Bergson to Sartre, are but the present of the future and 
not the authentic future; the future is what is not grasped, what befalls us and lays hold of us. The other is 
the future (Levinas 1989: 43-44). 
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The structure of the trace is a relationship with absence (Levinas 1986: 351; 1989: 43). The erasure of the event 
is simultaneously the erasure of the singularity of the other in time. Any ideal horizon will tend to neutralise the 
event because it anticipates it in a particular form in advance and thus destroys its novelty (Derrida 2005b: 143). 
The frame does not merely totalise, it totalises in advance (Derrida 1994: 37). It pre-empts the possibility of 
change and thereby closes it altogether. The future resists this unification but this resistance is erased in the 
second level of violence (Derrida 2005b: 128).160  
Derrida (1994: 3) seeks to maintain a here and now without the conjunction of past, present and future. The 
challenge lies in the attempt to think the present as disjunction (18). Even if the arrow of time is broken or 
splinters into a million possible and impossible lines, the past, present and future are only understandable if their 
complexity is reduced (25). In order for the first time to be an event, it also needs to be the last time. The event 
always recedes from the present towards the future and the past (Derrida 1994: 14). Once an event has been 
interpreted by the system and becomes part of the range of future possibilities, it ceases to function as pure 
future. The future is not what is possible. It is precisely that which is impossible within the present organisation 
of the system (35). What is impossible cannot be articulated within the system. Therefore, every frame that 
invokes a vision of the future neutralises the future as an event.  
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 
a. POSTSTRUCTURALISM TURNS TO LINGUISTIC VIOLENCE 
Critical systems theory asserts that all concepts, including violence, are anthropomorphic insofar as they are 
embedded in epistemological and linguistic systems.161 In other words, describing the reproductive system of a 
tree frog is not itself natural. The first and second levels of violence will be implicated in this description. It does 
not follow that all concepts apply equally to the social and natural world because all concepts are 
anthropomorphic. It can still be acknowledged, without making too many grandiose claims about what separates 
human beings from other living systems, that to speak of a human social phenomenon is different to describing 
the organisation of a cell, a lion or an eco-system. In fact, the statement of irreducible difference between 
different systems follows from the anteriority of difference within the complex system. Cilliers (2000c: 24; 
2001: 137) argues that the description of complexity must be completed or rather supplemented with the 
                                                      
160 “Moreover, the teleology or teleologism that so powerfully governs the transcendental idealisms and rationalisms of 
Kant and Husserl is also that which limits or neutralises the event. Teleologism seems always to inhibit, suspend, or even 
contradict the eventfulness of what comes, beginning with the scientific event...” (Derrida 2005b: 128). 
161 “All knowledge, whatever it may be, supposes a knowing mind, whose possibilities and limits are those of the human 
brain, and whose logical, linguistic, and informational support comes from a culture, therefore from a society, hic et nunc” 
(Morin 1992: 85).  
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description of the particularities of any one complex system in order to say something interesting about that 
system. Every complex system has both general and singular characteristics.162 Whereas the conceptualisation of 
the first and second levels of violence can be incorporated into a general description of complex systems, 
violence has a particular meaning in the context of human social systems such as cultures, political systems and 
languages.  
The particular case of language, through which we order society, in which identities are formed and through 
which we structure society with categories, classes, narratives, norms, politics and laws, demands attention. 
Because there is no social system that evades it, whether or not language is considered violent determines 
whether violence lies inside or outside a range of social systems. The work of the first and second levels of 
violence in the constitution of all meaning is what determines that this complex, ‘deconstructive’ or indeed 
poststructuralist understanding of violence is opposed to the liberal tradition that seeks to keep language and 
violence separate (Hanssen 2000: 160). This separation is not consistently maintained. For example, within this 
tradition, the concept of “hate speech”, which is words that can harm, undermines its absoluteness (160).  
Returning to Arendt’s (1970: 43-45) theory of violence as an example of this tradition for a moment, it is 
apparent that within the clear typology that distinguishes and defines power, violence and their associates, power 
is associated with the collective, with consensus. This consensus, the very converse of violence, is made possible 
through language. Language is the vehicle through which we may realise an alternative to violence. It is no 
surprise then that in On Revolution (1963: 9), she places violence outside language: 
Where violence rules absolutely, as for instance in the concentration camps of totalitarian regimes, not 
only the laws – les lois se taisent, as the French Revolution phrased it – but everything and everybody 
must fall silent. It is because of this silence that violence is a marginal phenomenon in the political realm; 
for man, to the extent that he is a political being, is endowed with the power of speech... 
Arendt goes on to say that violence itself is “incapable of speech” (9). Accordingly, theories of violence that 
articulate violence only deal with its justifications and legitimacy (10). It must be emphasised that the artificial 
engagement between Arendt and Derrida here acknowledges that the violence at stake in the opposition of 
violence and speech falls under what Derrida (1997: 112) calls “empirical”. More than that, it is brute physical 
violence. It cannot be achieved by words and it cannot be articulated with words. The juxtaposition of these two 
positions must be mindful of the fact that violence does not mean the same thing in each. However, what is at 
stake is not merely a semantic confusion. The definition of violence delimits its relation to language.  
                                                      
162  “Certain systems may display some of these [ten general] characteristics more prominently than others. These 
characteristics are...a general, low-level, qualitative description. If we accept this description (which from the literature on 
complexity theory appears to be reasonable), we can investigate the implications it would have for social or organisational 
systems” (Cilliers 2000c: 24, author’s emphasis).  
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Within liberalism, power, politics and speech supplement each other (Hanssen 2000: 163). This position cannot 
be summarily dismissed by deconstruction. It creates a real possibility that ideas about government and law 
might mediate that human tendency to settle the matter of which idea is better with war and physical force 
(Arendt 1963: 87). To purge speech of violence is to create a space in which legitimate rule is not merely for the 
strongest. Arendt (86) does not argue that a political consensus is easy to achieve. She (86-87) indeed argues that 
social and economic asymmetry produce conditions that could well make political power impossible and leave 
only violence as an option for changing the system. However, this violence is only a means to an end that it itself 
cannot achieve. Violence – here what is being spoken of is empirical violence – is still “pre-political” (86). What 
is needed to achieve power and enter into a political space is an “egalitarian” space in which speech is the means 
of deciding the best possible ideas to be embodied in nonviolent laws and political institutions (Hanssen 
2000:160).  
In line with this, Arendt (1963: 87) associates power with structure and violence with chaos and decomposition 
of order. While it can interrupt a given order, violence does not produce anything positive in its place. This 
position assumes that violence and peace are ontologically prior to speech, which can be employed as a neutral 
arbiter between the two (Hanssen 2000: 161). This view is challenged from several angles. In Black Skin White 
Mask, Fanon (2008: 8-27) discusses the ways in which language is a means – like violence – of forcing the 
‘Negro’ to behave in a certain way. It has material effects, causing psychological harm. Language, the very word 
‘Negro’ subordinated some people to others in a legitimate ways, at least in a certain historical context (19). It 
was not the breaking of laws and norms, but their enforcement and their legitimacy within a culture and a 
language that brought about violence. French itself, the language which Derrida, an Algerian Jew, was forced to 
use, was utilised as a weapon forcing people to rid themselves of difference in order to legitimately belong 
within the French linguistic community. Not only the French – properly speaking – but also the “Negros” of the 
colony who had managed by artifice to bring themselves closer to the French norm used language in this way 
(10-13). They denied the fact of their creolisation and their home within spoken Creole in order to purify 
themselves of that cultural ambiguity that excluded them from the civilised world. And yet, among the French, in 
this case, in this moment in history, the fact of their blackness was a difference whose mark could not be erased 
and which guaranteed exteriority with respect to the French community.  
Not only the words of a language, but also the language as a whole insofar as it imposes a boundary of absolute 
difference, is violent (9, 15). It is violent in the sense that it cannot tolerate internal differences that it does not 
itself sanctify. And, in a more colloquial sense, it is violent because this constitutive violence has material 
effects. Its violence is inscribed in the world and on the body. Similar arguments are presented in those marginal 
philosophical and political discourses such as feminism or queer theory or postcolonial theory (Hanssen 2000: 
161, 173). Each raises objections to empirical conditions, but on related terms, with the constitution of meaning 
that produces and legitimates these conditions through the reification of complex and dynamic différance.  
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This type of analysis is enabled by the inversion of the ontological priority of reality over the world that 
characterised theory during and after the linguistic turn (161). This manner of priority is impossible within a 
philosophy that is premised on the alienation of language from the world. Language has the capacity to produce 
consensus, but this consensus does not reflect any purer truth that escapes the conflictual constitution of 
language itself (Derrida 2005b: 73). Saussure and Levi-Strauss, both having made this turn, seek again to purge 
the language of violence by opposing natural speech to artificial writing, and in doing so still associate violence 
with all forms of political institution (Derrida 1997: 36). In contrast with the liberal tradition, violence still enters 
the realm of politics, despite their mutual opposition of speech and violence. The personal is free of violence 
when it is free of political structures that go against natural organisation. Derrida’s (40, 44) reading of the 
structuralist paradigm extends the violence of writing to all language through the extension of writing – the 
imposition of unnatural hierarchy – each disdains. It is clear that the containment of violence is not pursued in 
the name of violence. It is done rather in the name of nonviolence. It is done so that nonviolence is not merely an 
abstraction, but an achievable reality.  
Whether nonviolence is ostensibly achieved through the creation of political structures or by avoiding political 
structure, the desire to maintain this real possibility is repeated. However, the problems with the enforcement of 
this desire are clear. For example, democracy, which is commonly held up as a nonviolent alternative to tyranny 
or lawlessness, is argued by Derrida (2005b: 63) to depend on the same destruction or exclusion of difference 
that characterises all structure, definition and law: 
…democracy has always wanted by turns and at the same time two incompatible things: it has wanted, on 
the one hand, to welcome only men, and on the condition that they be citizens, brothers, and compeers 
[semblables], excluding all the others, in particular bad citizens, rogues, noncitizens, and all sorts of 
unlike and unrecognizable others…. 
It is not only language that is violent, but also politics, identities, institutions, and laws whose operation is 
mediated through meaning but that are not strictly linguistic. A politics that is not violent would not be 
meaningful. Any political ideal such as consensus or democracy would have to be deliberately positioned 
beyond meaning in order to be nonviolent (Derrida 2005b: 37; Hanssen 2000: 169). What is lost in this position 
is a nonviolent system as a real achievable political goal, not only in the sense implied by the lowest level of 
complex organisation, but in also in the establishment of institutions meant to ameliorate this lowest level.  
b. LAW AND PEACE: A COMPLEX CHALLENGE TO KANT 
In line with critical complexity theory and deconstruction, Nietzsche (2000: 56) associates language with truth 
and the construction of truth with the institution of order in the world. Hierarchy, subordination and law are built 
on the boundaries instituted within language. This institution is intended to mediate the relations between people 
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that would otherwise be violent. In fact, the state of nature – human existence prior to society – for Nietzsche is 
“the most flagrant bellum omni contra omnes” (54). Law structures society so that only violence legitimated 
within language is allowed. However, in anticipation of the poststructuralist association of language, law and 
violence, Nietzsche (55) protests the application of general concepts to singular things. Nietzsche’s thought can 
be read as a “critique of philosophy as an active indifference to difference, as the system of adiaphoristic 
reduction or repression” (Derrida 1982: 17). This proto-grammatologist, in forsaking the centre, also appears 
seduced away from the peacefulness that the centre legislates (Nietzsche 2000: 54).  
In accordance with this understanding of language, truth and law, and taking the will to power into account, it is 
clear that this theoretical position is in tension with law as such. Nietzsche (2006: 340) criticises Immanual Kant, 
first, for his attempt to find a foundation that would ground all morality, and secondly for failing to acknowledge 
that moral codes are not justified. Instead, they justify what would otherwise be arbitrary actions, characters and 
institutions.163 Nietzsche, in his polemic against all established moral norms and Kant at the mast of this way of 
thinking, criticises the claim that any law could be categorical. More importantly, like linguistic categories deny 
the singularity of individuals, so moral and legal categorical imperatives deny the singularity of individuals (van 
Tongeren 2000: 195). Instead, the law addresses: “peoples, races, epochs, classes, and above all to the whole 
animal ‘human’, to human being in general” (Nietzsche 2006: 342, author’s emphasis). The law addresses “the 
herd” (van Tongeren 2000: 195). A law – as a boundary or a frame – must instate a higher, more important and 
forceful level of difference in order to justify the erasure of the individual. It cannot tolerate its own 
contradiction or internal struggle. A law is always a law for many and not for one. A law must hold for all over 
which it has jurisdiction. In its most emphatic expression, this extends to “all human wills” (Kant 1898: 43). 
Kant, on the other side of the polemic, endeavours in The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 
(3) to work backwards from “everything empirical” and common sense moral reasoning to locate precisely those 
laws or that law that is of “absolute necessity”. Kant (4) seeks morality that is grounded a priori, before the 
particular situation in which it is followed. Furthermore, to follow the law must be done for the sake of the law 
itself in order to be moral (5). Morality is law, and not contingent situated decisions that happen to coincide with 
the law. Kant (38) therefore arrives at the categorical imperative: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at 
the same time will that it should become a universal one”. Moral laws are not found in interactions between 
people, but arrived at by a process of deduction that begins with this single absolute foundation (38). Kant (39) 
reformulates this law in terms of nature: “Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a 
                                                      
163 In Beyond Good and Evil § 187, Nietzsche emphasises the arbitrary nature of moral law that claims universality: 
One sort of moralist would like to exercise his power and creative whims upon mankind; a different sort, and perhaps 
Kant himself, uses his moral code to announce: ‘What is honourable in me is that I can obey – and it should be no 
different for you than for me!’ 
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Universal Law of Nature”. Kant illustrates the application of this imperative with an anecdote about a man who 
wishes to take his own life. The man reasons with himself that, based on “self-love”, it is right that he should 
shorten his life which in the course of time will bring about greater suffering than satisfaction (39). To the 
question of whether this self-love could become a principle that is universal within nature, Kant (39) answers 
that a sentiment to improve life by destroying it is contradictory and therefore could not exist within nature, 
which must by this reasoning be non-contradictory or internally consistent. Three more such anecdotes are 
offered, reinforcing the message that what matters in matters of morality is not individual circumstance but the 
general principle at stake.  
The moral thing to do challenges the individual’s experience of him or herself. The moral thing is certainly not 
the expedient thing. What is clearly marginalised in this type of analysis is the internal difference that challenges 
general classifications, demarcations and rules. Kant writes: 
Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a 
universal law of nature, far from being that we should will that it should be so (41).  
The property of universality is intrinsic. It is the origin of morality in the world. Evil, Kant (331) argues 
elsewhere164 – and perhaps one could add violence here – cannot have the same origin as morality. It cannot 
originate with the categorical imperative. 
This question of origins is looked on quite differently in On the Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay, in which 
Nietzsche (2006: 413) makes bold accusations against Kant. The categorical imperative or indeed any 
categorical imperative is not only wrong in the sense of taking important differences as irrelevant. This mistake 
is itself immoral: 
In this sphere of legal obligations then, we find the breeding-ground of the moral conceptual world of 
‘guilt’, ‘conscience’, ‘duty’, ‘sacred duty’, – all began with a thorough and prolonged blood-letting, like 
the beginning of all great things on earth. And may we not add that this world has never quite lost a 
certain odour of blood and torture? (not even Kant: the categorical imperative smells of cruelty...) (413, 
author’s emphasis). 
In The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche (489) calls the categorical imperative “harmful” and “mortally dangerous” 
(author’s emphasis). The reduction of difference called violent from the shared perspective of deconstruction and 
critical complexity theory is analogous to the gesture within a categorical morality recognised by Nietzsche. 
Having already likened arche-violence to the clash of the wills to power, it can be inferred from this discussion 
that the tripartite structure of complex violence must produce an understanding of the law that shares Nietzsche’s 
                                                      
164 Kant (1898: 331) explores the origin of evil mankind in the first part of The Philosophical Theory of Religion. 
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concerns about its violence. This being the case, the discussion of complex violence must also share a suspicion 
of Kant’s (1898: 3) aim to ground all moral action and his conclusion that the metaphysical foundation of all 
morality has its origin in a unitary principle free of any contradiction or internal difference.  
If the law in this abstract and lean sense cannot be thought to bring about a state of non-violence, then the 
possibility of non-violence on the level of actual pragmatic legal law is also, like democracy, perpetually violent. 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1939: 2), built on the foundation of metaphysically grounded morality, sets out a clear 
and specific pathway towards international peace. That is, international relations without the possibility of war 
(2-3). Like Nietzsche, Kant (10) argues that “the state of nature is not a state of peace, but of war”. However, 
through a programme of implementable strategies, this war can be superseded by the institution of law (11). 
What stands in the way of achieving good laws that bring about peacefulness is only the passage of time (67). 
This type of achievable programmable nonviolent law is not possible within the framework of violence 
developed from a complexity informed position, no matter how sophisticated it may be. In practical terms, it is 
unclear where this leaves politics, social systems or the law.  
It is important to note that violence is never identified except with reference to a moral judgement, a boundary 
and a frame. To kick a soccer ball is not violent. But to kick a human being is violent. A whole network of 
definitions and assumptions underpin this seemingly simple distinction. Violence requires recognition. Even 
Nietzsche, who so plainly disdains the law of morality, instates a morality of his own, even if this is by definition 
a morality that resists generalisation, in other words, a morality that is sensitive to individuals and not 
standardised for the group (van Tongeren 2000: 197-202). It might overrun common conceptions of lawfulness 
but it is not without its own laws. The violence of a genocide can only be determined with reference to a moral 
law that tells us that human life cannot be taken, and certainly not taken en masse justified by characteristics that 
are deemed contingent in relation with the fact of humanness. The law may not bring about peace, but it brings 
about a provisional answer to suffering and an attempt, however flawed, at ending that suffering. Without it, not 
even the attempt is possible. Without the law, violence in any form is invisible (Gasché 1994: 16, 18). All law is 
violence, but violence that can be argued to be tolerable within a specific context and for a specific time, chiefly 
if this violence is in service of putting an end to another intolerable atrocity (Derrida & Roudinesco 2004: 31). 
The distinction between tolerable and intolerable violence may involve privileging one form of suffering over 
another.  
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VI. NEGOTIATING THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE 
a. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF RAPE IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ILLUSTRATION OF 
VIOLENCE ON THE SECOND LEVEL 
The second level of violence in the system is linked to all forms of normalisation of which the law, as a system 
of norms, rules and conventions is a paradigmatic instance and so draws Derrida’s focused attention in several 
texts: Before the Law (1992: 181-220); The Law of Genre (1992: 221-252); The Laws of Reflection (1987a: 13-
42); The Force of Law (2002a: 230-259); Spectres of Marx (1994 ); and in other texts in which the law in general 
or specific laws are invoked and critiqued and criticised. One distinguishes between tolerable violence and 
intolerable violence by means of the employment of a frame (Derrida & Roudinesco 2004: 31). This frame can 
be positioned in many ways. Or perhaps it is better to say that there are several frames or boundaries at work. It 
is impossible to account for them all but it is possible to understand some and to identify their effects. If the 
question as to where the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate forms of empirical violence lies is asked, 
it does not resound into a silent abyss (32). Many would readily answer that they knew. The boundaries in 
society do not always appear to be ambiguous. Laws, for example, only function because they claim clarity and 
predictability (Phelps & Kazee 2007: 349). Where there is ambiguity, it can be exploited only to instate an 
ostensibly clearer, most consistent and more correct alternative. It seems unconscionable to propose a law that is 
wittingly vague or even open to contradictory interpretations. An ambiguous law is no law at all. Many 
boundaries and frames are accepted, unquestioned and continually affirmed. The general effects of law, reducing 
the heterogeneity of the complex system, reducing history to a linear past and reducing the future to a telos, have 
been elaborated in general. However, an argument that begins with difference cannot be tested only in general. 
For this reason, the violence of the law must be explicated at the hand of an example. 
The legal definition of rape in South Africa provides a clear example of a specific frame that was applied in the 
past in order to recognise a specific violence; a challenge to that frame based on the differences it denies within 
the categories it enforces; and the supersession of that violence by another. The problem of this definition is 
examined through a consideration of diametric arguments for particular legal definitions of rape (Phelps 2008; 
Phelps & Kazee 2007; Snyman 2007). In 2007, the Constitutional Court of South Africa undertook to extend the 
definition of rape from non-consensual penile-vaginal penetration to include non-consensual penile-anal 
penetration of a woman, citing women’s rights to dignity, equality and security as justification for this extension 
(Snyman 2007: 677). CR Snyman (679) argues that the Court extended this definition by establishing an analogy 
between anal and vaginal sexual penetration and in so doing neglected an important difference between these 
two distinct things. This conflation of difference is seen as establishing a “dangerous precedent” in which the 
equivocation of two unlike things is used to extend the law in an unjustified way (677). This extension creates 
uncertainty about the integrity of the law and its ability to withstand several varying contexts in which it is 
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applied (680). By conflating the difference between non-consensual vaginal and anal penetration, respectively, 
the court effectively creates a new crime (681).  
Snyman (681) predicts (correctly) that the new Bill on Sexual Offences will extend the definition of rape even 
further to include the non-consensual anal penetration of a male. A precedent was indeed set. Whether it was 
dangerous depends on which differences are central to the analysis and which are marginalised. Snyman (683) 
invokes the biological differences between men and women in order to argue that rape is uniquely a violation of 
women’s physiological form: 
Penile penetration of the vagina may result in the woman’s becoming pregnant. This results in the 
woman’s vagina playing a privileged role in her biological makeup (author’s emphasis).  
It is the risk of pregnancy that makes rape particularly more of a violation, more violent that sexual assault, even 
if sexual assault is abhorrent and unacceptable and has shared consequences such as emotional scars and the risk 
of HIV (683). It is easy to imagine a case where the non-consensual penile-vaginal penetration of a woman has 
little or no risk of pregnancy: if contraception is used or if the woman or man is infertile, for example. Snyman 
(684) argues for the recognition and privilege of this difference and the consequent maintenance of the law in its 
traditional form. 
The Constitutional Court did not agree (Phelps 2008: 648-649). The definition of rape was changed to include 
non-consensual anal penetration of women, which did initiate the extension of the law in order to then recognise 
male rape as being of the same order. The decision actively deconstructed the hierarchical relation between 
heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse and other expressions of sexuality that underpinned the previous 
definition. It also undermined the reduction of sexual difference to a biological difference and the consequent 
casting of man as an active perpetrator of crimes and woman as an impotent victim (655). Although this may 
often be the case, to codify this relation in a law both recognises it as an empirical fact that demands redress and 
also entrenches it as a norm (Phelps & Kazee 2007: 344). The definition of rape does not prioritise the interests 
of women without also marginalising the interests of vulnerable boys and men and reifying the meanings of 
sexual difference and sex respectively (345). It is not the difference between vaginal and anal sex or the 
difference between women and men that underpins this new decision. Rather, it is the acknowledgement of the 
internal differences within gender and within forms of sexual intercourse that are concealed by the emphasis on 
accepted gender boundaries. In order to unearth this level of heterogeneity, it is not difference but sameness 
between men and women and between different sexual acts that must be emphasised. A new crime is indeed 
created herewith, and with it new definitions of gender and of sex are also constituted because of the imposition 
of a new legal frame. Neutralising gender difference in order to acknowledge other difference has allowed the 
court to recognise institutional violence against gay and lesbian citizens analogous to the violence the law 
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inflicted on victims of anal rape. Phelps & Kazee (354) argue that to develop the law in this way is as important 
as enforcing the law as it stands.  
The motivation of the law must always be to recognise and redress violence. While the decision to extend the 
scope of rape to include anal rape is strongly motivated, it cannot be denied that in a country like South Africa, 
the particular risk of falling pregnant without access to proper healthcare or abortion facilities adds a concern 
that does not pertain to anal rape. However, it must be decided which difference is more important in a particular 
social, cultural and historical context. This example does not only illustrate the violence of framing and 
bounding as prioritising certain differences over others, it also demonstrates the necessity of having to enforce 
that violence in answer to another empirical violence. It must be acknowledged that a position such as Kant’s or 
indeed Arendt’s allows for moral certainty, which is certainly problematic but not without merit. Neither a 
definition of rape that protects the reproductive integrity of women nor one that protects the dignity, equality and 
security of both genders with respect to all sexual activity can be ultimately grounded or justified given the 
dynamics of complex organisation.165 The fate of the law in this discourse is this fundamental uncertainty.  
b. DERRIDA ON MANDELA: TO CHALLENGE LAWS IN THE NAME OF LAWFULNESS  
It can be argued that a position informed by complexity need not disparage the law because it is critical of it. 
Derrida (1994: xix) argues that the question of law is not reducible to particular laws or rights. He (1987a: 13-
42) writes of his admiration of the law reflected in his admiration of Nelson Mandela. It is not Mandela’s 
admiration of particular laws or even particular systems of law that is admirable, but his admiration and 
invocation of lawfulness above the particular, contingent law that govern society (20, 38). It is jurisprudence, the 
philosophical engagement with law as the institution of right and wrong, that demands our respect. This position 
can be situated within a poststructuralist tradition that theorises violence as the source of harm and the source of 
positive transformation in society (Hanssen 2000: 173). 
Mandela is the first name of a legal conundrum. How to use the law to undermine a law or an entire legal system 
without questioning for a moment the law itself? This is not only Mandela’s problem but the general problem 
confronted within complexity, and by Derrida. How does one undermine a boundary without undermining 
                                                      
165 Spivak (1987: 103) schematises this movement of deconstructive criticism in her discussion of marginality in academic 
and political discourse. To proceed by inverting a hierarchical opposition involves a double movement in which the 
inversion is itself challenged by the logic – the recognition of arche-violence – that enabled its genesis. She (103) argues 
that oppositions are therefore never “merely reversed”. There is always displacement that reminds us of the deep insecurity 
at the foundation of any political or legal or intellectual assertion: 
The peculiarity of deconstructive practice must be reiterated here. Displacing the opposition that it initially apparently 
questions, it is always different from itself, always defers itself. It is neither a constitutive nor, of course, a regulative 
norm (103). 
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boundaries as such? If critical complexity theory is not to be equated with relativism, then this problem must be 
addressed. Derrida (1987a: 20-21) reads Mandela as exposing the fiction upon which the apartheid legal system 
was founded in order to achieve an initial destabilisation of the authority of the particular laws under which he 
was convicted as a political prisoner. In his speech at the Rivonia Trial, Mandela demands reform in the name of 
“we the people” (21). He demands it in the name of all people in South Africa under the law. He juxtaposes the 
definition of South African ‘people’ protected under the law with the ‘people’ that must be excluded in order that 
the former group is maintained as the people. He destabilises the legal recognition of people and so demands that 
the law correct itself by correcting its recognition and by reframing the population. The authority of law as such 
– as an abstract hypothetical judgement of what is permissible in society – is never questioned. It is not the frame 
but its form, its position and its content that had to be transformed.166 
The abstract principle of law, a law without content, might be thought an impotent thing. However, on Derrida’s 
(23) analysis of Mandela’s struggle, this abstract principle made concrete in the particular demands laid out in 
the Freedom Charter enforces the law. Law as such, made visible in the challenge of particular laws, is forceful. 
However, the appearance of the law in general is only enabled by the transgression of a law (33, 39). This 
transgression is itself violent even if it is necessitated. In this case, the process of democracy had to be 
interrupted with violence in order to instate a more democratic state (Derrida 2005b: 34-35). Arendt (1970: 30) 
would acknowledge the perceived need for this violent interruption and also accept that the apartheid laws were 
unjust. Violence would still be a means to political power. This admission would not call the democratic legal 
system that replaced apartheid inherently unjust and certainly not violent. Transgression, the initial violence, is 
without content and without the rule. Therefore as a political-legal response, it is a non-response. What is 
required in the end is a new rule to replace the old (Derrida 2005b: 40). Transgression, which necessarily 
opposes the law to itself, is argued by Derrida (1987a: 38) to be the cornerstone of “exemplary” political 
activism. However, neither transgression nor legality is nonviolent. As with the particular case of the legal 
definition of rape, so it is with the more general case of the definition of the system of law in South Africa.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The boundary is never obliterated. It is only ever reconstructed or replaced. However, particular frames such as 
the racist ideology that legitimated a racist state and legal system in South Africa or even the less overtly 
                                                      
166 Derrida (1987a: 26) argues:  
In all sense of this term, Mandela remains, then, a man of the law. He has always appealed to the law even if, in 
appearance, he has to oppose himself to such-and-such specific legality, and even if judges have made of him, an 
outlaw. 
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problematic one that purports to redress gender inequality by the creation of a separate legal definition for sexual 
crimes particular to the female anatomy are always vulnerable to deconstruction: 
...the limit of the frame or the border of the context always entails a clause of nonclosure. The outside 
penetrates and thus determines the inside. This is what I have analysed so often, and so long, under the 
words ‘supplement’, ‘parergon’, and each time that I have said of the trait of writing or of 
inscription...(Derrida 1988b: 152-153).167 
As long as specific frames are seen as legitimate, they will tend to erase this non-closure (Derrida & Roudinesco 
2004: 28). Critical complexity theory need not insist on the dissolution of every boundary. We need the 
constitutive violence of the discourse on human rights in order to understand empirical violence as violence 
(Praeg 2008: 215). If things cannot be named, contextualised and understood, there can be no intervention. 
Deconstruction presupposes a structure with which to engage. To place something outside the system of meaning 
as it were, to spare it the violence of equivocation, internal division and the counter-violence of the boundary, is 
not necessarily good (Gasché 1994: 16). What is advocated is not silence. Violence is an inescapable aspect of 
human interaction insofar as that interaction is meaningful. The boundary constrains and enables complex 
organisation. The second level of violence is instated by deciding the boundary so that complex organisation can 
be understood. However, the arche-violence can always be used to challenge this understanding.168 To mobilise 
the arche-violence or différance against the closure of boundaries and the accepted order of things is, for Derrida 
(2005b: 39), political action.  
It is clear that this position implies that intervening in the second level of violence always eventually involves 
the institution of a different violent frame. The consequences for ethics will be explored in chapter 5. However, 
some initial remarks can be made at this point. If ethics involves meaning, then ethics will be violent no matter 
how sensitive any particular position is to the singularity of the event to which it responds. If the frame is 
considered to be violent, then that analysis can be turned on the position from which it is espoused. What 
violence, for example, does a theory which sees violence everywhere do to the world? It can be argued, as it was 
in relation to arche-violence, that a theory that allows no reprieve from violence and no place in the system that 
                                                      
167 Derrida (2005b: 151) also discusses this non-closure in the context of the relation between human beings and animals: 
...None of the conventionally accepted limits between the so-called human living being and the so-called animal one, 
none of the oppositions, none of the supposedly linear and indivisible boundaries, resist a rational deconstruction – 
whether we are talking about language, culture, social symbolic networks, technicity or work, even the relationship to 
death and to mourning, and even the prohibition against the avoidance of incest – so many ‘capacities’ of which the 
‘animal’ (a general singular noun!) is so dogmatically to be bereft, impoverished” (151). 
168“…we have to draw on the understanding that the force of a bellicose identity can be challenged by the power of 
competing identities. These can, of course, include the broad commonality of our shared humanity, but also many other 
identities that everyone simultaneously has” (Sen 2006: 4, author’s emphasis).  
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escapes it is complicit in the constitution of a world that is more violent than it needs to be. Without making a 
metaphysical commitment to a nonviolent ontological reality, it must at least be acknowledged that the 
possibility exists that this position sees more violence than there is. This point cannot ever finally be dismissed. 
However, another can be posited to counter it.  
One must ask what is sacrificed in order to reach a point that can be considered nonviolent or peaceful. One must 
ask who legitimates this condition. What is taken into account in deciding whether there is violence or not. The 
mistake has been made often enough to demonstrate that finitude of understanding does result in concrete 
empirical suffering when that understanding in enforced upon the world. As with the wretched criminal with 
whom this chapter opened, the violence of limited and transitory frames through which the world is legitimately 
understood at different times and places is written on the bodies of those who suffer the consequences of this 
bounded understanding. This generalisation of violence is done in the name of those whose violence goes unseen 
because of the boundaries instituted in the system. This is why deconstruction demands attention to the margins 
in order to understand the way in which what is considered the demarcation of an interior and exterior space 
determines how something is understood (Critchley 1992 87; Culler 1983: 215-216). Deconstruction, or a 
deconstructive attitude, involves the cultivation of sensitivity towards the centre as a source of repression 
(Spivak 1987: 104). Perhaps this can be extended to all non-foundational or post-metaphysical positions insofar 
as these positions make room for an analysis of violence.  
The redress of violence in the case of the extension of the institution of marriage to same-sex couples was briefly 
mentioned under the discussion of legal definitions above. While this extension was argued to recognise violence 
in a manner analogous to the redefinition of rape, there is a significant difference. In both cases, marginal 
phenomena displaced the central meanings that underpinned the respective laws as they stood. It appears that to 
have rape not go unseen is an obviously better state of affairs. Without discrediting individuals’ desires to wed, it 
is not immediately clear that extending the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples is better than, for 
example, to problematise the definition of marriage as such with recourse to its exclusion or marginalisation of 
same-sex couples. It must at least be acknowledged that from this perspective, although lawfulness is not 
dismissed, the price – being made to suffer the violence a second time of the boundary in the name of social 
freedom – of inclusion in the centre for those once at the margin may be too high.169 The employment of a new 
frame always produces a new centre on which it is hinged and a new margin (Spivak 1987: 107).  
                                                      
169 Spivak’s deconstructive feminist position (1987: 107) is sensitive to this price: 
The putative centre welcomes selective inhabitants of the margin in order better to exclude the margin. And it is the 
centre that offers the official explanation; or, the center is defined and reproduced by the explanation that it can 
express. 
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It is clear that the law can be understood as violent in itself if a certain theoretical perspective is adopted. That is 
to say, the law is violent because it reduces difference in space and time. This is the sense in which Morin (2007: 
3) describes knowledge as “mutilating”. However, the mutilation of the second level of complex organisation is 
not merely epistemological. In a system of racial classification, for example, where categories employed never 
give rise to overt and empirical violence such as rape, the categories themselves can be experienced as harmful. 
When Derrida (1998: 9) argues that the Creole is most sensitive to the stakes of violence, he suggests that 
violence need not take the form of rape and murder to be material or to be felt. This insight speaks to the matter 
at hand. The violence of the boundary always has the potential to produce empirical violence. Empirical 
violence, though related to the boundary, is distinct from its general operation. It is to this final level of violence 
that attention is now turned. Empirical violence, non-violence and ethics are the related subjects of chapter 5. 
Each of these three concerns is coupled to the conception of exteriority. It therefore the system’s outside to 
which the argument must be directed.  
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CHAPTER 5 
OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM: EMPIRICAL VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter moves on to the crux of the problem of violence or to violence as a problem in the complex system. 
It is empirical violence, violence that harms, violence that produces suffering, to which this entire project has 
been progressing. The problem of this empirical violence and the possibility of its eradication – nonviolence – 
can finally be addressed head on. At this point in the argument, it is clear that intervention in the violence of 
closure in the complex system requires the use of violence against itself (Spivak 1997: lxxvii). The continuous 
autopoiesis of the system produces and is produced by the first and second levels of violence. In opposing this 
system of meaning, one cannot transcend its violent operations. This follows from the exposition of the boundary 
in the previous chapter. That being said, an entirely totalising description of the violence in the complex system 
would depend upon a description of the system that subsumes every singularity, action, word and sign produced 
in it without reserve.  
This is not the case. The problem of what becomes of exteriority in a philosophical paradigm that permits no 
unmediated access – access that transcends arche-violence and the boundary – to anything outside meaning itself 
must be addressed. The outside of the system is significant both as unmarked space inside the system and as pure 
unmediated reality which cannot be rendered fully present within the system. It should be reemphasised that the 
absence of full presence is not full absence. Morin (2007: 100) argues that critical complexity theory is not 
absolutely alienated from the material by its insistence upon the mediation of meaning. However, its 
understanding of the material “has enriched itself in its dereification” (100). In other words, dynamic and 
complex reality is not entirely revealed in our models, but our models are still oriented by reality. The real, 
singular or material exceed but do not escape the system. 
A discussion of empirical violence is compelled to go beyond a concern with the ways in which violence is 
implicated in understanding, to consider whether a theory of critical complexity allows for an understanding of 
violence as an empirical event outside the structures of understanding. This discussion attempts to articulate real 
and concrete violence. The concrete, empirical suffering of victims of empirical violence motivates this attempt. 
The task of this chapter is to sketch a conceptual framework for a discussion of violence that is sensitive to the 
ambiguities and limitations of such a general undertaking and endeavours to breach the closure of a linguistic – 
in the broad sense that has been attributed to writing as making meaning – analysis. Examples of empirical 
violence can be offered in order to contextualise this chapter’s subject matter: war; rape; murder; assault; and 
torture. The previous chapter suggested that the material effects or experienced consequences of the second level 
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of violence supplement this list of physical violations. The turn to empirical violence completes the navigation of 
this project from the inside, to the boundary, to the outside of the complex system, which are all interrelated but 
distinct sites of violence. The third site is the most critical. 
 A discussion of exteriority does not only pertain to empirical violence. Nonviolence could not be addressed 
within a discussion of either the internal dynamics of the system or in relation to the boundary. Empirical 
violence and nonviolence appear to be diametrically opposed. However, their mutual relation to the outside 
brings empirical violence and nonviolence into the same ‘level’ of analysis. This chapter therefore develops a 
general understanding of exteriority and examines empirical violence and nonviolence, respectively, in light of 
this understanding. Singularity, alterity and spacing are iterations of exteriority within complexity thinking that 
are relevant to this discussion. Each remains irreducibly distinct. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,170 
another philosopher to whom deconstruction can be traced, is used to situate this discussion of the outside within 
a broader discourse on ethics and exteriority (Derrida 2001: 97-192). The mutual exteriority of empirical 
violence and nonviolence is not presented in order to suggest an identity between these distinct concepts.  
This chapter navigates problematic terrain. As with all descriptions, the violence of the boundary is implicated in 
this exposition of empirical violence. Empirical violence exceeds the opening and closure of meaning the same 
way that all singularity or any possible pure and unmediated reality exceeds the system. The attempt to articulate 
singularity by means of the imposition of a frame will always be imperfect. It is itself a violent act. Having 
explicated the distorting effects of the frame, it is apparent that that claim that one’s description is valid or 
important cannot be absolute. The implication of violence within meaning and language is a source of great 
difficulty in this context. 
It is clear that deconstruction is preoccupied with violence, but it is not entirely clear that it can theorise the 
second level of violence that rejoins language and violence, and claim at the same time to be able to talk about 
empirical violence in the way that one might hope to speak about violence. That is, to identify empirical violence 
beyond linguistic structures, to be certain of one’s identification with reference to the extra-linguistic object of 
observation, and to give it a full description and to successfully intervene and halt its proliferation. When Arendt 
(1963: 9) argues for the opposition of language and violence, she only contradicts the position within 
                                                      
170 Levinas’ (1986) writing on alterity was used in the exposition of the outside of the complex system in chapter 2. The 
purpose of this inclusion was to contextualise deconstruction as a philosophy that is concerned with irreducible difference, 
in contrast to a history of philosophy in which difference always defers to the same. Both Levinas (1986) and Derrida 
(1982: xx) attempt to cast aside the philosophical will to mastery that is expressed as hierarchy and envelopment within 
philosophical thought. Levinas’ concept of the other was also presented as a foil to deconstruction, in order to characterise 
the nuance of deconstruction that posits a relationship of dynamic asymmetry between the same and the other (Cornell 
1992: 69). Reference to Levinas’ (1989: 43) writing on alterity and the future as a pure unmarked event illustrated, again, 
the debt owed by deconstruction in terms of its discourse on difference. This relationship between alterity and the future 
relates to the discussion of nonviolence further on in this chapter. The primary text engaged in this chapter is Totality and 
Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority (1979). 
165 
 
deconstruction on one level. The opposition of language and violence within liberalism allows for language to be 
used to makes sense of and to mediate empirical violence. By reincorporating violence within speech, 
deconstruction, conversely, alienates speech from empirical violence. The result is that one’s ability to intervene 
where empirical violence proliferates is drastically compromised.  
The alienation of language from empirical violence is discussed in this chapter, with reference to insights from 
Nietzsche and Levinas, respectively, which are incorporated in the body of deconstruction. It is suggested that a 
philosophical position that insists on a gap between what is and knowledge of what is risks reducing the 
discussion of violence to a merely aesthetic matter. What would be at stake in a discussion on violence would, as 
a consequence of this reduction, no longer be violence, but only its representation in the system of meaning. A 
discussion of the risk of ‘aesthetification’ must turn its attention to the opposition of art and truth that underpins 
the characterisation of this risk of aesthetification as a danger. This opposition is challenged and by the 
deconstruction of the opposition of aesthetic concerns and matters of knowledge and morality that Derrida 
performs in Parergon (1979b) Before the Law (1992: 181-220) and The Law of Genre (1992: 221-252). The 
exposition of the dangers of aesthetification, together with the general exposition of exteriority, are used to 
enable a close reading of Derrida’s (1985b) attempt to articulate the empirical violence of apartheid in Racism’s 
Last Word. 
The notion of exteriority as spacing has been used throughout the discussions of critical complexity theory, 
deconstruction and their intersection in chapters 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Derrida (1997: 68) defines spacing as 
both the time in which space is opened and the space in which time is opened. Spacing enables signification but 
it does not itself signify anything more than an indeterminate absence of saturated meaning. Singularity is that 
which exceeds our attempts to give it a complete description within a general system of meaning. Phrased 
differently, it is that which remains unique despite the dissolution of self-identity engendered by its iterability. 
The concept of singularity situated outside sense motivates an exploration of non-sense, of spacing. Spacing is 
unmarked (Derrida 1981b: 43). It prevents the enclosure of the singular in the system. It also prevents the closure 
of the system to singular phenomena. Accordingly, the problem of singularity cannot be resolved by the system 
reverting to a self-referential and relativistic description thereof. The effect of the system’s dynamic organisation 
of space and structure is that spacing is always the space in which the singular may appear and become 
meaningful. Spacing is the possibility that the singular might be included in the system. It is also possibility of 
the appearance of nonviolence in the system.  
Nonviolence is excluded from the system by the marking of arche-violence and the boundary. Spacing, however, 
undermines the boundary and its violence. The characterisation of nonviolence in this chapter is developed in 
conversation with the concept of justice. This is motivated by the analogous relationship between nonviolence 
and space, and justice and space. The exposition of nonviolence steers the discussion toward the ethics of 
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complexity thinking. This project has gestured towards this notion at several points. A fuller description is 
offered in light of the preceding descriptions of violence in the system and of empirical violence and 
nonviolence outside it. Before this can be attempted the third level of violence must be elucidated. 
II. THE THIRD LEVEL OF VIOLENCE: THE COMPLEX STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL 
VIOLENCE 
Derrida’s (1997: 112) analysis of violence in the system distributed over three levels is extended in this chapter. 
The strategic use of the separation of violence into levels has led to the description of the third level of violence 
as empirical violence. It is violence in its “colloquial sense” (112). Empirical violence, however, undermines the 
clarity of the distinction between the three levels of violence because its complex structure always involves all 
three levels. The ordering of Derrida’s analysis of violence appears to prioritise the arch-violence and the 
violence of the boundary over empirical violence. This apparent privilege begs an explanation.  
It was suggested in chapter 3 that Nietzsche, Derrida, and by extension also the critical complexity theorists, fall 
prey to the inevitable naturalisation and even valorisation of violence because of the respective iterations of 
arche-violence as a violent aetiological explanations of the system of meaning. Nietzsche (see for example 2006: 
488) cannot finally slip this accusation. Particular affirmations of the vitality of a warlike attitude and empirical 
war appear throughout his texts (van Tongeren 2000: 163). Where this literal affirmation is not the case, 
Nietzsche’s works are a performance of his doctrine of the will to power (Spivak 1997: xliv; van Tongeren, 
2000; 16). His polemical style, his philosophical hammer and his warring words instantiate force (van Tongeren 
2000: 16, 99). The war of wills is the alternative to law and conformity. Nietzsche’s (2006: 488) valorisation of 
actual empirical violence, however, is not universally applicable to his corpus of writings. His philosophy does 
not give us any indication that it should be. He (413) also argues against the empirical violence at the foundation 
of any order of things. Indeed, when he (413) laments the cruelty of the categorical imperative, he does not only 
lament the suppression of individual difference. It is the empirical force, the instruments of torture and terror that 
are used in the service of the imperative, the instruments that are responsible for its imperativeness, which he 
criticises too. Nietzsche thus criticises the use of violence as an instrument of legitimisation, and also celebrates 
violence and struggle as a means of achieving a new, dynamic and vital way of being.  
Derrida’s (1997: 112) analysis certainly overlaps with this theory in many ways. It also differs significantly. 
Instead of violence producing order, it is the order of things that is the origin of empirical violence.171 It should 
                                                      
171 Referring back to Levi-Strauss’s refusal to attribute violence to the Nambikwara, a people ostensibly without a written 
order of things, Derrida (1997: 111) writes:  
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be noted that although the first and second levels of violence are more original than the first, they are still 
“inferior” to it (112). Derrida (112) privileges the meaning of violence as an empirical event. His positioning of 
empirical violence as a tertiary event is an act of resistance against positions that posit empirical violence as 
original, natural and inevitable (Grosz 1999: 12). If empirical violence is to be thought at this tertiary level, then 
it can no longer be thought of as natural, for its origin – arche-violence – is artifice itself (112, 149). Its tertiary 
character also prevents an understanding of violence as purely random outbursts of force. That is not to say that 
particular manifestations of empirical violence are the determinate outcomes of particular epistemological 
configurations. However, particular events are largely enabled and constrained by these frames. As Sen (2006: 9) 
argues, empirical violence cannot be thought of outside of its relation with ideas, norms, laws and identities. 
The third level of violence in the system is complex because it is it several things at once (Derrida 1997: 112). It 
is material and singular, it is meaningful because it produces generally understandable meaning and it is an 
interruption of that meaning and meaning in general.172 Empirical violence interrupts the closure of the second 
level violence by revealing “the first nomination”, the arche-violence (112). The instance of the second level of 
violence in the directive ‘do not murder’, depends upon its general applicability in order to function as a law. 
The empirical event of a murder is a first challenge to the authority of the law. This authority can be reinstated 
with violence through the apparatus of the legal system, perhaps also with the “cruelty” that Nietzsche (2006: 
413) identifies as its means of enforcement. However, it is not the fact of transgression that really interrupts the 
law. The transgression of a law still affirms the law as long as that law is still an adequate frame for its 
understanding. It is the occurrence of an event whose ambiguity disrupts the certainty of its definition of murder, 
such as murder to protect oneself, murder by the state or murder during a war, which draws attention to the 
validity of the category murder and its legal status. In the case of the forgoing examples, it is clear that their 
ambiguity is resolved to an extent with the creation of subcategories: self-defence; capital punishment; and 
casualty of war. Nonetheless, as long as a manifestation of empirical violence remains a unique occurrence, it 
possesses the potential to rupture the closure of meaning. 
Another example of the interruption of the self-maintenance of the system is violent political revolution. Without 
ever justifying violence in any form, Arendt (1970: 20-21) does acknowledge that under conditions of extreme 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Anterior to the possibility of violence in the current and derivative sense, the sense used in "A Writing Lesson," there 
is, as the space of its possibility, the violence of the arche-writing, the violence of difference, of classification, and of 
the system of appellations. 
Empirical violence is derivative. 
172 Grosz (1999: 11) explains that empirical violence always gestures back towards the law that is implicated in its origin. It 
disrupts this law by exposing the arbitrary distortion on which it is founded as well as its material violence. 
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deprivation of freedom, violent revolutions may be an inevitable recourse of the powerless. Indeed, the 
significance of these events as a source of change is not to be underestimated (20). However, Arendt (21) 
maintains that violence never achieves a positive change, nor does it establish a more just political order. The 
imminent discussion of nonviolence in the system reaches the same conclusion. Violence is never just (Derrida 
2002: 235). It should be added that empirical violence, insofar as it becomes meaningful, does reinforce or 
establish order. Rape, for example, although the horror of experiencing or perpetrating this act may astound 
speech, still manages to confer a relationship of hierarchy and identity on the rapist and the victim. It still 
generates meaning because it offers itself to interpretation, whether the full presence of violence is 
communicable or not. It is not claimed that this is a just order, but simply that it is an order. Empirical violence 
offers itself to understanding by means of both the first and second levels of violence. However, provisionality 
and partiality are the conditions of this understanding. The impossibility of presence of meaning returns this 
discussion to the outside.  
III. BEYOND THE LIMIT: TWO ITERATIONS OF EXTERIORITY 
a. SINGULARITY OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM 
There are two definitions of exteriority that are employed in the model of the complex system developed in this 
work. The first is the environment or context outside the system’s boundary. The notion of the boundary 
necessarily invokes the idea that there is something inside and outside. Every boundary has two sides. What is 
excluded by a boundary need not be unintelligible. In order to understand a word in a particular language, one 
must determine the boundaries of this language and in so doing one also determines things that do not belong 
inside that language. However, one does not assume that what is outside English, for example, is without 
meaning determined within a different system of relations. It is only without a determined meaning within that 
narrowly defined system. The boundary is juxtaposed to a limit of which only one side, only the inside, is 
visible. Meaning has boundaries and limits (Culler 1983: 123; Derrida 1993: 47, 67). The second sense of 
exteriority is the outside that lies beyond the limit of possible meaning. Both these understandings of exteriority 
are important within deconstruction and critical complexity theory.173 However, it is the latter and more radical 
exteriority to which attention is turned. To this end, attention also returns, as Derrida (2001: 78-96) does, to the 
thought of Emmanuel Levinas. 
                                                      
173 Spivak argues that (1997: lxxvii) deconstruction is precisely that which offers a way out of the closure of knowledge and 
sense. The idea of the outside is a way of introducing the possibility of radical change and transformation in the system and 
can therefore be understood as liberating. It is also a rejection of the security of anchoring our knowledge and morals in a 
fixed system that excludes nothing. 
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It is in relation to the distinction between limits and boundaries that Levinas’ ‘Other’174 (1986; 1989: 42-44) has 
been contrasted with Derrida’s ‘others’175 in order to make the argument that absolute difference resists meaning 
and tends towards a metaphysical understanding of difference (Cornell 1992: 69).176 The other is not completely 
excluded from the system by a limit. Absolute absence of the other, like absolute presence of the other, is not 
possible in the play of meaning generated by the movement of différance (Derrida 1982: 19). There is always an 
excess of difference that overflows the closure of a boundary. Derrida (in Caputo 1997: 14, 18) insists in the 
Villa Nova Roundtable that there is an excess of difference that exceeds the economy of différance. This is the 
singularity, the unique thing in itself that the arche-violence cannot subsume in the system. Excess does not 
shield the other from the system’s relations of dynamic asymmetry (Derrida 1992b: 68, 228; 2001: 157). 
However, the possibility of signification, in producing this excess, destroys the possibility of experiencing “the 
purity of ‘reality,’ ‘unicity,’ ‘singularity’” (Derrida 1997: 91). 
Levinas’ (1979; 1986; 1989) philosophy of alterity is relevant to the conceptualisation of the outside of the 
system that exceeds the arche-violence and the boundary. The Other – other than the self and the system – does 
not stand in a relationship of dynamic asymmetry with the self or same or system. Alterity, in this case, is that 
which escapes the tendency of the system to interiorise the outside in order to make it understandable. This 
tendency is thwarted by the dissimilarity of the outside with categorisation inside the system. The dissimilarity 
between the inside which generates understanding and the outside that presents itself to be understood without 
submitting itself to acceptable categories of understanding creates an irrepressible space between all descriptions 
of the Other and the Other itself. Without embarking on a full exposition of the Other in Totality and Infinity: an 
Essay on Exteriority (Levinas 1979), it is necessary to look to the text for its notion of exteriority that sheds light 
on the discussion of empirical violence.  
Levinas’ (1979: 21) preface to Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority begins with a description of the 
impact of war on the relation between the self and the Other. War reduces morality to a set of instrumental 
imperatives (21). It systematises everything and in so doing, transforms complex beings into objects to be 
manipulated towards an end that is independent of the objects themselves. War cannot, therefore, function with 
the idea of exteriority that resists complete incorporation within the system. In this sense, because nothing but 
objects determined inside the system are tolerated, war is understood to be totality itself. War cannot allow the 
                                                      
174 When it is referred to the Other in relation with Levinas’ (1979) text, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, this 
Other will be capitalised in line with the convention of the text that indicates the asymmetry of the relation of the other 
outside and above the self. However, because the absolute asymmetry of the other is not maintainable within complex 
organisation, this convention is not continued where it is not referred to this text.  
175 “...each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and deferred in the economy of the 
same...” (Derrida 1982: 17) 
176See chapter 2. 
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Other to appear as a singular and complex being (21). The Other becomes meaningful within the network of 
differentiations within the system in a process that involves only the internal logic of the system. In its 
thoroughly self-referential organisation, the possibility of the appearance of an unmarked, unmediated Other – an 
Other distinguished only by its fundamental difference from the system itself – is closed.177 There can be no 
consideration of singularity that would challenge the general framework that is applied to it in order to render it 
intelligible as an object (22). War is thus a hyperbolic manifestation of a system of meaning that maintains itself 
by marginalising and excluding differences that threaten its rigid order. War is not unique in this way. This self-
maintenance is related to the general operation of the second level of violence that operates by homogenisation, 
marginalisation and exclusion.  
In opposition with the objectifying movement of war, Levinas (25) proposes eschatology as a relationship with 
the Other that breaches the totalising organisation of the system. Eschatology is a relationship with the Other that 
extends beyond the present toward an open future. Although it also concerns the future, eschatology must be 
distinguished from teleology because it does not concern the conceptualisation and pursuit of a predetermined 
end. An eschatological engagement is distinct from all epistemological strategies that categorise and stratify 
objects. Eschatology is an attempt to resuscitate the excess of difference that respects the alterity of the Other 
(22-23). Derrida (1994: 14, 15) affirms this attempt when he argues that despite the movement of the system that 
tends towards totalisation, the system cannot totally consume all alterity and singularity within the system.  
Levinas (1979: 42) positions the ethical encounter between self and other as prior to ontology. In this context, 
ontology is understood to render Being and beings present and exposed in a consummate description within the 
system of meaning (Heidegger 1962: 21, 23; Derrida, 1982: 47; 1981a: 352). To ‘ontologise’ the Other, reality 
or singularity would be to render it present within a fixed order of meaning (Derrida 1981a: 4). Contrastingly, 
Levinas (1979:28) seeks to restore the eventfulness of being. This gesture is repeated in Morin’s (1992: 14) shift 
from thinking of beings as objects to thinking of being as complex systems. It is an attempt to rethink the object 
as a dynamic unity with an excess of meaning rather than an impoverished form in need of fulfilment by a 
thinking subject (Levinas, 1979: 26). 
The alterity of the Other must not be thought of in relation with a visual boundary. Even more forcefully, 
Derrida (2001: 141) argues that to use these terms ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ to speak about the Other is merely an 
extension of the system, the self or the same. Alterity as singularity is different to the differences – distinctions 
such as inside/outside – that mark the system. The Other is thus not merely the simple negation of the inside 
(Levinas 1979: 41). To recognise the appearance of the Other within the same is to run up against the limits of 
                                                      
177 The Other in its singularity depends on a general system of meaning in order to be meaningful. However, if this system is 
closed to the alterity of the other, then the meaning attributed to the other within the system can only be derived from the 
system itself. If the other were to remain unmarked, it would also be invisible (Levinas 1979: 22). 
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sense and meaning as generated in the system (Derrida 2001: 141). According to Levinas (1979: 23), a relation 
with the Other is a relation to infinity. As a relation to infinity, it is an interruption of the closure of the system as 
a totality. In order for the outside to interrupt the closure of the system, it must still engage meaning in some 
sense and it does so by means of the trace. The face of the Other is the trace of the Other appearing within the 
same (Levinas 1986: 351). The face interrupts the closure of the logic of law and war (Levinas 1979: 26). 
However, this trace of the Other is not co-opted into the system of meaning.178 It challenges all knowledge and 
common sense (194). As Derrida (2001: 125) explains, “For reasons now familiar to us, the face-to-face eludes 
every category...The unity if the face precedes, in its signification, the dispersion of senses and organs of 
sensibility”.  
There is no experience of singularity that is immediate (Derrida 1997: 211). The first two levels of violence are 
implicated in this mediation. While the first level of violence opens a space between meaning and being, the 
second proposes to erase this space. It allows being to appear as if it can be fully disclosed. Both space and the 
boundary are required to deliver being to the level of representation (Grosz 1999: 10). Rephrased in terms of 
complexity, the representation of a particular aspect of reality always exceeds any single attempt to grasp it with 
a sign or a concept or even a lengthy dissertation. However, reality does not exceed the system as a whole. The 
transcendence of a trace is not pure. The trace of a particular instance of singularity becomes meaningful in its 
differences from all other traces. Meaning is a property of the system as a whole. The trace inhabits the system 
and is marked by its violence; however, the violence of the system is also challenged by the trace of the other 
that resists both the absence indicated by the arche-violence and the appearance of full presence fabricated by the 
boundary (Levinas 1979: 24).179 
The relation of a general system of meaning to the Other as a manifestation of singularity is structured by the 
space between meaning and being (38). This distance is not absolute. Levinas (60) argues that the same and the 
Other can “rejoin” one another within the pursuit of truth. The idea of truth as it is used here is only relevant in a 
system in which being is not present without any form of mediation (60). The separation meaning and being 
requires a description of the condition in which the two are reconciled. Without this separation there would be 
nothing but being. The disjuncture between meaning and being produces the possibility of the distinction 
between truth and untruth or “ignorance, illusion and error” (60). There is no possible way of erasing the risk of 
                                                      
178 “A trace is never present, fully present, by definition; it inscribes in itself the reference to the spectre of something else. 
The remainder is not present either, any more than a trace as such” (Derrida 2005a: 151). 
179 In Levinas’ (1989: 45) own words: 
The relationship with the Other, the face-to-face with the Other, the encounter with a face that at once gives and 
conceals the Other, is the situation in which an event happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is utterly 
unable in its regard, but where none the less in a certain way it is in front of the subject. The other 'assumed' is the 
Other. 
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error. The process of knowing cannot be one of unity because it is conditioned by this risk. A disjunction 
between what is and what is known persists because there is no foundation for its restoration (61).180 
The trace of singularity calls us to respond without the comfort of laws, norms or even categories that could 
certify or justify that response (Derrida 1993b: 364). Derrida (361-364) elaborates on this idea in his discussion 
of the Politics of Friendship. In order to love the other, the otherness of the other cannot be consumed within my 
understanding (361). From the perspective of the self, it is the call to respond that creates an asymmetry between 
the self and the other in which the other stands above and beyond the self (365, 377). This asymmetry is 
experienced in its inverted form from the perspective of the other, who is also a self in relation to me (Derrida 
2001: 157). Asymmetry, as it was argued in chapter 3, does not constitute hierarchy or inequality by itself 
(Derrida 1993b: 366). This is because hierarchy requires stability. The other, the singular, or indeed the friend is 
not a fixed entity but develops over time. Responding to what is not present, or to one whose presence is the 
presence of the absence of full meaning, opens the self or same to a relationship with the future (368, 369). 
This response must be premised on some form of recognition. The face as a trace must be recognisable in order 
to be meaningful at all. If the face does not signify as a sign does within a system of meaning and within a 
context, it is unclear how it comes to mean anything at all (Derrida 2001: 126).181 In Of Grammatology, Derrida 
(1997: 62) equates the trace with différance. From this, it can be inferred that it is not fully present within the 
system. However, in the context of this discussion of singularity, it could be argued instead that neither the trace 
nor différance is radically other if radical otherness is taken to exceed meaning entirely. The Other whose 
transcendence is marked with a capital O must thus be renamed ‘other’. The trace of other without a capital O 
sacrifices its exteriority by allowing a trace of singularity, whose singularity is only protected by its deferred 
completion and not by its absolute closure in relation to the same, to enter the system (Derrida 1992: 68). The 
                                                      
180 The dream of stabilising truth, first by separating knowing and being and then permanently reconciling the two, is the 
impetus of a metaphysics: 
All dualisms, all theories of the immortality of the soul or of the spirit, as well as all monisms, spiritualist or 
materialist, dialectical or vulgar, are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was compelled to strive 
toward the reduction of the trace. The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the logos, the 
humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the gestures required by an onto-theology 
determining the archaeological and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life without 
différance: another name for death, historical metonymy where God's name holds death in check (Derrida 1997: 71). 
181 There is a difference between the appearance of the other in the face to face encounter and the revelation of knowledge 
through language and theory. The other appears but is not known: 
In the face, the other is given over in person as other, that is, as that which does not reveal itself, as that which cannot 
be made thematic. I could not possibly speak of the Other, make of the other a theme, pronounce the Other as object, 
in the accusative (Derrida 2001: 125). 
The revelation of the other is the revelation of an overabundance of difference and presence of the absence of categorised 
meaning (128, 129).  
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trace thus feeds into the sign but it is not identical to it. Another way of conceptualising the trace is to say what it 
is not; and what it is not is an anchor for a one to one reference between a sign and its reference.  
Despite the resistance of the other as singularity to a general system of meaning, language remains the condition 
for interaction with the other (Levinas 1979: 39).182 It is an inter-subjective medium. Yet, language and concepts 
bring the singular in tension with general categories, which are generated within language itself (Levinas 1979: 
73; Morin 2007: 103). Signatures, for example – the most singular of marks attributed to the subject who is the 
most singular of objects – simultaneously preserve a trace of originality and suffer the erosion of singularity in 
order to enable appearance (Derrida 1988b: 20). The signature as an event must appear on the condition of the 
loss of its “rigorous purity” (20). However, because a sign cannot retain a singularity that is non-relational and 
unmarked by violence, signs cannot ever capture more than a trace of singularity (Derrida 1992: 62; 1997: 91; 
Gasché 1994: 16). This impossibility of the pure presence of singularity is the only possibility of its appearance. 
The other or the singular always appears by way of the law, of convention, categories and language (Derrida 
1993b: 384). The violence of the frame or boundary enables this appearance while constraining how it may 
appear (Cilliers 2005b: 611).  
The possibility of a language without violence or with less violence can be hypothesised. Derrida (2001: 184) 
proposes that a language that could incorporate the other without violence would be a language without a 
predicate. The verb ‘to be’ reduces the other to the present. To understand the singular as dynamic and changing 
means that nothing is ever merely what it is. Its identity is extended to what it will and could become in the 
future (Morin 2007: 100). Morin (1992: 81) suggests that the distance between the subject and what it 
understands that is opened by the recognition of complexity already reduces the violence or mutilation of 
understanding. The refusal to allow the distance between the knower and what is known requires that the world 
is emptied of all singularity so that our general frames of understanding may go unperturbed by what they 
suppress and exclude (81). A world of objects that conforms to epistemological categories can never surprise. It 
cannot allow events and it is always determined. This insight from complexity is clearly opposed to Dillon’s 
(2000: 10) estimation of complexity theory that was discussed in chapter 3 that evaluates it as theory that 
engages alterity in order to facilitate its mastery. 
                                                      
182 To reduce the Other to meaning in the sense of categorising the Other and placing the Other within a network of 
categories, is the violence of philosophical discourse and all theoretical discourses that make an object of the Other (Derrida 
2001: 145). The form of this argument is very close to Derrida’s (1979b) analysis of the violence of the frame. Derrida 
(2001: 184) outlines the requirements of a nonviolent language in line with Levinas’ exposition: 
...nonviolent language would be a language which would do without the verb to be, that is, without predication. 
Predication is that first violence. Since the verb to be and the predicative act are implied in every other verb, and in 
every common noun, nonviolent language, in the last analysis, would be a language of pure invocation, pure 
adoration, proffering only proper nouns in order to call to the other from afar.  
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The alterity of the other that exceeds meaning is unstructured and therefore also “undeconstructible” (Caputo 
1997: 128). What the other means within the system of meaning can and does deconstruct. However, the 
singularity of the other as such does not. Thus singularity itself or the singularity of a subject or a system or a 
being is always outside economy. The singular in this sense is not a stagnant point somewhere outside language; 
tts appearance is an event (Derrida 1992: 68). It should be stressed that an event is not an arrival (Derrida 2002b: 
96). The event of singularity is not the inclusion of singularity within the system. We cannot reach and 
rehabilitate the event in any programmed way in order to correct the violence of the system. Once an event 
arrives within the system, it ceases to be an event. Derrida (96) provides an apt illustration: 
It may rain this evening, or it may not, but this will not be an absolute event because I know what rain is, 
at least insofar as, and to the extent that, I know; and what is more, it is not an absolutely other singularity. 
Exteriority as singularity and as an event depends on exteriority as spacing. The exposition of this mutual 
implication follows.  
b. SPACING AND THE FUTURE OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM 
Spacing has been variably referred to as space, time-space, space-time and espacement (Derrida 1988b: 9; 1997: 
68). It is associated with différance, for which, like trace and violence, it is a supplement (Caputo 1997: 97-99; 
Derrida 1981b: 40). It has been suggested to be both a quasi-origin and product of arche-violence (Derrida 1997: 
111-112). However, the relation between space and singularity, which both exceed the system, still begs 
clarification. The alterity of singularity is not spatial (Derrida 2001: 116). Its excess is hyperbolic. However, 
despite this hyperbole, the movement of différance still allows for singularity in the system. Derrida is not 
consistent on how singularity relates to meaning. In places, such as in Of Grammatology (1997) generally, and, 
more specifically, in the discussion of speech and writing (91) and in the analysis of proper names (107-112), the 
singular, if it still exists, only exists outside the system. In other places, the system reverberates with singularity. 
Singularity within the system, “differs from itself, it is deferred [...] so as to be what it is and to be repeated in its 
very singularity” (Derrida 1992: 68). In order for this to be possible, singularity must be meaningful as part of 
the system and not only outside the system. Space, however, is never meaningful.  
 The arch-violence produces space in the system (Derrida 1997: 109). This space is what prevents alterity or 
singularity from simply being present. Given the inherent error or artifice involved in the process of 
understanding the singular or attaining its truth, the meaningful appearance of singularity can never coincide 
with its full presence. However, meaning that is structured by the trace always remains open to the possibility of 
change and development and therefore cannot completely erase the possibility of the future presence of the 
singular (Derrida 1997: 63; 1982: 19; 2005a: 150). Spacing is the opening in which it is possible that the other 
will appear in the system (Derrida 1997: 68; 2005a: 150). The space within the sign produces a polysemy that 
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opens the sign to more difference within itself and more room for the difference of the other to manifest (Derrida 
1981b: 43). There is a qualification in respect of this possibility. Its realisation would depend on the complex 
organisation of the system coming to rest. Given this openness to the possibility of the full presence of 
singularity generated by space or rather by its closing, and the concomitant impossibility of closing space 
because of its structural necessity in the system, the possibility of the full presence of singularity is a possibility 
that has the structure of impossibility. It is, in a sense, a pure possibility, never to be realised. Nevertheless, this 
possibility is of ethical significance. If one is to respond to the other, then one does not merely allow space in the 
system so that the system can continue to reproduce itself in time. Rather, one makes space for the singular to 
appear in response to its difference for which we know the system is an inadequate measure (Derrida 2001: 321; 
Gasché 1994: 21).  
The definition of rape can be used to illustrate this point. The need to revisit the definition of rape in South 
African law arises because the law not a perfect description of the world in which it intervenes. It must be 
accepted that the law attempts to describe events whose ambiguity and singularity test its requirement for 
generality and stability. In order to change the definition of rape in South African law, the first level of violence 
had to be used to disrupt the second level of violence of the law. The space within the text, which is exposed by 
rehabilitating the differences that were deemed to be unimportant, disrupts the closure of the boundary. The 
space opened in this deconstructions allow for difference that had been excluded to be included in the system. 
This is done in the name of the singular or other that suffers empirical violence, which remains invisible without 
more – and different – violence on the second level.  
Derrida (1981a: 36) sees a kind of tyranny in pure interiority because it does not allow for change and 
development. The “airtight inside” that must be understood in terms of the violence it produces in erasing the 
possibility of internal heterogeneity and an open future, must make room for an outside inside the text (36). 
Space resists meaning. Particular spaces can be closed in order that singularity becomes meaningful, but space 
itself is unmarked in the process. The space within complex organisation is the possibility of a different future 
contained within the structure of the system (Clark 2005: 179). Space thus opens the system to the possibility of 
the event of singularity (Derrida 2002b: 94). The event interrupts the organisation of the system and opens space 
within it. Clark (2005: 181) argues that the expositions of exteriority by Derrida and Levinas, respectively, are 
important supplements to critical complexity thinking. If it is argued that empirical violence exceeds the system, 
then the form and consequence of this excess and exteriority must be placed in relation to singularity and space 
in order to clarify it.  
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IV. OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM: EMPIRICAL VIOLENCE AS SINGULARITY 
a. EMPIRICAL VIOLENCE EXCEEDS THE ORGANISATION OF MEANING 
Hanssen (2000: 9) contends that to claim that an account of violence does more than to offer a limited, 
contextualised and perspectival description, one would need to amalgamate all documentations of the almost 
infinite list of all atrocities ever committed by human beings with every use of the word and with every 
theoretical perspective, anthropological, psychological, criminological and all others. Even if this were 
achievable, the generalisations made and theories developed would “exert an interpretive force over its object/ 
field of analysis”, making distortions that are hidden by its claim to universality. This argument is supported the 
insights developed within critical complexity theory and deconstruction. There is more happening in the system 
than one can account for in any one description. This is an empirical quandary (Derrida 2001: 365). However, 
what this insight fails to convey is the second sense in which the system exceeds description. This is the barrier 
to totalising descriptions posed by complex organisation, by play, and by arche-violence (365). Hanssen’s (2000: 
9) argument can be supplemented by the discussion of singularity.  
 In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that arche-violence inhibits the totalisation of singularity inside 
the complex system because, in the first place, singularity is always differing and deferred. Singularity unfolds in 
time. In the second place, singularity that becomes meaningful inside the system is not identical with singularity 
that exceeds it. This is another way of saying that the violence of the frame necessarily reduces the complexity of 
what it allows to be understood. There is a surplus of singularity within the system and a surplus that exceeds the 
system. To wit, when we describe something concrete, something of the world and not language, we cannot say 
everything about it. An act of violence, to return to the empirical matter at hand, will always retain its singularity 
that is never quite exposed within the system itself. Returning to the definition of rape, it can be said that the 
concrete experience of rape is always structured in terms of the second level of violence – it is, in line with the 
exposition of the three levels of violence, produced within a world of accepted meaning – but not consumed by 
it. Something of this terrible event remains not quite understandable. What is not mediated by the system as it, 
like the other, passes through language and the law, cannot make sense (Derrida 1993b: 384). As the analysis of 
rape in the previous chapter demonstrates, how something is understood can change and expand. Expansion is 
not, however, completion. This problem does not need to remain abstract. Arendt (1950) confronts the problem 
of violence that exceeds explanation or meaning in a discussion of the violence of the Nazi concentration camps 
in Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps.  
Arendt (1963: 9) endorses the separation of language and violence within liberalism when she observes the 
silence of extreme expressions of violence. The muteness of the violence is not simple or absolute. It does not 
preclude the possibility that it can be endeavoured to use language to understand violence. However, the ability 
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of language to make something understandable that is itself without words demands that language or more 
specifically, theory, is able to change in order to reconcile itself with new, concrete events. How we understand 
the world tends to sediment into stable and even seemingly immutable categories until these categories, 
explanatory frameworks and assumptions collapse or “explode” in the face of phenomena that exceed both 
present categories and our anticipation of what will become possible in the future (Arendt 1950: 49). Language 
and theory must have the capability to adapt to new appearances of singularity. 
Arendt (1950: 49) attributes the unintelligibility of the Nazi concentration camps, at least in part, to subjective 
and perhaps disjunctive nature of accounts of the horrors of the camps. However, the violence of the camps, 
even if all possible accounts could be accounted for and corroborated, still exceeds what Arendt (50) identifies as 
the available lenses for the analysis of violence. Neither a utilitarian means-ends analysis nor an explanation that 
posits the camps as the most extreme logical expression of racism provides an adequate description (50). The 
camps presented an authentic event in the history of violence because they were “unprecedented” (50). This 
description must be qualified. It was not the mass slaughter of human beings, or the use of cruelty or forced 
labour, or the murder of innocent parties, or the violent expression of racism, or even the concentration camp as 
a means of controlling and inflicting harm upon a largely civilian population that was without precedent (51, 55). 
Arendt (55) argues that despite these precedents, the Nazi concentration camps were unique. The first 
concentration camps, those used by the British during the Boer War in South Africa and to control civilians in 
India, were not a central mechanism of government. What further distinguishes the Nazi camps from the British 
examples and makes the Nazi camps inexplicable, is that fact that the means – violence – in the case of all 
seemingly similar events had a clear benefit or end (51). The perpetrators of violence benefitted “as an ordinary 
burglary benefits the burglar”.183 
In order to clarify the difference between these manifestations of empirical violence that can be understood as 
instruments for the achievement of an end on the one hand, and the inexplicable violence of the camps on the 
other, Arendt provides an historical account184 of the events that led to and maintained the Nazi camps. To begin 
                                                      
183 The fact that the Nazi death camps do not fall within the definition of violence in which violence is merely an instrument 
for the achievement of a goal that can itself be articulated, challenges the description of violence as an instrument in On 
Violence (Arendt 1970: 48, 51). 
184 Arendt (1950: 51) begins by identifying those elements of the Nazi camps that merely repeat what has gone before, not 
only once but many times: 
Antisemitism by itself has such as long and bloody history that the very fact that the death factories were chiefly fed 
with Jewish ‘material’ has somewhat obliterated the uniqueness of this ‘operation’. Nazi-antisemitism moreover, 
showed an almost striking lack of originality...  
 
In fact, everything up to the death camps themselves were, on Arendt’s (53) account, predictable and predicted by Jewish 
and non-Jewish people during the war.  
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with, the particular historical contingencies, context, individuals and experiences are not identical to any other 
particular event in history. Additionally, there are several puzzling actions of both the oppressors and the 
oppressed that distinguishes this event of violence in the history of violence in the world (59-60). However, the 
most distinct of these differences, according to Arendt (54-55), is that the Nazi concentration camps were 
independent of any economic or even military benefit. It is this fact that requires that the social sciences depart 
from conventional modes of analysis when dealing with this particular event. Arendt (64) warns that, “[the] 
greatest danger for a proper understanding of our most recent history is the only too comprehensible tendency of 
the historian to draw analogies”. No comparison, no general frame or assumptions, and no present knowledge 
can capture its singularity. 
When this article was written, the Holocaust was recent history. However, events in contemporary, recent history 
have provoked analogies with the Nazi genocide of Jewish people (Praeg 2008: 209). The singularity of the 
event of this shocking empirical violence has not been protected. First, in order for the perpetrators of violence in 
the camps to be held to account, the singularity of events had to be violated in a confrontation with general laws, 
legal norms, accepted punishments and with a generalised account drawn from several unique experiences of 
what happened (Arendt 1950: 63-64). For a court to have made sense of the violence of the Nazi concentration 
camps, this violence had to be made to conform to recognisable and therefore understandable definitions and 
descriptions. In a second gesture of generalisation, the word ‘genocide’ was not only a standard name for the 
heterogeneous event of the Holocaust, but also now includes the particular and singular events of the Hutu 
genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda have been drawn into an analogy with the Nazi genocide of Jewish people (Praeg 
2008: 209).185 
To name acts of violence, and to conceptualise these singular acts in order to allow for understanding and 
intervention, collectivises singular events and erases the heterogeneity and excess of singularity that makes the 
event an event in the first place (194). This is necessary if we are to extend our understanding of empirical 
violence and to prevent it (195).  
To name an event ‘genocide’ makes that event recognisable by implicitly invoking all genocides that have 
already occurred and the possibility of its repetition (194). Even its first inscription is repeatable or iterable 
(Derrida 1988b: 9). However, the interpretive violence – a material effect of the first and second levels of 
organisation – of identifying the horrors of either the Holocaust or the Rwandan Genocide with any other events 
is immediately apparent in its callousness and vulgarity. Empirical violence appears, at least in this sense, to 
announce its singularity more emphatically than, for example, a leaf. This emphatic singularity does not only 
                                                      
185  Leonhard Praeg’s (2008: 193-223) attempt to render the Rwandan genocide thinkable frames it with Benjamin’s, 
Derrida’s and Girard’s respective philosophies in order to describe it and other genocides as instances of failed or deferred 
foundational violence.  
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apply to genocide, but to all forms of empirical violence for which we have names, and for those forms of 
empirical violence that will be named in the future.  
The use of names, context and analogy to understand empirical violence is politically expedient, but fails to 
address the singularity of the event of empirical violence (Zizek 2006: 231, 234).186 Zizek (230) makes an 
argument about the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in A Plea for a Return to Différance 
(with a Minor Pro Domo Sua) that is pertinent to this discussion. He (230) criticises those who indulged in what 
he calls “leftist Schadenfreude” because they sought to contextualise 9/11 within a historical and political 
situation in order to relativise its scale, significance and intensity of violence in light of other empirical violence 
that goes unseen and unvalued. This relativistic approach is premised on an assumption that comparison and 
measuring of empirical violence is unproblematic and appropriate. Whereas postmodernists and 
poststructuralists – here, Derrida and Zizek are included – are often accused of providing the backdrop for 
legitimisations of violence by espousing such relativist worldviews, Zizek (229, 330) points to the emphatic 
insistence on singularity within many of these perspectives that counteracts relativistic understanding. He (330) 
argues that there is no place for calculation in the face of the suffering of others. And, further, that there is 
something unethical about making a comparison between such singular tragedies as the Holocaust, the Rwandan 
Genocide and the war in Democratic Republic of Congo. It is unethical because it fails to relate to the singular in 
its singularity.  
The singularity of an event does not protect it from the law. It is not obviously ethical to simply allow singularity 
to be unmarked and to say nothing about it simply because one cannot say everything. The example of the 
Rwandan genocide can be used to make a few critical points. This particular singular event of empirical violence 
occurred within a particular political, cultural and historical context. To argue that, for example, many more 
people died in the Rwandan genocide than died in 9/11 is not necessarily motivated by the desire to reduce the 
significance of the events of 9/11, but perhaps to redress the imbalance of significance attributed to either event. 
Furthermore, the wordlessness experienced in the face of empirical violence must not negate similarities with 
previous events of violence in order to announce its singularity (Praeg 2008: 205). The violence we call 
unthinkable or shocking is remarkably recurrent in many ways. The severe and horrific violence of the Rwandan 
genocide is not indicative of something peculiarly Rwandan or African (196, 105).187 Singularity should not be 
emphasised to the extent that it undermines concrete and significant similarities between empirically violent 
events.  
                                                      
186 Zizek (2006: 243) draws a direct analogy between différance and parallax, his “own master signifier for the ‘minimal 
difference’” between the object and an observation or experience thereof. 
187 As Cilliers (1998b) says of apartheid, the emphasis on singularity must be tempered by a caution against externalising 
the cruelty of violence so that it has a very specific locus and identifiable agents who bear responsibility for the violence. In 
other words, the emphasis on singularity must not be a means of protecting oneself from complicity in the structures in 
which violence is perpetrated. 
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Returning to the example of rape, it can be argued that there are enough events of the sought we characterise as 
rape in order to give good reason for its generalisation, and in order to intervene in its perpetration. Although 
empirical violence may present a seemingly impossible barrier to all theoretical attempts to understand it, it is 
not for want of examples that the endeavours in this direction fail. Further, it is not always a matter of ethical 
response to the singular that comparisons between violent events are avoided. It is also often because certain 
violent events are privileged over others, either because the victims are privileged or because some events have 
more conspicuous victims who suffer more easily perceptible harm. Another point that can be raised as a 
criticism of the overemphasis of singularity is that allotting the same immeasurable singularity to each event of 
empirical violence can have the result of rendering all violence equal in its infinite unintelligibility. The danger 
of relativism is reintroduced by this gesture. There is a practical but also an ethical need to compare violent acts 
and to make judgements as to which are worse and even which are acceptable. 
The immediacy of an event of empirical violence, with regard to which we feel a moral imperative to intervene, 
not only in order to stop the event from repeating itself but also in order to bear testimony to the suffering of the 
victims of empirical violence and to hold the agents of violence accountable, is lost in the space opened by the 
arche-violence. The violence of the frame and its continual revision are always necessary. Different descriptions 
will reproduce a different excess because what is marginalised and excluded changes. However, the excess as 
such does not disappear. Arendt’s (1950) discussion of the Nazi concentration camps shows that the excess of an 
event of empirical violence can open space within accepted structures of meaning. 
b. SPEAKING ABOUT EMPIRICAL VIOLENCE: AN AESTHETIC PROBLEM  
The problem of the inadequacy of language and theory in relation to empirical violence is a general problem that 
permeates complexity thinking. It is not only violence, but all empirical singularity that exceeds language and 
theory; and not sometimes, but always. It is an error to assume that a material phenomenon is reducible to human 
knowledge or experience of it, even if this phenomenon occurs within human interaction (Morin 2007: 107). The 
event of violence merely calls attention to a more general problem. However, in considering the particular case 
of violence, the relationship between meaning and being is instantiated in a specific way with its own specific 
complications. In order to specify the fate of empirical violence, understood from a complexity informed 
perspective, it is necessary to restate the problem. Meaning arises within a system of dynamic differences in 
which there is no origin that can, “orient, balance, and organise” meaning (Derrida 2001: 352). It is not anchored 
in reality. The link between reality and understanding is indirect and mediated (Derrida 1997: 91). Derrida does 
not explain exactly how reality enters representation, although it is implied that it does indeed enter, since the 
text is not a closed, fully autopoietic system. 
Nietzsche, whose philosophy also announces the event of structure without origins, is more explicit about the 
nature of the relationship between language and the world (Derrida 2001: 369). Reality does not enter language. 
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Rather, language and reality are fundamentally estranged. The reconciliation of language and reality does not 
occur on its own. It must be made and reinforced through linguistic conventions that function as frames through 
which the world becomes manageable (van Tongeren 2000: 71).188 A vivid depiction of the schism between 
meaning and being is offered in On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (Nietzsche 2000). This essay begins 
with “Once upon a time,” as would a fable, and with the very first sentence, a first blow to the wall separating 
fact and fiction is delivered. The fable about the “clever beasts” that discover the art of knowing ends with 
knowing withering away as the beasts perish (53). Consequently, knowledge fades away, leaving no perfect 
remnant in its wake. The link between knowledge and the world is transient because knowledge itself is transient 
and so, for that matter, is reality.  
There is a relationship between knowledge and the world. There is truth; however, this truth does not correspond 
with an unmediated presence or “thing in itself” (55). Truth is an aesthetic relation between knowledge and 
reality. It is: 
A moveable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations 
which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished... (56) 
This aesthetic link between reality and knowledge is the creation of human beings for whom the creation of 
metaphors is a fundamental drive. In order to conceal the properly aesthetic origin of meaning, human beings 
only recognise creativity in narrowly defined creative acts within art, which is opposed to truth and reason (59, 
60). Nietzsche (61) does not deny the usefulness of concepts and categories. However, he (61) intimates that 
concept-driven reason alone does not foster wisdom. Concepts must be retained insofar they are useful, but their 
pragmatic value must not be mistaken for metaphysical certainty. Perhaps what is suggested is the necessity of 
an aesthetic sensibility or at least a bold sense of the aesthetics of truth.189 
 This understanding of language pervades Nietzsche’s persistent engagement with truth and meaning in his texts 
(van Tongeren 2000: 72). No text escapes the moment in which this underlying uncertainty undermines the unity 
and mastery its content might propose. The grammatological structure of writing serves a similar function with 
regard to the whole body of works that can be collected under the banner of deconstruction. Like the extension 
of metaphor – an arbitrary analogy between two unlike things – creates space within Nietzsche’s epistemology; 
                                                      
188 “These frames are established through the rules of grammar, but, even before that, through the most elementary material 
of language: words. Words do not connect us with reality: they are but ‘illusive bridges,’ ‘rainbows...between things which 
are eternally apart’...” (van Tongeren 2000: 71). 
189 J.M. Bernstein (1992: 1) argues that Nietzsche is part of a long philosophical tradition that sees art and the aesthetic as 
being “somehow more truthful that empirical truth”. Aesthetic truth is at odds with the kind of truth produced by categories 
and laws. This idea sets art apart from a strategy of understanding that erodes the internal différance of the system or event 
being described. 
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so the supplemental relation of one sign to another creates space that separates the sign from its origin (Derrida 
1982: 227, 229). The metaphorical character of the sign is extended even to the proper name: 
Thus the name, especially the so-called proper name, is always caught in a chain or a system of 
differences... the proper-ness of the name does not escape spacing. Metaphor shapes and undermines the 
proper name (Derrida 1997: 89).  
In the case of empirical violence, even the names of such singular and horrific violent events such as apartheid or 
the Rwandan Genocide are ‘metaphorical’. If empirical violence always exceeds its names and the system in 
general, and Derrida and Nietzsche are taken seriously when asserting the aesthetic character of meaning, then 
the aesthetification of meaning must necessarily be extended to include every attempt to produce a description of 
any empirical violence. In a more emphatic formulation, one could say that the description of violence is the 
creative production of a pragmatic fiction.  
This is not a notion that can be tolerated within the law or within a political discourse or movement that seeks to 
produce and justify a certain course of action, or indeed in any sphere in which the ethical recognition of 
violence is usually understood to be founded upon certainty. When Derrida (2002a: 235) argues that he never 
endorses any form of empirical violence, he suggests, unlike the first two levels of violence, that it is always to 
be rejected. This uncompromising rejection implies that empirical violence can be distinguished from our 
processes of understanding in a final way. It is, however, complicated by the relation of singularity to arche-
violence and to the law. Critics of deconstruction disparage its positive reception in the legal and political sphere 
because of what is perceived as an overemphasis on singularity, marginalia or exceptions in cases where general 
laws are applicable and effective (McCormick 2001: 396).190 In her defence of deconstruction as an appropriate 
discourse about violence, Elizabeth Grosz (1999: 13) makes the bold statement that she “[does] not believe that 
Derrida abandons the moral and ethical dilemmas raised by very concrete and disturbing explosions of violence 
in the ‘real world’”. Despite the deconstruction of morality within the dynamics of the second level of violence, 
empirical violence must be opposed absolutely (11). Accordingly, Robert Bernasconi (2007: 81) situates Derrida 
in the company of Levinas, reading them both as providing a space for political engagement post the crisis 
invoked by the loss of metaphysical certainties.  
The problem of aesthetics and violence within complexity thinking can be approached from another angle. The 
problem of ‘aesthetification’ is a problem because of the underlying opposition between aesthetic judgements on 
                                                      
190McCormick (2001: 396), who reads deconstruction as a literary theory, argues: 
 
According to critics, Derrida and deconstruction undermine the possibility of rational justification or interaction and 
aesthetically celebrate moments of groundless decision in dangerous ways, Consequently deconstruction threatens to 
subvert the rationalism of the ‘West’ or the Enlightenment tradition in ways reminiscent of the two most famous 
intellectual spokesmen for Nazism... 
183 
 
the one hand and truth claims on the other; or meaning on the one hand and reality on the other (Bernstein 1992: 
2). This opposition of truth and art allows us to reduce aesthetic objects and the critique of aesthetics to a lesser 
status, as “merely aesthetic”, which means to say that the proper concern of this area of human endeavour is 
related to beauty and non-cognitive processes that are alienated from cognitive processes that engage in truth and 
morality (2-3). Ethical judgements that involve aesthetic elements are thus considered a reduction of ethics to 
irrational premises. Aesthetic objects fall outside the sphere of truth and goodness. This is what J.M. Bernstein 
(4) terms, “aesthetic alienation”. He (3) traces this type of thinking back to Kant (3). Kant’s Critique of 
Judgement, however, attempts to reconcile truth and art by specifying those elements of critique that are 
particular to art in order to determine aesthetic truth in opposition with a wholly irrational or counter-rational 
engagement with art.  
Derrida (1992: 34) challenges the opposition between aesthetics and philosophy – the science of truth and 
morality – in several places in his writing. In particular, the diametric opposition between literature and 
philosophy is called into question and deliberately disrupted. The disruption of this opposition is not only the 
disruption of one or both traditions in which specific forms and conventions have become entrenched over time, 
but also a question of the opposition of truth and fiction (37). The deconstruction of this opposition, argues 
Derrida (37), sets a chain of similar deconstruction in motion, “between nature and institution, nature and 
conventional law, nature and history.” Literature and art in general allow one a certain licence to creativity, to 
say whatever one wants. This is understood as undermining its critical potential (38). However, while this is true, 
literature also has critical potential. Literature can be used to engage with questions of truth and morality.  
Derrida (1979b: 17) performs a deconstruction of the boundary enclosing the aesthetic field in Parergon, in 
which the closure around that which Kant deemed to be properly within the ambit of aesthetic judgements of 
taste is disturbed. The broader problem of inside/outside distinctions and the general conditions of understanding 
are explored through a discussion of a merely aesthetic object, the frame (30, 39). In this analysis, what is 
demonstrated is the gesture of the particular beyond itself. Furthermore, the problem of the closure of the 
aesthetic realm repeats the problem of closure contained in the frame. All forms of closure are always enclosed 
within a wider explanatory framework: “the theory of aesthetics within a theory of the beautiful, the theory of 
the beautiful within a theory of taste, and the theory of taste within a theory of judgment” (30). The frame is used 
to sketch out the general conditions of all judgements. 
Derrida (1994) frames his reading of Karl Marx and his analysis of temporality, particularly the relationship of 
history and the future to the present and to presence, with a literary text. Hamlet announces the central argument: 
“The time is out of joint” (1, 3, 18, 49). The ghost of the dead king becomes the spectral vision of the past 
approaching from the future (11). Hamlet is not treated as a mere fiction. Rather, fiction is treated, despite its 
fictionality, as if it is the singular incarnation of a serious or nonfictional philosophical problem of presence. 
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Similarly, Kafka’s Before the Law is used in an identically named essay, in the first place, to question the 
position of literature in relation with philosophy (Derrida 1992: 186). The fiction is used to question the 
definition of literature (191). The story of literature is linked with a story of the law. It is used to gesture towards 
the fictionality of the law in all its seriousness (212). The law is also addressed in another literary exposition in 
The Law of Genre, the scope of which extends beyond the, “aesthetic, poetic and literary corpus” (230). An 
analysis of genre slides into an analysis of gender and of difference and boundaries, more generally (243-245). 
Each of these analyses suggests the same thing. That is that it is not only general conceptual frameworks that 
impose themselves onto singular texts. The text – aesthetic, fictional, idiosyncratic – also informs the general 
way in which we understand important aspects of our existence. The general system can be altered by an 
aesthetic object that manages to encapsulate an instance of singularity. To read an artwork within a general 
system of meaning is different to reading the world as if it were a unified text. The same event, a sunrise, for 
example, read in a description in a newspaper and read in a novel should be read differently. Reading the world 
as a text, drawing connections as one might in a novel in which the product is directed at creating meaning in a 
specific way, should be questioned.  
Derrida’s deconstructions of the truth/aesthetic opposition, suggests that aesthetic objects have the ability to 
produce meaning where conventional conceptual expositions fail. Levinas (1989: 130) makes a similar point in 
his essay on aesthetics, Reality and its Shadow, in which he asserts:  
Where common language abdicates, a poem or a painting speaks. Thus an artwork is more real than reality and 
attests to the dignity of the artistic imagination, which sets itself up as knowledge of the absolute.  
Bernstein (1992: 14) suggests that there is a link between politics and aesthetics. Aesthetics opens up an 
alternative politics and perhaps also a way of intervening in violence that the system cannot comprehend in 
terms of conceptual classification. In light of the discussion on singularity, drawing on both Derrida and Levinas, 
it can be deduced that the ability of the aesthetic object to speak where concepts fail is related to the appearance 
of alterity. The problem of addressing the singular in a nonviolent language without the predicate is obviously 
solved in one sense with wordless art in particular, but also in poetry insofar as it has the ability to bend concepts 
to their limit in order to open and transform meaning, or in other words, to create space for alterity. This space is 
the point of departure for a difference-centred politics as proposed by Bernasconi (2007: 85). The appearance of 
the other throws the self into question. The other thus comes as an interruption to the same and provokes change 
in the system. It provokes political engagement without providing a programme for politics (85).  
To rupture the boundary alienating art from philosophy or art from politics does not have to result in a collapse 
of one term into the other (Bernstein 1992: 261). In terms of this discussion, to allow a space for art to mediate in 
the understanding of violence does not have to result in the pure aesthetification of violence. However, aesthetic 
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objects afford an opportunity in which attention is returned to the moment of interruption of our categories and 
conceptual schemes that an event of violence creates. This is not only in the case with extreme violence such as 
the Holocaust that is characterised as a challenge to the contemporary conceptualisation of violence by Arendt 
(1950). It is the case for every instance of empirical violence. Art does not define what has happened when an 
empirical violence has been experienced as much as question what has already been defined in terms of that 
empirical violence (Bernstein 1992: 261). The confrontation of art and philosophy is a reiteration of the tension 
between particularity and generality (261). This tension cannot be resolved. The ability of the aesthetic to engage 
singularity in a way that philosophy or another theoretical and conceptual discourse cannot, is employed by 
Derrida (1985b) in a controversial essay on apartheid in which he attempts to articulate the singularity of 
apartheid as an event unlike any other. The analysis navigates the ambiguous terrain between a political action, a 
philosophical exposition and an aesthetic analysis of the word ‘apartheid’ as a textual or aesthetic artefact.  
c. RESPONDING TO EMPIRICAL VIOLENCE: DERRIDA ON APARTHEID 
In order to speak to the singularity of empirically violent events, one must find a way of singularising one’s 
analysis. In other words, one must extricate one’s analysis from the possibilities of analogy or equivocation. 
Derrida (1985b: 290-299) attempts to do exactly this in his analysis of, and ethical stand against, apartheid in 
Racism’s Last Word. This article provides an illustration of the difficulties that a three tiered understanding of 
violence produces with respect to the criticism of concrete violence that one wishes to oppose. In order illustrate 
the strategy of this analysis, it is necessary to quote directly from the text. Derrida (291) begins, not with a 
description of atrocities or even with a legal analysis, but with the word ‘apartheid’, defined as “the unique 
appellation for the ultimate racism in the world, the last of many”.  
Apartheid is described as “the last”, or, “the worst” racism (291). It is the last because it is the worst and the 
newest. But the article – or presentation or political intervention, for it was initially used to open an art 
exhibition on apartheid – meant to characterise apartheid as the most extreme instantiation of racist logic ever to 
occur, “the most racist of racisms” (291). The context in which Derrida (293) delivered his address was an effort 
to respond to the singular event, apartheid, with another event. Significantly, in terms of the foregoing 
discussion, the eventful response is aesthetic. The exhibition of artworks is boldly touted as an attempt to “speak 
the other’s language” (294). It appears that the unconditional and abstract silence of a painting is the only 
appropriate way of dealing with empirical violence. This is because the works do not “represent” anything, but 
are, instead, an address, an appeal (299). The language of otherness in which the address is made is non-
language. The other is thus shrouded in mystery, which in the context of an abstract confrontation between self 
and other is perhaps acceptable, but is quite different in a political context in which the other needs words in 
order to engage with and in the system. To deny the other words in this context of a political engagement is not 
useful. It can also have the ironic effect of reducing the other’s complexity, rather than emphasising it.  
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Apartheid is called, “the archival record of the unnameable” (291). It is argued that it resists representation 
because of the extremity of its violence. It resists presentation. Its violence exceeds the system of meaning or 
representation because of its utter atrocity (293). However, if the foregoing discussion of singularity and the 
analysis of the complex structure of violence are to be followed, it is not its extremity but its singularity that 
resists presentation. Derrida (1985b) wants to take a moral stand against apartheid because it is violent and not 
because it is singular. However, the horror of empirical violence does not guard against representation. 
Apartheid is not, in fact, unnameable or indescribable. It is named and its violence was codified and often well 
documented. This presentation of racist violence in the law is proposed to be the most flagrant vulgarity. 
Derrida’s resistance to the representation of apartheid is not a logical necessity, but a morally motivated 
resistance to understanding apartheid. The article is a performance of deliberate misunderstanding. Its insistence 
on the name and the significance of the name, repeated in Derrida’s (1986) response to his critics,191 appears to 
announce that making something understandable makes it acceptable. The first reaction to an empirical violence 
must not seek to make it meaningful but should reject it completely. 
Derrida (292) argues that there is something inherent to the name ‘apartheid’ that resists the play of signification. 
Its empirical violence does not successfully become meaningful within the opening of the first two levels of 
violence: 
Apartheid: by itself the word occupies the terrain like a concentration camp. System of partition, barbed 
wire, crowds of mapped out solitudes. Within the limits of this untranslatable idiom, a violent arrest of the 
mark, the glaring harshness of abstract essence (heid) seems to speculate in another regime of abstraction, 
that of confined separation (292). 
This argument, although it can be understood by contextualising Derrida’s (292) strategy as an ethical 
performance, cannot be maintained within a system structured by différance. Meaning is always relationally 
constituted. For apartheid to resist relations within the system of meaning, it must be void of any meaning. 
However, this is not the case, for if it were, then the analysis in Racism’s Last Word would have been over 
before it had begun. The eventfulness of apartheid is immediately eroded by the articulation of its name. The 
iterability of apartheid means that its originality is compromised from the beginning. It is, as Derrida (291, 292, 
293) acknowledges, in some aspects, merely a reiteration of an old racism. Insisting upon the singularity of 
apartheid prevents one from making useful and important general observations about race, racism and violence. 
It also risks emphasising the significance of this violence to the detriment of other empirical violence, which are 
                                                      
191 Anne McClintock and Rob Nixon (1986: 140) are extremely critical of Derrida’s style and content: 
 
Certainly the essay is tendered as a call to action, an urgent injunction to "save humanity from this evil" apartheid; besides 
exposing the "truth" of apartheid, its purpose is to "fling back an answer" (riposter). If, then, Derrida seeks not merely to prize 
open certain covert metaphysical assumptions but also to point to something beyond the text, in this case the abolition of a 
regime, then the strategic value of his method has to be considered seriously. This entails, in particular, pondering the political 
implications of both his extended reflection on the word apartheid and his diffuse historical comments. (author’s emphasis) 
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somehow necessarily lesser. This risk is an inevitable result of the recognition of the uniqueness of this event 
and of the properness of its name. 
Apartheid is untranslated and is argued to be untranslatable (292). A brief general analysis of translation within 
deconstruction serves to contextualise this assertion. A pure translation is not possible with a complex self-
organising system of meaning.192 Derrida’s (2002a: 104) analysis of this theme in Des Tour de Babel,193 in which 
the biblical narrative about the Tower of Babel is read, makes this point. This reading focuses on the 
disintegration of a single unified language into a multiplicity of languages that cannot be reconciled to one 
another once they have emerged (104-105). Derrida (104) understands Babel as a testament of the irreducibility 
of different things to a single unified whole. It is an illustration of the inevitable decomposition of the unit into 
the multiplicity. Derrida’s (107) analysis of Babel strongly suggests that all cohesive meaning will tend towards 
its own deconstruction, regardless of the unity of the event from which it can be said to originate. In other words, 
where there is difference, there is also always disjunction (Derrida 1994: 19). 
The word ‘Babel’ is a proper noun, which, like ‘apartheid’, attaches itself to a specific event. The properness of 
its name appears to have preserved its integrity over time. Its inability to be translated follows from the natural 
and unmediated relation between signifier and signified (105). As such, the attachment between signifier and 
signified is unbreakable (104). Babel refers to only one event; and the event can only bear the name of Babel. 
For a pure translation to become possible, a referent would have to be able to bear several names without the 
referent itself differing with its changing names. The relation between signifier and signified could not be fixed. 
In a system in which the requirement that signifiers and signifieds are interchangeable were met, something 
would also be required to stabilise the system to the extent that secure equivalence between translatable 
signifiers could be established. Meaning could not only be the result of difference in the system, but also of a 
master signifier that could guarantee the translation.194 Derrida (1985b: 292; 1986: 162) reads a relentless 
properness and a literal essence of ‘apart-ness’ in the word apartheid that further entrenches its untranslatability. 
Apartheid resists the economy of arche-violence and the boundary. 
                                                      
192Différance makes translation possible only by disrupting its purity. Pure translation:  
 
...is possible only if a permanent code allows a substitution or transformation of signifiers while retaining the same 
signified, always present, despite the absence of any specific signifier. This fundamental possibility of substitution 
would thus be implied by the coupled concepts signified/signifier, and would consequently be implied by the concept 
of the sign itself. Even if, along with Saussure, we envisage the distinction between signified and signifier only as the 
two sides of a sheet of paper, nothing is changed” (Derrida 2001: 263). 
 
193 Derrida (2002a: 111) describes Babel as, “This singular example, at once archetypical and allegorical...an introduction to 
all the so-called theoretical problems of translation.” 
 
194 This analysis encounters the general problem of meaning in the complex system that was addressed in Derrida’s (1997: 
3-94) deconstruction of Saussure’s structuralist project in Part I of Of Grammatology. 
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A first point of criticism against Derrida’s (1985b) analysis must be raised with respect to the aesthetic style of 
engagement in which apartheid is regarded as a large, coherent text. Apartheid was not a unified text. Although 
this criticism must be qualified with a corrected understanding of text as anything that has meaning, an 
awareness of empirical power or terror can be lost in a discussion on words and general structures. Moreover, as 
much as Derrida would seek to preserve the properness of the name of ‘apartheid’, this preservation is 
impossible. The proper name is always severed from its origin as soon as it appears within a system of meaning 
(Derrida 1997: 112). The proper name is always also a common noun.195 Even in an original text, meaning is 
always already dissimilar with itself and dispersed within a network of relations. Derrida (2002a: 109) argues 
that “intralinguistic translation operates immediately”. 
Inscription within a language requires interpretation because meaning is not present. Every interpretation 
changes the meaning slightly, adjusts its idiom, or it could be said, translates it (109). There is no original. Even 
the original is already a translation (115). It must be emphasised that translation is not a copy in the conventional 
sense. Or, formulated differently, a copy is already dissimilar with itself (Derrida 1988b: 20). The space within 
meaning must be closed with every interpretation. It is space within the system that allows translation as 
interpretation without guaranteeing it. Pure translation is impossible if names are thoroughly proper or if 
meaning arises in a dynamic system of pure differences. However, a form of – impure – translation, understood 
widely, as interpretation that involves the closure of boundary in a dynamic system of differences, is possible. In 
the hierarchical opposition of the original and the translation, following that general pedagogical structure of a 
deconstruction, the master term – the original – is deposed and translation is displaced in order to allow for a 
more general understanding of the term. The inevitability of translation is also the impossibility of a last word on 
any matter, including violence and apartheid (Cilliers 1998b: 84) 
McClintock and Nixon (1985: 154) criticise Racism’s Last Word for failing to be an historical analysis of the 
mechanics of the racist social and political discourse in South African. They (141) accuse Derrida of blatantly 
ignoring the factual history of the word, which the name obscures, in order to cauterise apartheid and prevent it 
from bleeding into other understandings and making sense within its appropriate context. McClintock and 
Nixon’s article attempts to re-contextualise apartheid by tracing the contingent historical development of South 
African racism. It displays a notable lack of understanding of deconstruction and executes an overzealous 
dismissal of Derrida’s (1985b) strategy without recognising its aim at all. Its deepest fault is that it leaves no 
room for the type of absolute ethical rejection that Racism’s Last Word allows. It reads as an attempt to explain 
away the violence of apartheid, as if this could ever be done. McClintock and Nixon (1985: 154) accuse Derrida 
                                                      
195 In regard to apartheid in particular, the word has come to stand for a centralised and codified form of racial segregation 
that is codified in the laws of a state. See, for example, Edward Said’s (1985) critical examination in An Ideology of 
Difference. Cilliers (1998b: 75-88) makes the argument that Derrida’s (1985b) absolute rejection and singularisation of 
apartheid risks externalising its racist violence to the effect that it renders other – especially European – racist violence 
invisible. In other words, it makes a scapegoat of South Africa. 
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of being too particular by limiting his discussion to a name, and too general by linking this name to a general 
logic of racism and other forms of marginalisation and exclusion. A valid analysis of “racial representation” is 
deemed unattainable within a poststructuralist discourse because of its reliance on such general structures as 
“logocentrism” and “Western metaphysics” (154). 
In response to this sweeping criticism of poststructuralist critique, Derrida (1986: 163) argues, first, that all 
historical concepts have names. The name, ‘apartheid’, belongs to South African – now past – politics. Violence 
must be addressed by its name. McClintock and Nixon (1985: 153, 154) are correct in pointing to the relevance 
of economic and class factors in an explanation of apartheid. However, Derrida (1985b; 1986) is not engaged in 
this type of project. It is, as it was suggested earlier, an ethical-political performance. It is an attempt to not 
understand apartheid by constructing its social or economic narrative and in resisting this construction, to 
respond to the singular suffering of singular individuals that exceeds that socio-economic frame. Additionally, 
Derrida’s corpus of work as dealt with within this project’s analysis of the tripartite structure of complex 
violence, struggles with the tension between singular events and general systems, laws, norms, conventions and 
other bounding structures. This tension is too hastily passed over by those who dismiss the possibility of general 
structures that enable particular events. The mode of engagement in Racism’s Last Word cannot stand on its own 
as a consummate description or analysis. Heeding Hanssen (2000: 9) again, if this is its ambition, then it fails 
before it has begun. However, there is a place for this type of ethical intervention. Its uncompromising rejection 
of empirical violence cannot be achieved without concomitant risks associated with the recognition of 
singularity. However, its place, perhaps as our first response to violence, or the last word to an explanation of 
violence, is to guard against these explanations functioning as justifications. 
V. THE OTHERS OUTSIDE: NONVIOLENCE, JUSTICE AND SPACE 
a. NONVIOLENCE AND SPACE 
The identification and rejection of violence is not only complicated by the relation of empirical violence to its 
meaning and the moral ambiguity of the second level of violence. The rejection of violence in the system implies 
a movement towards a condition without violence, however fleeting this condition might be. Therefore, an 
understanding of nonviolence is as necessary in understanding and intervening in violence as violence itself. If 
violence is inevitable, to the effect that the possibility of nonviolence is precluded, then the absolute rejection of 
violence is of no strategic value. To intervene in violence because it is unethical without any idea of nonviolence 
is futile. Certainly, without an idea of nonviolence, the value of deconstruction for political action is rendered 
moot.  
There is nonviolence. It is captured in the notions of, “gift, hospitality, donation, generosity, or ethics” (Grosz 
1999: 14-15). Like empirical violence, it not simply inside the system. It cannot be made present in the system. 
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Nonviolence is outside the system in three distinct senses that correspond to the three levels of violence. The 
first level, arche-violence, is the possibility of the second and third levels of violence. However, arche-violence 
also undermines all boundaries and allows nomination, thereby enabling empirical violence to become 
meaningful so that it can be addressed. The arche-violence is thus also the possibility of nonviolence (Derrida 
1997: 140). The arche-violence opens the possibility of nonviolence, but it cannot establish a nonviolent order 
(110).  
Order or structure that emerges out of organisation involves the violence of the boundary. Nonviolence on this 
level depends upon a complete lack of structure. Yet, because the arche-violence continues to undermine the 
boundary, the violence of the boundary is not absolute. The impossibility of nonviolence or peace with respect to 
the second level of violence, does not prevent Derrida (2002a: 302) from utilising the second level of violence in 
Taking a Stand for Algeria.196 A programme for peace is developed in this text in spite of the dual conditions of 
its impossibility – arch-violence and closure – in the system. Nonviolence is impossible inside the system; 
however, this impossibility is qualified.197 Like the arche-violence, the violence of the boundary enables the 
interpretation of empirical violence and thus simultaneously empowers its amelioration. The possibility of 
nonviolence is strangely preserved as impossibility. In this regard, nonviolence can be inserted into a chain of 
supplementary concepts: différance, trace, gift, forgiveness, justice. Each of these impossible possibilities 
exceeds the movement of the system (Derrida 1994: 23). Justice has particular bearing on this discussion 
because of its relationship with the law and thus also with violence. A few introductory remarks frame this 
parallel exposition of justice and nonviolence. 
Nonviolence, like justice, functions as a quasi-transcendental in the play of meaning (Caputo 1997: 41). By 
refusing to give nonviolence an absolute description within the system – because it is impossible – it also 
exceeds the system, and thus also partially escapes the play of meaning. As a result of its partial transcendence, it 
cannot function as a foundation or absolute explanation, hence its quasi-transcendental status. Levinas (1979: 
24) argues that, “[of] peace there can be only an eschatology”. In other words, peace is not produced within the 
present. It is always outside the designation of a here and now. It is outside structure and therefore also beyond 
                                                      
196 Derrida (2002a: 302) still takes a stand for “civil peace” (author’s emphasis). This peace is not demanded as an abstract 
possibility of a future possibility. Rather, like Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1939), it is set out in a list of programmable criteria: 
 
1. for a new international solidarity; 
2. for an electoral agreement; 
3. for a dissociation of the theological and the political; and 
4. for what I would more or less properly call a new Third Estate (Derrida, 2002a: 303). 
 
197 The structure of the possible impossible finds its iteration in the notions of the gift, hospitality and forgiveness (Derrida 
2005a: 79, 81). The conditions of possibility within deconstruction are separated from any extrapolation of the present (79-
80). The conditions of possibility are thus bound up with conditions of impossibility within the present organisation of the 
system. Possibility is thus associated with novelty and the event. The possibility is thus reframed as the, “perhaps” (Derrida 
2002b: 344). 
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deconstruction. It is “undeconstructable” (Caputo 1997: 128). This formulation presents an immediate danger of 
falling back into the metaphysics of presence, erasing the ‘quasi’ in favour of absolute transcendence. This 
would shield nonviolence from the system and ensure its security, for which there is no foundation.  
b. VIOLENCE AND JUSTICE: WALTER BENJAMIN’S CRITIQUE OF VIOLENCE  
Derrida’s essay on the Force of Law, in which an understanding of justice is developed in relation to the law and 
to violence, is a critique of and expansion on Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence198 (Zacharias 2007: 103). 
Benjamin’s essay, to which the twin questions of justice and violence are addressed, begins with two proposals: 
the first is that the violence of the law and the state are not necessarily just; and the second is that there is a 
possibility that there is a form of violence that is just (Zacharias 2007: 105).  
Benjamin (1978: 277-278) asserts that the legal philosophy of natural law – most prevalent at the time of this 
article’s authorship – proposes no contradiction between justice and violence if violence is used to pursue just 
ends. This philosophy provides a justification for such bloody events as the French Revolution. Offering a 
different perspective, the philosophy of positive law deems violence to be just only if it can be assessed to be an 
appropriate and legal means to the achievement of any end (278). In other words, positive law proposes that 
legitimate and illegitimate violence can be distinguished in terms of the nature of the violence itself and not the 
goal at which it is directed (279). Benjamin (281) proposes that justified violence on this account is violence that 
is directed at sustaining lawfulness. Neither understanding, however, satisfactorily justifies violence. 
A typology of violence is sketched with the aid of two examples (282). The first is a factory strike in which 
workers resort to violence in order to escape the exploitative violence of their employer. In some cases, this type 
of strike would be endorsed by the state. It is the state and its law that guarantees workers the right to strike. 
However, in other cases, violent strikes are suppressed with state counter-violence because the violence of the 
strike somehow is intolerable to the state. The violence that the state finds so threatening is the focus of 
Benjamin’s (282) interrogation. It is contrasted to a second example of violence that the state finds threatening. 
This is the violence of prolific criminals, which Benjamin (283) finds less conceptually challenging that the 
illegal strike. Its threat to the state is that it challenges state law with contradictory norms or law (283). The 
violence of the criminal and the violence of the state in the first example are “law-making” and “law-preserving” 
violence, respectively (284). Law-making violence is the origin of order and law-preserving violence maintains 
the hegemony of that order (Buonamano 1998: 174). In both cases the law itself is affirmed (Benjamin 1978: 
286). Both forms of violence are means for which a specific law and order is the end (287). 
                                                      
198 Benjamin’s (1978: 277-300) essay was juxtaposed to the liberal disavowal of all forms of violence in chapter 3. This 
argument is maintained and elaborated here. 
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Benjamin (291) goes on to specify a third type of violence by returning to the example of the workers’ strike. 
Following Sorel, Benjamin (291) distinguishes a political strike from a proletarian strike. In a political strike, the 
state and the law are not undermined. Those who rise up do so with the aim of transferring power from one 
group of privileged agents to another within present hierarchical power structures. This strike presents no real 
challenge to the system. However, Benjamin (291) argues: 
In contrast to this political general strike (which incidentally seems to have been summed up by the 
abortive German revolution), the proletarian general strike sets itself the sole task of destroying state 
power...While the first form of interruption of work is violent since it causes only an external modification 
of labour conditions, the second, as a pure means, is nonviolent. 
Pure means – violence as the pure interruption of the closure of relations within the system without the 
perversion of a systemised goal – is understood to be mysteriously voided of its violence. Both law-making and 
law-preserving violence are forms of mythic violence (294). This violence is contrasted to the violence of pure 
means or, “divine violence” (297).  
Mythic violence is always contestable, or as Buonamano (1998: 176) puts it, it is “undecidable” and subject to 
interpretation. Unlike mythic violence, which is concerned with transgressions and retribution in relation to the 
law, divine violence is external to the law. Another point on which divine violence can be contrasted to mythic 
violence is that the former does not spill any blood. It is messianic; it “only expiates” (Benjamin 1979: 297). Its 
expiation is premised on the fact that it does not spill blood. Educative power can be an example of divine 
violence if it is not co-opted by the structures of mythic violence and maintains its ability to transform without 
bloodshed (Buonamano 1998: 176). Divine violence explodes the structures of the system (Benjamin 1978: 300). 
It cannot be absorbed into either law-making or law-preserving violence. Divine violence is not determined by 
the judgement that recognises it. It is decidable (Buonamano 1998: 176; Derrida 2002b: 291). Even though it is 
not inherently ambiguous, divine violence is not obvious because its reparatory power is not, “visible to men” 
(300). Divine violence offers a religious style salvation that rescues the world from outside and that is 
independent of any individual actions therein.  
c. JUSTICE IS OUTSIDE VIOLENCE: DERRIDA READING BENJAMIN 
It follows from the sketch of deconstruction read through the lens of complexity theory in chapter 2, that 
complex justice, like Benjamin’s (1978: 297) divine violence, must come from beyond the system’s present 
organisation. Unlike Benjamin’s (297) divine violence, it has been argued that justice always remains 
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‘undecidable’.199 By implication, justice cannot appear in the system and still maintain its justness. It offers no 
utopian consolation. An attempt to understand justice is, therefore, a confrontation with aporia (Derrida 2002a: 
230-259). Force of Law (231) begins with a question that should be contextualised within this much broader 
treatment of violence and nonviolence within deconstruction. This question asks whether or not justice is 
required or even permitted within deconstruction. The question is motivated by a suspicion that it does not. 
Derrida’s (230-259) argument begins by separating violence and the law and insisting that this separation does 
not produce an absolute alienation: 
I want to insist at once to reserve the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law [loi] that not only exceeds or 
contradicts law but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it 
may just as well demand law as exclude it (233).  
This extrication of justice from the law coincides with its general exteriority in relation to the organisation of the 
system of meaning. The tension between the law – not only the law, but all forms of form, all forms of structure 
and closure and decision – and the singularity that exceeds moral and juridical calculation instigates a 
deconstruction of the authority of the law. It begins to rupture the legal frame through which violence is thought 
to be appropriately understood. It perturbs the foundation of the law.  
The passing of a law brings about a certain order which exerts an interpretive violence on its object (241). This 
violence can be judged to be legal or illegal. It can be tested against preceding laws, norms and assumptions in 
order to assess its conformity within the boundary of the legal system itself. It can also be judged to be good or 
bad against social or economic standards. Yet, the assurance of a precedent which secures its legality, or of a 
social norm, which secures its popularity, is not a foundation from which justice can be assessed. The foundation 
of the law is separated from justice by its violence (242). Justice is not defined as the maintenance, health or 
robustness of the system. Justice exists as a possibility that there might be nonviolence that is sustained by the 
fact that the economy of the system is open to something other than itself. The law can be deconstructed because 
it is constructed. Justice, on the other hand, is not structured and does not structure the system. Like space and 
singularity, it cannot be reduced, nor can it be deconstructed. It is therefore outside deconstruction. Derrida (243) 
argues that given the exteriority of justice and the fact that deconstruction involves both space and closure; one 
must deduce that justice is only possible between the openness or undecidability of space and the closure or 
decidability of the law. The occurrence of justice is not space; nor is it closure that can it be enforced by the law. 
The closure of space closes the possibility of justice. Deconstruction therefore addresses itself to what is 
excluded by the closure of the system – heterogeneity, singularity, the event – in order to open space and the 
possibility of justice. Justice depends on deconstruction. From the opposite direction, it can also be said that the 
                                                      
199 ‘Undecidableness’, the ‘undecidable’ and ‘undecidability’ are not forms of indecision. It is not the oscillation between 
clear alternative that can be overcome, but rather a condition in which the ambiguity of a phenomenon or experience or 
argument is irreducible (Derrida 1993a: 21). This point was made in chapter 2. 
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possibility of justice sustains the movement of deconstruction. The possibility of justice creates a responsibility 
to work towards it. 
Justice calls one to respond (244). The responsibility generated by the possibility of justice is experienced as 
aporia (144). This experience is a confrontation with the undecidability of the condition of knowing and of 
knowing what to do. One might be tempted to assume that because we may judge the outcome of an event to be 
good or bad, that this judgement authorises a secondary assessment of whether it is just or unjust. However, 
justice cannot be determined inside the system because the system itself is violent and produces the possibility of 
empirical violence and because the pronouncement of justice requires absolute certainty (245). The singularity of 
an event or a person would need to be allowed to inhabit the system without any adulteration or containment in 
order to guarantee nonviolence. In Force of Law, Derrida (245) is explicit about the limits to the attempt to 
address the other in this way. He (Derrida 2002a: 245) asserts, “I cannot speak the language of the other except 
to the extent that I appropriate it and assimilate it according to the law”. This is true of all attempts to address the 
other or an event as a singularity in his or her or its own idiom (107). The exhibition at which Racism’s Last 
Word (1985b) was delivered, attempted to negotiate this difficulty by reverting to the extra-linguistic artistic 
medium of art. However, this does not succeed in escaping interpretive violence or in making justice or the other 
any more clearly understood. It is impossible to assess whether or not this type of gesture addresses the suffering 
other. What is more likely is that the artists only addressed themselves and articulated their own otherness, their 
own extra-linguistic excess that was provoked by an encounter with an external singularity and with a singular 
violence.  
The question of language pertains to meaning in the broadest sense – as inscription – and language in its narrow 
sense. Derrida (2002a: 230-232) frames his essay on violence with the practical ethical dilemma in which he 
finds himself having to speak another’s language. The problem of speaking the other’s language also has 
practical relevance in the context of the growing homogenisation and hegemony of European languages as the 
lingua franca of official exchanges in the legal and political arena (McCormick 2001: 402). Although disjunction 
pervades all communicative exchanges, the problem of marginalised languages and marginalised others is 
relevant, especially in South Africa in which those who stand before the law and before society must often 
represent themselves in a language that is not their own. The attempt to reverse the demand on the other so that it 
falls instead on the self, the system or indeed the courts to inhabit an unfamiliar tongue does, in a concrete way, 
begin to redress the system’s total denial or assimilation of the alterity of the other.  
The problem of justice alerts one to the tension between generality and singularity that leads us to look outside 
the present economy of meaning for solutions (Derrida 2002a: 245). In order to maintain the possibility of 
justice, there must be space within the structure of the law in which singularity can appear. However, the law 
cannot be constituted only of space. It requires structure and closure in order to function. It can also not tolerate 
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too much singularity because needs to be general in order to function as a law that is consistent and fair (245). It 
needs to be stable and predictable in order that it does not create a condition of fear and insecurity by its 
disorderliness (Snyman 2007: 679). Despite these general conditions, the law must respond to different situations 
in a way in which the differences that distinguish one case from another and one person from another are taken 
into account. The law is thus required to be general and stable and particular and transformative at the same 
time, lest it locks itself into a rationalised process of violent self-maintenance (Phelps & Kazee 2007: 354). Put 
another way, the law is not about the law. The law is about justice even though it is not justice. The violence of 
the law has been elaborated at length. However, before this theme is left, it is significant to note that Derrida 
(250) invokes Levinas’ other in his discussion of justice. This other – the singular – and the violence the other is 
made to endure can indeed be read as orienting the entire discussion of justice. The resistance of the other to the 
verb ‘to be’ can also be read as analogous to the resistance of justice to description (Derrida 2001: 157).  
d. CONFRONTING THE APORIA OF JUSTICE AND NONVIOLENCE 
Derrida (2002a: 237) argues that it is impossible to know that an action or an event has been just, or that a person 
is just. Unlike with Benjamin’s (1978: 291) non-violent divine violence, there is no violence within the system 
that can be called nonviolent and, subsequently, there is no violence that can bring about justice. For this reason, 
the association of transformation with violence in the system must not be mistaken for a position that advocates 
violent revolution (Buonamano 1998: 177). It is not the case that a revolution is the institution or practice of 
justice (Derrida 2002a: 178). Revolution never escapes the reach of law. Phrased in Benjamin’s (1978: 285) 
terminology, it is always a form of law-making violence. Even though Derrida (2002a: 298) reads the Critique of 
Violence as placing divine violence beyond the functioning of the system of law, it is still too clearly determined, 
“too messianico-Marxist or archeo-eschatological”.200 The exteriority of divine violence preserves its integrity 
even once it has arrived inside the system. Its violence retains a purity that is not possible within a complex 
system. Justice, contrastingly, only preserves its exteriority insofar as it does not appear in the system. The 
paradox created by the arche-violence – nonviolence is impossible, nonviolence is always possible – is 
experienced as aporia.201 
The confrontation with aporia is the experience of not knowing which way to go (Derrida 1993a: 12). It is an 
impasse, “before a door, a threshold, a border, a line, or simply the edge or the approach of the other as such” 
(12). Aporia permeates the boundary in all its modalities – “ethics, law, politics” – in its undecidableness (15). It 
                                                      
200 Derrida’s (2002a: 295) reading of Benjamin’s Nazism and the ‘Final Solution’: Probing the Limits of Representation 
resists the aesthetic closure of Benjamin’s typology of violence. Neither divine violence nor mythic violence, and not even 
both together can be used to explain the Holocaust without reducing a singular and complex expression of violence to a 
simple theoretical frame (McCormick 2001: 414). 
201 The notion of aporia was introduced in chapter 2; however, this introduction requires expansion in this context. 
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is an experience of the groundlessness of the boundary that is characterised by a paradox. The first aspect of this 
paradox is that the confrontation with aporia is transient. It is always possible to navigate beyond an aporia 
(Derrida 2002a: 244). However, aporia is precisely that which does not all one to pass. The second aspect of 
aporia is the experience of being confronted with the impossibility of passage (244, 245). Like the 
infrastructures, aporia is simultaneously possibility and impossibility (Derrida 2005a: 79). It is experienced as a 
“double bind” (Derrida 2000c: 300). As the impossibility of a decision as calculation, aporia opens up the 
possibility of a decision as a decision. The impossibility of the decision is therefore not negative (357). A degree 
of freedom with respect to the rule is implied in order for a decision to take place. The decision, understood in 
this way, creates an indissoluble responsibility that falls squarely on the shoulders of the one who decides. 
Responsibility for the decision is responsibility for the other. In the paradigmatic instance of a judge making a 
judgement in a court of law, the second level of violence produced within the law is confronted with its own lack 
of grounds – dissolved by the first level of violence – so that singularity can be addressed.  
The experience of aporia can be restated as the aporia of experience (Derrida 1993a: 15). All experience 
including the experience of the other and of justice must always pass through the law (Derrida 1993b: 384). The 
other does not merely pass through the law uneventfully. The trace of singularity also disrupts the law by calling 
attention to its arbitrariness and thus also its violence. This disruption unveils the arche-violence and necessitates 
a second reparatory violence, a firm decision, the affirmation of a frame through which the experience of 
singularity becomes meaningful despite its excess. Aporia disrupts the illusion that the decision or the frame 
follows seamlessly from logic, reason, truth. Following this argument, it cannot be denied that the insistence on 
aporia does problematise the value of the frame and its status.  
The insistence on the distinction between modernist epistemological strategies and complexity thinking with its 
definitive shift from object to system, may create the impression that complexity thinking is able to comprehend 
complex phenomena in their complexity without reverting to reductionist strategies (Morin 2005: 10, 12; 2007: 
101). In other words, it could appear that complexity is able to comprehend aporia without using the second level 
of violence. This is not accurate. Complexity and complex emergences are irreducible. The complex system as a 
model is an attempt to articulate this irreducibility without disallowing all forms of knowledge (Morin 2005 12). 
Access to complexity is always interrupted by the aporia of experience and enabled by inevitable mediation. In 
order to understand complex phenomena, to interpret and to know, one must always reduce the complexity of the 
phenomenon (Cilliers 2000a: 12). This is the paradox of understanding.202 In terms of justice and the law, law is 
                                                      
202 The impossibility of a complete understanding does not eliminate the possibility of understanding altogether. It does, 
however, introduce the second level of violence – of bounding – into all understanding: 
To fully understand a complex system, we need to understand it in all its complexity. Furthermore, because complex 
systems are open systems, we need to understand the system’s complete environment before we can understand the 
system, and, of course, the environment is complex in itself. There is no human way of doing this. The knowledge we 
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the calculation necessary for the pursuit of justice; however, it is not a sufficient condition for the achievement 
thereof (Derrida 2002a: 244).  
The notion of aporia is addressed to singularity and as such it is not a unified notion. There is not one experience 
of aporia, but ‘aporias’ in the plural (Derrida 1993a: 20). The three aporias associated with the law are the 
suspension of the law, the undecidability of justice and the urgency of the decision (Derrida 2002a: 251, 252, 
255). Derrida’s (255) three aporias of the law – introduced in chapter 2 in order to conceptualise the ‘outside’ of 
the system of meaning – can now be restated in terms of the discussion of violence and nonviolence developed 
hitherto.  
The first aporia is the experience of the inadequacy of the law to the pursuit of justice and the requirement that 
the law is suspended in order to maintain the possibility of justice. While the law is ultimately arbitrary, it is not 
trivial. The judge is obliged to apply the law and to act in accordance with the rule. In fact, the judge is 
responsible for this application. However, the judge bears a second responsibility to the event that has occurred 
and the singular individuals that do not demand the application of the law, but demand that justice is delivered. 
The application of the law defers to the demand for justice, and yet, the judge must enforce the law (252). The 
judge seeks to redress violence (pursue justice) by enforcing violence. According to Derrida (251), the 
application of the law in answer to empirical violence is an affirmation of the law. Each time the law is affirmed 
it is effectively reconstituted as law. A judge cannot escape the moment of violence in applying the law, but this 
violence must pass through a suspension, a moment in which the judge must address herself or himself to the 
singularity of the event. 
 The second aporia is the experience of the permanence of undecidability (252). The undecidable, argues Derrida 
(252), “is not merely the oscillation between two significations or two contradictory and very determinate rules”. 
It is also the situation in which a system of general meanings and general laws are called to respond to that 
which remains in excess of the markings of the system and the process of calculation. In its excess and without 
marking, its excess remains heterogeneous. The application of the law that seeks to do justice is marked by the 
moment of undecidability. The decision to apply the law cannot address itself to singularity without an 
acknowledgement of the impossibility of deciding as calculation (253). This moment ensures that it is the judge 
and not the law that bears the responsibility for the decision. In other words, justice does not regulate the 
decision because its content is indeterminate. It is this spectral – indeterminate and yet somehow present in its 
absence – quality of undecidability that allows a decision to be redressed and remade in response to the 
intolerable violence it may itself produce.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
have of complex systems is based on the models we make of these systems, but in order to function as models – and 
not merely as a repetition of the system – they have to reduce the complexity of the system” (Cilliers 2005a: 258). 
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Despite the persistence of the undecidable or the absence of perfect calculation, the third aporia places a 
constraint on the infinite demand of the other for justice. The third and final aporia is the urgency of the response 
to violence (255). Justice does not wait for the arrival of perfect knowledge. It is argued below that justice is 
always attached to the future. However, the demand for justice is still now. There is an “irreducible urgency” to 
respond to the violence to which one addresses oneself immediately (255). These aporias are the conditions of 
the possibility of justice. In order that justice could appear, aporia must not be denied. However, aporia also 
reiterates the impossibility of justice and thus also its exteriority. It is the characterisation of this exteriority that 
now requires more direct exposition. 
e. NONVIOLENCE IS OUTSIDE AND IN THE FUTURE 
The problem of justice cannot be extricated from the either singularity or space within complex organisation. 
Derrida (1994: 23) invokes Levinas’ definition of justice as relating to others without violence in his discussion 
in Spectres of Marx. A judgement must attempt to address singularity in its own tongue, as it were. However, 
despite Derrida’s (for example, 1985b) occasional trust in the power of the aesthetic object to address the other, 
there is still an irreducible space between addressor and addressee opened by the arche-violence (245). A 
judgement is thus always violent in the sense that it cannot be performed without the arche-violence and the 
boundary. A judgement as a performative – as a performance of force – is an enactment of violence on at least 
the first two levels and also possibly the third. The event of a judgement must arrive at some point. It cannot 
remain outside sense and calculation forever. A judgement must be reasonable and find its validation in reasons: 
...a performative cannot be just, in the sense of justice, except by grounding itself [en se fondant] in on 
conventions and so on other performatives, buried or not, it always maintains within itself some irruptive 
violence. It no longer responds to the demands of theoretical rationality... 
Justice remains to come, it remains by coming... (Derrida 2002a: 256) 
A judgement must ultimately submit itself to the limits of sense. A judgement must explain itself as soon as it 
has taken place. A judge must account for a judgement. However, Derrida (256) argues that the judgement is not 
merely an instance of violence on the second level of organisation. In creating space within sense, there is a 
possibility that the system will be transformed by the appearance of the other within this space. There is no way 
of guaranteeing that this will happen and no way of being assured that it has happened. This is because justice 
itself never arrives (McCormick 2001: 417). Unlike divine violence, justice is always conditioned by the 
subjunctive. If the singularity of an event could be presented within a judgement, then justice could arrive. 
Justice, like nonviolence, is not here and not now (Derrida 1994: 27). It is the possibility that violence will be 
overcome in the system (Derrida 1994: 27). Nonviolence on the first two levels is a necessary condition for the 
arrival of justice. While the occurrence of empirical nonviolence is not denied outright within complex 
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organisation, it is argued that its identification relies upon a frame and thus also upon the interpretive violence of 
closure.  
Justice and nonviolence are linked to a chain of supplemental concepts that are inside meaning insofar as they 
can be articulated, but still retain a measure of exteriority. Justice, nonviolence, forgiveness, the gift 203and 
singularity are impossible within complex organisation; but this impossibility or exteriority is not a simple 
negation (Derrida 1994: 23). The gift can be used to shed light on the possible (interior) impossibility 
(exteriority) of nonviolence. 
The impossibility of the gift is explained from different angles and within different contexts in Given Time: I. 
Counterfeit Money (Derrida 1992b). Its exposition in The Time of the King (1-33) crystallises the paradox of the 
gift as the possible impossible. The gift, like justice, involves a relation of the self to another (11). The self must 
give something other than herself or himself to the other (12). Another condition of the gift is that there is, “no 
reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt” (12). If the gift is met with a gift in return then the first gift is 
annulled by the exchange. It is taken up within an economy of exchange and is transformed from a gift into a 
commodity. This debt immediately undermines the gift as a gift. A gift that remains a gift must interrupt the 
economy of exchange (13). The giving of a gift does not only depend on the giver to give freely and without a 
counterclaim, but also on the person to whom the gift is given to accept the gift and resist the economy that is 
established with the acceptance of the gift. The gift, argues Derrida (1994: 23) is an “an-economic ex-position to 
others”.  
Forgiveness is another concept that is possible within complex organisation only as impossibility (Derrida 
2005b: 81). If one forgives in accordance with a duty or a law then one does not really forgive. For one to 
forgive what is legislated as forgivable is merely to follow a law. Forgiveness cannot be prescribed. For it to take 
place, one must forgive what the laws say is unforgivable. It is not conditioned by the debt raised with an 
apology. It is also not the logical outcome of a reparative process. Just as the eventfulness of empirical violence 
demands a hyperbolic rejection of violence that resists conceptualisation, so forgiveness exceeds the law and 
demands its own hyperbolic formulation. The gift, forgiveness, justice and nonviolence are only possible if their 
possibility is perpetually placed beyond the present organisation the complex system. Their respective arrivals 
are marked with the difference and deferral set in motion by différance. If the event of nonviolence is to remain 
an event, then it can never really become more than a possibility. The plenitude of meaning that would 
characterise a utopian vision cannot therefore bring about nonviolence. In fact, a utopian ideal, rather, guarantees 
                                                      
203 Justice is explicitly with the logic of the gift in Force of Law (Derrida 2002a: 235): 
It goes without saying that discourses on double affirmation, the gift beyond exchange and distribution, the 
undecidable, the incommensurable or the incalculable, on singularity, difference and heterogeneity are also, through 
and through, at least oblique discourses on justice. 
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violence. When one attempts to bring about justice or nonviolence, one is always assimilated to the chain of 
frames such as law, right and morality. The arrival of nonviolence is still always, “the coming of the impossible, 
where a "perhaps" deprives us of all assurance and leaves the future to the future” (Derrida 2002b: 344). 
The argument that nonviolence lies outside the system, both in the sense that it exceeds the system’s organisation 
in space – it cannot be subsumed within that organisation and structure – and in that it remains in the future, 
requires a clarification of what is meant by the future. The future that is suppressed by the second level of 
violence is separated from the present by a disjunction (Derrida 1994: 25). This disjunction is what prevents the 
absolute closure of the second level of organisation. The future as an event is never present within organisation. 
To say that nonviolence coincides with the future is not to say that nonviolence cannot exist here and now. This 
conclusion would undermine the development of any ethical or political position. There is nonviolence but it is 
not fully determined by either our actions or descriptions. To call a certain organisation nonviolent is to 
incorrectly assume perfect knowledge of that organisation. The future as an event is not necessarily good 
(Derrida 2002b:105). In fact, to open the system to an undefined future is to take a risk (Derrida 1997: 5). It is 
not because the future is necessarily nonviolent that the present must be interrogated. It is because the present is 
violent (5). Like Levinas (1979: 24), Derrida (1994: 37) develops a position in which any discourse on peace and 
nonviolence is always a discussion that involves the future. However, in doing so the future as an “eschaton” 
must be distinguished from the future as a telos (37). Teleology, as it was argued in chapter 4, is a frame that 
perpetuates the second level of violence. However, eschatology does not close organisation. Rather, as a future 
without form, the eschaton interrupts the closure of the present.  
VI. ETHICS, VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE 
Ethics is not rendered redundant by the acknowledgement of complexity. In fact, ethics is an inevitable 
consequence of the first and second levels of violence. Critchley (1992: 31) argues that ethics is the horizon of 
all deconstruction. Without the possibility of perfect knowledge, one is responsible for the form and content of 
what one knows and how one acts based on that knowledge. In this sense, ethics can be thought to be prior to 
knowledge. However, this strong formulation implies a separation of ethics and epistemology that cannot be 
sustained within complexity thinking. Within critical complexity thinking, concepts like justice, nonviolence and 
forgiveness that inform and underpin moral and political positions are rendered problematic. Still, particularity 
within deconstruction, these concepts are still privileged (Caputo 1997: 41). 204  This privilege cannot be 
                                                      
204 It was mentioned in section IV that justice was afforded the status of a quasi-transcendental within deconstruction. In 
Force of Law (Derrida 2002a: 243), the claim is made that, “Deconstruction is justice” (author’s emphasis). This hyperbolic 
formulation is meant to underscore the significance of the notion of justice within deconstruction. Both nonviolence and 
justice are made possible by the opening of space in the system and also function as pseudo-origins for the movement of 
deconstruction. Neither is, however, a pure and transcendental origin. A truly transcendental source of ethics such as Kant’s 
(1989: 38, 39) categorical imperative, introduced in chapter 4, provides an absolute foundation for all moral judgements. 
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ultimately grounded, but it persists in the form of a commitment to the possibility of relationships without 
violence that is simultaneously motivated and frustrated by the inevitability of violence in the complex system 
(Derrida, 2001: 102).  
In order to subscribe to the ethics of complexity informed by the disavowal of empirical violence, it would 
appear that one must already perceive violence to be a problem. This is the danger of an ethics of complexity. It 
cannot be enforced by a law or a commandment. It is indeed the opposite that is true. The recognition of this 
type of ethics, which is the recognition of violence as a problem, is what gives the commitment to law is force. 
The ethics of complexity at which we arrive via deconstruction is an ethics that demands a singular response to 
the oppressed, the disenfranchised, the excluded, the marginalised, the weak and the suffering whether they are 
good or bad (Derrida 2002b: 35-36). It is an ethics that one might, in deference to Nietzsche (2006: 311-361) and 
the debt owed by deconstruction and complexity to his performance of decentred thought, frame as an ethics 
beyond any categorical designation of good and evil.  
It should be recalled that the first and second levels of violence in complex organisation are not necessarily good 
or necessarily bad. Furthermore, both are necessary conditions of meaning in the system. To frame violence as a 
problem within complexity is not to advocate its eradication on these levels (Corson 2001: 866, 868). Without 
violence there is neither structure nor deconstruction. Still, the problem of violence on these two levels demands 
a response and an active engagement. As it was argued at the beginning of the chapter, empirical violence and 
the suffering it produces, create this demand.  
The material violence suffered by the other is not only rape, murder and other atrocities. It is also the material 
experience of violent distinctions made within language and the law. The suffering of the other raises the 
question of ethical responsibility, what it is and how it is borne. The possibility of nonviolence produces a 
responsibility to act in a way that attempts to bring about nonviolence despite the impossibility of its full 
presence in the complex system (Cornell 1992: 149, 167). 205  Derrida (1993b: 377-380) characterises this 
responsibility as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Neither justice nor nonviolence fulfils this requirement because of their respective exteriority in relation with the complex 
system as a model for understanding social systems. 
205 Caputo, (2003: 9) questions the efficacy and value of this exterior notion of justice and this question can be extended, by 
analogy, to nonviolence:  
But if something unconditional happens, without sovereignty and without being, without force and without power, 
would it have the wherewithal to transform us, to turn us around, to make us new? Would it, could it, be something 
truly revolutionary, or would it lie lame and lifeless and ineffective? Could something be revolutionary without 
having revolutionary power? Could something that is at best a “weak force” (force faible) be strong enough to save 
us?  
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1. One answers for one’s self and one’s actions beyond a simple present, for everything that bears one’s 
name (378); 
2. One responds to the other and for the other (379); 
3. One answers before the other and is judged by the other (379-380). 
The responsibility to respond to violence in the name of nonviolence is a responsibility that, like both empirical 
violence and nonviolence, is not contained within the boundaries that enable meaning and structure and law. It is 
thus a responsibility without a boundary (Derrida 2002a: 247). It is an infinite responsibility. The aporia of the 
judgement, both in terms of what conventionally falls into the sphere of ethical or rather moral judgements, as 
well as the decision in general, the employment of a frame, prevents the transference of this responsibility onto 
any code. A judge that implements a racist law does not escape the responsibility for the violence – both 
interpretive and empirical – that is produced by that judgement (Derrida 2005b: 145, 154).  
This formulation is an outcome of the acknowledgement of complexity in the system. An ethics of complexity 
cannot be unproblematically translated into a practical, moral, juridical or political programme of action (Derrida 
2005b: 145). Any clearly defined programme involves a leap that is discontinuous with the calculation and 
preparation that preceded it. The appearance of the incalculable at the limits of sense is inevitable. Derrida (146) 
refers to the example of cloning in order to demonstrate the appearance of the incalculable even within science. 
Proponents of cloning defend it because its benefits and risks can be calculated and measured against one 
another. Although this exercise is necessary and important, the values attributed to each benefit and risk a that 
guide the entire exercise, imply a leap whether this is acknowledged in the calculation or not. The leap is not 
mystical. It does not mean that calculation is not valid; it is simply never calculation all the way down. The same 
point can be made in terms of critical complexity theory. All knowledge involves reduction in complexity 
(Cilliers 2002: 78). It involves framing and simplification (81).206 This sensitivity leads both deconstruction and 
complexity to a paradox of reduction: we cannot reduce that which we want to know without at least distorting 
what it is we want to know; and we cannot know with reduction (Cilliers 2005b: 137-138; Derrida 1979a). The 
limitations of knowledge produce a normative dimension to every act of knowing. A denial of the necessary 
violence of thinking, which is both enabling and constraining, is a denial of the ethical responsibility one bears 
for this violence.  
To use the aporia of the experience of justice in order to justify a position of non-intervention is neither the 
intention of deconstruction nor a rigorous understanding of its emphasis on singularity and responsibility 
                                                      
206 “Complex systems are open systems; interactions take place across their boundaries. However, if an infinite number of 
interactions have to be considered, the production of meaning will be indefinitely postponed. This, we know, is not the case. 
Meaning is generated in real time. How is this possible? Because meaning is constituted in a specific context where some 
components are included and others not. It would not be possible to have any real meaning if the number of relationships 
were not limited. In other words, for meaning or knowledge to exist at all, there have to be limits. We cannot comprehend 
the world in all its complexity. We have to reduce that complexity in order to generate understanding” (Cilliers 2002: 81). 
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(McCormick 2001: 416). One never escapes the obligation to act. In fact this can be formulated even more 
strongly. One never escapes action. No response is still a response for which one is responsible regardless of 
whether or not one accepts this responsibility. One must engage in political and legal debates and intervene in 
the opening and closing of meaning (Derrida 2002a: 257). This is a dangerous position because it is vulnerable 
to relativism. One has to ask, however, whether this danger is produced by a deconstructive attitude or whether 
deconstruction does not expose a danger that pervades all juridical and political interventions and simply goes 
unacknowledged. A relativistic licence to do or say anything at all is not sustainable within a rigorous 
understanding of opening and closure in the system. There are not infinite degrees of freedom for any form of 
knowledge in the system and knowledge of moral judgements is no exception. There will be feedback from the 
system. The second level of violence suppresses but cannot finally erase the first and third levels of violence as 
sources of change and eventfulness in the system. It is certainly not proposed that the system will simply self-
correct as if towards some perfect self-directed end. It is simply that the possibility of change is always still the 
possibility of change for the better toward a nonviolent future. An ethics of complexity is therefore necessarily 
an ethics of transformation. Transformation requires us to engage the future by anticipating and working towards 
a just tomorrow, by imagining better futures.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The exteriority of empirical violence and nonviolence in relation to the complex system begs a final 
qualification. It should be emphasised that, in chapters 1 and 2, the system was specified as a model of reality 
and not reality in itself. The articulation of empirical violence and nonviolence inside that model is the attempt to 
keep that model open to the world, to reality in itself, to which no immediate access is possible. It is because of 
the necessity of the model for all understanding that is absolutely imperative that there is room for a robust 
discussion of violence. Without this space, the validity of the model as a means of understanding social systems 
is greatly undermined. 
One of the sources for the possible characterisation of complexity theory as a theory that reduces  human beings 
to mere cogs in the machine is its lack of a forceful and developed articulation of violence as a problem. Without 
the ability to articulate violence, not only as a structural feature of the system but as an ethical, political and 
moral problem, the only impetus for change from the perspective of critical complexity thinking would still turn 
on the health or robustness of the system. For example, an argument for cultural diversity can be made from 
critical complexity theory. It could be made by arguing that diversity – difference – is a precondition for the 
emergence of complexity. And, further, diversity is not only a necessary condition for complexity, but more 
differences in the system allow for richer relationships between elements inside the system. This is a valid 
argument, given the model of complex systems developed in chapter 1. However, without the language of 
violence, this argument is inadequate. It gives credence to Dillon’s negative (2000) assessment of complexity 
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theory as a merely strategic and instrumental use of difference. Using the violence of understanding as a point of 
departure returns the focus of a discussion of diversity back to the victims who suffer because of their difference. 
This may seem a trivial point. However, the suffering of others and the health of the system will not always lead 
us to the same outcome. Critical complexity theory – as distinguished from restricted engagements with 
complexity (see Morin 2005) – opened to the language of violence, allows for the rehabilitation of the person, 
the other, the damaged thing, the one who suffers, as the starting point of and political or moral action. From 
here, it can be established that social system as a complex system does not consume the individual. While this 
does appear at first to be a humanist argument, it can be extended to all difference and singularity that is 
violently suppressed and reduced in the system, including animals and the environment. 
Deconstructive ethics as an ethics informed by the acknowledgement of complexity always involves a return to 
the margin. The separation of a text, a meaningful system, into components that are essential to the constitution 
of the system and components which are merely marginal because of their resistance to the established identity 
or order within the system sanctifies a certain attitude towards marginality. Deconstruction reverses this attitude 
(Culler, 1983: 215). Its supplementation of critical complexity theory allows this theory to develop a similar 
attitude towards those who suffer as a result of the normal organisation of the system. It is this attitude that 
underpins a commitment towards engaging with the structures of meaning in order to work towards the 
alleviation of empirical violence by employing the first two levels of violence. The ethics of critical complexity 
theory displaces the absolute authority of the closure of the present (Critchley 1992: 26). This is why the 
affirmation of an ethics of complexity is always also the affirmation of excess and exteriority. 
Arendt (1970: 80) warns that the dependence on violence for interruption within a theory always risks endorsing 
empirically violent historical events such as wars and revolutions, whether they produce great suffering or not. 
This is not the case here. In order to arrive at this position, it would have to be possible to give content to the 
notion of justice that underwrites the justness of a revolution. From complexity, there is no way of arguing that a 
violent revolution is itself ever just. The ethics of critical complexity is not an apologia for violent revolution. 
What is advocated is that decisions are made and actions are taken in order to redress empirical violence in the 
name of the possibility of nonviolence. In this process, one cannot escape the constitutive and enabling violence 
of one’s position. However, when one approaches the problem of violence with sensitivity to one’s limitations, 
one’s position will necessarily be provisional and correctable. The action advocated within the ethics of critical 
complexity is reminiscent of Spivak’s (1990: 109) strategic essentialism. Although one departs from a position 
that is not essentialist, one is not half committed to one’s actions or ideas or morals (11, 15). Every ethical-
political engagement tends towards essentialism insofar as it requires a closure of the boundary (51). One 
imagines a better future and commits fully to a moral judgement and consequent actions in order to bring about 
change that secures that future. One does not say that the oppression of women is wrong given a specific 
understanding of women as free and autonomous agents capable of choice and action, within the context of a 
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specific culture and within the present historical moment, but this position cannot be ultimately grounded. One 
certainly does not halfway reject the violence of the Rwandan genocide or propose that in some cases, rape is not 
only understandable, but morally justifiable.  
However, having begun with an acknowledgement of radical uncertainty and recognition of the problem of 
violence, one is sensitive to the discontinuities and contradictions of one’s position. Spivak (58) argues that all 
liberation movements and identity based politics will undermine themselves because they impose a hegemonic 
identity and programme onto singular individuals. For example, the women’s movement from which such 
privileges as control over one’s reproductive health and the right to vote depends on an understanding of women 
that denies the internal differences that allow divergent experiences of womanhood. However, this identity 
which makes sexual difference into an essential truth is strategically useful. Our only hope is that a utopian ideal, 
a political movement, an identity and the law will deconstruct. Once it can no longer be maintained that a frame 
alleviates more violence than it generates, it must be deconstructed. Again, this judgement must be made by the 
employment of another frame and without any ultimate guarantee. The affirmation of an ethics of critical 
complexity is a risk. It is a risk that requires that one always engages in the anticipation of a different future. 
Further attention to the consequences of this analysis is given in the conclusion.  
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CONCLUSION: A RADICAL POLITICS OF NONVIOLENCE – AS IF IT WERE POSSIBLE 
I. COMPLEXUS, COMPLEXITY, DIFFÉRANCE, VIOLENCE...  
This conclusion is the final act of violence in this project. It is the final opportunity to gather up all the 
arguments developed, clear up any lagging ambiguities, any potentially heterogeneous organisations and to 
constrain the possibilities of (mis)interpretation and so also to enable clear meaning. It will not be used to restate 
the detailed analysis that has been developed throughout the body of this work. Some reinforcement is certainly 
necessary. However, this is, in the first place, the necessary closure of an interpretative frame. It must present 
itself as a justification for the project as a whole. In a sense, this justification is simple: violence is a problem that 
demands a response and the acknowledgement of complexity, whether through the lens of critical complexity 
theory, deconstruction, or informed by Nietzsche or Levinas, has implications for how we respond and why we 
do. In order to get to this response, two tasks needed execution: a theoretical exploration of complexity; and an 
exposition of the meaning of violence.  
This thesis has been about violence and complexity. The ‘and’ signifies the situation of violence in an 
unspecified relation to the experience and conceptualisation of complexity and vice versa. The indeterminate 
character of this relation, the space opened by the ‘and’, is intended to accommodate the various meanings of 
violence that emerge at various levels of complex organisation. In terms of the first level of violence, it is more 
specific to say that there is violence in the system. Or, even to close the distance opened by a conjunction and 
pronounce that violence is the system.207 In terms of the second level of violence, one might characterise it as the 
violence of the system. It is the violence that emerges in the process of the system’s self-organisation, through 
which the system produces a structure and stable meaning. This violence of structuring, bounding and framing is 
the violence of the system that obscures its original violence, its arbitrary differential organisation (Derrida 
1979b).208 The third level of violence – material or empirical violence – is neither entirely in nor entirely of the 
system. Here the ‘and’ signifies a relation of difference and tension. In a sense, this violence is ‘other than’ or 
outside meaning. It must be drawn into the system by means of the first two levels of violence to become 
meaningful.  
                                                      
207 See chapter 3. This characterisation of violence as the system is related to the idea that meaning emerges out of relations 
of difference between elements or components in a complex system. It is because meaningful components are organised 
through asymmetrical, antagonistic and relations of différance that this ‘violent’ system can be juxtaposed to a peaceful 
system in which meaning is a property intrinsic to individual components, and in which relations between components 
would subsequently be ordained by this pre-given and therefore natural order of things (Cilliers 1998a: 95, 120, 124; 
Derrida 1982: 8; Morin 1992: 119). 
208 See chapter 4. 
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With respect to each of its three modulations or levels, the exposition of violence could not begin without 
attention to the organisation of the system itself. The extensive discussion of the system informed by critical 
complexity theory and deconstruction was necessitated by the position of this paper, which holds that the affinity 
between critical complexity theory and other theoretical positions ought to be demonstrated. To open critical 
complexity theory in this deliberate way has served a dual purpose. First, it has served to underwrite a 
philosophical reading of a theory that has emerged largely outside philosophy. Its execution has shown how 
critical complexity confronts philosophical problems and that it can be used to supplement philosophical 
discourses that confront related problems. Secondly, contextualising critical complexity theory within a wider 
philosophical confrontation with complexity and complex phenomena has also served to supplement and so 
enrich critical complexity theory.  
The conceptualisation of violence, taking the epistemological and ethical implications of complexity into 
account, has been dense. It has required that critical complexity theory is placed within a wider philosophical 
context and supplemented with several references to other theoretical positions discussed both at the core of this 
discussion and at its margins. A significant motivation for the choice of deconstruction as the primary 
supplement is that deconstruction has an expressed and pervasive preoccupation with the violence implicated in 
the development of meaning in human interactions with one another and with the world and objects in it (Derrida 
1998: 9). This orientation is not always explicit, but it is woven into the fabric of deconstructive readings of the 
philosophical canon and of more marginal texts.  
The relative novelty of complexity theory and its eccentricity in relation to the philosophical canon has 
demanded a thorough clarification of the conceptual space in which violence is to be readdressed. It has also 
demanded that the place of critical complexity theory within the humanities and social sciences is challenged 
through encounters with more established socially oriented theories. The insights drawn from critical complexity 
theory, of which the insistence upon limits to knowledge and an ethics informed by uncertainty have been 
emphasised in this project, are not unique to it. In this sense, a significant aim of this exploration of violence was 
to show that critical complexity theory has not fallen, perfectly formed, from the sky, and that it can and should 
be developed and questioned from beyond its own boundaries. There is a remarkable poverty of attention to the 
considered comparison of complexity theory with other theories in order to show points of agreement and 
divergence.209 Where this comparison has taken place, it has often been either to show how philosophy benefits, 
without reciprocity, from an encounter with complexity theory; or it has been to argue that complexity theory 
fills the void opened by the obsolescence of philosophy (see for example Dillon 2000 and Taylor 2001). 
                                                      
209 This conclusion is based on a literary survey of texts that deal with complexity and poststructuralism, and on readings of 
seventy-one sources that draw complexity theory into conversation with poststructural philosophies. 
208 
 
The relationship between complexity theory and philosophy, seen as one in which complexity theory is heralded 
as the usurper of the place of other more thoroughly philosophical philosophies, is firmly rejected. The extension 
of complexity theory beyond natural phenomena in order that social phenomena can be modelled as complex 
systems does, however, require pause. It requires a critical engagement with the central concepts of complexity 
and with its lacunae. While it is the position of this thesis that the critical complexity theory espoused by Edgar 
Morin and Paul Cilliers throughout their respective works – as well as similar approaches developed by other 
authors – do hold potential for application in the social sciences, this enthusiasm is optimistically qualified. 
There is still work to be done in terms of conceptual development – as this thesis attempts with respect to 
violence. It is not necessary that the theory is perfected before it is applied. It is also a profitable enterprise to 
work out certain theoretical problems in the process of application. However, what is imperative is that the 
critical, reflexive engagement that follows from a complexity-informed epistemology is part of all complexity 
related endeavours. Any model of a complex system must itself be evaluated in the course of its application. 
Using Derrida’s (1993a: 20-21) conceptualisation, one can say that the confrontation with complex phenomena 
is an experience of aporia. One must develop and apply theory in order to enable understanding; but 
understanding also requires that theory is suspended in order that its interpretive violence is not carried out 
without consideration of the phenomenon in question, in its singularity (20).  
Formulated alternatively, the application must be carried out with an emphasis on complexity as a problem to be 
confronted, rather than a solution to be enforced (Morin 1992: 386). Edgar Morin (1983a; 1983b; 1992; 2005; 
2007) and Paul Cilliers (1998b; 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2001; 2002; 2004; 2005a; 2005b; 2006) both engage with 
complexity in this manner. Both underline the limits of theories of complexity and of models of complex 
systems (see for example Cilliers 2000c and Morin 1992: 150). At the most basic level, the acknowledgement of 
complexity is a challenge to all those structures that impose closure onto the field of meaning. To use complexity 
theory, which is a discourse in development, without reflecting on the fundamental uncertainty it proposes, is to 
fail to enact a rigorous application of the notion of complexity, which exceeds the closure of any particular 
model.  
If the fundamental epistemological uncertainty that is espoused by complexity thinking is to be applied with 
rigor; then critical complexity theory cannot simply be taken to dismiss other discourses on social phenomena in 
terms of its own internal distinctions – as if these distinctions are afforded the status of a metaphysical 
foundation. Complexity opens the philosophical conversation. It cannot close it. To develop a discourse on 
violence beginning and ending only within critical complexity theory would be to impose a premature and 
ultimately unjustifiable theoretical closure – an unproductive violence – onto it. Such violence could find no 
justification within a rigorous reading of complexity informed philosophy. Within the tension between critical 
complexity theory and deconstruction, a novel, interesting and ethically significant understanding of violence 
emerges.  
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Oriented by a concern with violence, this project has been structured in order to accommodate several points of 
engagement between critical complexity theory and other theories that endeavour to confront the ultimate lack of 
metaphysical foundation at the base of knowledge and of morality.210 Jacques Derrida’s (1997; 1981b; 1982) 
différance has been used to direct these engagements. Deconstruction has framed critical complexity and it been 
framed within critical complexity theory, as an attempt to navigate complexity.211  
Deconstruction allows itself to be read as a form of complex systems thinking. However, it is also not confined 
to this reading. Derrida also engages various modes of complexity thinking in other theorists who do not employ 
the system as a philosophical tool. His (Derrida 2001: 97-192) reading of Levinas is an example of this 
engagement. The conclusion drawn by demonstrating the affinity between these distinct styles of thinking that 
also have distinct objects and arguments is not to establish an identity between them. Deconstruction is not 
critical complexity theory. Critical complexity theory is also not deconstruction. However, in the encounter 
between critical complexity theory and deconstruction, interesting philosophical/political positions can be 
explored.  
Différance captures the sense of complexity as complexus; that is, as interrelation without fixed and absolute 
boundaries between elements inside the system (Morin 2005: 6). It also captures the sense of complexity as 
dynamic organisation in time and space. It is the position of this thesis that Derrida’s chain of supplementary 
(non)concepts can be supplemented thus: trace, space, supplement, parergon, hymen, graft, writing, arche-
violence, différance, complexus, complexity, boundary, asymmetry, antagonism, and violence (Derrida 1981b: 
40; Spivak 1997: lxx). These infrastructures, via their relations to Saussure and to both Morin and Cilliers, have 
provided the structural framework for a relationship between critical complexity theory and other philosophical 
perspectives.  
The density of the forgoing five chapters has been deliberate in one sense and unavoidable in another. It has been 
necessitated by Derrida’s persistent attention to texts outside deconstruction and by the reiteration of significant 
themes and problems dealt with in this thesis, outside deconstruction and critical complexity theory. The 
infrastructures – différance, trace, space, arche-violence and others – whose general characterisation of the text 
must not be taken for ontological certainty, open themselves to relationships with a broader philosophical 
corpus. Of particular significance in this process of extra-complexity reference, not only by way of Derrida’s 
engagement, have been the philosophical writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, Hannah Arendt, Immanual Kant and 
Emmanuel Levinas.  
                                                      
210 Derrida’s (2001: 351-370) Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences was used to situate all 
complexity-informed and grammatological projects within the same epistemological break. 
211 See chapter 2. 
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The tripartite structure of complex violence is fraught with tension between the desire to articulate and redress 
violence with certainty, and the acknowledgement of the limitations of any such attempt. The strategic division 
of violence into three distinct ‘levels’ cannot be maintained all the way down, as it were. Still, these ‘levels’ are 
not trivial, despite the fact that, like all meaning, they are arbitrary in the sense that they cannot be 
metaphysically motivated. Each level of violence corresponds to different but related experiences of violence. 
And, although the third level of violence – the material but not necessarily physical level – appears relatively 
marginal in relation to discussion of the violence of meaning in this project, it must be emphasised that these two 
levels of violence are part of a framework in which the problem of empirical violence and violence as an 
empirical problem can be addressed. The first two levels of violence allow for the widest possible understanding 
of violence, so that no vulnerable voice claiming to have borne witness to violence may be shut up without due 
consideration. The theorisation of violence on the three levels of organisation is a political strategy informed by 
the ethics of complexity, by which violence is opened to ethical-political engagement, as an impetus for 
intervention. 
II. THE FIRST LEVEL OF VIOLENCE: POLITICS WITHOUT GROUNDS 
The first level of violence encompasses the dynamic organisation of the arche-violence within deconstruction 
and asymmetry and antagonism within complexity theory (Derrida 1997: 112; Cilliers 1998a: 95, 120, 124; 
Morin 1992: 119). Its operation is the very possibility of meaning without a metaphysical foundation. In terms of 
an abstract system of language, this level of violence seems relatively innocuous. However, the relational 
structure of meaning and the asymmetrical character of these relations are not innocuous if it enables, as it does, 
a system of meaning through which subjects come to understand themselves and one another. Given this 
performative force of language, ‘asymmetry’ and ‘antagonism’ cannot be thought of as neutral mechanisms. The 
first level of violence fails to maintain neutrality because it enables the emergence of boundaries and hierarchies 
in the system. The arche-violence is neither good nor bad on its own, but it is never on its own. There is no 
organisation without structure and a measure of stability. Value judgements like good/bad, right/wrong, and 
good/evil are possible because meaning is not random. The arche-violence is constrained by the boundary and its 
violence; but the boundary can also always be undermined by arche-violence. It is this second possibility that 
enables us to judge and to oppose one boundary with another.  
The arche-violence/asymmetry/antagonism ensures that all organisation and order emerges out of the complex 
relations between components in the system (Derrida 1997: 37, 139-140). No order is possible without it. The 
first level of violence also ensures that these components are never isolated and always already engaged with one 
another. As a result, ethics, necessitated by being in the world with others, is made possible and always already 
in play. In this regard, it should be recalled that without the first level of violence – the violence of nomination – 
there is no possibility of addressing oneself to another or of addressing violence in the world (112). The arche-
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violence opens the self to a relation to what is outside it. However, in enabling a relation to this other in this way, 
the arche-violence also removes me from the other whose immediate presence is thwarted by spacing opened by 
the name.  
Considering the systemic interactions between human beings or between cultures or however the components of 
a social system are defined, the implication of violence (and space) of the name and of the boundary in the 
formation of what we mean to ourselves and to other people – as well as in the very process of ethical relation to 
the other – closes the possibility of unproblematic, unmediated and deterministic understanding and engagement. 
The asymmetry of relations inside the system always contains the possibility that there will, as Levi-Straus 
(1961: 292) suspects, be exploitation, domination and empirical violence. The ethics of complex interaction is 
also a politics of complex interaction because of this danger inherent to complex interaction in which, it would 
seem, all components can never be equal. Structural inequality is inevitable but never beyond the possibility of 
reorganisation. The possibility of inequality is thus the possibility that it will be challenged. 
The relationship between components in the complex system is political in another sense. It is never only about 
the relationship between two isolated elements (Derrida 1997: 139-140). Every relationship always involves 
related subsystems as well as the system as a whole. The concept of violence on the first level can be used to 
affirm the old feminist motto: there is no space inside the system that is not conditioned by general systemic 
organisation. There is no personal space that is not political, or whose meaning can be isolated from the broader 
network in which its participants exist. Consequently, there is no space inside the system that cannot be 
addressed as a politically pertinent matter. The notion of politics employed in this argument is a lean notion, but 
a significant one. Politics is not meant, here, to refer to the acts or organs of the state or social institutions. 
Instead, this more general concept of politics encompasses all that is public and systemic and, as such, involves 
general social structures. Because these social structures emerge out of antagonistic and asymmetric relations, 
because the complex system is not a flat, homogenous structure, and because these the conditions of hierarchy 
emerge out of organisation on the level of the arche-violence, politics also refers to a terrain which is ordered 
and which is, by definition, not ordered by nature. Politics is juxtaposed to a natural state because the arche-
violence destroys the possibility of a natural order. 
From the perspective of critical complexity theory supplemented with deconstruction, politics can be understood 
as being with others, mediated by difference and boundaries, always retaining the possibility of producing 
empirical violence for one’s self and for the others, the meaning of which is contested and always remains 
contestable. The politics of complexity is a politics of engagement. One is always already politically engaged. If 
one is engaged and always already participating in the general system of meaning which, in turn, structures one’s 
relations with others and with the world, then the acknowledgement of that engagement presents one with the 
opportunity engage strategically and with cognisance of one’s implication in the constitution of meaning beyond 
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one’s own local actions. Regarding the first level of organisation, one can say: the system is violence. And, 
regarding the definition of politics offered here, one must also, consequently, say that the system is politics. The 
arche-violence separates meaning from being. In so doing it undermines the formation of a utopian vision that 
claims a natural or determinate status for itself. To say that we cannot formulate a perfect order or restore a 
natural one is not to advocate a simple maintenance of the present. Instead, it leads us to re-evaluate and revalue 
the future (Levinas 1979: 24). Understanding the first level of violence in this way, as necessitating an ethical-
political engagement with the future, guards against the valorisation or neutralisation of violence that Hannah 
Arendt (1970: 74) reads in philosophies that insist on a relationship between violence and the genesis or vitality 
of the system. 
III. THE SECOND LEVEL OF VIOLENCE: WE MUST CHALLENGE THE MASTER  
If one arrives at this point at which the inevitability of ethical engagement and political engagement is 
acknowledged and one considers this acknowledgement alongside the perpetual possibility of empirical violence 
in the system – the perpetual possibility that one produces this empirical violence by one’s own actions – one has 
an imperative to advocate and act against the simple maintenance of the present organisation of the system. One 
must identify and deconstruct the structures through which the second level of violence operates. One has a 
responsibility for oneself, to oneself, to the other and for the other, and for all the others (Derrida 1993b: 377-
380). This responsibility may appear to be overwhelming, from the perspective of the choosing subject. It may 
be impractical, from the perspective of the ethicist, the lawyer, the politician or anyone who needs to formulate a 
system in which agents are held accountable by means of a chastisement or retributive action that effectively 
organises various acts of empirical violence on a scale of relative badness or evil or undesirability.  
However, as it was suggested in chapter 5, when considering Derrida’s hyperbolic formulation of responsibility, 
in Politics of Friendship (377-380) and throughout Acts of Religion (2002a), following Levinas’ (1979) 
hyperbolic deference to the other, and Morin’s (2007: 3-4) insistence on the dramatically named “mutilation” of 
thinking, and Cilliers’ (2000b; 2001: 145; 2005a: 264) insistence on responsibility that exceeds the 
determination of any rule, it must be questioned whether this tendency toward excess is motivated by theoretical 
inclination, or if the theoretical insistence on excess exposes this condition from which rules and categories – the 
second level of violence – shield us. The denial of the hyperbolic is concomitantly a failure to respond to the 
singularity, the other person, the people, the animal, the planet, that is harmed, excluded, marginalised and 
oppressed with all the confidence that a rule affords. If this is indeed the case, then it might be the place of a 
philosophical engagement with such practical matters as lawfulness and politics, to intervene in order to restore 
the excess, to be, as Derrida (2001: 76) says, “the attempt-to-say-the-hyperbole”. The authority of the various 
incarnations of the second level of violence – the frame, the boundary, the line, the law, the rule, the calculation 
– must all be interrogated before they are accepted and also after. This must be done at the risk of slipping 
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outside sense, of speaking non-sense; it must be done at the risk of sounding mad. This is not an argument 
against lawfulness and calculation, but only an argument against the ossification or indeed deification of order at 
the cost of those who are harmed by it.  
A radical politics informed by the acknowledgement of complexity as an emergent property of the interaction 
between subject and object is radical precisely because it is underpinned by a deconstructive engagement with 
the present. In order to allow this engagement, the present must be understood in terms of both the past (which 
cannot be known objectively, but must be selected) and the future (which is constrained by the past and the 
present, but not to the extent that the possibility of a truly eventful event can be closed) (Cilliers 2006: 109; 
Derrida 1994: 14-16). The hyperbolic responsibility that accompanies the acknowledgement of complexity is, in 
many ways, responsibility for the present we create. The emphasis on the ultimately arbitrary character of the 
second level of violence, stripped of its foundation by the arche-violence, frames human social systems as 
creations, a collective creative acts. Things are never simply what they are but what we have made them. There 
is no maker or master that cannot be challenged. 
Rather than propose metaphysical grounds for moral responsibility or political intervention, the position 
espoused from within deconstruction is that we are all infinitely responsible for what we do and what we do not 
do precisely because there is no ultimate transcendent justification to underwrite our actions. Derrida (2002b: 57) 
elaborates on the political significance of this responsibility. It is not only the state sanctioned performances of 
the second level of violence that require critical engagement. It is also counter-state demonstrations, 
revolutionary projects, liberation movements and identity politics that require the same rigorous questioning. 
One cannot commit oneself, argues Derrida (57), under the weight of one’s responsibility, without first 
publically questioning the hierarchies and boundaries that structure any political movement. One must ask who 
is framing the process, how it is being framed, and who is marginalised and excluded by the frame. This 
argument implies that those with greater agency within the structure of an organisation have a greater 
responsibility than those who do not.  
A radical politics informed by the acknowledgement of complexity cannot profess that a revolution without 
violence will come to save to us. We are thrown into a world of violence without anything more than the 
irrepressible possibility that it might not be so tomorrow. Nonviolence, justice, forgiveness, the gift, and the 
singular will not arrive without work. We cannot wait for the event to come. We must act and act now (Derrida 
2002a: 251-252). And yet, with all the urgency of a response to violence that is necessary, our actions, models 
and calculations, the frame through which we are able to address violence, must be provisional (Cilliers 2001: 
139). There is always the risk of reification, of carrying out our own strategic violence (Spivak 1990: 109). 
Responsibility for the present never rescinds, even after an intervention. Revolutions often justify the recourse to 
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violence by proposing the advent of the new: the new law, the new state (Derrida 2002a: 269). There is violence 
inherent in this vision of the future because it sees itself as a final solution with possibility of change.  
IV. ADDRESSING EMPIRICAL VIOLENCE IN COMPLEX ORGANISATIONS  
Empirical violence and the suffering it engenders is, again, the ultimate motivation for this engagement with 
violence. Sympathy with the marginalised and oppressed is what informs the critical engagement with and 
scrutiny of the framing of empirical violence and the programmes by which it is to be addressed (Derrida 2002b: 
39). The conceptual framework developed from critical complexity theory and deconstruction allows this type of 
engagement. It is starkly different from the strategic engagement with the concept of violence in order to justify 
its use for the liberation of the marginalised and oppressed that Arendt (1970: 12-20) dismays. It has been 
proposed that Derrida (1997: 112) situates empirical violence on a tertiary level in order to implicate meaning 
and, more specifically, language in the genesis and constitution of empirical violence. However, the violence of 
meaning is not the pure origin of empirical violence. An alternative way of thinking about this relationship is to 
say that where there is empirical violence – that we have identified as such – there is always meaning and 
interpretation. There are competing frames and resultant understandings, and there are entrenched relationships 
or newly created stratification. Meaning enables empirical violence; and empirical violence creates meaning. 
The inclusion of violence in language is not gratuitous postmodern excess. It is also more than an assertion of the 
fact that words can be harmful. Most people would accept this assertion to a lesser or greater extent.  
It goes beyond this assertion because the theorisation of the violence of meaning maintains the possibility that an 
empirical violence that is made invisible or swept aside within a certain frame could still be addressed by 
attending to the violence of the frame itself. No value attributed to empirical violence is final. In cases in which 
violence appears to be unproblematically intolerable such as in the case of genocide, this point does not seem of 
any particular relevance. However, it should be recalled that the understanding of any event, even such a 
viscerally horrifying event as genocide, is seldom unified or sufficiently aware of the need to redress all 
suffering. In the case of empirical violence where the victims are perhaps less ‘innocent’, less likable, less like us 
good citizens, this is all the more important.  
There is much empirical violence that is made invisible by our disdain for its victims. Rape in prisons, for 
example, is not seen as being high on our agenda of social ills that require redress. This is not to say that we 
should, as a global society, spend less time focused on victims with whom it is easier to sympathise. It is, 
however, an argument that all violence in the world, for which we are all responsible, is never acceptable. If we 
do choose to accept it, then it should be understood that acceptance is the same as justification. In the case of 
violence in prisons, the sincere acknowledgement of responsibility for what goes on ‘in there’, or ‘out there’ or 
however we choose to articulate the exteriority of the problem, would radically change how we feel about the 
suffering that persists with our approval. Prisoners are just one group of marginalised persons. The poor, the 
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mentally ill, the different, the strange, the black, the female, the homosexual and all the others whose internal 
difference is erased in order to justify a certain identity and order in which empirical violence goes 
unacknowledged and unaddressed, all these who suffer demand a response. The singularity of empirical violence 
does not transcend the system entirely (Derrida 1997: 112). It cannot be made present within the system either. 
However, we all bear a responsibility to make it meaningful, to draw it into the system, to make it visible to 
address ourselves to the other, provisionally, with humility, but with urgency. 
V. A POLITICAL STRATEGY FROM THE MARGIN FOR THE OTHER  
Two things are absolutely essential to any politics that orients itself from the margin. The first is a celebration of 
international difference, of creolisation; and the second is the adoption and cultivation of an aesthetic attitude. 
Attention to the creolisation is, in practical terms, attention to what is being suppressed with words or with 
physical force, in order to maintain a certain order, structure, law. One must ask what is being marginalised and 
excluded, and which aspects are being sacrificed in the name of a general principle or ideal. For example, in a 
struggle for equal agency and representation for women in South Africa, how much homogenisation of women 
as a group can be tolerated before this homogenisation produces its own empirical violence to the extent that it 
can no longer be tolerated? Do we address gender related violence in domestic relationships – generally 
involving men and questions of masculinity – at the cost of marginalising the interests of lesbian women? Do we 
address the devaluation of blackness in relation to whiteness, by espousing a potentially damaging black pride or 
African Renaissance in this process? We, of course, as Spivak (1990: 109) suggests, tackle these political 
problems strategically. But, we know that strategy cannot save us, and that ultimately, every strategy will 
deconstruct. Given the complexity of social systems, things cannot simply be assumed to be good for everyone, 
everywhere, at all times. History holds a litany of testimonies that suggests the opposite is more likely. 
Those who enforce their need for purity, for purification, clarity and clean lines in matters that involve human 
relations are merchants of violence (Derrida 1988b 119). Utopia contains the seeds of dystopia. Not only do 
utopian visions often require blatant atrocity in order to be instantiated, but their epistemological violence 
obscures their brutality and potentially vitally important internal difference (119). In ethics and politics – 
formulated hyperbolically – “...nothing can be simple, and contamination is a good thing!” (Derrida 2002b: 256). 
It must be acknowledged that utilitarianism has its place, and that the interests of the many, of the majority, must 
also be heard and effected. However, this must be done with care for those excluded by the very idea of the 
majority, for the masses’ suffering certainly does not preclude them from causing others to suffer (39).  
The celebration of creolisation must be accompanied by an aesthetic sensibility. The aesthetic attitude is 
aesthetic in the sense that it attempts to go beyond what it present and to conceptualise, create and instantiate 
what is yet to come. It is also aesthetic in the sense that it attempts to engage with what is excluded in the 
formation of a category, a concept, a narrative or an argument. An aesthetic attitude is one which moves us to the 
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serious business of imagining better futures (Cilliers & Preiser 2010: 291). This requires a turn to the event, 
without a programme and without dogma.  
To proceed without dogma must not be taken as a rejection of all attempts to reach political consensus. 
Agreement can function as a guard against political relativism. Indeed, to elevate violence to this central focus in 
the development of an ethical and political position demands a level of consensus. It is not metaphysically 
guaranteed. However, consensus must always be challenged. One must criticise the rhetoric and categories that 
motivate social change and so interrogate the legitimacy of any transformation or revolution. One cannot give up 
on revolution as such. When one does that, one must also deny a priori the possibility of the event, and thus also 
the possibility of nonviolence (Derrida 2002b: 96). In order to preserve and nurture this possibility, a radical 
politics informed by the acknowledgement of complexity and responsibility for the other must embrace 
creativity, always guided by the commitment to address violence in all its forms. The incarnation of this radical 
politics in a political programme that is yet to be developed and redeveloped future projects. 
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